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NASA NTRS2017

The Potassium-Argon Laser Experiment (KArLE): Design Concepts

The absolute ages of geologic events are fundamental information for understanding the timing and duration of surface processes on planetary bodies. Absolute ages can place a planet's history in the context of the solar system evolution. For example, "when was Mars warm and wet?" is one of the key questions of planetary science. If Mars was warm and wet until 3.7 billion years ago, for instance, it suggests that Mars was still warm and wet when life appeared on Earth. Mars history has been discussed so far based on crater chronology, but the current constraints for Martian chronology models come from the cratering history of the Moon [1]. Moreover, the lunar chronology model itself is fraught with uncertainty because our understanding of lunar chronology is constrained only in a few time periods and itself needs further investigation relating crater-counting ages to absolute ages [2]. Although sample return missions would provide highly accurate radiometric ages of returned samples, they are very expensive and technically challenging. In situ geochronology is highly valuable because they would have larger number of mission opportunities and the capability of iterative measurements for multiple rocks from multiple geologic units. The capability of flight instruments to perform in situ dating is required in the NASA Planetary Science Decadal Survey and the NASA Technology Roadmap. Beagle 2 is the only mission launched to date with the explicit aim to perform in situ potassium-argon (K-Ar) dating [3], but it did not happen because of the communication failure to the spacecraft. The first in situ K-Ar dating on Mars, using SAM and APXS measurements on the Cumberland mudstone [4], yielded an age of 4.21 +/- 0.35 Ga and validated the idea of K-Ar dating on other planets. However, the Curiosity method is not purposebuilt for dating and requires many assumptions that degrade its accuracy. To obtain more accurate and meaningful ages, multiple groups are developing dedicated in situ dating instruments [5-8].

design↗

NASA NTRS2019

Onboard Decision-Making for Nominal and Contingency sUAS Flight

This study presents an onboard decision-making architecture for small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS). The decision-maker is part of NASA's SAFE50 project that is working under the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Technical Capability Level (TCL) 4 to provide autonomous point-to-point UAV flight in BVLOS, high-density urban environments. The decision-maker monitors various metrics to determine the safety and feasibility of the mission and categorizes flight states as Nominal, Off-Nominal, Alternate Land, and Land Now in a finite state machine. Changes in the monitored metrics serve as transitions in the state machine and trigger replanning. Navigation degradation and communication failure are simulated to show the feasibility of the decision-maker framework in appropriately switching the flight state.

Baculi, Joshua↗

NASA NTRS2006

Abnormal/Emergency Situations. Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Emergency and Abnormal Events on the National Airspace System

Access 5 analyzed the differences between UAS and manned aircraft operations under five categories of abnormal or emergency situations: Link Failure, Lost Communications, Onboard System Failures, Control Station Failures and Abnormal Weather. These analyses were made from the vantage point of the impact that these operations have on the US air traffic control system, with recommendations for new policies and procedures included where appropriate.

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NASA NTRS2013

Work Practice Simulation of Complex Human-Automation Systems in Safety Critical Situations: The Brahms Generalized berlingen Model

The transition from the current air traffic system to the next generation air traffic system will require the introduction of new automated systems, including transferring some functions from air traffic controllers to on-board automation. This report describes a new design verification and validation (V&V) methodology for assessing aviation safety. The approach involves a detailed computer simulation of work practices that includes people interacting with flight-critical systems. The research is part of an effort to develop new modeling and verification methodologies that can assess the safety of flight-critical systems, system configurations, and operational concepts. The 2002 Ueberlingen mid-air collision was chosen for analysis and modeling because one of the main causes of the accident was one crew's response to a conflict between the instructions of the air traffic controller and the instructions of TCAS, an automated Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System on-board warning system. It thus furnishes an example of the problem of authority versus autonomy. It provides a starting point for exploring authority/autonomy conflict in the larger system of organization, tools, and practices in which the participants' moment-by-moment actions take place. We have developed a general air traffic system model (not a specific simulation of Überlingen events), called the Brahms Generalized Ueberlingen Model (Brahms-GUeM). Brahms is a multi-agent simulation system that models people, tools, facilities/vehicles, and geography to simulate the current air transportation system as a collection of distributed, interactive subsystems (e.g., airports, air-traffic control towers and personnel, aircraft, automated flight systems and air-traffic tools, instruments, crew). Brahms-GUeM can be configured in different ways, called scenarios, such that anomalous events that contributed to the Überlingen accident can be modeled as functioning according to requirements or in an anomalous condition, as occurred during the accident. Brahms-GUeM thus implicitly defines a class of scenarios, which include as an instance what occurred at Überlingen. Brahms-GUeM is a modeling framework enabling "what if" analysis of alternative work system configurations and thus facilitating design of alternative operations concepts. It enables subsequent adaption (reusing simulation components) for modeling and simulating NextGen scenarios. This project demonstrates that BRAHMS provides the capacity to model the complexity of air transportation systems, going beyond idealized and simple flights to include for example the interaction of pilots and ATCOs. The research shows clearly that verification and validation must include the entire work system, on the one hand to check that mechanisms exist to handle failures of communication and alerting subsystems and/or failures of people to notice, comprehend, or communicate problematic (unsafe) situations; but also to understand how people must use their own judgment in relating fallible systems like TCAS to other sources of information and thus to evaluate how the unreliability of automation affects system safety. The simulation shows in particular that distributed agents (people and automated systems) acting without knowledge of each others' actions can create a complex, dynamic system whose interactive behavior is unexpected and is changing too quickly to comprehend and control.

complex systems↗

NASA NTRS1987

Reliable communication in the presence of failures

The design and correctness of a communication facility for a distributed computer system are reported on. The facility provides support for fault-tolerant process groups in the form of a family of reliable multicast protocols that can be used in both local- and wide-area networks. These protocols attain high levels of concurrency, while respecting application-specific delivery ordering constraints, and have varying cost and performance that depend on the degree of ordering desired. In particular, a protocol that enforces causal delivery orderings is introduced and shown to be a valuable alternative to conventional asynchronous communication protocols. The facility also ensures that the processes belonging to a fault-tolerant process group will observe consistant orderings of events affecting the group as a whole, including process failures, recoveries, migration, and dynamic changes to group properties like member rankings. A review of several uses for the protocols is the ISIS system, which supports fault-tolerant resilient objects and bulletin boards, illustrates the significant simplification of higher level algorithms made possible by our approach.

Birman, Kenneth P.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Virtually-synchronous communication based on a weak failure suspector

Failure detectors (or, more accurately Failure Suspectors (FS)) appear to be a fundamental service upon which to build fault-tolerant, distributed applications. This paper shows that a FS with very weak semantics (i.e., that delivers failure and recovery information in no specific order) suffices to implement virtually-synchronous communication (VSC) in an asynchronous system subject to process crash failures and network partitions. The VSC paradigm is particularly useful in asynchronous systems and greatly simplifies building fault-tolerant applications that mask failures by replicating processes. We suggest a three-component architecture to implement virtually-synchronous communication: (1) at the lowest level, the FS component; (2) on top of it, a component (2a) that defines new views; and (3) a component (2b) that reliably multicasts messages within a view. The issues covered in this paper also lead to a better understanding of the various membership service semantics proposed in recent literature.

Schiper, Andre↗

NASA NTRS1984

Communication on the Flight Deck

The importance of good verbal communication by airplane crews is discussed. The common understanding of what it takes to fly a plane serves the communication and coordination. It is shown that accidents and incidents often are a result of failure to communicate. People's conceptions of what they are doing effect performance of a task and communication about performance of that task. It is known that if what they are doing is complex, they must find a simple framework to represent it to avoid being overwhelmed by complexity. A model that reduces the complexity of flying a jet to a representation composed of a few relatively independent dimensions which capture the major features of this task was developed. The model allows assessment of what crew members know, to look at actual performance, and to develop training recommendations.

Siesfeld, A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

An Autonomous Distributed Fault-Tolerant Local Positioning System

We describe a fault-tolerant, GPS-independent (Global Positioning System) distributed autonomous positioning system for static/mobile objects and present solutions for providing highly-accurate geo-location data for the static/mobile objects in dynamic environments. The reliability and accuracy of a positioning system fundamentally depends on two factors; its timeliness in broadcasting signals and the knowledge of its geometry, i.e., locations and distances of the beacons. Existing distributed positioning systems either synchronize to a common external source like GPS or establish their own time synchrony using a scheme similar to a master-slave by designating a particular beacon as the master and other beacons synchronize to it, resulting in a single point of failure. Another drawback of existing positioning systems is their lack of addressing various fault manifestations, in particular, communication link failures, which, as in wireless networks, are increasingly dominating the process failures and are typically transient and mobile, in the sense that they typically affect different messages to/from different processes over time.

Mahyar R Malekpour↗

DOE OSTI2025

Evidence of Completion of Milestone 4: Simulation Testbed Validated with Experimental Data

Milestone 4 is given in the SOPO as being due in quarter 5 (ending 9/11/2020) and is described thus: Milestone 4: Enhanced Simulation Testbed Validated with Experimental Data (UM, Mathieu) Simulation testbed validated with data obtained from experimental testbed, specifically, nonlinear load behaviors and communication network issues observed in the experimental testbed will be modeled in the simulation testbed. The simulation testbed should accurately capture TCL real and reactive power consumption (including during extreme events associated with nonlinear behaviors and communication network failures) to within 5% RMSE error with respect to data obtained from the experimental testbed.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS1964

Research on failure free systems quarterly report no. 3, 20 apr. - 20 jul. 1964

Failure free electronic systems - statistical quality measurement, adaptive voter, failure responsive system organizations, and medium communication

SYSTEM FAILURE↗

NASA NTRS1972

Auxiliary engine digital interface unit (DIU)

This auxiliary propulsion engine digital unit controls both the valving of the fuel and oxidizer to the engine combustion chamber and the ignition spark required for timely and efficient engine burns. In addition to this basic function, the unit is designed to manage it's own redundancy such that it is still operational after two hard circuit failures. It communicates to the data bus system several selected information points relating to the operational status of the electronics as well as the engine fuel and burning processes.

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NASA NTRS1986

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1

The findings of the Commission regarding the circumstances surrounding the Challenger accident are reported and recommendations for corrective action are outlined. All available mission data, subsequent tests, and wreckage analyses were reviewed and specific failure scenarios were developed. The Commission concluded that the cause of the Mission 51-L accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reuse, processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading. In addition to analyzing the material causes of the accident, the Commission examined the chain of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that the decision making process was flawed in several ways including (1) failure in communication resulting in a launch decision based on incomplete and misleading information, (2) a conflict between engineering data and management judgements, and (3) a NASA management structure that permitted flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.

Rogers, W. P.↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Multiple Model Based Approach for Deep Space Power System Fault Diagnosis

Improving protection and health management capabilities onboard the electrical power system (EPS) for spacecraft is essential for ensuring safe and reliable conditions for deep space human exploration. Electrical protection and control technologies on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) current human space platform relies heavily on ground support to monitor and diagnose power systems and failures. As communication bandwidth diminishes for deep space applications, a transformation in system monitoring and control becomes necessary to maintain high reliability of electric power service. This paper presents a novel approach for on-line power system security monitoring for autonomous deep space spacecraft.

Autonomous Power Controller↗

NASA NTRS2009

Design and Verification of a Distributed Communication Protocol

The safety of remotely operated vehicles depends on the correctness of the distributed protocol that facilitates the communication between the vehicle and the operator. A failure in this communication can result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle. To complicate matters, the communication system may be required to satisfy several, possibly conflicting, requirements. The design of protocols is typically an informal process based on successive iterations of a prototype implementation. Yet distributed protocols are notoriously difficult to get correct using such informal techniques. We present a formal specification of the design of a distributed protocol intended for use in a remotely operated vehicle, which is built from the composition of several simpler protocols. We demonstrate proof strategies that allow us to prove properties of each component protocol individually while ensuring that the property is preserved in the composition forming the entire system. Given that designs are likely to evolve as additional requirements emerge, we show how we have automated most of the repetitive proof steps to enable verification of rapidly changing designs.

Munoz, Cesar A.↗

NASA NTRS1939

Full-Scale Wind-Tunnel Investigation of Wing-Cooling Ducts Effects of Propeller Slipstream, Special Report

Nickle, F. R.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Autonomous Assessment and Predictive Capabilities for Low-Altitude Urban Flight Operations

The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace will introduce new vehicle types, technologies, and operational paradigms for which safety must be maintained and hazards mitigated. One approach is to attempt to design for possible hazards and unsafe incidents that can occur at different phases of flight (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight) and during ground operations. Another is to mitigate safety incidents by implementing changes to policies, procedures, regulations, and design to cover personnel, equipment, and aircraft during operations. These and other techniques, not described herein, are typically conservative or adhoc in that they reduce the likelihood of risk after safety incidents have occurred. In this work, the goal is to develop a more predictive capability to monitor and mitigate risk and hazards to safety “in-time” enough for decisions to be made. In line with NASA’s Aeronautics Mission Directorate Strategic Thrust 5 [1] (In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance), the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project under which this work falls, is developing and demonstrating innovative and safety-oriented solutions that enable modernization and aviation transformation. To that effect, this work will detail data-driven efforts on the SWS project to develop a number of safety-critical services for in-time monitoring and mitigation of hazards to low-altitude flight operations. First, hazards to these operations are identified based on previous work by NASA [2,3] and others in the aerospace industry. These hazards include (i) unsafe proximity to other vehicles, property, and people on the ground, (ii) critical system failures such as communication signal/GPS loss, unexpected propulsion system degradation, engine/power failure, and (iii) operational/environmental issues such as severe weather and gusty winds. For these hazards, safety metrics, which can be quantified and assessed are defined, models to monitor and predict them are developed, and flight test data is generated to develop, validate, and test these models, considering the complex interplay of the different hazards that define them [4-6]. In addition, the uncertainty in the non-deterministic effects that cannot be modeled nor predicted and unknown unknowns that arise after design/testing and during operations must be handled in rigorous manner. As a result, for each of the developed safety metrics, their dependencies on one another are characterized and a framework for handling the uncertainties inherent in the modeling, algorithms, and measurements required for prediction is also developed [7]. To that effect, this presentation will describe the safety metrics and services already developed and underway under the System-Wide Safety project that utilize data-driven techniques for the identification of anomalies, precursors, and trends (APTs) to monitor and mitigate hazards to safety, in-time, for urban flight operations in low-altitude airspace.

Okolo, Wendy A.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Ayame/PAM-D apogee kick motor nozzle failure analysis

The failure of two communication satellites during firing sequence were examined. The correlation/comparison of the circumstances of the Ayame incidents and the failure of the STAR 48 (DM-2) motor are reviewed. The massive nozzle failure of the AKM to determine the impact on spacecraft performance is examined. It is recommended that a closer watch is kept on systems techniques,

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