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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Accelerating Nuclear Facility Mission Completion Through an Improved Chemical Hazard Control Strategy - 20460

Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management [1], explicitly identifies hazardous materials in addition to radioactive materials when establishing the scope of materials that must be evaluated in Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. This inclusion has led to a near decade-long progression of more and more rigorous application of chemical hazard controls in these facilities. The progressive addition of more rigorous chemical hazard controls has occurred across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex, having been driven by contractors and regulators alike. However, chemical hazards in other DOE facilities have been, and continue to be, controlled using traditional industrial safety centered strategies. Thus, identical chemical hazards are controlled using dramatically different approaches based solely on the facility type. Not only are the controls different, the analysis and derivation rigor and requirements are also significantly different. In particular, chemical control derivation and application in non-nuclear facilities are much less onerous than the comprehensive hazard analysis process used in nuclear facilities, even in circumstances in which chemicals are not initiators to, or do not exacerbate a nuclear event. While the derivation and control approaches used in these two types of facilities are disparate, the safety results are similarly effective based on a review of reported chemical events from 2014 through 2018. While both approaches achieve comparable safety outcomes, the approach used in nuclear facilities results in significantly greater preparation costs and implementation costs. Furthermore, the problem with the differing approach is not relegated to the control preparation and implementation burden. The operational impact of potentially unnecessary controls slows mission completion without a corresponding increase in safety, not to mention the dilution of the importance of Technical Safety Requirements. The proposed solution must first include a critical and thorough examination of DOE Complex and top-tier chemical industry chemical hazard control practices, coupled with a similar examination of the driving facility regulatory requirements. Results from the examination can then be used to fuel a bold departure from current chemical control practices in Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. Development of an improved and consistent chemical hazard control process would follow, one that continues to ensure safety while accelerating mission completion and significantly reducing the burden associated with chemical hazard control development and implementation. The improved process must establish a hierarchy where radiological hazards are addressed using safety class and safety significant controls and chemical hazards are addressed using overarching safety management programs (with limited unique exceptions). The improved Hazard Category 1,2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy, while compliant with 10 CFR 830 [1], would be founded on the requirements in 10 CFR 851, Worker Safety and Health Program [2], and the complementary DOE O 151.1D, Comprehensive Emergency Management System [3]. In this way, the Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facility chemical hazard control strategy would, wherever appropriate, be the same process used at other DOE Complex facilities. Ultimately, the improved process will maintain safety and significantly reduce costs and life cycle risk through faster mission completion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

TA-55 building entrusted with more plutonium capability: What does it mean for the mission?

The first floor of the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building at TA-55, known as RLUOB (roo-lob) or Plutonium Facility-400 (PF-400), will soon become a bustling and dynamic space as employees and programs increase their work scope thanks to the new hazard category 3 designation. On Feb. 7, NNSA gave the final stamp of approval designating RLUOB as a hazard category 3 (HC-3) nuclear facility. RLUOB has been designated as a radiological facility (less than HC-3) since 2013, when the first phase of RLUOB Equipment Installation was completed. HC-3 is a level up in facility hazard category, a major effort to support the national security mission.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

CATMoS: Collaborative Acute Toxicity Modeling Suite

Background: Humans are exposed to tens of thousands of chemical substances that need to be assessed for their potential toxicity. Acute systemic toxicity testing serves as the basis for regulatory hazard classification, labeling, and risk management. However, it is cost- and time-prohibitive to evaluate all new and existing chemicals using traditional rodent acute toxicity tests. In silico models built using existing data facilitate rapid acute toxicity predictions without using animals. Objectives: The U.S. Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative Methods Acute Toxicity Workgroup organized an international collaboration to develop in silico models for predicting acute oral toxicity based on five different endpoints: LD50 value, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency hazard categories, Globally Harmonized System for Classification and Labelling hazard categories, very toxic chemicals (LD50 =50 mg/kg), and non-toxic chemicals (LD50 >2000 mg/kg). Methods: An acute oral toxicity data inventory for 11,992 chemicals was compiled, split into training and evaluation sets, and made available to 35 participating international research groups that submitted a total of 139 predictive models. Predictions that fell within the applicability domains of the submitted models were evaluated using external validation sets. These were then combined into consensus models to leverage strengths of individual approaches. Results: The resulting consensus predictions, which leverage the collective strengths of each individual model, form the Collaborative Acute Toxicity Modeling Suite (CATMoS). CATMoS demonstrated high performance in terms of accuracy and robustness when compared to in vivo results. Discussion: CATMoS is being evaluated by regulatory agencies for its utility and applicability as a potential replacement for in vivo rat acute oral toxicity studies. CATMoS predictions for over 800,000 chemicals have been made available via the NTP’s Integrated Chemical Environment. The models are also implemented in a free, standalone open-source tool, OPERA, which allows predictions of new and untested chemicals to be made.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2021

Uranium Prototype Glovebox and Furnace Design and Build (SPC-2954)

This specification contains the requirements for design, analysis, fabrication, testing and delivery of the Uranium Prototype Glovebox (UPG) and Furnace, and the associated equipment as described herein. The UPG will be primarily used for the containment of uranium and the prototyping of equipment to be used in higher hazard category gloveboxes. This will allow complex pieces of equipment to be tested in a less hazardous environment prior to fabrication and installation in other gloveboxes.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

NSUF Rad-AFM: Nanoscale Material Property Measurements of Radioactive Materials

Many advances in our understanding of radiation induced damage mechanisms are due to imaging techniques including transmission electron microscopy and scanning electron microscopy. However, the effect of these radiation induced defects characterized on the atomic to micrometer scale are often interpreted by changes in bulk material properties measured in the hundreds of microns to cm scale. In order to bridge this gap, additional tools need to be developed for use with radioactive materials. To this end a new Asylum Infinity multimodal atomic force microscope (AFM) has been added to the library of Nuclear Science User Facility (NSUF) instruments for use on radioactive materials. This instrument is housed in the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory (RPL) which is a Department of Energy Hazard Category II Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility operated by Battelle at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This allows for the handling, sample preparation, and characterization of highly radioactive materials providing a unique capability to understand fundamental properties of nuclear materials and the effects of radiation induced damage.

Riechers, Shawn L.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Detritiation Strategies for Mitigating Tritium Releases

Tritium confinement is performed using different barriers to minimize releases to the environment. Primary confinement is usually performed by process piping and components, secondary confinement typically by inerted gloveboxes connected to a continuously operating tritium stripper system. Some facility designs employ tertiary tritium confinement by using process room confinement with a tritium stripper system activated after an accident to further mitigate tritium releases to the environment. Secondary confinement of some tritium systems such as radiation-hardened or shielded-cell enclosures are not easily achieved using designs for inerted glovebox. These enclosures can be challenging to seal for secondary tritium confinement due to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) needs for temperature control, as well as feedthroughs for equipment and instrumentation, are potential pathways for tritium leaks or loses. Additional tritium leak paths can be created in secondary confinement enclosures due to a Design Basis Accident (DBA) seismic event. These new, larger tritium leak rates from the DBA event are usually not part of the stripper system design basis so all tritium released to the secondary confinement enclosure is assumed released to the environment. Detritiation strategies for shielded enclosures and/or gloveboxes with significant leak rates are necessary to minimize off-site radiological dose consequences. To address this, the relationship between the confinement system leak rate and stripper system (recirculating) flow rate was evaluated to meet prescribed maximum allowable environmental tritium emissions from the event. The simple analysis described assumes a constant leak rate from the confinement system (i.e. shielded enclosure or glovebox) while a recirculating stripper system strips tritium from the system– a competition between tritium release and tritium recovery. At a high level, the resulting expression summarizes the relationship between system leak rate (F L ) and stripper flow rate (F S ) relative to allowable tritium release (Q A ) and initial tritium release (Q 0 ): $\frac{F_L}{F_s}$ ≈ $\frac{Q_A}{Q_0}$. This report derives the relationship between these parameters, examines the impact of finite stripping times followed by purging of the stripped volume. The analysis provides example results for up to 30 gram tritium releases: the maximum tritium inventory of a Hazard Category III (Department of Energy) Nuclear Facility. The detritiation model presented represents a high-level analysis of tritium recovery versus losses for “leaky” confinement enclosures such as shielded cells after large tritium releases. Key parameters for doing the analyses are the system leak rate, stripper flow rate, initial tritium release, and allowable tritium release values. The analyses show a proportional decrease in releases with reduction in initial tritium release but a non-linear increase in tritium recovery with increased stripper flow rate or reduced leak-rate. The analyses also apply to glovebox confinement systems which could have significant increases in leak rates after a DBA. The analysis recognizes but does not include tritium absorption followed by re-emission from the walls of the confinement volume – an analysis which could be pursued in future studies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Conservative Release Fraction Correlation for Spray Releases

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) is planning to conduct repairs in the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF), and prior to conducting this work they will re-evaluate the hazard category designation for LERF. As part of this evaluation, WRPS needs estimates of the release fraction of potential accidental sprays, because a spray release is a potential bounding accident. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory previously developed a conservative correlation for the cumulative generation rate (volume per time) of aerosol droplets less than or equal to specific sizes from spray releases as a function of the spray pressure, orifice area, and droplet diameter. To obtain release fraction estimates from the conservative generation rate correlation, the correlation needs to be recast by dividing the aerosol generation rate by the flow rate of a spray. In the current study, a conservative release fraction correlation was developed from the conservative aerosol generation rate correlation developed previously by dividing the generation rate correlation by the flow rate of a spray using an orifice flow rate equation and then this correlation was adjusted to be conservative. Test data were also extrapolated to a lower pressure than the lowest pressure tested (100 psig) for the spray data used for developing the previous conservative generation rate correlation. The new conservative release fraction correlation was then used to predict release fractions of respirable droplets (droplets = 10 µm) for four specific pipes that are part of LERF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Technical analysis of filter testing at the U.S. Department of Energy Filter Test Facility

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard DOE-STD-3020-2015 requires verification testing at the Filter Test Facility (FTF) of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to be installed in nuclear facility (Hazard Category 1, 2, 3, and radiological facilities) confinement ventilation systems, or to be installed in habitability systems (e.g., filters for protection of workers required to act for the control and mitigation of emergency situations). Filters in these applications perform a safety function in accident situations, are designated as important to safety, or are necessary for habitability systems. Different FTFs have operated for decades, and results of tests are available to examine the need for and benefits of continued execution of 100 percent QA verification testing. The objective of this study and resulting report was to assess the need for 100 percent QA testing at the current FTF in Maryland, based on an examination of a database of test results from 2013 to August 2020. Filters that require independent testing per DOE-STD-3020-2015 to be installed in nuclear facilities are sent to the FTF before being shipped to the facilities. The FTF examines the documentation (e.g., certificates of compliance, results of particle penetration and airflow resistance testing by the manufacturers, labels affixed to filters and packages, and other requirements specified in purchase orders by the nuclear facility operators), implements visual inspections of the physical state of the filters, and checks the dimensions of frames. Filters that meet the documentation and visual inspection requirements are subjected to particle penetration and airflow resistance testing. In case of rejections, the filters are shipped back to the manufacturers, at the cost of the manufacturers, for replacement. Filters that pass all tests are shipped to the nuclear facilities.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2023

Mean Time to Failure Analysis for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Tritium Containment Vessels

The Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility located in Technical Area 16 (TA-16) of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Tritium related research, development, and processing in support of stockpile stewardship program activities is conducted at WETF. Within WETF, various devices can be used to contain tritium and certain devices are designated as Tritium Containment Vessels (TCVs). Several different device types are identified as TCVs within WETF such as LP-50s and AL-M1s. Historically, a threshold tritium mass value has been used as the mechanism for designating a device as a TCV. When the tritium content of the device was below the tritium mass threshold it was not considered to be a TCV in the formal context. When the tritium content was above the administrative threshold, the device was considered to be a TCV. An upper tritium mass limit was also established for TCVs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory Glenn T. Seaborg Institute: 2025 highlights

The Glenn T. Seaborg Institute (GTSI) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) serves as a dedicated hub for advancing actinide R&D, aimed at strengthening the United States’ capabilities in actinide science. With a focus on medical, industrial, and national security applications, the ORNL GTSI seeks to foster the next generation of scientists and engineers. Collaborating closely with corresponding Seaborg Institutes at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Idaho National Laboratory, the ORNL GTSI leverages its unique strengths. These include unparalleled expertise in isotope production, handling of rare isotopes, and leadership in neutron and computational sciences. Notably, the ORNL GTSI is positioned as the nation’s cornerstone for actinide R&D, capitalizing on the exceptional capabilities of the High Flux Isotope Reactor—the premier reactor for isotope production—and the Hazard Category 2 Radiochemical Engineering Development Center, which supports advanced production, processing, and applications research. Furthermore, the GTSI is committed to serving as a national center of excellence for training across all levels of actinide science education. This report provides an overview of the activities, milestones, and accomplishments of the ORNL GTSI over the past year.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Supporting Fusion at the Idaho National Laboratory

The Fusion Safety Program at Idaho National Laboratory has supported efforts to develop magnetic and inertial confinement fusion energy devices for commercial energy power development since 1979. In addition to our DOE less than hazard category 3 tritium handling facility STAR, we also have unique capabilities such as an adaptation of the severe accident code MELCOR developed specifically for fusion, and integrated modeling capabilities using the MOOSE Finite Element Code. In this presentation, we cover our unique experimental capabilities for investigating tritium sorption, solubility and permeation including in molten salts. We also show the application of MELCOR-TMAP to predict thermal hydraulics and tritium migration in normal and accident conditions. Finally, we demonstrate high-fidelity modeling capabilities found within the open-source MOOSE finite element framework as well as fuel-cycle modeling using TMAP8.

70 - PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Radiological Dose Consequence Modeling Parameters for Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

To assure consistency between DOE and NRC safety basis requirements this ECAR documents the DOE basis requirements for dose consequence assessments in accordance with Standard DOE-STD-3009-2014. The methodology in this ECAR outlines parameters for evaluating airborne radiological releases and provides a consistent basis for assessing current and future DOE NE facilities.

73 - NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗