Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Grid Asset Security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Self-Assessment Guide Checklist

This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗
DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Security Constrained Economic Optimization of Photovoltaic and Other Distributed Assets

The rapid growth of distributed energy resources (DERs), especially photovoltaic (PV) systems, has introduced new complexities in maintaining grid reliability, stability, and cost-effective operation. This project addresses these challenges by developing and demonstrating a scalable GridOS Distributed Energy Resource Management System (DERMS) that enables secure, real-time optimization and control of DERs at the distribution feeder level.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Workshop Report: Rural Electric Cooperative Distributed Energy Resource Business Model Development Workshops

The United States' energy future is being shaped by decades of technology innovation, rapidly changing consumer requirements, and governmental focus on securing reliable, low-cost energy sources. With expanded electrification and increased emphasis on grid reliability coupled with the heightened complexity and risks associated with transmission infrastructure, the use of distributed energy resources (DERs) is more commonly being considered a safe, efficient, and cost-effective way to maintain grid resilience and reliability. Amidst improvements in performance, decreasing costs, and unprecedented federal policy support for DERs, electric cooperatives are considering new opportunities to use these assets to ensure secure and reliable operations for millions of customers. In light of these developments, a series of workshops were held to collaborate on the development of business models for DERs in rural electric cooperative ecosystems. The first workshop was held July 11, 2024, at the Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association Inc. headquarters in Westminster, Colorado (hereafter referred to as the "Tri-State Workshop"). The second workshop was hosted by PNGC Power on Oct. 9, 2024, in Portland, Oregon (hereafter referred to as the "PNGC Power Workshop"). These workshops convened representatives from G&Ts, distribution cooperatives,2 the energy industry, the financial community, the U.S. government, national and regional organizations, and national laboratories to share perspectives on the unique needs, challenges, and opportunities that they face as DERs are further integrated into the grid. The workshops were designed to address the following objectives: (1) develop the enabling attributes of electric cooperative DER business models, (2) explore pathways for generating community benefits from these assets, and (3) identify technical challenges and market risks for DERs in rural electric cooperative service territories. This report outlines key findings and major themes identified by workshop participants that federal agencies, G&Ts, distribution cooperatives, and other entities can consider to advance electric cooperative DER business models.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Developing a Framework for Valuation of Grid Services

The electric system is rapidly evolving and growing, raising new questions about how to define and value grid services delivered by a diverse set of resources, including customer-owned assets. This report advances a service–parameter–value framework that links what a grid service does to why it matters, and how its benefits are evidenced. We build upon prior efforts (Bender et al. 2021) and extend them to include value categories (reliability, resilience, cost & access, and security) with primary and secondary tiers, service-specific value streams that explain how benefits materialize, and metrics that make valuation traceable and comparable. We apply the framework to the six core grid services defined in (Kolln et al. 2023): Frequency Response, Regulation, Reserves, Energy, Voltage Management, and Blackstart and demonstrate it on three use cases to highlight the adaptability of these value streams. Further, we outline how the framework integrates with existing tools such as asset optimization, hosting capacity and cost-benefit analysis, and propose a path to portable qualifications and consistent stacking rules for use in tariffs and filings. Finally, we identify future pathways for research and application research needs to support standardization and decision-ready comparisons across services, assets, and architectures.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

From Bricks to Clicks: Mapping the White Space in Building Innovation

It is a critical national imperative to transform the buildings sector, yet innovation is impeded by deployment failures that leave promising technologies stranded. Conventional market reports and techno-economic analysis provide an insufficient understanding of markets and resource allocation for emerging building technologies. They omit crucial commercialization factors such as ecosystem maturity and adoption friction, where the coordinated participation of a network of suppliers, contractors, financiers, regulators, and integrators is required to scale solutions. This study addresses these gaps by introducing an evaluation framework grounded in front-line data from six years of the DOE's IMPEL incubator, comprising experience from 300 building-sector innovators and the adjacent, complex ecosystem. Our methodology synthesizes top-down market analysis with bottom-up, practitioner-level data across five megatrends: (M1) Affordable materials and industrialized construction; (M2) Healthy and efficient mechanical systems; (M3) Intelligent building operations; (M4) Buildings as grid assets; and (M5) High-density power and cooling for data centers and therein identify twelve "white space" technology opportunities. Next, we develop a multi-criteria scoring rubric to rank these opportunities based on parameters, i.e., Affordability, Quality of Life, Reliability, and Security, yielding composite ‘Demand’ and ‘Maturity’ indices. Our results indicate that the most significant white spaces may not be incremental products but a new class of ‘Ecosystem Enablers’, such as logistics platforms, orchestration layers, and automated compliance software that solve structural deployment gaps. This paper summarizes this transparent, evidence-based, practitioner-informed evaluation framework for policymakers and investors to re-evaluate policy and resource allocation and unlock scalable market transformation.

Singh, Reshma↗
DOE OSTI2025

Blockchain Research and Development Activities Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and Utility Sector

This article provides an in-depth analysis of blockchain research in the energy sector, focusing on projects funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and comparing them with industry-funded initiatives. A total of 110 funded activities within the U.S. power industry were successfully tracked and mapped into a newly developed categorization framework. This framework is designed to help research agencies to systematically understand their funded portfolio. Such characterization is expected to help them make effective investments, identify research gaps, measure impact, and advance technological progress to meet national goals. In line with this need, the proposed framework proposes a 2-D categorization matrix to systematically classify blockchain efforts within the energy sector.Under the proposed framework, the Energy System Domain serves as the primary classification dimension, categorizing use cases into 30 distinct applications. The second dimension, Blockchain Properties, captures the specific needs and functionalities provided by Blockchain technology. The aim was to capture blockchain’s applicability and functionality: where and why blockchain? Principles behind the selection of the viewpoint dimensions were carefully defined based on consensus obtained through the Blockchain for Optimized Security and Energy Management (BLOSEM) project. The mapped results show that activities within the Grid Automation, Coordination, and Control (31.8%), Marketplaces and Trading (25.5%), Foundational Blockchain Research (19.1%), and Supply Chain Management (17.3%) domains have been actively pursued to date. The three leading specific use case applications were identified as Transactive Energy Management for Marketplaces and Trading, Asset Management for Supply Chain Management, and Fundamental Blockchain for Foundational Blockchain Research. The Marketplaces and Trading and Retail Services Enablement domains stood out as being favored by industry by a factor greater than 2 (2.3 and 2.6, respectively), yet there seemed to be little to zero investment from DOE. Approximately 76% of the total projects prioritized Immutability, Identity Management, and Decentralization and/or Disintermediation compared to Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization, Automation, and Privacy and/or Anonymity. The greatest discrepancies between DOE and industry were in Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization and Automation. The industry efforts (36% in Asset Digitization/Tokenization and 22% in Automation) was 14 times and 2.4 times, respectively, more intensive than the DOE-sponsored efforts, indicating a significant discrepancy in industry versus government priorities. Overall, quantifying DOE-sponsored projects and industry activities through mapping provides clarity on portfolio investments and opportunities for future research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2014

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Flexible Demand [Slides]

This briefing presents some prior work on security needs for virtual power plants (VPPs). This presentation introduces virtual power plants (VPPs) and discusses why they are an emerging participant in our power grid. We will look at several examples where they have been critical for grid reliability. We will then take a dive into some of the risks associated with wide-area digital coordination of VPP assets, and finally conclude with an outlook on what's next.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

ARIES Annual Report FY25

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) test bed for energy system demonstration and de-risking. ARIES comprises the largest collection of physical and digital assets in the DOE laboratory complex, supporting flexible configuration across a broad range of energy scenarios. In Fiscal Year 2025, ARIES provided a platform for system-level research to anticipate and address future energy needs in energy security, system reliability, and technology deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

EVs-at-RISC: A Secure and Resilient Interoperable SCM Control System Architecture for Electric Vehicle’s-at-Scale (Final Technical Report)

The EVs-at-RISC project was a five-year research, development, and demonstration initiative to create foundational tools for utility-scale fleet aggregation and Smart Charge Management (SCM) of Electric Vehicles (EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), and related Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Rather than seeking to develop and demonstrate highly perfected SCM algorithms and control strategies, this project instead focused on creating foundational software solutions that enable unprecedented digital interoperability across the communications technologies and vendor platforms used to manage EV , EVCI, and DER, as well as existing energy management infrastructure operated by utilities, grid operators, and aggregators. This project then extends these novel interoperability capabilities to develop and deploy powerful middleware abstractions across grid edge networks and EVCI/DER fleet aggregations incorporating modern software tools and best practices, such as CI/CD, to bring the immense capabilities of infrastructure-as-code and policy-as-code to modern grid edge network environments. This addresses the foremost systemic issues preventing realization of any net operational benefits from scaled deployment of behind-the-meter EV, EVCI, and DER assets in electric power grids and markets today. The results of this approach and project unlock massive potential for new SCM capabilities to be easily prototyped, evaluated, and deployed at-scale within the existing grid edge network infrastructure and EVCI/DER technology ecosystem. The EVs-at-RISC project achieves this by extending Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB), a conceptual model for digital interoperability and distributed intelligence in traditional front-of-meter utility SCADA networks, validating our hypothesis that OpenFMB could be similarly used to solve systemic digital interoperability issues in behind-the-meter environments and unlock real-world utility-scale SCM capabilities without requiring any new proprietary vendor solutions or significant infrastructure reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

CyberMESA: Evaluation Procedures and Metrics for Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A report detailing the cybersecurity evaluation and assessment procedures for EV charging infrastructure. This report is authored by three national lab contributors. INL, PNNL, NRL. The grid integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI) is a large and complex system of systems (SoS) made up of components from many manufacturers and integrated by various companies responsible for their operation and maintenance. This complexity makes it challenging to implement security standards like IEC 62443 across the entire infrastructure. This document aims to aid in the vulnerability assessments of individual devices, such as Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), to support vendors in adopting and implementing security standards such as UL 2900, NIST SP 800-53 and Common Criteria (CC) (ISO/IEC 15408). This document serves as a guide to help evaluate the cybersecurity posture of EVCI assets. It aims to provide a consistent method for evaluating EVCI, enabling cybersecurity research teams to systematically test a wide range of electric vehicle (EV) assets. The target audiences include cybersecurity research teams, vendor development teams, automotive OEMs, and third-party evaluators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗