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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Managing Hanford's Direct Feed Low Activity Waste Program - 20002

The Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for the management and completion of the River Protection Project (RPP) mission, which comprises both the Hanford Site tank farms operations and the completion and operation of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project. The RPP mission is to safely retrieve, treat, and immobilize Hanford's high-level and low-activity tank waste and close the tank farms to protect the Columbia River. The Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) Program is a major subset of the overall RPP mission, providing disposition of low-activity waste. The scope is to retrieve, treat, and immobilize the low-activity waste at the Low-Activity Waste Facility. DFLAW will begin operations no later than December 2023. The DFLAW Program overarches a suite of individual projects, activities, and infrastructure upgrades. The major projects and activities include multiple contractors under both ORP and the Richland Operations Office, underscoring the need for effective integration, coordination, and collaboration. The objectives of the DFLAW Program leadership team are to: - Effectively coordinate and integrate the projects that comprise the DFLAW Program - Manage the interfaces between the projects so that the integrated DFLAW Program is completed successfully - Ensure the DFLAW portfolio of projects operate as required without gaps or conflicts at the interfaces. DOE is accomplishing these objectives through a newly established leadership model that integrates the DOE and contractor work streams and promotes a teamwork model to enable collaborative success. Long considered one of the most formidable cleanup challenges at Hanford, the Department of Energy and its contractors are on the verge of achieving a cleanup commitment that has been decades in the making. DOE is preparing to vitrify (turn to glass) Hanford's chemical and radioactive tank waste using the DFLAW process. The Modified Consent Decree milestone for completing hot commissioning of the Hanford Site's Low- Activity Waste Facility is Dec. 31, 2023. While this milestone may seem distant under normal project management circumstances, it is a relatively short period of time for the operational and cultural transformation necessary to successfully begin treating tank waste at Hanford. Direct feed means separating the waste at a tank farm to remove the more radioactive portion (i.e., solids and cesium) so that the resulting low-activity (less radioactive) waste can be fed directly to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's Low-Activity Waste Facility. Starting DFLAW will require a singular, intensive leadership focus, along with a sustained, collective commitment to excellence and teamwork by the Department and its contractors. Major upgrades to Hanford's infrastructure will occur prior to startup. Supporting DFLAW operations requires significant integration between the DFLAW facilities - the Waste Treatment Plant, Hanford's tank farms, effluent treatment facilities, disposal facilities - and between all of the site contractors to achieve success. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Update on Parallel Process Execution in the Next Generation System Analysis Model

As of the end of 2021, 88,880 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) (44,741 MTHM in dry storage; 44,139 MTHM in wet storage) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) were stored at various reactor sites across the United States [1]. The Office of Storage and Transportation in the Department of Energy is planning for the transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). To aid in this effort and inform decision-makers about the backend of the spent fuel cycle, systems analysis tools capable of analyzing the various options with respect to SNF and HLW management are being used as well as continuously improved to meet the evolving needs of the program. System analysts typically use these tools to vary underlying assumptions (shipping rates, allocation priority, available facilities, start dates, etc.) and study the implications of these changes on site clearance schedules, campaign costs, transportation infrastructure acquisition, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Soil Desiccation Treatability Testing at BC Waste Disposal Cribs

During Hanford’s production period, low-level waste products generated from chemical processing of uranium fuel rods were discharged directly to the ground through a system of cribs and trenches located in the 200-BC-1 Operable Unit (OU). The site consists of 6 cribs and 20 trenches that received more than 117,000 m3 of radioactive liquid waste discharged to the soil. These unlined infiltration galleries held volumes of liquid waste while it seeped into the ground, with the understanding that the 100 m (330 ft) thick vadose zone in the area would effectively capture the effluent and prevent groundwater impacts. A conceptual model showing the operation of cribs and trenches is shown in Figure 1. Data show effluent from the 26 cribs and trenches containing about 410 curies of Technetium-99 (Tc-99) is primarily located between 30 m and 70 m (98 ft and 230 ft) depth (Corbin et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2004). Despite no evidence indicating that the contamination has reached the groundwater at BC cribs and trenches, the mobility of Tc-99 had been demonstrated in laboratory tests and was recognized as a threat to groundwater at the site. Using data from numerical models, laboratory analyses, field investigations, and information on historical discharges, the EPA and Ecology identified Tc-99 and U contamination of the vadose zone as a remediation priority. The U.S. DOE was notified by EPA and Ecology regarding risks associated with Tc-99 contamination in a letter requesting development of a strategy for improved methods to understand the nature and extent of vadose zone contamination, specifically Tc-99, and to develop remedial options for addressing such contamination. To develop the appropriate technology for characterizing, remediating, and monitoring the deep vadose zone Tc-99 contamination, the U.S. DOE worked with the EPA and Ecology to create a Treatability Test Plan under a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for the Hanford 200 Areas. Under this RI/FS, it was determined that a treatability test for soil desiccation should be carried out as it was identified as a promising in-situ treatment technology for mitigating risks posed by Tc-99 contamination to the groundwater table. The BC Cribs and Trenches site was identified as a representative site for Tc-99 and U contamination and selected for the soil desiccation treatability test. In this chapter, we summarize the overlying regulatory framework of RI/FS and treatability tests and illustrate how development and experimentation supported the evaluation of selected remedies. We briefly discuss the RI/FS for the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site and focus on the soil desiccation treatability testing performed at the BC cribs and trenches site under the Deep Vadose Zone Treatability Test Plan for the Hanford Central Plateau (DVZ-TT). The DVZ-TT is one component of the remedial investigation/feasibility study for the Hanford 200 Areas and represents the underlying regulatory framework that drives site operations towards records of decision and site closure.

Mangel, Adam R.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hydrogen Transport in a Model 9979 Shipping Package with Inner Convenience Cans

Radiolytic hydrogen production and accumulation inside containment packages is a concern at any facility responsible for their packaging, storage, transportation, and/or disposal. When hydrogen gas accumulates to concentrations above the Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) which is 4% or 40,000 ppm in air, the possibility of a deflagration or explosion increases. This concern persists over the course of the package lifetime which is unlimited when disposed of by burial or in permanent repositories. Here, we report on a numerical model used to predict the concentration of hydrogen within each layer of a Model 9979 package containing a convenience can assembly. Simulations show the hydrogen concentration to always be highest in the inner convenience can containing the radioactive source. When the radioactive source is within the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Packaging Limits, the hydrogen concentration is shown to remain well below the LFL at all times including packaging, storage, transportation, and disposal. A hydrogen transport model is presented for a Model 9979 package system containing a nested arrangement of convenience cans, which are tin oxide coated steel cans of various sizes with a slip-lid assembly. The inner convenience can contains the radioactive source material along with an unknown quantity of incidental water acquired from humid air or processing. While visible organic materials such as paper and plastics were purposely excluded from the inner can, it is not possible to claim the wastes are entirely organic free. The inner convenience can is tape sealed and placed into a plastic bag which is horsetail closed (i.e., twisted and taped). The bagged can is placed into an outer convenience can that is also tape sealed. The can assembly is then placed into the 30 gallon drum and subsequently placed inside the 55 gallon drum in the 9979 package. Here we assume hydrogen gas is produced in the inner convenience can from alpha radiolysis of water at a rate dependent on the quantity of uranium isotopes and water present. The hydrogen transport model was used to calculate hydrogen accumulations within the package’s five layers at different times and conditions. These simulations serve two purposes; (i) to build confidence in the model by comparing predicted values to measured values, and (ii) to check the steady state hydrogen concentrations that are approached at long times in the package’s lifetime. Model simulations were compared to gas samples taken from the 30 gallon drum after storage at LANL’s Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building for around 500 days. Hydrogen concentration calculations over much longer periods (i.e., more than 270 years) included extreme storage durations, transportation at extreme cold temperatures, and disposal of packages assuming different average temperatures.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Aqueous Nitrate Operations in PF-4 [Slides]

Aqueous Processing has evolved since 1978. Recover plutonium from residues: recycle plutonium; waste disposal. Plutonium residues dissolved, purified, precipitated, oxidized. Liquid residues recycled, sent to Rad Liquid Waste, or Cement Fixation. Restart of operation in 2023 after ~10 yr pause.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Used Nuclear Fuel Management Using the Next Generation System Analysis Model

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is leading the National effort to manage the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, encompassing the safe transportation, storage/staging, and/or eventual disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is DOE’s discrete-event, agent-based simulation tool designed to model the full life cycle of UNF from reactor discharge to final disposal. NGSAM supports the DOE Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition by enabling a detailed, scenario-based analysis of logistics, infrastructure, and shipping strategies. NGSAM replaces legacy models with a modern, flexible platform built on Repast Simphony and enhanced by the Process Analysis Tool. NGSAM simulates the movement and interaction of individual fuel assemblies with system components such as canisters, casks, railcars, and facilities. The model integrates with the Java Transportation Operations Model to plan and execute transportation scenarios, supporting both constrained and unconstrained resource allocation. Key features include customizable allocation and acceptance algorithms, detailed facility-level operations, and a Quick Edit tool for rapid scenario adjustments. NGSAM supports multimodal transportation modeling (e.g. rail, road, barge) and provides comprehensive cost, schedule, and infrastructure data. NGSAM utilizes data from sources such as DOE’s STANDARDS UNF database and DOE’s Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation, while also allowing user-defined inputs for scenario customization. NGSAM enables stakeholders to evaluate complex UNF management strategies, assess system performance under varying assumptions, and inform decision making for future infrastructure investments. Its modular architecture and integration with other Integrated Waste Management System tools make it a critical asset for planning the safe and efficient disposition of the Nation’s growing UNF inventory.

Craig, Brian [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)]↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of DWPF Sludge Batch 6 (Macrobatch 7) Pour Stream Glass Samples

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) began processing Sludge Batch 6 (SB6), also referred to as Macrobatch 7 (MB7), in June 2010. SB6 is a blend of the heel of Tank 40 from Sludge Batch 5 (SB5), H-Canyon Np transfers and SB6 that was transferred to Tank 40 from Tank 51. SB6 was processed using Frit 418. During processing of each sludge batch, the DWPF is required to take at least one glass sample to meet the objectives of the Glass Product Control Program and to complete the necessary Production Records so that the final glass product may be disposed of at a Federal Repository. Four pour stream glass samples and two Melter Feed Tank (MFT) slurry samples were collected while processing SB6. The samples were transferred to the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) where they were analyzed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI1989

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI1989

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 1, January-March 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 International Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety: NUCSAFE 88 by A. P. Malinauskas and J. G. Pruett; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 18 Chernobyl Today: State of Research by A. Yu. Gagarinskii; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 23 Problems Associated with Routine In-Plant Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Systems at U.S. Light-Water Reactors by Barry G. Wahlig, David M. Walker, Mahmoud R. Ghavi, and John M. Palms; DESIGN FEATURES: 34 Twentieth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference by R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First, 46 Design Options for the Core Support Structure for Liquid-Metal-Cooled Reactor Plants by J. P. Burelbach, W. J. Kann, J. G. Saiveau, and R. W. Seidensticker; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 53 The Radiological Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident by L. V. Konstantinov and A. J. González; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 70 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 80 Fuel Performance Annual Report for 1986 by W. J. Bailey, 103 Safety Considerations Related to 12-Hour Shift Schedules by S. Gould, 105 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 108 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 130 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 140 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 145 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 153 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 69 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 79 International Seminar on Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, 129 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Short Courses, 152 MIT Offers Summer Short Courses on Reactor Safety and Nodal Analysis, 152 Seminar on Use of PCs in Probabilistic Safety Analysis, 157 The Authors, 160 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 29.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Numerical study of the chemo-mechanical behavior of FEBEX bentonite in nuclear waste disposal based on the Barcelona expansive model

Experimental studies show that compacted bentonite used as a backfill material for nuclear waste repository experiences strong coupling between chemical and mechanical processes. Here, we use a dual-structure expansive soil model, referred to as the Barcelona Expansive Model (BExM), to predict the behavior of bentonite buffer in subsurface emplacement tunnels for high-level radioactive waste. After emplacement, the bentonite is subjected to complex and coupled Thermal-Hydraulic-Mechanical-Chemical (THMC) processes. The BExM constitutive model is implemented in a multi-phase reactive transport and geomechanics simulator, TOUGHREACT-FLAC3D, and the model is verified with one benchmark test on FEBEX bentonite. We utilize a one-way Chemo-Mechanical (C-M) coupling approach, in which chemical changes affect the mechanical behavior of bentonite through the BExM linked with the evolution of mass fraction of smectite, exchangeable cation concentration, and ionic strength via osmotic suction. The parameters of the new coupled model for FEBEX bentonite are calibrated against a series of laboratory experiments with various salinity solutions. Finally, coupled THMC modeling is conducted for a generic argillite repository with bentonite buffer under high temperature, focusing on the long-term chemical change and its effect on the mechanical process.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Update on Parallel Process Execution in the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM)

As of the end of 2022, it is estimated that over 90,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) were stored at various commercial nuclear power reactor sites (both operating and shutdown) across the United States [1]. The Office of Storage and Transportation within the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy is planning for the transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). To aid in this effort and inform decision-makers about the backend of the spent fuel cycle, systems analysis tools capable of analyzing the various options with respect to SNF and HLW management are being used as well as continuously improved to meet the evolving needs of the program. System analysts typically use these tools to vary underlying assumptions (shipping rates, available facilities, start dates, interim storage capacity, etc.) and study the associated system implications such as timing for clearing sites of SNF, various cost elements, transportation infrastructure acquisition needs, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Planning for Nuclear Power Plant Site Visits - 20481

The U.5. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) is planning for future large-scale transport of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) to eventual disposal and/or storage facilities. As part of its planning efforts, DOE conducts evaluations of removing SNF from nuclear power plant sites. Site visits are a pivotal piece in the site evaluations that are conducted by DOE, and significant planning efforts are undertaken to design and implement site visits. Site visits typically include three days of surveys and meetings, including one day each for the nuclear power plant site visit, evaluating near-site transportation infrastructure, and meeting with community engagement panels or advisory boards. This paper outlines DOE-IWM's planning process for conducting nuclear power plant site visits and summarizes the key activities carried out to prepare for a site visit, including a discussion of the background research conducted prior to a site visit. Additionally, the paper describes the development of reference databases for site visits, the identification of unique site characteristics, and the use of geographic information system (GIS) applications to enhance the quality of the information collected during a site visit. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Model Development for Thermal-Hydrology Simulations of a Full-Scale Heater Experiment in Opalinus Clay

Disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository is studied. In situ heater experiments in underground research laboratories provide a realistic representation of subsurface behavior under disposal conditions. Here, this study describes process model development and modeling analysis for a full-scale heater experiment in opalinus clay host rock. The results of thermal-hydrology simulation, solving coupled nonisothermal multiphase flow, and comparison with experimental data are presented. The modeling results closely match the experimental data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Considerations for Managing DOE Standard Canisters within an Over-canister as Part of an Integrated Waste Management System PPT

To better enable informed decision making regarding the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Integrated Waste Management Program within the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) has been sponsoring research into a comprehensive integrated waste management system (IWMS) that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). An important aspect of the IWMS is DOE-managed Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported, received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at DOE facilities nationwide, and DOE is responsible for managing the SNF currently in its possession. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types that employ various cladding materials, fuel materials, and enrichments. To enable interim, road-ready dry storage (RRDS) of the wide variety of SNF types found in the DOE inventory, a standardized canister system (i.e., the DOE Standard Canister) was proposed for the packaging demonstration. This robust, welded canister system is designed to confine radionuclides, prevent criticality by precluding content moderation, and satisfy other requirements as part of a larger storage, transportation, and disposal system. While SNF has yet to be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister, DOE Standard Canister designs were included in past storage facility and disposal facility design licensing endeavors. In a renewed effort to evaluate packaging SNF at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in a RRDS configuration, researchers are planning the RRDS Packaging Demonstration. This demonstration is supplemented by analytical structural, criticality, and material compatibility evaluations that support management of SNF in DOE Standard Canisters, taking advantage of past analysis work to the extent possible. One of the largest differences between the current Packaging Demonstration and past analytical evaluations is the inclusion of an over-canister containing multiple DOE Standard Canisters. For the Packaging Demonstration, DOE Standard Canisters loaded with SNF are planned to be placed in a larger diameter over-canister. The sealed over-canister could then be placed in a storage overpack for onsite storage, or in a transportation overpack for shipment to an offsite storage location or disposal site once one becomes available. This paper examines the relevant considerations and provides a preliminary evaluation of integrating the over-canister configuration into the storage, transportation, and disposal processes of the overall waste management system. For storage and transportation, the over-canister can be considered analogous to a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for commercial SNF. For disposal, the DOE Standard Canisters could be removed from the over-canister and placed in a co-disposal waste package with canisters containing vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) similar to configurations examined previously, or the sealed over-canisters might be capable of direct disposal in a waste package.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Preliminary Radiological Risk Assessment Model for Disposition of Remote-Handled Transuranic Wastes at Los Alamos National Laboratory Area G - 20116

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates a low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal site at Material Disposal Area G, in Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA. Area G has been the primary LLW disposal site for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since the 1960's. In addition to LLW, Area G is host to a variety of other wastes, the disposition of which must be determined before closure of the site. A probabilistic Radiological Risk Assessment (RRA) for Area G is used in order to support decision making regarding some wastes that are not addressed in the extant Area G Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA). Between 1979 and 1987, 33 special shafts were augered into the Bandelier Tuff at Area G. This volcanic tuff is present across Pajarito Plateau on the eastern slopes of the Jemez Mountains, and varies widely in its consistency, from weakly indurated non-welded layers to welded layers that uphold the mesa cliffs of the Plateau. These mesas are home to LANL, Area G, and the townsites of Los Alamos and White Rock, with residences about 1400 m from Area G. The 33 Shafts were lined with steel casing, and contain remote-handled (RH) transuranic wastes (TRU) resulting from experiments and analysis performed in special glove boxes at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at LANL. Some of these wastes originated as used nuclear fuel. The purpose of the Area G RRA is to evaluate the potential future risk to humans and the environment from the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts in the context of the risk associated with the surrounding wastes at Area G. The analysis is responsive to expectations outlined in DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, and is informed by the Manual and Guidance accompanying DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Because the waste meets the definition of TRU, the regulatory context necessarily takes into consideration the regulation governing the disposal of TRU from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): 40 CFR 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. Given the broader regulatory context for the RRA, the analysis is subject to different assumptions from those made in the existing DOE O 435.1 PA and CA, such as allowing for future occupation of the site. The analysis begins with a comprehensive evaluation of features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios (FEPS) for Area G and the wastes it contains. These FEPSs are screened to eliminate from further consideration those of extremely low probability and/or consequence, and a conceptual site model (CSM) is subsequently developed. The scope and structure of the Area G RRA Model is informed by this CSM, and the Area G RRA Model is developed using the GoldSim systems analysis modeling platform. This paper presents the initial version of a defensible, transparent, and reasonably realistic model, which is based on the state of knowledge of the wastes, the site, and the FEPSs that govern contaminant transport from wastes into the environment and subsequent exposures to humans and other biota. Probabilistic model input distributions represent uncertainties inherent in the real and modeled systems. The results of the Area G RRA Model inform decisions regarding the disposition of the RH TRU in the 33 Shafts. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

DECOVALEX-2023: Task F2 Salt Final Report

The subject of Task F of DECOVALEX-2023 concerns performance assessment modelling of radioactive waste disposal in deep mined repositories. The primary objectives of Task F are to build confidence in the models, methods, and software used for performance assessment (PA) of deep geologic nuclear waste repositories, and/or to bring to the fore additional research and development needed to improve PA methodologies. In Task F2- (salt), these objectives have been accomplished through staged development and comparison of the models and methods used by participating teams in their PA frameworks. Coupled-process submodels and deterministic simulations of the entire PA model for a reference scenario for waste disposal in domal salt have been conducted. The task specification has been updated continuously since the initiation of the project to reflect the staged development of the conceptual repository model and performance metrics. Thermal, hydrological, mechanical, and chemical properties of individual components of the engineered and natural system were chosen for relevance by participating teams. The salt reference case system was characterized using data and measurements collected at relevant underground research laboratories (URLs), field sites, and simulation results from teams with specialized modelling capability. Participating teams made a wide range of model assumptions from compartmentalized networks to full 3D models of the salt formation. No single contributed model includes full-fidelity representation of all the features, events, and processes (FEPs) detailed in the task specification, but almost all features and processes are represented in at least one model. Despite differences in the modelling strategies developed by participating teams, all models indicate that salt compaction and radionuclide diffusion are key processes in the repository, and for the FEPs and model scenario considered, little of the disposed radionuclides will migrate beyond the repository seal over the 100,000 year simulations. In general, the model output quantities have the largest differences over the short term and near the waste. The models tend to be more similar further from waste and at later time. Disparities between the models are believed to be due to differing simplifications from the task specification, some of which are chosen simplifications to reduce complexity, and some are restrictions imposed by the modelling tools. A second round of this task has been accepted for DECOVALEX-2027 in conjunction with Task F1 on crystalline PA modelling. The future round includes waste package heating, improved modelling of salt creep closure, additional comparisons of coupled-process sub-models, and the impact of repository engineering design on radionuclide migration in the repository. Participants will also propose and finalize a set of uncertain inputs for the reference case simulations, propagate these uncertainties in a set of realizations, and conduct sensitivity analyses on the simulation results.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Choosing the Best Modeling Platform for Radiological Risk Assessment Models - 20468

Radiological risk assessments, in the form of performance or safety assessments, are often required under regulations or guidance for remediation of contaminated land, decommissioning of contaminated buildings or structures, and radioactive waste disposal. These risk assessments are usually supported by fate and transport models that address decay and ingrowth of radionuclides, as well as their movement through engineered systems and the natural environment. These models are often projected thousands, or more, years into the future, largely because the radioactive species change through decay and ingrowth, and hence the magnitude of the radioactive effect changes with time. There are many computer codes that are available to address this type of modeling. They range from addressing specific pathways or processes such as infiltration of water, groundwater, surface water, air, biota, diffusion and advection of water and gases, to those that try to couple all processes together to evaluate the impact of fate and transport through the entire system to places in space and time to which access is assumed. These different types of codes are sometimes separated with the monikers process-level and systems-level codes, although it is often not clear that this separation does justice to the capabilities of the many codes that are available to evaluate fate and transport of radionuclides. The focus of this paper is the latter group of modeling codes. Several systems level modeling codes exist and are used. There are differences between these codes in terms of utility, flexibility, complexity and cost. The purpose of this paper is to compare a few of these codes in the context of work currently being performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Working Group 1 (WG1). The MODARIA II WG1's main focus is how stakeholder engaged decision analysis can, or should, be applied to radiological contamination problems so that better, longstanding, sustainable, solutions are reached. However, the WG1 also recognizes the potential impact of the modeling tools that are chosen to address radiological risk, which is often a primary objective of decision making for radiological problems. Other objectives might also be important, such as constraining costs, obtaining financing, minimizing impact on ecosystems, saving cultural resources, saving jobs, farmland, environmental justice, etc., in a full decision analysis for a given radiological contamination problem, but none of these other objectives have the same types of complex modeling needs as minimize radiological dose. Consequently, a further focus of WG1 is to evaluate the potential impacts on decision making of the choice of fate and transport, and risk assessment, modeling codes that are used to support decision making. The WG1 will produce a report at the end of 2020 that will focus on an approach to effective decision making and stakeholder engagement. The report will also consider the role that performance assessment modeling should play in the decision-making process, including the impact of the choice of modeling tools or computer codes on risk-informed decision making. Several sites around the World have been made available by Member States for these model comparisons, and several modeling tools have been considered. However, the focus of this paper is on two of the sites, one in Belgium and one in Ukraine, and on three of the tools: NORMALYSA (NORM And Legacy Site Assessment); GoldSim{sup C}, and AMBER{sup C}. The final report from this working group will also cover other modeling tools, including RESRAD, and PC-Cream{sup R}. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

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