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DOE OSTI2025

Microstructure & Mechanical Properties of Scaled Thermally Aged LPBF 316H SS Builds

As part of the US Department of Energy’s Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies program’s mission to accelerate qualification of advanced manufacturing pathways for nuclear applications, laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) 316H stainless steel (SS) has been selected as a model system to develop a rapid code case framework. This effort directly addresses the grand challenges of (1)expanding the limited portfolio of materials currently codified for elevated-temperature nuclear structural service under Section III, Division 5of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; and (2) significantly reducing qualification timelines that traditionally exceed a decade. The strategic importance of LPBF 316H lies in its immediate industrial relevance, existing data foundation from wrought 316H, and alignment with ongoing code case development for LPBF 316L.Prior work revealed accelerated precipitation of deleterious secondary phases and reduced creep ductility in as-printed LPBF 316H. Building on that prior research, FY2025activities focused on establishing an understanding of the key failure mechanisms of crept 316H specimens to aid in code case development and on evaluating stress relief (SR) parameters on the high-temperature performance and thermal aging-induced degradation of tensile and fracture behavior in LPBF316H.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Microstructure and Mechanical Properties of Scaled Thermally Aged LPBF 316H SS Builds

As part of the US Department of Energy’s Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies program’s mission to accelerate qualification of advanced manufacturing pathways for nuclear applications, laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) 316H stainless steel (SS) has been selected as a model system to develop a rapid code case framework. This effort directly addresses the grand challenges of (1) expanding the limited portfolio of materials currently codified for elevated-temperature nuclear structural service under Section III, Division 5 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code; and (2) significantly reducing qualification timelines that traditionally exceed a decade. The strategic importance of LPBF 316H lies in its immediate industrial relevance, existing data foundation from wrought 316H, and alignment with ongoing code case development for LPBF 316L. Prior work revealed accelerated precipitation of deleterious secondary phases and reduced creep ductility in as-printed LPBF 316H. Building on that prior research, FY 2025 activities focused on establishing an understanding of the key failure mechanisms of crept 316H specimens to aid in code case development and on evaluating stress relief (SR) parameters on the high-temperature performance and thermal aging induced degradation of tensile and fracture behavior in LPBF 316H.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2026

Ceramic Composite Experimental Testing Status

Over recent years, ceramic matrix materials such as SiC–SiC and C–C have been gaining interest for use in fusion reactors, light water reactors (LWRs), and high-temperature reactors (HTRs). These materials are good candidates to operate in very high temperature and moderate to high radiation environments. The evaluation of composite materials, in general, is challenging because of variations in precursor materials, variations in the fabrication process across fabricators, and the wide range of potential fiber architectures, to name a few. However, the need to evaluate neutron-irradiated properties adds another layer of complexity, which includes cost, timeline, and specimen size limitations (often associated with irradiation testing). A qualification methodology for the use of ceramic composites is provided in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III-5-HHB. The methodology is supported by ASTM International (ASTM) guides, which provide a pathway to accomplish this effort. Part of the qualification strategy is for the designer to collect material property data on environmental conditions representative of its design envelope. These data include irradiation effects. This report presents an experimental study and test campaign developed to partially address this gap by providing initial mechanical and physical property data required for design. A variety of different materials using different manufacturing techniques are considered as part of this campaign. The test plan suggests performing a screening or partial irradiation study to assist the designer during the material selection process. The designer can then perform a more comprehensive qualification study if the material performance is promising. This work focuses on the status of the specimen preparations (machining of samples), the current test methods and failure analysis as well as the preparation of irradiation vehicles for the irradiation campaign. The irradiation will be performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Specimen sizing and remaining life sample calculations for high temperature reactor material surveillance

Advanced high-temperature nuclear reactors rely on structural components that will operate for decades under combined mechanical, thermal, and environmental loading. Materials surveillance programs are a promising strategy for managing the resulting uncertainty in long-term structural integrity by monitoring degradation in service using passively actuated mechanical test articles. Previous reports have developed a simplified, spreadsheetimplementable framework for sizing these test articles and for inferring accumulated creep damage and remaining life from ex-situ test data. This report advances that work toward practical deployment by providing a sample-problem book: a collection of worked, end-toend examples in which the ASME Section III, Division 5 design analysis of a representative high-temperature reactor component is carried through to a sized surveillance article, verified with detailed finite-element analysis, and concluded with a remaining-life assessment based on an assumed ex-situ creep-rate measurement on the retrieved specimen. The report also summarizes ongoing ANL engagement with ASTM Committee E10 on Nuclear Technology and Applications toward drafting a standard covering surveillance procedures for advanced reactors.

Barua, Bipul (ORCID:0000000247184113)↗

DOE OSTI2026

Development of a Framework and Methodology for an Advanced Reactor Materials Environmental Effects Design Guide

Advanced non-light-water reactor components may operate at elevated temperature while experiencing cyclic loading, significant neutron irradiation, and exposure to reactor coolant. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 5, provides design rules for elevated-temperature service but does not include specific procedures to account for environmental effects on material properties. This report develops an initial framework and methodology for an Environmental Effects Design Guide (EEDG) focused on neutron irradiation; coolant-environment effects are reserved for future work. The proposed approach treats irradiation as a property-based overlay on the existing Division 5 design process, with two routes: a sparse-data route applying two reduction factors — FCR on creep-rupture strength and FF on fatigue life — for the creep-fatigue evaluations that typically control the design of advanced high-temperature reactor components, and a fuller framework developing the property-to-rule chain across the four Division 5 checks (primary load, strain limits and ratcheting, creep-fatigue, and buckling), together with swelling and weldments as scope items. Both routes are scoped by an in-pile qualification that restricts the use of post-irradiation-examination-derived properties in regimes where an in-pile mechanism could control the design outcome. Illustrative outputs derived on a compiled annealed Type 316 database — FCR ≈ 0.78–0.86 and FF ≈ 0.4 — demonstrate the calculation method within that specific dataset. The framework is an initial, testable design-rule concept; it identifies a practical path for preliminary design evaluations under sparse data and the material data and testing needed to develop the framework further.

Barua, Bipul (ORCID:0000000247184113)↗

DOE OSTI2022

Perspective on “code qualifying” new graphite grades for use in advanced nuclear reactors*

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) publishes the Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code, which include guidance for the safe development, construction, and operation of boilers and pressure vessels. ASME BPV Code Section III “Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components” Division 5 focuses on “High Temperature Reactors”. Subsection HH, subpart A lists the different materials properties that are to be measured and how those properties change due to different environmental conditions (oxidation and irradiation damage) for a graphite to be accepted for use in a high temperature reactor core (i.e., “Code Qualified”). Currently there are no nuclear graphite grades that are “Code Qualified” (i.e., a reactor designer can select a graphite grade and build their reactor without any additional testing), which is due in part to development of new graphite grades in the last 20 years and the lack of comprehensive programs needed to produce the data for the code cases. This perspective is going to discuss the requirements, as called out in the ASME BPV Code, that are necessary to “code qualify” a nuclear graphite grade but will primarily focus on the practical and technical challenges associated with irradiation-induced property changes and how to address these to assist with getting graphite ready for use in advanced nuclear reactors. These same technical challenges can be expected to arise for other materials being developed for advanced reactor concepts.

advanced nuclear reactors↗

NASA NTRS1984

Summary of shuttle data processing and aerodynamic performance comparisons for the first 11 flights

NASA Space Shuttle aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic research is but one part of the most comprehensive end-to-end flight test program ever undertaken considering: the extensive pre-flight experimental data base development; the multitude of spacecraft and remote measurements taken during entry flight; the complexity of the Orbiter aerodynamic configuration; the variety of flight conditions available across the entire speed regime; and the efforts devoted to flight data reduction throughout the aerospace community. Shuttle entry flights provide a wealth of research quality data, in essence a veritable flying wind tunnel, for use by researchers to verify and improve the operational capability of the Orbiter and provide data for evaluations of experimental facilities as well as computational methods. This final report merely summarizes the major activities conducted by the AMA, Inc. under NASA Contract NAS1-16087 as part of that interesting research. Investigators desiring more detailed information can refer to the glossary of AMA publications attached herein as Appendix A. Section I provides background discussion of software and methodology development to enable Best Estimate Trajectory (BET) generation. Actual products generated are summarized in Section II as tables which completely describe the post-flight products available from the first three-year Shuttle flight history. Summary results are presented in Section III, with longitudinal performance comparisons included as Appendices for each of the flights.

Findlay, J. T.↗

NASA NTRS1936

Flow phenomena on plates and airfoils of short span

Investigations on the flow phenomena at plates and cambered models were carried out with the aid of force measurements, some pressure distribution measurements, and photographic observation. The experimental methods are described and the results given. Section III of this work gives a comprehensive account of the results and enables us to see how nearly the lift line and lift surface theories agree with the experimental results.

Winter, H↗

NASA NTRS2000

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 1999

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for the calendar year 1999.This was a year of notable achievements and significant frustrations. Both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs were delayed.The Space Shuttle prudently postponed launches after the occurrence of a wiring short during ascent of the STS-93 mission. The ISS construction schedule slipped as a result of the Space Shuttle delays and problems the Russians experienced in readying the Service Module and its launch vehicle. Each of these setbacks was dealt with in a constructive way. The STS-93 short circuit led to detailed wiring inspections and repairs on all four orbiters as well as analysis of other key subsystems for similar types of hidden damage. The ISS launch delays afforded time for further testing, training, development, and contingency planning. The safety consciousness of the NASA and contractor workforces, from hands-on labor to top management, continues high. Nevertheless, workforce issues remain among the most serious safety concerns of the Panel. Cutbacks and reorganizations over the past several years have resulted in problems related to workforce size, critical skills, and the extent of on-the-job experience. These problems have the potential to impact safety as the Space Shuttle launch rate increases to meet the demands of the ISS and its other customers. As with last year's report, these work- force-related issues were considered of sufficient import to place them first in the material that follows. Some of the same issues of concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS arose in a review of the launch vehicle for the Terra mission that the Panel was asked by NASA to undertake. Other areas the Panel was requested to assess included the readiness of the Inertial Upper Stage for the deployment of the Chandra X-ray Observatory and the possible safety impact of electromagnetic effects on the Space Shuttle. The findings and recommendations in this report do not highlight any major, immediate issues that might compromise the safe pursuit of the various NASA programs. They do, however, cover concerns that the Panel believes should be addressed in the interest of maintaining NASA's excellent safety record.The Panel is pleased to note that remedial efforts for some of the findings raised are underway. Given appropriate funding and cooperative efforts among the Administration, the Congress and the various contractors, the Panel is convinced that safety problems can be avoided or solved resulting in lower risk for NASA's human space and aeronautics programs. Section II of this report contains specific findings and recommendations generated by Panel activities during the calendar year 1999. Section III presents more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. A current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff is included as Appendix A. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1998 annual report. It has been augmented this year to include brief explanations of why the Panel classified the NASA response as " open,""continuing," or "closed." Appendix C lists the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1999.

Blomberg, Richard D.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2017

Meteoroid Environment Modeling: The Meteoroid Engineering Model and Shower Forecasting

The meteoroid environment is often divided conceptually into meteor showers and the sporadic meteor background. It is commonly but incorrectly assumed that meteoroid impacts primarily occur during meteor showers; instead, the vast majority of hazardous meteoroids belong to the sporadic complex. Unlike meteor showers, which persist for a few hours to a few weeks, sporadic meteoroids impact the Earth's atmosphere and spacecraft throughout the year. The Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) has produced two environment models to handle these cases: the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM) and an annual meteor shower forecast. The sporadic complex, despite its year-round activity, is not isotropic in its directionality. Instead, their apparent points of origin, or radiants, are organized into groups called "sources". The speed, directionality, and size distribution of these sporadic sources are modeled by the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM), which is currently in its second major release version (MEMR2) [Moorhead et al., 2015]. MEM provides the meteoroid flux relative to a user-provided spacecraft trajectory; it provides the total flux as well as the flux per angular bin, speed interval, and on specific surfaces (ram, wake, etc.). Because the sporadic complex dominates the meteoroid flux, MEM is the most appropriate model to use in spacecraft design. Although showers make up a small fraction of the meteoroid environment, they can produce significant short-term enhancements of the meteoroid flux. Thus, it can be valuable to consider showers when assessing risks associated with vehicle operations that are brief in duration. To assist with such assessments, the MEO issues an annual forecast that reports meteor shower fluxes as a function of time and compares showers with the time-averaged total meteoroid flux. This permits missions to do quick assessments of the increase in risk posed by meteor showers. Section II describes MEM in more detail and describes our current efforts to improve its characteristics for a future release. Section III describes the annual shower forecast and highlights recent improvements made to its algorithm and inputs.

Moorhead, Althea V.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Launch Complex 34, SWMU CC054 2023 DNAPL Source Zone Operations, Maintenance, and Monitoring, Site-Wide Long-Term Monitoring, and Hot Spot 6 Air Sparge System Annual Performance Monitoring and Phase Two Expansion Construction Completion Report Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida

This Annual Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) for the Dense Non-Aqueous Phase Liquid (DNAPL) Source Zone (DSZ), Site-Wide Long-Term Monitoring (LTM), and Hot Spot 6 (HS 6) Air Sparge (AS) System presents the results of Year 14 operations and performance monitoring of the hydraulic containment (HC) Interim Measure (IM), details associated with construction and implementation of the HS 6 AS system expansion (Phase Two), and the results of operations and performance sampling of the HS 6 AS IM at Launch Complex 34 (LC34), located at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS), Florida. The timeframe for activities documented in this PMR extends from April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024. LC34 has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit CC054 under the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program. The objective of the HC IM at LC34 is to contain the shallow and deep DSZ and surrounding dissolved-phase trichloroethene (TCE) high concentration plume via operation of a hydraulic containment system (HCS). The pre-IM design 300 micrograms per liter (μg/L) TCE groundwater contour was used to establish the deep zone capture area for deep recovery wells, and the shallow zone capture area was defined by the DSZ. The system began operating in 2010, and in 2015, the system was expanded to provide HC for areas within the 300 μg/L TCE groundwater isocontours of HS 3 and 4. In 2018 and 2019, an investigation was conducted to recharacterize the DSZ, which included investigating TCE mass in Layer 7. This data was subsequently used to optimize the pumping rates of the HCS and install additional recovery wells in Layer 7 to more adequately capture residual contaminant mass. The operational period for Year 14 of the HCS was from April 1, 2023 to March 31, 2024. Operational runtime for the system was 94 percent during Year 14, with downtime events attributed to planned maintenance, system repairs, and power outages. As of March 31, 2024, a total of 344,849,634 cumulative gallons of groundwater containing 94,656 pounds of chlorinated volatile organic compounds (CVOCs) have been removed by the HCS. During the reporting period covered under this report, the HCS recovered 31,176,393 gallons and approximately 6,319 pounds of CVOC mass. Total combined influent concentrations of TCE have decreased since startup from approximately 280,000 µg/L (January 2010) to 25,000 µg/L (March 2024). During the reporting period, all effluent concentrations from the HCS (aqueous and vapor) were below regulatory reporting limits, indicating the system continues to operate as intended. Performance monitoring was conducted in January 2024 within the DSZ to evaluate TCE contamination. Groundwater samples were collected via DPT at nine locations, consistent with previous events between 2017 and 2022. Full vertical profile sampling was completed at each DPT from 8 to 98 feet below land surface (bls), at 5-foot intervals. The DPT performance monitoring results are summarized in this PMR. The results revealed TCE remains at concentrations greater than 11,000 µg/L in the DSZ (1-percent solubility, indicative of DNAPL) at eight of the nine DPT locations and at depths ranging from 28 to 98 feet bls. An overall decreasing trend of TCE concentrations was observed in DPT samples during this reporting period, which is a reduction from the previous event (December 2022) and the peak event in December 2021, where TCE percentages appeared to increase in all depth zones because several recovery wells were turned off during the AS pilot study in the DSZ. The maximum TCE concentration in January 2024 was 1,600,000 µg/L in the 53 feet bls depth interval at DPT594 (previous maximum result in 2022 was 1,800,000 µg/L in the 48 feet bls depth interval at DPT599). This maximum concentration in the 53 feet bls depth interval is in the deep capture zone. During the January 2024 DPT event, the largest portion of TCE mass was observed in the 48 feet bls interval above/within Layer 4. This trend remains consistent with previous years and appears to indicate continued mass discharge from Layer 4 (fine-grained unit). In addition to DPT sampling, annual groundwater samples were collected from 11 deep monitoring wells in the DSZ area (Layers 7 and 8) in December 2023 to verify vertical and horizontal delineation. Three of the wells were also sampled biweekly to evaluate operations of recovery well RW21D (screened 86 to 106 feet bls), which was installed in January 2023. Of the Layer 7/8 monitoring sampled only annually, results were non-detect or less than groundwater cleanup target levels GCTLs in December 2023, with the exception of one well, IW45D2, which had a cis-1,2-dichloroethene (cDCE), detection greater than the GCTL. Of the three wells sampled biweekly during the operational period, the well located closest to Layer 7 recovery well RW21D (IW44D2, screened 105 to 115 feet bls) had concentrations of TCE, cDCE and vinyl chloride (VC) greater than GCTLs throughout the operational period, but displayed a decreasing trend since the peak concentrations in September 2023. The maximum TCE concentration during this operational period was 190,000 µg/L at IW44D2 in September 2023, but reduced to 700 µg/L in March 2024, indicating the HCS is still effectively removing mass from the source area. Expansion of the HCS and addition of new recovery wells is ongoing and will continue to be evaluated as the groundwater recovery scheme is optimized. Details of the expansion and optimization will be provided in a future PMR. The HS 6 AS IM was initiated in 2018 with 160 AS wells and expanded in 2019 with another 140 AS wells. An additional expansion of the HS 6 AS IM was completed during the reporting period covered under this report and details of the construction implementation and startup of the expansion are detailed in Section III of this report. The new expansion, referred to as Phase Two, was implemented between August 17, 2022 and August 28, 2023, and included the installation of 190 air sparge wells to treat an additional 11.2 acres. The original configuration (referred to as Phase One) operated until Phase Two came online, then all but 52 AS wells were turned off so the components could be moved and utilized in the Phase Two area. The 52 AS wells that remain on are in a barrier configuration preventing contaminated groundwater from impacting the treated area. The HS 6 AS system (both Phase One and Two) operated normally during the reporting period covered under this report. Semi-annual performance monitoring of the Phase One configuration was conducted in April and November 2023, consistent with previous years. For the Phase Two configuration, 21 new monitoring wells were installed and sampled quarterly, with a baseline event in July 2023, and quarterly events in November 2023 and February 2024 summarized in this report. Semi-annual monitoring results collected in April and October 2023 show concentrations of contaminants of concern (cDCE, trans-1,2-dichloroethene, and VC) have decreased to less than GCTLs in nearly all wells and not impacting the surface water drainage canal, indicating the HS 6 IM continues to meet objectives. The baseline and quarterly sampling for the Phase Two configuration indicate generally decreasing concentrations in wells within and around the perimeter of the treatment area. At least two more quarters of monitoring will be conducted and once those results are evaluated a reduced the sampling frequency may be considered. Overall, the tasks associated with Year 14 operation of the HC IM and operation of the HS 6 AS IM were performed in accordance with recommendations included in the previous 2022 LC34 (Year 13) PMR. Evaluation of results from the HC IM and HS 6 IM show that these systems are operating as designed and meeting performance objectives.

groundwater remediation↗

DOE OSTI2020

Effects of Notches on the Intermediate Creep-Rupture Life of Alloy 617 Weldment

A Code Case has recently been completed that adds Alloy 617 to Section III, Division 5 of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which covers high temperature nuclear components. However, additional information is needed to address concerns raised by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that are not covered by the Code Case. The effects of notches (geometric discontinuities) and multiaxial stress on the expected creep life of a component are among these concerns. This report covers the current state of testing of Alloy 617 notched specimens at Idaho National Laboratory, with particular focus on intermediate length (8,000 – 20,000 hours) creep tests of Alloy 617 weld metal. While most of this testing is ongoing, the current state of the tests indicate that the multi-axial stress state imposed by the notch geometry does not negatively impact the creep rupture life of the Alloy 617 weld metal. While the weld metal is notch strengthening in short-term (1,000 – 2,000 hours) testing, it is not clear if this characteristic will continue to hold for intermediate and long-term testing. Ongoing tests will provide additional information to address this concern of a crossover from notch strengthening to notch weakening for intermediate and long-term creep lives.