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FY25 Mid-Year Report: FABIA In-Field Laser Absorption Spectroscopy for UF6 Enrichment

From September 2024 through April 2025, the FABIA team has been working towards completing the IAEA requirements for technology transfer of the instrument. The primary tasks in place for this transfer are to complete a validation study using various enrichments of UF6, to finalize the data analysis routines in the FABIA software, and to complete FABIA electrical component compatibility. These topics are expanded in greater detail below. In addition to the tasks, the FABIA team hosted IAEA representatives to observe a live analysis demonstration of the FABIA instrument on February 3, 2025. As a result of this visit, some updates to the tasks were communicated.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

AI for Nuclear Safeguards Verification

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilizes AI/ML to analyze open-source information, including satellite imagery and scientific publications, to verify the completeness of State declarations regarding nuclear activities. AI/ML already assist the IAEA with automating processes and analysis of large datasets, including satellite imagery and unstructured data, improving efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation. AI/ML in nuclear safeguards come with its own challenges that include the need for large, unbiased datasets, the risk of AI-generated fake information, including the potential for manipulation of satellite imagery.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Destructive Analysis of TRISO Particles: Crush/Burn/Leach Followed by Davies-Gray Titration and IDMS

The accurate accounting of nuclear materials is a cornerstone of international nuclear safeguards. One emerging challenge in this domain is the fabrication of TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) particle fuels. Although these innovative fuel forms are critical for advanced reactor applications, their robust refractory ceramics and coating compositions present significant obstacles to destructive analysis (DA) methods. Ensuring full and quantitative recovery from these particles is essential for accurate mass accountancy. The current study was initiated to address these challenges, first by validating a previously established destructive method developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the quantitative recovery of uranium from TRISO particles and then following that process with uranium content determination through isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and Davies-Gray titration. This study expands on the scope of a digestive method that was developed under the Advanced Gas Reactor Fuel Development and Qualification program and is currently implemented in both the Coated Particle Fuel Development Laboratory and Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at ORNL. The success of the previous Advanced Gas Reactor work relied on developing a DA method to evaluate the fabrication process and reactor experiments. The methodology described in this report was designed to rigorously investigate the efficacy of the crush/burn/leach sample preparation of TRISO particles; it aims to quantify uranium recovery while also assessing the effects of TRISO constituents (e.g., silicon and zirconium) on analytical precision and accuracy. By comparing the results from the titration method and IDMS, we sought to determine whether existing analytical procedures accepted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be effectively translated to TRISO fuel forms. The team employed an approach that involved processing replicate TRISO samples, optimizing the milling (i.e., crushing) step and performing serial leaches. The elemental composition of the analytical samples was examined to prepare for interference studies in the second year of this project. The integration of gamma spectrometry to verify residual uranium activity further strengthened the validation. Statistical methods were applied to the collected data to evaluate the uncertainties arising from sampling, sample preparation and uranium quantification. These uncertainties were then compared to the IAEA’s international target values (ITVs). Additional data collected in upcoming project work will strengthen the uncertainty estimates. Ultimately, it is hoped that this project will contribute materially to the body of work related to characterization of TRISO based fuels for the purpose of material accountancy and its applications to international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Inspecta Technical Report

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant), an AI-powered smart digital assistant (SDA) equipped with robotic capabilities. This innovative tool aims to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of international nuclear safeguards inspections. Inspecta is designed to assist inspectors on-site by supporting or automating tasks that are often mundane, hazardous, or prone to errors. In 2021, the development team established the specifications for Inspecta by thoroughly analyzing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents and consulting with former IAEA inspectors and subject matter experts. This process involved aligning in-field inspection tasks with existing commercial and open-source technologies, thereby creating a roadmap for the initial prototype of Inspecta and identifying areas requiring further research and development. From 2022 to 2025, the focus shifted to integrating a critical inspection activity—the examination of seals—into an early version of Inspecta. This phase has involved the development of both software and hardware capabilities essential for this task. This report outlines the advancements in Inspecta’s functionalities, particularly those that support the seal examination process.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

In-Field Alpha Spectrometer Development FY2022 Mid-Year Report

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed an In-Field Alpha Spectrometer (IFAS) to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) at processing facilities, to perform field assessments to verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO 2 F 2 ·2H 2 O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the course of this project INL, PNNL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory worked to optimize the SUDA sample design for alpha spectrometry, to optimize processes for manufacturing, loading, and shipping SUDA samples, and to allow the measurement of loaded SUDA samples. In fiscal year (FY) 2022 INL has bene investigating the reproducibility and measurement precision of IFAS measurements and the associated determination of uranium enrichment.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

FY26 Mid-Year Report

The goal of this project is to develop specific aspects of ultra-high-resolution microcalorimeter technologies that support IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory needs and the goals of SP-1 19/NML-003 "Microcalorimetry Analysis Technique for NML" but are outside the scope of the SP-1. The focus is on commissioning, assembly, and testing of the microcalorimeter decay energy spectrometer with superconducting transition-edge sensors (TESs) and magnetic microcalorimeters (MMCs) in preparation for transfer to the IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Investigation of U content in J-swipe/PIC samples

This final report documents the results of an evaluation of the U content in J-swipes for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). J-swipes are manufactured with inked numbers (1–30) and U backgrounds that are considered consistent across different lots and manufacturing times. These characteristics make them ideal for use by IAEA inspectors for pre-inspection check samples to ensure inspectors are not cross-contaminating sites. However, recent work has found elevated U concentrations in the inked numbers compared with the J-swipe material. To determine whether the inked numbers correlate with the U backgrounds, triplicate U content measurements were made on Swipes 1, 2, 11, 22, and 28. Triplicates of each swipe were processed through the standard chemistry used by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Network of Analytical Laboratories team and analyzed for U content by isotope dilution via multicollector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Finally, samples were made by mass consisting of only ink areas and only cotton swipe material to determine the trace element differences between the cotton and the ink.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Plutonium Signatures in Molten-Salt Reactor Off-Gas Tank and Safeguards Considerations

Fluid-fueled molten-salt reactors (MSRs) are actively being developed by several companies, with plans to deploy them internationally. The current IAEA inspection tools are largely incompatible with the unique design features of liquid fuel MSRs (e.g., the complex fuel chemistry, circulating fuel inventory, bulk accountancy, and high radiation environment). For these reasons, safeguards for MSRs are seen as challenging and require the development of new techniques. This paper proposes one such technique through the observation of the reactor’s off-gas. Any reactor design using low-enriched uranium will build up plutonium as the fuel undergoes burnup. Plutonium has different fission product yields than uranium. Therefore, a shift in fission product production is expected with fuel evolution. The passive removal of certain gaseous fission products to the off-gas tank of an MSR provides a valuable opportunity for analysis without significant modifications to the design of the system. Uniquely, due to the gaseous nature of the isotopes, beta particle emissions are available for observation. The ratios of these fission product isotopes can, thus, be traced back to the relative amount and types of fissile isotopes in the core. This proposed technique represents an effective safeguards tool for bulk accountancy which, while avoiding being onerous, could be used in concert with other techniques to meet the IAEA’s timeliness goals for the detection of a diversion.

Dunkle, Nicholas (ORCID:000000027323011X)↗

Multilateral Testing Workshop on Relocatable Portal Monitors

The procurement and deployment of radiation detection equipment is a multi-faceted challenge across the globe. Knowledge sharing of the testing methods used to evaluate equipment for deployment scenarios helps improve the understanding of deployed systems by the global community. The United States Department of Energy’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Office (NSDD) performed a series of characterization measurements in 2019, focused on radiation detection systems that could function as relocatable portal monitors. The capstone activity for this project was a multilateral and cross-disciplinary workshop demonstrating, performing, and refining the techniques used in the characterization measurements with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and global partners. A group of technical experts including representatives from nine countries, the IAEA, and NSDD gathered at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM during September of 2019 for the Operational and Performance Testing and Evaluation of Relocatable Portals Workshop. Over the course of a week, the group discussed the necessity for and process of developing operational and performance requirements, challenges related to deploying radiation detection systems for the countries in attendance, use cases for deploying relocatable radiation detection equipment, and considerations related to testing equipment for appropriate deployment scenarios. All participants were given the opportunity to have hands-on experience with eleven relocatable systems in executing a limited scope characterization test comprised of six test scenarios. At the conclusion of testing, participants reviewed and presented their findings, and the group as a whole compared and contrasted their experiences. Suggested revisions to the test methods and ideas for further collaborations were discussed. This report discusses the logistical and planning considerations for bringing together experts across disciplines in a multilateral workshop on testing of radiation detectors, as well as presenting the testing methods performed, results, and paths forward. Success of workshops related to technical knowledge transfer and improvement of test methods is key to global technical and scientific support of radiation detection deployments.

Erchinger, Jennifer L.↗

Safeguards Technical Objectives for Thorium Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Cycles

China, Denmark, France, India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, are exploring commercial thorium fuel cycles for domestic power production and/or international export. For any thorium fuel cycle facilities built and/or operated in a non-nuclear weapon State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, those facilities and any associated nuclear material would be subject to international nuclear safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thorium fuel cycle facilities offered for the application of safeguards under a voluntary offer agreement by a nuclear weapon State would also be subject to safeguards, if selected by the IAEA. Compared to uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities, thorium fuel cycle facilities are comparatively diverse from an inspection and accounting perspective, differing greatly in material type, form, and design from uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities and also from each other. Of these, the most complex thorium fuel cycles – and therefore likely the most challenging to the implementation of international nuclear safeguards – are those that include thorium molten salt reactors. With thorium fuel cycles approaching near-term commercial deployment timelines, it is imperative that the international nuclear safeguards community begins to think about how to adapt existing international nuclear safeguards concepts and approaches to thorium fuel cycles, as well as mitigate any gaps that may exist. This paper focuses on the development of recommended safeguards technical objectives for efficient and effective application of international nuclear safeguards measures (e.g., containment / surveillance, non-destructive assay, destructive assay, environmental sampling) to thorium molten salt reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Optimization Of In-field Alpha Spectrometry For Uranium Enrichment Determination In Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO2F2&middot;2H2O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

Chichester, David↗

INSEN 2023 Yearly Updates

The International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) is the primary international network for nuclear security educational initiatives. INSEN plays a central role in fostering collaboration and knowledge-sharing among nuclear security education experts worldwide. In the wake of the global pandemic, INSEN remained committed to strengthening nuclear security education and resumed in-person activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed its continued dedication and support to the network’s mission and presented new activities aimed at elevating global nuclear security efforts. Throughout the year and during the annual and leadership meetings, working groups showcased their vibrant work and presented innovative ideas, invigorating the attendees’ dedication to their crucial work. Comprehensive presentations by the IAEA during the INSEN annual and leadership meetings highlighted the importance of the network and its continued commitment to promoting nuclear security on a global scale. One notable and encouraging trend was the increase in network membership, signifying a growing commitment to nuclear security worldwide and the continued interest in nuclear security from member states and international organizations. The value of initiatives such as the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative was emphasized at the annual meeting, accenting the need for diverse perspectives and expertise to ensure a secure nuclear landscape.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 1, January-February 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Optimization of In-Field Alpha Spectrometry for Uranium Enrichment Determination in Uranium Hexafluoride

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research is underway to develop In-Field Alpha Spectrometry (IFAS) as a method to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at processing facilities to assess and verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (UO2F2). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the past year optimization work has significantly increased the diameter of useful SUDA samples (from 12.7 mm to 48 mm), improved the manufacturability and reproducibility of SUDA samples, increased the area of the IFAS alpha spectrometer sensor from 1.2 cm to 3.1 cm, and improved source positioning within the IFAS. This paper will report on this optimization work, its impacts on IFAS performance, and future plans for IFAS miniaturization, improvements, and testing.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Demonstration and Verification of Thermo-Mechanical Bowing in a Limited Free-Bow SFR Concept Using MOOSE

Core bowing due to thermal gradients and irradiation induced swelling and creep introduces significant reactivity feedback effects in liquid metal-cooled fast spectrum reactors. During startup, normal operations, and transient events, differential thermal and flux gradients cause expansion, creep, and swelling, which results in bowing in preferential directions depending on local material properties and load-pad and restraint-ring design. The bowing phenomenon produces negative reactivity during accident conditions provided the restraint system has been properly designed to optimally guide the deformation outwards in the active core region. Under the Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation program, a Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based multiphysics approach to model core bowing is being developed. The present work expands on previous modeling of simpler International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification problems with these tools by modeling IAEA Verification Problem 4, which involves a symmetric sector of a reactor core with ducted assemblies undergoing differential thermal expansion due to thermal gradients bowing outward with duct-to-duct contact. This model is available on the National Reactor Innovation Center Virtual Test Bed repository. This example was verified against benchmark participant results, which includes bowing deformation evaluation and duct-to-duct interactions at load pads with mechanical contact.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Select Proliferation Studies on TRISO-fueled, Heat-Pipe-cooled Microreactors

Nuclear microreactors carry the potential to open up new markets for the nuclear industry, as their expected cost competitiveness in non-traditional market segments (e.g., mines, military bases, extraterrestrial surfaces, and remote areas), and their inherent safety features make them deployable when other power sources are unavailable or difficult to exploit. For countries that have not traditionally participated in nuclear power, microreactors represent a clean energy solution [1]. However, their use, especially in non-weapons states, may entail challenges in terms of maintaining international nuclear safeguards [2]. Furthermore, the deployment locations where microreactors may prove most cost competitive would be difficult to access by state and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [3]. In addition to the isolated nature of potential deployment sites, the low-power characteristic of microreactors suggests that numerous microreactors would need to be deployed to meet energy demands. That, coupled with the unique physics of many current microreactor designs, opens up a new area of research with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards concerns [2]. Whereas traditional facilities are inspected as isolated cases when looking for signs of diversion or misuse; microreactors may need to be assessed in the context of the entire fleet to which they belong. International safeguards necessitate timely detection of any significant quantities (SQs) of material that are being diverted (e.g., 1 SQ of special nuclear material diverted over the course of a 1-year period) [4]. For low-enriched uranium, the IAEA defines 1 SQ as corresponding to 75 kg of 235U. The purpose of the present paper is to explore the detectability threshold for material diversion in microreactors by relying on critical control drum angles, excess reactivity, and the reactor lifetime as the selected operational parameters. For this assessment, a heat-pipe-cooled microreactor was regarded as the base design. While the conclusions reached in this paper are not readily extendable to the design of actual microreactors, the analysis herein enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the level of accuracy needed for reference calculations in order to detect diversion scenarios by utilizing the selected operational parameters (i.e., mainly control drum angles, critical insertion angle, and the reactor lifetime).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High sensitivity measurement of femtogram-level 238 Pu by thermal ionization mass spectrometry with correction of background 238 U

Low-concentration plutonium isotopic measurements provide a valuable fingerprint to identify possible material origins in the context of environmental contamination monitoring, environmental tracing, nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics, and treaty monitoring. Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) has long been recognized as one of the most sensitive techniques for plutonium isotopic measurement, but has not generally been utilized for 238 Pu determination, especially at low concentrations, due to an isobaric interference from 238 U, prevalent as background. Here, this work demonstrates a new analytical technique for correction of background 238 U from the 238 Pu counts collected during a TIMS analysis. The technique takes advantage of the higher ionization temperature of U relative to Pu and uses a 235 U tracer added after plutonium purification chemistry for 238 U semi-quantitative determination. This technique has been successfully applied to the determination of 238 Pu concentration and the 238 Pu/ 239 Pu ratio in sample types including single-isotope standards, isotopic certified reference materials, matrix-containing environmental reference materials, and simulated nuclear detonation debris. The results have been directly compared on a sample-by-sample basis to alpha spectrometry results. The detection limit by this new technique is 0.23 fg 238 Pu, which was previously unachievable by mass spectrometry and is possible in around 1 h of analysis time post-chemistry compared to weeks of required counting time by alpha spectrometry (at the same atom amount). We also present original, high precision data for Pu isotope concentrations in IAEA-384, Fangataufa Sediment, including 242 Pu results for the first time. The new technique allows measurement of a key isotope, 238 Pu, that was previously not measured in small environmental or nuclear forensics collections.

238Pu↗