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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Industrial Control System Risk

Risk is integrated into all business processes, and leaders work to limit risk to as low as reasonable within their systems. Within Industrial Control System networks, risk is especially challenging due to the second- and third-order effects that an attack can incur. We present a new equation for risk and analyze its appropriateness in determining risk through Monte Carlo methods. We believe that this new equation has merit in allowing leadership to more quickly access and mitigate risk based off factors within the decision maker’s control, understanding how capable an attacker may be, how much impact an attack would have on the system, and how intensely an attacker may want to cause damage to the system. These variables will allow a leader to provide strategic vision to the business that he/she leads.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Space in 21st Century Conflict: Calibrating Risks, Tailoring Strategies (Workshop Summary)

U.S. strategic thinking on outer space security has been slow to evolve since the 1990s and the DoD finds itself struggling to develop an adaptive and cohesive strategy for the domain. Russia and China, however, have been thinking about space in a holistic and integrated way for some time. Both countries recognize that U.S. conventional strength relies heavily on technologies and systems enabled by space-based assets. Thus, holding those assets at risk represents an opportunity to asymmetrically counter America’s ability to project power. China and Russia been developing a suite of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to accomplish this, to include direct-ascent weapons, space-based weapons, jammers, and cyber capabilities; both countries have also incorporated these systems into their respective tactical and strategic planning. This represents a serious threat to U.S. power projection and assurance of our regional allies and partners. Assuring the U.S.’s ability to operate in space is paramount for supporting regional security missions in both Europe and East Asia. Assuring DoD operations and capabilities in outer space, however, remains a challenge for the defense community. One solution offered by strategists is to enhance U.S. resiliency in space to turn the domain from offense dominant to defense dominant. This, they argue, can be achieved by improving space situational awareness (SSA), protecting space assets with active and passive countermeasures, disaggregating assets and leveraging new commercial space capabilities, and integrating allied space capabilities. However, many barriers remain to accomplishing these objectives. For example, some think that the classified nature of many U.S. space activities is an obstacle to deepening cooperation with commercial partners and allies. Others acknowledge the lack of a working model for incorporating cheaper, diverse, and scalable commercial space systems. Identifying where space fits into broader U.S. deterrence strategies is a subject of contention. While discussions over the past few years have focused on the practicability of deterring attacks on space assets via cross-domain threats, this line of thinking has yielded few useful insights. Consequently, defense practitioners have more recently shifted to thinking of space as part of an integrated deterrence concept, one that envisions building resiliency and defenses into our space architecture while simultaneously holding an adversary’s space-based assets at risk to enhance deterrence more broadly. However, both approaches illuminate a larger problem in the discussion of the relationship between space and deterrence: there is a lack of consensus on what it is we are trying to deter, how space fits into broader deterrence and strategic constructs, and the role of space in extended deterrence and assurance of allies. For example, is the United States’ priority to discourage attacks in space, to ensure regional power projection and alliance support capabilities, to deter broader global conflict or all of the above? Answering such questions will be an important step toward integrating space into a comprehensive defense strategy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

AURORA-SETO_VirginiaTech_ Power & Energy Center

This is a presentation. The outline of the presentation is : Overview multiple grid resiliency projects at Siemens Corporate Technology Introduce AURORA project(AUtonomous and Resilient Operation of energy systems with RenewaAbles) Dive into physics and cyber situation awareness Discuss challenges encountered at building a more resilient distribution grid

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2014

Design of High-Fidelity Testing Framework for Secure Electric Grid Control

A solution methodology and implementation components are presented that can uncover unwanted, unintentional or unanticipated effects on electric grids from changes to actual electric grid control software. A new design is presented to leapfrog over the limitations of current modeling and testing techniques for cyber technologies in electric grids. We design a fully virtualized approach in which actual, unmodified operational software under test is enabled to interact with simulated surrogates of electric grids. It enables the software to influence the (simulated) grid operation and vice versa in a controlled, high fidelity environment. Challenges in achieving such capability include achieving low-overhead time control mechanisms in hypervisor schedulers, network capture and time-stamping, translation of network packets emanating from grid software into discrete events of virtual grid models, translation back from virtual sensors/actuators into data packets to control software, and transplanting the entire system onto an accurately and efficiently maintained virtual-time plane.

Yoginath, Srikanth B↗
DOE OSTI2017

Enhancing power plant safety through simulated cyber events - 341

There are gaps in understanding how a cyber-attack would manifest itself within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This is especially true for nuclear power plants where safety has much broader consequences than nonnuclear plants. The operating and emergency procedures that operators currently use are likely inadequate for targeted cyber-attacks. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions would keep the plant in a safe condition. This research is part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development program where a nuclear power plant cyber model of the control system digital architecture is coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. Cyber event scenarios will be performed on the coupled system with plant operators. The scenarios simulate plant conditions that may exist during a cyber-attack, component failure, or insider sabotage, and provide an understanding of the displayed information and the actual plant conditions. These scenarios will determine if plant operators can 1) recognize that they are under cyber-attack and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. Experiments with nuclear power plant operators will be carried out over FY 2018 and results of the research are expected by the end of FY 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2014

RBAC Driven Least Privilege Architecture For Control Systems

The concept of role based access control (RBAC) within the IT environment has been studied by researchers and was supported by NIST (circa 1992). This earlier work highlighted the benefits of RBAC which include reduced administrative workload and policies which are easier to analyze and apply. The goals of this research were to expand the application of RBAC in the following ways. Apply RBAC to the control systems environment: The typical RBAC model within the IT environment is used to control a user’s access to files. Within the control system environment files are replaced with measurement (e.g., temperature) and control (e.g. valve) points organized as a hierarchy of control assets (e.g. a boiler, compressor, refinery unit). Control points have parameters (e.g., high alarm limit, set point, etc.) associated with them. The RBAC model is extended to support access to points and their parameters based upon roles while at the same time allowing permissions for the points to be defined at the asset level or point level directly. In addition, centralized policy administration with distributed access enforcement mechanisms was developed to support the distributed architecture of distributed control systems and SCADA; Extend the RBAC model to include access control for software and devices: The established RBAC approach is to assign users to roles. This work extends that notion by first breaking the control system down into three layers 1) users, 2) software and 3) devices. An RBAC model is then created for each of these three layers. The result is that RBAC can be used to define machine-to-machine policy enforced via the IP security (IPsec) protocol. This highlights the potential to use RBAC for machine-to-machine connectivity within the internet of things; and Enable dynamic policy based upon the operating mode of the system: The IT environment is generally static with respect to policy. However, large cyber physical systems such as industrial controls have various operating modes (start-up, normal operation, emergency, shut-down and maintenance are typical). The policy enforcement architecture must be able to support changes in access permissions as the mode of the control system changes. For example an operator’s role may not allow the operator to shut down a pump during “normal operation” but that same operator role may be given permission to shut down the pump if the refinery transitions to “emergency” mode. The effectiveness of the approach was validated by applying it to the Experion Process Knowledge System. This is a large commercial industrial control system often used to control oil refineries and other assets within the oil and gas sector. As a by-product, other industries using Experion (Pharmaceuticals, Specialty Chemicals, etc.) also benefit from increased security. Policies representative of those that would be used within an oil refinery were created and validated against the RBAC model as implemented in the underlying SQL database. The administration of policy is simplified which in turn makes it practical for security administrators to specify policies which enforce least privilege. The result is a qualitative reduction in risk. The benefits of the enhanced RBAC model are clear and as a result. Honeywell is incorporating portions of the RBAC research into the 2014 release of Experion.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2012

INL High Level Language Microcontroller Implementa

The overall goal of this project is to improve the security of embedded devices (microcontrollers) used in monitoring and control of energy-sector infrastructure. As these devices are essentially scaled-down personal computers (PCs), they are vulnerable to common low-level cyber-attacks such as buffer overflows and insecure authentication. The implementation of a modern high-level programming language on these microcontrollers would disallow such low-level attacks as the languages would have inherent safeguards against these types of cyber exploits. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has partnered with Siemens Corporate Research (SCR) to develop and test a 4 th -generation language DNP3 implementation on real-world embedded hardware. These tests were carried out on control-system device models currently deployed in real-world applications. Testing was performed with existing C-based DNP implementation as well as the Python version developed by INL.

4GL↗
DOE OSTI2019

Blockchain Smart Contracts for Transactive Energy Systems

This report demonstrates the impact of blockchain technology underlying a transactive energy system and articulates details and principle components of each of five stages in a transactive energy system. This report depicts the engineering requirements of a sample market system, blockchain features, and the relationship between those requirements and features (Section 2.2). Clear value propositions of blockchain features for transactive energy systems are: identity management, security of data, resiliency, decentralization and smart contract trustworthiness, performance, integrity in a trustless environment and access control. Due to the immutability afforded by blockchain architecture, increased data fidelity could potentially help detect targeted cyber-attacks and increase resiliency of grid integration. A distributed system can be more fault tolerant and enable transactive energy by supporting machine-to-machine transactions that can be integrated directly into complex grid operations without the need of trust in a third party. Energy auctions, and potentially registration processes, can be carried out according to transparent rules implemented as smart contracts (Section 4.0). In this current experiment, we ran a use-case/table-top exercise that imitated a real-time 5-min double auction market. The objective of this demonstration is to investigate the applicability of blockchain with transactive energy systems (Section 3.0).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Benefits Quantification: Recommendations for Consideration

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) integrates engineering principles into the design, development, and operation of cyber-physical systems (CPS) to mitigate or eliminate the impact of cyber-enabled attacks. In July 2024, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) engaged MITRE researchers to investigate methods for systematically measuring the benefits of CIE implementation. This included evaluating the success and outcomes of CIE, identifying and quantifying the value of early adoption, and determining the business justification for its implementation, especially in existing infrastructure. MITRE reviewed existing methods in engineering and cybersecurity to understand how organizations prioritize security investments, considering their strengths, weaknesses, and relevance to CIE stakeholders. Based on this analysis, MITRE proposed potential approaches for quantifying CIE benefits and provided recommendations for INL's consideration.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Cryptography Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Systems

Distributed energy resource (DER) systems are rapidly being adopted and integrated within the electric power grid. Developments in smart grid devices and communication protocols are advancing the power system domain but are also introducing new cyber attack vectors. In particular, the ability to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data is of increasing concern. Cryptography is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to protect DER systems and their critical information. This paper discusses prominent methods of cryptographic authentication and encryption that can be used to secure DER communications. Specific considerations and recommendations for applying cryptography to DER systems are provided, including system design constraints and system impact. These will be demonstrated with two case studies that assess cryptography hardware requirements and communications latency in DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cybersecurity Platform and Certification Framework Development for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC)-Integrated Charging Ecosystem (Final Project Report)

This report summarizes a pioneering effort in Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure ecosystem cybersecurity requirements, assessment methodologies, functional verification, as well as embodiment of the key technologies in the form of hardware and software tools being made available to the public. EPRI led a team of experts, as well as a stakeholder coalition encompassing all key actors in the EV charging infrastructure ecosystem that includes eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) equipment (defined as 200kW or above). EV charging infrastructure in the United States is a patchwork of networks that have continued to grow organically and have been designed to serve the charging needs of the EV owners, who are their customers. In doing so, each network provider, as well as their connected entities such as the cloud Electric Vehicle Service Providers or EVSPs, utility back office, utility AMI networks, payment networks, as well as Original Equipment Manufacturer (EV manufacturer) telematics networks, have designed systems that may work well individually, but no single entity is responsible for the entire ecosystem to be secure in terms of data exchange. Furthermore, there is no uniformity in how each actor has implemented the cybersecurity requirements since no system-wide cybersecurity requirements existed prior to this project. The final project report describes the technical approach guided by the EV charging infrastructure cybersecurity working group, convened specifically for this project. The technical approach included definition of requirements at the ecosystem level, treated as a ‘system of systems’, and then passed down to individual systems (EVSE, EV, cloud EVSP, utility, and the payment networks), followed by developing the cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessment methods, that were later applied to real-world cyber-physical systems at EPRI, ANL, and NREL laboratories, to validate both the process and the results. Finally, in a spotlight over the most vulnerable equipment, which is the EV charge station (AC or DC), the team developed a multi-layer cybersecurity implementation in the embedded domain embodied by the open-source Secure Network Interface Card (SNIC) demonstrating the various ways in which the infrastructure can be secured protecting against the identified attack surfaces. Finally, the entire process of EV infrastructure cybersecurity assessment was encapsulated in the Electric Vehicle Charging Cybersecurity Management (EVC2M) online GUI-based tool, that is expected to be released to the public. The report presents the objectives, the technical approach, the key results, and recommendations for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

CyberPetri at CDX 2016: Real-time Network Situation Awareness

CyberPetri is a novel visualization technique that provides a flexible map of the network based on available characteristics, such as IP address, operating system, or service. Previous work introduced CyberPetri as a visualization feature in Ocelot, a network defense tool that helped security analysts understand and respond to an active defense scenario. In this paper we present a case study in which we use the CyberPetri visualization technique to support real-time situation awareness during the 2016 Cyber Defense Exercise.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2014

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2014

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2018

Presentation for LDRD FY19 proposal: An Innovative Secure millimeter wave (mmWave) Machine to Machine (M2M) Communication Network for Operating Drones

We propose to prove the principle that a novel 5G wireless network using newly available millimeter wave (mmWave) frequency bands can operate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with Machine to Machine (M2M) communication. If successful, this proposed network will provide a superior alternative to existing methods with improved radio frequency (RF) coverage and resiliency against cyberattacks. The use of UAVs or drones for non-military applications has been advancing rapidly for a large number of applications in the United States. They include public safety search and rescue of natural disaster victims, surveillance of remote critical infrastructure, surveys of environmental quality in protected regions, and detection of threats during major public events. The proposed approach involves research with modeling, simulation, and experimentation to validate the hypothesis in the following thrusts: 1) Using mmWave beams with antennas tilted upward for RF coverage in the sky to analyze the security, reliability, and spectral efficiency of this wireless network for UAV/drone operation; 2) Adding non orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) to analyze increase in security and spectral efficiency when compared to existing methods; 3) Adding intra-drone communication among the swarm of drones to analyze further increase in reliability and spectral efficiency; 4) Concluding the proof of principle/concept with modeling and experiment to demonstrate that a swarm of drones controlled with this advanced network can be effectively used during the simulated recovery of a critical infrastructure e.g. a cyber compromised power grid that requires a black restart. The experiments will be executed at the North Carolina State University (NCSU) using NCSU’s 28 GHz mmWave system. A conceptual Invention Record Disclosure (IDR) has been filed and we expect Intellectual Property (IP) from this proposed research to advance the IRD towards patent filing by INL with support from NCSU. Successful outcome from this work will pave the way for significant future research needed to mature the technology for a nationwide secure and reliable network supporting a large number of government and public safety drones.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Insecurity of Wireless Networks

Wireless is a powerful core technology enabling our global digital infrastructure. Wi-Fi networks are susceptible to attacks on Wired Equivalency Privacy, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), and WPA2. These attack signatures can be profiled into a system that defends against such attacks on the basis of their inherent characteristics. Wi-Fi is the standard protocol for wireless networks used extensively in US critical infrastructures. Since the Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) security protocol was broken, the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol has been considered the secure alternative compatible with hardware developed for WEP. However, in November 2008, researchers developed an attack on WPA, allowing forgery of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets. Subsequent enhancements have enabled ARP poisoning, cryptosystem denial of service, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Open source systems and methods (OSSM) have long been used to secure networks against such attacks. This article reviews OSSMs and the results of experimental attacks on WPA. These experiments re-created current attacks in a laboratory setting, recording both wired and wireless traffic. The article discusses methods of intrusion detection and prevention in the context of cyber physical protection of critical Internet infrastructure. The basis for this research is a specialized (and undoubtedly incomplete) taxonomy of Wi-Fi attacks and their adaptations to existing countermeasures and protocol revisions. Ultimately, this article aims to provide a clearer picture of how and why wireless protection protocols and encryption must achieve a more scientific basis for detecting and preventing such attacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Workbook: End-of-Train (EoT) / Head-of-Train (HoT) Communications

This workbook presents a vulnerability (CVE-2025-1727 ) found in train applications and guides a digital risk assessment and mitigation analysis and application of Cyber-Informed Engineering principles to mitigate the potential consequences and ultimately the hazard through the engineering discipline because of exploiting this vulnerability. Workshop participants are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The workbook guides the participant to: • Understand the HE communication vulnerability • Map digital threats to physical consequences • Use bowtie analysis to illustrate both “security” and “engineering” barriers • Apply CIE principles to ensure that even if communications are compromised, the physical engineered system still behaves safely. • Produce an actionable set of engineered and infosec controls for implementation

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Audits Made Simple

A company just got notified there is a big external audit coming in 3 months. Getting ready for an audit can be challenging, scary, and full of surprises. This Gold Paper describes a typical audit from notification of the intent to audit through disposition of the final report including Best Practices, Opportunities for Improvement (OFI), and issues that must be fixed. Good preparation can improve the chances of success. Ensuring the auditors understand the environment and requirements is paramount to success. It helps the auditors understand that the enterprise really does think that security is important. Understanding and following a structured process ensures a smooth audit process. Ensuring follow-up on OFIs and issues in a structured fashion will also make the next audit easier. It is important to keep in mind that the auditors will use the previous report as a starting point. Now the only worry is the actual audit and subsequent report and how well the company has done. “Virtualization, mobilization, and cloud technology have created new points of entry into business, leaving them vulnerable to covert cyber-attacks,” states a report by Ernst & Young. Executives are struggling with the potential for a data breach, and resolving this business risk is high on their agenda. While most audit committee members are financially solid, they lack knowledge of technology issues, making understanding of this risk difficult. Success with an audit helps management understand the risk management is accepting, highlight gaps in security, and generate ideas on how to improve. These results are an important aspect of managing the business risk.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗