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At least 973 records · Page 54
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Incorporation of trace metals in Hanford waste boehmite mineral phases and dissolution rate impacts

Abstract Data from radioactive Hanford tank waste samples was analyzed to assess whether trace metals present were incorporated into the bulk boehmite matrix or were simply intermingled with the bulk material and subsequent impacts to the boehmite dissolution rate. Results suggest that chromium is primarily blended into the bulk boehmite, with a small fraction present on the surface of the solids. However, increasing the level of chromium incorporation 30‐fold decreased the dissolution rate of boehmite by only 8%, suggesting incorporation of chromium into these samples had a minimal impact on the dissolution rate. Iron was also found to be incorporated in the boehmite solids. Silicon appears to be simply intermingled and not blended into the boehmite crystals.

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DOE OSTI2020

LANL Waste Management

All waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) is subject to one or more types of regulations and must be managed properly. This document describes LANL requirements for waste generated and managed by waste generators and Treatment and Storage Facilities (TSFs) to ensure compliance with legal mandates and Laboratory requirements as necessary to protect human health, safety, and the environment. This document has been revised as part of a process in which the Laboratory systematically plans, documents, executes, and evaluates its management of regulated waste streams.

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DOE OSTI2021

Acceptable Knowledge Technologist Procedure

Process acceptable knowledge (AK) is a waste stream characterization method that can be used to meet all or part of the waste analysis requirements appropriate for the waste. The method may include documented knowledge of process (KOP), additional characterization data, and/or facility records of analysis. LANL will use process AK to ensure chemical compatibility; assign matrix parameter categories and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hazardous waste numbers (HWNs) commonly referred to as EPA codes to waste streams; and determine the waste material parameters and radionuclides present in waste streams.

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DOE OSTI2021

Soil Sampling Results for Closure of a Portion of Solid Waste Management Unit #16

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/ NNSA) and National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS), the management and operating contractor for Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA), has prepared this soil sampling results report for closure of a portion of Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) #16. The entire network of SNL/CA sanitary sewer lines, including building laterals, was identified as SWMU #16 under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Assessment conducted for SNL/CA in April 1991 (DOE 1992). Along with the previous SWMU #16 investigation results (SNL/CA 2019), the results of this investigation are intended to support closure decisions by the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), as discussed below. SNL/CA personnel completed upgrading its sanitary sewer discharge network in 2019. These upgrades included installing new sections of underground lines and decommissioning certain sections of the old piping system by capping in place. To date, several sections of the sewer line have been abandoned-in-place by capping as new sewer lines were installed or flow was rerouted to other existing lines. To formally close these abandoned sections of the sewer line, the RWQCB required that SNL/CA personnel collect soil samples to be analyzed for contaminants potentially released from the sewer lines. SNL/CA personnel hired Weiss Associates (Weiss) of Emeryville, California to prepare a sampling and analysis plan, implement the sampling plan and report the results of the investigation under Purchase Order #2166257. The Sampling and Analysis Plan for Partial Closure of Solid Waste Management Unit #16 (SAP) was submitted to the RWQCB on August 14, 2020 by Weiss on behalf of SNL/CA. The RWQCB approved the SAP on September 30, 2020 after Weiss updated the method detection limit and reporting limits for total polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and individual aroclors. Soil sampling was conducted in accordance with the SAP except that fewer locations were sampled due to site constraints, as discussed below. This report presents the results of the sampling effort and documents all associated field activities including borehole clearing, soil sample collection, storage and transportation to the analytical laboratories, borehole backfilling and surface restoration, and storage of investigation-derived waste (IDW) for future profiling and disposal by SNL/CA waste management personnel.

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DOE OSTI2022

ALDWP NET- TA-55 Waste Management Item #53780 [Slides]

Waste is a Product. It must be manufactured in complete compliance with the customers’ (WIPP, various LLW sites) specification. Programmatic, facility, and maintenance personnel originate the waste. NPI-6 is the waste generator (key legal term). Our customers are the waste originators.

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DOE OSTI2023

Refinement of Pitting Factor Basis to Support the Corrosion Control Program (Interim Report)

At Savannah River Site (SRS), High-Level Waste is stored in below-grade tanks constructed of carbon steel. This waste is composed of sludge, salt cake, and/or supernate. In part, preparation of this waste for future processing involves dissolution of the salt cake layer. The salt dissolution process can create conditions that leave the carbon steel tanks susceptible to a number of corrosion processes. The salt to be dissolved contains high concentrations of nitrate, that once released, create an environment that may be conducive to pitting corrosion or stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon steel. Additionally, during the salt dissolution process, in the absence of mixing, stratification of the supernatant liquid may occur. This can result in less dense, more dilute waste layers occurring higher in the tank. In these more dilute waste layers, the susceptibility to localized corrosion could potentially differ from that of the more concentrated salt solutions evaluated in previous testing, as the amount of inhibiting and aggressive species, not just the ratios, can affect susceptibility. Evaluation of the susceptibility to localized corrosion in these more dilute waste chemistries could provide insight into the amount of inhibitors required to effectively mitigate pitting corrosion in stagnant salt dissolution environments, as well as other tank farm operations involving dilute waste streams.

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DOE OSTI2023

Characterization of Infrequent Samples from the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility: Leak Detection Box (LDB) Drain Cell Sample: May 15, 2023, Sample

Savannah River Mission Completion Engineering (SRMC-E) requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) analyze the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) samples from the following Tank Farm areas: the sump encasement, catch tank, drain cell, and waste tank annulus. In general, these CSTF samples will be analyzed on an infrequent basis and analyses will include detection for total beta/gamma activities, total alpha activity, free hydroxide, and pH measurement. SRMC-E corresponded with SRNL to obtain the final results through memo SRNL-L3120-2023-00013. This report presents characterization from results for the leak detection box (LDB) May 15, 2023, drain cell sample. The sample was clear and colorless with no visible particulates. The results are measurements for total gamma, total alpha, total beta, free hydroxide, pH, and density. These analyses were performed in triplicate. A summary of the average analytical results for the LDB sample includes the following. The measured pH for the LDB May 15, 2023 "as-received" drain cell sample range was 6.60-6.89, and the free hydroxide concentration as expected, based upon the pH, was <0.02 M. The average measured density of the "as-received" drain cell sample determined at 22 °C was 1.022±0.001 g/mL. the average measured total alpha activity for the LDB May 15, 2023, sample was 3.04E+02±1.13E+01. This value is less than 4.83E+03 dpm/mL, which is the procedural limit for non-waste determination. The total empirical activity of the beta and gamma emitting (represented by by the sum of total beta and B-137 m activities) averaged to 1.83+04±1.07E+03 dpm/mL. This value is less than 8.69E+05 dpm/mL, which is the procedural limit for non-waste determination.

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DOE OSTI2020

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material shipping package, or the 9982, differs from the others by allowing a multitude of radionuclides instead of a single defined set. While allowing flexibility, this requires more justification on why these contents would be worthwhile and why they would not cause various safety hazards when shipped together. The latter was covered through mass limit calculations, and the potential uses for the package are shown through comparison with historical shipments. Here, the mass limits were already calculated[1] and used to show three example shipments are suitable for the 9982 as well. Plutonium stored in 3013 containers[2], training sources shipped in 9977 packages[3], and americium standards shipped in 9978 packages[4] were all analyzed. The mass of each radionuclide and the corresponding mass limit were used to first determine if the listed content could be shipped. If so, the maximum allowed mass of such contents is also calculated in order to see if the 200-gram fissile limit for the 9982 would be violated if additional material was packed. The sum-of-the-fractions method produces contents that do not violate the mass limits or exceed the 200-gram fissile limit. These sets also serve as realistic examples of what may be shipped in the 9982. Well-founded example contents will help the approval of the package by showing its compatibility with previously shipped material. Unfounded hypothetical contents would not show the usefulness of having a wide variety of allowed radionuclides. More contents may be developed in order to incorporate other radionuclides that were not present in these three examples. The light elements will also need to be evaluated due to their exclusion currently preventing some materials from being allowed in the 9982.

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DOE OSTI2023

Effects of anisotropic shale creep on the stress and permeability evolution of a geological nuclear waste repository

To ensure long-term safety and performance, geological nuclear waste repositories require low-permeability barriers such as bentonite buffers and/or shale host rock. Shale is not only known for its low permeability but also for its trend to undergo time-dependent deformation (i.e., creep), which could heal damage, but the effects of shale creep on the long-term performance of nuclear waste repositories have not been clearly understood. In particular, the anisotropic nature of shale (i.e., bedding) could have a significant effect on its creep behavior, and consequently, on the long-term performance of nuclear waste repositories. In this research, numerical simulations were carried out with the objective of showing the effects of anisotropic shale creep on the stress and permeability evolution of a generic geological nuclear waste repository in shale. The TOUGH-FLAC simulator, a thermo-hydromechanically (THM) coupled numerical code, was used for the simulations. To achieve the objective, comparisons were performed between the results of anisotropic shale creep simulations and those of different simulation cases, namely, no creep (i.e., elastic), isotropic creep, and long-term creep shale cases. Results of the comparisons show that the elastic and isotropic creep shale cases respectively led to the overestimation and underestimation of stress and permeability in the repository, whereas the long-term creep shale case, which accumulated greater creep in later periods than in earlier periods, helped to keep large shear and tensile stresses from developing while maintaining compressive spherical stress, resulting in consistently low permeability levels. These results indicate that performance assessments with elastic and isotropic creep formation models will provide the upper and lower bound estimates of stress and permeability, while more reasonable estimates will be given by an anisotropic creep formation model, and that shale with long-term creep characteristics will be beneficial in many aspects of the safety and performance of nuclear waste repositories.

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DOE OSTI2020

Review of Mercury in the SRS Tank Waste Storage and Treatment Processes for Applicability to Hanford Waste Processing

The Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford produced large quantities of plutonium and other radioisotopes. The separations processes recovered plutonium and produced large quantities of High- Level Waste (HLW) that accumulated at each site in large, underground storage tanks. SRS has been retrieving the stored HLW, pretreating the waste for immobilization, and immobilizing the waste in glass or grout waste forms since the mid-1990s. Treatment of the waste at Hanford is expected to start in the early 2020s. Mercury is present in both the SRS and Hanford tank waste. SRS has recently completed an evaluation of mercury speciation throughout the tank waste treatment and immobilization flowsheet. This study was reviewed to determine what information from the study can be applied to the Hanford tank waste treatment program.

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DOE OSTI2020

INL Waste Management Program Assessment Report

This is an INL annual internal waste management program assessment report that will need to be sent to NNSS for review. The report includes a summary and completed checklists based on the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria.

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DOE OSTI2020

Considerations on Managing Flowsheet and Technology for DFLAW Production

This report evaluates best practices for flowsheet and technology (F&T) management and makes recommendations for Hanford tank waste treatment operations initially for Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DFLAW). Establishing practicing F&T management operations prior to hot commissioning the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant is desirable to ensure focused F&T leadership and F&T capabilities and competencies are immediately ready to sustain DFLAW production operations. Management of F&T is characterized by the five programmatic elements important to sustained operations and leads to recommendations for Hanford tank waste treatment operations:

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DOE OSTI2024

Project Report for Cold Spray Phase 2 (Tasks 9-20)

In support of the ongoing environmental protection mission at the Hanford Site, led by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), the cold spray team has continued development of the tank refurbishment technology. Orano Federal Services, along with subcontractors VRC Metal Systems (VRC) and Robotic Technologies of Tennessee (RTT), have worked with WRPS experts to refine the tools demonstrated in Phase 1 of this project, with the potential to refurbish double shell tanks (DST)s on the Hanford Site, extending the service lives of these vital waste storage facilities.

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