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At least 973 records · Page 54

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NASA NTRS1984

Ground test experience with large composite structures for commercial transports

The initial ground test of each component resulted in structural failure at less than ultimate design loads. While such failures represent major program delays, the investigation and analysis of each failure revealed significant lessons for effective utilization of composites in primary structure. Foremost among these are secondary loads that produce through-the-thickness forces which may lead to serious weaknesses in an otherwise sound structural design. The sources, magnitude, and effects of secondary loads need to be thoroughly understood and accounted for by the designers of composite primary aircraft structures.

Bohon, H. L.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Displays and Controls (D and C) subsystem hardware. The function of the D and C hardware is to provide the crew with the monitor, command, and control capabilities required for management of all normal and contingency mission and flight operations. The D and C hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed consists of the following: Acceleration Indicator (G-METER); Head Up Display (HUD); Display Driver Unit (DDU); Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI); Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI); Attitude Director Indicator (ADI); Propellant Quantity Indicator (PQI); Surface Position Indicator (SPI); Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI); Caution and Warning Assembly (CWA); Annunciator Control Assembly (ACA); Event Timer (ET); Mission Timer (MT); Interior Lighting; and Exterior Lighting. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1968

Statistical and metallographic aspects of fatigue failure mechanisms in metals

Statistical analysis and metallographic aspects of fatigue failure mechanisms in copper alloys

Ravindran, R.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Going South: Analysis of an Historic Project Engineering Failure

NASA's successful conduct of the Apollo Program greatly enhanced the prestige of the United States and remains broadly accepted as America's gift to all Mankind. NASA's accomplishments continue to amaze the world. With the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) Americans once again tasked NASA to carry out a project that is expected to provide inspiration and economic stimulus to the United States and to the world. In preparation NASA has thoroughly examined space program precedents. There is, however, another precedent which has not been examined in this context but whose scope and environment in many ways parallel the VSE. This project was initiated by a team that had, ten years before, successfully completed an effort that, at a cost of $173 billion (in 2008 dollars), had pushed the envelope of technology, brought economic growth, established their country as the world leader in engineering, and been broadly accepted as that country's gift to all Mankind. The new project was again inspired by popular desire to enhance national prestige and make yet another major contribution to Humanity. This effort was predicted to require eight years and $156 billion (2008 dollars). However, after nine years and expenditures of 96% beyond the baseline, the project collapsed amid bankruptcy, political scandal, and criminal prosecution. This paper applies current project management metrics, such as earned value analysis, to review the strategic decisions in this historic failure and describe its ultimate collapse. Key mistakes are identified, and lessons are drawn which may prove useful in guiding the VSE.

Scott, John H.↗

NASA NTRS1979

Computation of spare parts requirements

Statistical analysis determines probability of failure for N-1 spares. Analysis can help reduce downtime in industrial processes by determining number of spare parts that must be stockpiled. Analysis can also be inverted to decide if number of spares on hand is sufficient for lifetime needs of system.

Mezzacappa, M. A.↗

NASA NTRS1994

The Dash Data Sharing System

The Data Sharing system (DASH) project was recently undertaken at NASA Johnson Space Center to introduce distributed data sharing into the Mission Control Center (MCC). Although the project focused on MCC communications, the solution is a general one. This paper describes that project. DASH allows applications to share data. It provides callable interfaces for applications wishing to export or import data. The system consists of several processes: publishers make exported data available to subscribers, which provide it to interested importing applications. A network registration service provides network location transparency, allowing the other processes to reside at arbitrary network locations. These processes act as intermediaries between external producing and consuming applications. DASH has been demonstrated in the MCC where it transmits Shuttle electrical bus data from the Bus Loss Smart System to the Configurable Realtime Analysis System. In addition, the Failure Impact and Procedure Analysis system used DASH to transmit Shuttle remote manipulator data from an expert system to a version of CRANS. DASH is currently being used to integrate a knowledge acquisition application and the CLIPS expert system shell.

Hasan, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Development of Composite Sandwich Bonded Longitudinal Joints for Space Launch Vehicle Structures

The NASA Composite Technology for Exploration (CTE) Project is developing and demonstrating critical composite technologies with a focus on composite bonded joints; incorporating materials, design/analysis, manufacturing, and tests that utilize NASA’s expertise and capabilities. The project has goals of advancing composite technologies and providing lightweight structures to support future NASA exploration missions. In particular, the CTE project will demonstrate weight-saving, performance-enhancing composite bonded joint technology for Space Launch System (SLS)-scale composite hardware. Advancements from the CTE project may be incorporated as future block upgrades for SLS structural components. This paper discusses the details of the development of a composite sandwich bonded longitudinal joint for a generic space launch vehicle structure called the CTE Point Design. The paper includes details of the design, analysis, materials, manufacturing, and testing of sub-element joint test articles to test the capability of the joint design. The test results show that the composite longitudinal bonded joint design significantly exceeds the design loads with a 2.0 factor of safety. Analysis pre-test failure predictions for all sub-element bonded joint test coupons were all within 10% of the average test coupon failure load. This testing and analysis provides confidence in the potential use of composite bonded joints for future launch vehicle structures.

Segal, Kenneth N.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem

Compton, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the body flap subsystem FMEA/CIL

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the rudder/speed brake subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the proposed Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RSB hardware. The IOA product for the RSB analysis consisted of 38 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 27 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS2011

EMU Lessons Learned Database

As manned space exploration takes on the task of traveling beyond low Earth orbit, many problems arise that must be solved in order to make the journey possible. One major task is protecting humans from the harsh space environment. The current method of protecting astronauts during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) is through use of the specially designed Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). As more rigorous EVA conditions need to be endured at new destinations, the suit will need to be tailored and improved in order to accommodate the astronaut. The Objective behind the EMU Lessons Learned Database(LLD) is to be able to create a tool which will assist in the development of next-generation EMUs, along with maintenance and improvement of the current EMU, by compiling data from Failure Investigation and Analysis Reports (FIARs) which have information on past suit failures. FIARs use a system of codes that give more information on the aspects of the failure, but if one is unfamiliar with the EMU they will be unable to decipher the information. A goal of the EMU LLD is to not only compile the information, but to present it in a user-friendly, organized, searchable database accessible to all familiarity levels with the EMU; both newcomers and veterans alike. The EMU LLD originally started as an Excel database, which allowed easy navigation and analysis of the data through pivot charts. Creating an entry requires access to the Problem Reporting And Corrective Action database (PRACA), which contains the original FIAR data for all hardware. FIAR data are then transferred to, defined, and formatted in the LLD. Work is being done to create a web-based version of the LLD in order to increase accessibility to all of Johnson Space Center (JSC), which includes converting entries from Excel to the HTML format. FIARs related to the EMU have been completed in the Excel version, and now focus has shifted to expanding FIAR data in the LLD to include EVA tools and support hardware such as the Pistol Grip Tool (PGT) and the Battery Charger Module (BCM), while adding any recently closed EMU-related FIARs.

Matthews, Kevin M., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the life support and airlock support systems, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Life Support and Airlock Support Systems (LSS and ALSS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. The discrepancies were flagged for potential future resolution. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LSS and ALSS hardware. The IOA product for the LSS and ALSS analysis consisted of 511 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 140 potential critical items. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 456 FMEAs and 101 CIL items. The IOA analysis identified 39 failure modes, 6 of which were classified as CIL items, for components not covered by the NASA FMEAs. It was recommended that these failure modes be added to the NASA FMEA baseline. The overall assessment produced agreement on all but 301 FMEAs which caused differences in 111 CIL items.

Arbet, J. D.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integrated Transcriptomic and Proteomic Analysis Identifies Plasma Biomarkers of Hepatocellular Failure in Alcohol-Associated Hepatitis

Alcohol-associated hepatitis (AH) is a form of liver failure with high short-term mortality. Recent results have shown that HNF4a defective function and systemic inflammation are major disease drivers of AH. Plasma biomarkers of hepatocyte function could be useful for diagnostic and prognostic purposes. Herein an integrative analysis of hepatic RNAseq and liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) was performed to identify plasma protein signatures for mild and severe AH patients. Alcohol-related liver disease cirrhosis (ALD)(AC), non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NALFD), and healthy subjects (HC) were used as comparator groups. Identified proteins primarily involved in hepatocellular function were decreased in AH patients which included hepatokines, clotting factors, complement cascade components, and hepatocyte growth activators. A protein signature of AH disease severity was identified including thrombin (THRB), hepatocyte growth factor alpha (HGFA), clusterin (CLUS), human serum factor H-related protein (FHR1) and kallistatin (KAIN), which exhibited large abundance shifts between severe and non-severe AH. The combination of THRB and HGFA discriminated between severe and non-severe AH with high sensitivity and specificity. These findings were correlated with the liver expression of genes encoding secreted proteins in a similar cohort, finding a highly consistent plasma protein signature reflecting HNF4A and HNF1A functions. This unbiased proteomic-transcriptome analysis identified plasma protein signatures and pathways associated with disease severity, reflecting HNF4A/1A activity useful for diagnostic assessment in AH.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the manned maneuvering unit

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve indepedence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware. The MMU is a propulsive backpack, operated through separate hand controllers that input the pilot's translational and rotational maneuvering commands to the control electronics and then to the thrusters. The IOA analysis process utilized available MMU hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware subsystems, assemblies, components, and hardware items. Final levels of detail were evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the worst case severity of the effect for each identified failure mode. The IOA analysis of the MMU found that the majority of the PCIs identified are resultant from the loss of either the propulsion or control functions, or are resultant from inability to perform an immediate or future mission. The five most severe criticalities identified are all resultant from failures imposed on the MMU hand controllers which have no redundancy within the MMU.

Bailey, P. S.↗

NASA NTRS1980

Ferrographic and spectrographic analysis of oil sampled before and after failure of a jet engine

An experimental gas turbine engine was destroyed as a result of the combustion of its titanium components. Several engine oil samples (before and after the failure) were analyzed with a Ferrograph as well as plasma, atomic absorption, and emission spectrometers. The analyses indicated that a lubrication system failure was not a causative factor in the engine failure. Neither an abnormal wear mechanism, nor a high level of wear debris was detected in the oil sample from the engine just prior to the test in which the failure occurred. However, low concentrations of titanium were evident in this sample and samples taken earlier. After the failure, higher titanium concentrations were detected in oil samples taken from different engine locations. Ferrographic analysis indicated that most of the titanium was contained in spherical metallic debris after the failure.

Jones, W. R., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Failure-Tolerant Avionics for Crewed Space Systems Recommended Best Practices

This paper provides an overview of some of the major steps needed to mature and justify the design of an avionics system for crewed spacecraft. It is organized as a collection of artifacts or pieces of evidence that NASA needs to assess the system at design reviews, including a functional failure modes and effects analysis (FFMEA), fault containment region (FCR) definitions, the failure hypothesis, and reliability analysis. This paper is intended as a reference for designers working on NASA crewed spaceflight projects, reliability engineers responsible for avionics system assessments, and program managers wanting to understand what evidence is required at design reviews to ensure crew safety and mission success.

Avionics↗