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DOE OSTI2024

New Tank Mapping Method Improves Waste Removal Process

Savannah River Mission Completion is the Liquid Waste (LW) contractor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The LW mission is tasked with treating and disposing of legacy nuclear waste. There are multiple facilities involved in this work, including the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), and the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). The CSTF includes 43 underground waste tanks used to store and support processing of radioactive liquid waste. Waste removal activities, such as salt dissolution campaigns and sludge agitation, are conducted within the CSTF waste tanks to convert the waste into a form that allows for downstream processing at other LW facilities. While performing these waste removal campaigns, camera inspections are performed to assess the quantity and distribution of the remaining waste within the waste tank (i.e. saltcake or sludge). Understanding the quantity and distribution of the salt/sludge within the waste tanks allows for improved waste removal strategies (e.g. mixing pump operation) and refined safety controls. Typically, several camera inspections are performed during a waste removal transfer to verify the elevation of the visible salt/sludge mounds against the known elevation of the liquid surface. The camera inspection footage must then be interpreted by a trained engineer who will develop a 2-D map that depicts the waste distribution at various elevations within the waste tank. This tank mapping is then used in conjunction with conservative assumptions to evaluate the volume of saltcake or sludge that is present within the waste tank.

Mini, Melany↗

DOE OSTI2026

Radioactivity-in-materials lead for nEXO (Final Scientific Report)

Abstract, introduction, and summary of work completed and products produced by DOE award SC002466. Primary products were six peer-reviewed publications and two PhD theses. This award also supported the operation of an underground HPGe detector and several radioassay measurements: one in a stand alone publication in Phys. Rev. C and the others in an upcoming nEXO radioassay summary paper. The nEXO collaboration aims to demonstrate the Majorana nature of the neutrino by observing the neutrinoless double-beta decay of 136 Xe with a next-generation experiment. The University of Kentucky nEXO group (UKY) operates a world-leading ultra-low-background γ-ray spectrometer as part of the nEXO radioactive background control R&D effort. The nEXO project is a proposed ton-scale neutrinoless double-beta decay experiment. The UKY PI is leading the radioactivity content assessment for all materials required by the nEXO project. As a subset of this task, UKY is also responsible for project-wide management of all low-background γ-ray spectrometry measurements; material assays with these types of instruments, together with ICP-MS, neutron-activation-analysis, and α-spectrometry, are critical to ensuring that the nEXO project can achieve its design sensitivity

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2026

EOS at the Fermilab LHC Physics Center(LPC)

The Fermilab CMS LPC center has operated an EOS instance since initial testing began in June 2012, transitioning to production storage in 2013 with an initial capacity of 600\,TB. Today, the system provides approximately 16\,PB of storage to support the 4{,}500-core LPC user analysis cluster, which serves several hundred active CMS users at any given time. In this talk, we will provide an update on our system setup and outline near-term plans for the CMS LPC production EOS system. We will share operational experiences from running our EOS system over the past year. Additionally, we will briefly discuss our recent efforts within the Fermilab Disk Evolution Project to consider the future architecture of HEP data storage at Fermilab for the HL-LHC era.

Wu, Yujun↗

DOE OSTI2026

EOS at the Fermilab LHC Physics Center(LPC)

Wu, Yujun↗

DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services 2020

The Ryuk Ransomware Attack on Universal Health Services (UHS) 2020 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the 2020 UHS cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. UHS manages over 400 hospitals and is one of the largest healthcare providers in the United States with 3.5 million patients each year. On 27 September 2020, UHS suffered a widespread ransomware attack that resulted in a denial of service to critical internet-dependent healthcare systems including workstations, phones, and data centers. Employees resorted to filing patient details with pen and paper, while other facilities had to redirect ambulances and urgent patients to other facilities for adequate care. Adversaries carried out the attack with Ryuk, a ransomware that encrypts data and generates a RyukReadMe.txt ransom note with the ransom fee to decrypt the data, varying from 15 Bitcoin (BTC) to 50 BTC, equivalent to roughly $\$$353,892 to $\$$964,617. UHS did not pay the ransom and was able to recover data through backups, but still reported an impact of $\$$67 million dollars in recovery costs. On 29 October, one month after the attack, UHS made an official statement that their systems had been restored and they were resuming normal operations. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 19 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fourteen of the identified techniques used during the UHS cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 106 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 82 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 30 days to two hours preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

ARM Aerial Facility (AAF) Merged Value-Added Product Report for Historical G-1 Field Campaigns

For 30 years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science supported an instrumented Grumman Gulfstream-1 (G-1) aircraft for atmospheric field campaigns. Data from the final decade of G-1 operations were archived by the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility Data Center (ADC) and made publicly available at no cost to all registered users. To ensure a consistent data format and to improve the accessibility of the ARM airborne data, an integrated data set was recently developed covering the final six years of G-1 operations (2013 to 2018). The integrated data set includes data collected from 236 flights (766.4 hours). Four of the seven field campaigns were based in the U.S. One campaign collected data from the wildfires in the U.S. Pacific Northwest and agricultural burns in the lower Mississippi River valley as part of the Biomass Burning Observation Project (BBOP) in 2013. In 2015, the ARM Cloud Aerosol Precipitation Experiment provided data on atmospheric rivers and associated aerosol-cloud interactions that produce heavy precipitation on the U.S. west coast during the early spring. Research data from Airborne Carbon Measurements-V (ACME-V), collected during the summer of 2015, gave scientists insight into trends and variability of trace gases in the atmosphere over the North Slope of Alaska to improve arctic climate models. In the early summer and autumn of 2016, the Holistic Interactions of Shallow Clouds, Aerosols, and Land-Ecosystems (HI-SCALE) campaign provided an extensive data set geared toward coupled processes that affect the life cycle of shallow clouds through the interaction among aerosol, cloud, land surface, and ecosystems. In 2014 (March and October), the airborne sampling moved outside of the U.S. to the city of Manaus in central Amazonia, Brazil, where residential and industrial emissions were extensively characterized by flights of the G-1. The GoAmazon2014/15 aircraft campaign data are being integrated with aquatic and terrestrial ecosystem measurements to quantify anthropogenic perturbations to a usually pristine tropical environment. Another international airborne mission was carried out in the Eastern North Atlantic region. The Aerosol and Cloud Experiments in the Eastern North Atlantic (ACE-ENA) campaign saw the G-1 aircraft fly from Terceira Island in the Azores during the summer of 2017 and the winter of 2018. The campaign studied both seasons to measure key aerosol and cloud processes under various meteorological and cloud conditions with different aerosol sources. Then the G-1 deployed to the Sierras de Córdoba range in central Argentina from October to November 2018 for the Cloud, Aerosol, and Complex Terrain Interactions (CACTI) campaign to study orographic convective cloud interactions with their surrounding environment. These comprehensive datastreams provide much-needed insight into spatiotemporal variability of thermodynamic quantities, aerosol and cloud states, and properties for addressing essential science questions in Earth system process studies.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Deep Learning for In-Situ Layer Quality Monitoring during Laser-Based Directed Energy Deposition (LB-DED) Additive Manufacturing Process

Defects are a leading issue for the rejection of parts manufactured through the Directed Energy Deposition (DED) Additive Manufacturing (AM) process. In an attempt to illuminate and advance in situ quality monitoring and control of workpieces, we present an innovative data-driven method that synchronously collects sensing data and AM process parameters with a low sampling rate during the DED process. The proposed data-driven technique determines the important influences that individual printing parameters and sensing features have on prediction at the inter-layer qualification to perform feature selection. Three Machine Learning (ML) algorithms including Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) are used. During post-production, a threshold is applied to detect low-density occurrences such as porosity sizes and quantities from CT scans that render individual layers acceptable or unacceptable. This information is fed to the ML models for training. Training/testing are completed offline on samples deemed “high-quality” and “low-quality”, utilizing only features recorded from the build process. CNN results show that the classification of acceptable/unacceptable layers can reach between 90% accuracy while training/testing on a “high-quality” sample and dip to 65% accuracy when trained/tested on “low-quality”/“high-quality” (respectively), indicating over-fitting but showing CNN as a promising inter-layer classifier.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

The ABCflux database: Arctic–boreal CO 2 flux observations and ancillary information aggregated to monthly time steps across terrestrial ecosystems

Past efforts to synthesize and quantify the magnitude and change in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems across the rapidly warming Arctic–boreal zone (ABZ) have provided valuable information but were limited in their geographical and temporal coverage. Furthermore, these efforts have been based on data aggregated over varying time periods, often with only minimal site ancillary data, thus limiting their potential to be used in large-scale carbon budget assessments. To bridge these gaps, we developed a standardized monthly database of Arctic–boreal CO 2 fluxes (ABCflux) that aggregates in situ measurements of terrestrial net ecosystem CO 2 exchange and its derived partitioned component fluxes: gross primary productivity and ecosystem respiration. The data span from 1989 to 2020 with over 70 supporting variables that describe key site conditions (e.g., vegetation and disturbance type), micrometeorological and environmental measurements (e.g., air and soil temperatures), and flux measurement techniques. Here, we describe these variables, the spatial and temporal distribution of observations, the main strengths and limitations of the database, and the potential research opportunities it enables. In total, ABCflux includes 244 sites and 6309 monthly observations; 136 sites and 2217 monthly observations represent tundra, and 108 sites and 4092 observations represent the boreal biome. The database includes fluxes estimated with chamber (19 % of the monthly observations), snow diffusion (3 %) and eddy covariance (78 %) techniques. The largest number of observations were collected during the climatological summer (June–August; 32 %), and fewer observations were available for autumn (September–October; 25 %), winter (December–February; 18 %), and spring (March–May; 25 %). ABCflux can be used in a wide array of empirical, remote sensing and modeling studies to improve understanding of the regional and temporal variability in CO 2 fluxes and to better estimate the terrestrial ABZ CO 2 budget.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Atomic Layer Deposition for Improved Biomass Conversion Catalysts

Heterogeneous catalysts are a key enabler of the transition towards a sustainable, bio-based economy for fuels and chemicals. However, the harsh conditions in many biomass conversion processes lead to nanoparticle sintering, support collapse, and metal leaching in conventional PGM catalysts. Next-generation catalysts must be developed to address these stability challenges. This presentation will discuss ongoing work between the Catalytic Carbon Transformation & Scale-Up Center at NREL and various industrial partners to develop scalable, cost-effective atomic layer deposition (ALD) coatings for improving the performance of biomass conversion catalysts. Substantial focus will be devoted to the benefits of TiO2 ALD coatings on supported Pd hydrogenation catalysts. Ten cycles of TiO2 ALD were found to dramatically improve the activity of a conventional Pd/Al2O3 catalyst towards aromatic hydrogenation, despite partial coverage of the Pd sites by the ALD layer. Subsequent advanced characterization and atomic-scale computational modeling revealed that the ALD coating influenced the adsorption strength of hydrogenation surface intermediates in unexpected ways, leading to higher reaction rates. Reaction testing after exposure to sulfur impurities, high temperature oxidation, and hydrothermal treatment demonstrated the improved stability of the ALD-coated catalyst. Additionally, the ALD synthesis process was found to be scalable over two orders of magnitude with minimal deviation in synthesized catalyst properties. These results were contextualized with cost models of industrial ALD coating and aromatic hydrogenation processes to further refine the value proposition of ALD coatings. Given the demonstrated improvements in hydrogenation, TiO2 ALD coatings have also been applied to supported Pt catalysts for use in other biomass conversion reactions, such as hydrodeoxygenation for production of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and the oxidation of glucose for bio-derived gluconic acid. Recent findings from these experimental campaigns will also be shared. ALD technology holds great potential in the development of next-generation catalysts for biofuels and bioproducts and this work constitutes an important examination of the impact of ALD coatings in a variety of reaction environments.

bioenergy↗

DOE OSTI2023

Trepanning Graphite Samples at a Shutdown Magnox Reactor: A US-UK Joint Exercise for Nuclear Verification

In April 2022, a team sponsored by the US DOE Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) shipped trepanning equipment to the nuclear power station at Trawsfynydd, Wales, UK to collect samples from the graphite moderator of Reactor 1. The sampling campaign to collect 48 graphite samples was completed in five weeks beginning July 11. Half the samples will be analyzed in the US to determine the total energy production of the facility. The other half will be analyzed by Magnox Ltd. to support decisions for options for the ultimate decommissioning path for the facility. This paper provides a description of the equipment and the operations required to trepan, collect, and package the samples while controlling the small amounts of radioactive graphite dust entrained on and within the tool. The most important sample parameter needed is the precise location of the sample, to within ±6 mm in a fuel channel, while the tool is deployed to between 12 and 20 meters below the operations floor; our means of achieving this precision is given.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

D and D Research on KM-IT Platform - 20494

The Knowledge Management Information Tool (KM-IT) is a web-based system developed to maintain and preserve the Department of Energy's (DoE's) knowledge base. The system was developed by Florida International University's Applied Research Center (FIU-ARC) with the support of the D and D community including the DOE Office of Environmental Management, and with the collaboration and support of the DoE's Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) and the former ALARA Centers at Hanford and Savannah. The KM-IT system is a community driven system tailored to serve the technical issues faced by the workforce across the DOE Complex. This KM-IT web-based interactive system is operational and available for use at www.dndkm.org and is currently comprised of the following modules: Web Crawler, Hotline, Technology, Hanford's ALARA Center Reports, Specialist Directory, Lessons Learned, Best Practices, Video/Picture Library, Vendors and Industry News. The Web Crawler dynamically searches through the KM-IT repository as well as the web and displays search results based on the search criteria. The Hotline allows registered users to post questions/problems related to D and D and to receive solutions from a subject-matter specialist. The Technology module serves as repository of D and D technologies and contains technology/ demonstration fact sheets and vendor information. D and D community members can add Lessons Learned, Best Practices, and Pictures/Videos to the D and D repository, after a formal approval process. The Vendor module provides a directory of commercial vendors who provide D and D related technologies, supplies, and services. KM-IT makes an excellent use of the knowledge that exists within the D and D community by allowing D and D project managers around the DOE complex to collaborate by sharing innovative ideas, past experiences, and practices and by maintaining a directory of subject matter specialists. FIU has developed the dedicated module on KM-IT platform to publish D and D research being performed at FIU. This module highlights current EM research efforts and activities in support of D and D being performed at FIU/SRNL associated with fixatives and intumescent products. FIU will expand this module to include the recent and current D and D research being performed across multiple DOE EM sites, national labs and universities. FIU will collaborate with SRNL, INL, ANL and other universities to explore and publish D and D research activities on KM-IT. As a result, the user community will have a centralized location to review new D and D related research across the DOE EM complex. (authors)

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