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At least 793 records · Page 44

Spent enrichment media for growth of gene-matched microorganisms

A method for amplifying and detecting microorganisms, such as species of Listeria, is described. The method utilizes gene-matched enrichment media and PCR-based detection. The enrichment media is spent media produced using a modified microorganism containing a plurality of mutations in a selected gene such that the modified microorganism does not contain the PCR signature. Thus, PCR detects only the amplified microorganism of interest, not the modified microorganism. Exemplary methods and kits for amplification and detection of Listeria species are described.

Ozanich, Richard M.↗

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Safe Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel

The aim for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) either in wet or in dry storage systems is to ensure general safety objective s are met throughout a desired storage period. Staff at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in collaborations with partners at other national laboratories, industry research organizations, and the University of South Carolina (UofSC), have performed materials aging testing and analyses, and have established nuclear materials aging management programs to support extended periods of safe storage of research reactor (RR) SNF and of commercial power reactor (PR) SNF pending ultimate disposal. Several example challenges include susceptibility of aluminum SNF from research reactors to corrosion in poor quality water (wet storage). In dry storage, aluminum SNF can release hydrogen via radiolysis of the hydrated oxides on the aluminum cladding. Austenitic stainless steel canisters used for dry storage are susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (outside-in attack) that threaten the confinement boundary provided by the canister. This paper further describes these challenges, among others, and the formulated solutions to support extended safe storage of SNF.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verification and Validation of START: A Spent Nuclear Fuel Routing and Decision Support Tool

The Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START) is a web-based geospatial decision-support tool being developed by the US Department of Energy’s Office of Integrated Waste Management (IWM) to support federal interim storage for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and associated transportation. START provides many functions for the IWM program including: serving as a communications tool for conveying geospatial data and information, an options analysis tool for exploring potential transport modes and routes for transporting SNF from nuclear power plants to future federal interim storage facilities, an emergency response planning tool for Tribes and States to identify training needs along potential SNF transport corridors, an environmental analysis tool for estimating potential radiation dose exposure from incident-free and incident-case SNF transport conditions, and a systems analysis support tool providing route-related inputs for system throughput analysis. As part of the START development process, a verification and validation (V&V) effort is being undertaken. In the initial V&V phase, several outputs of the START tool were checked such as the total distance, population and population densities within the buffer zone, and incident free dose. The V&V process is fluid as it will be utilized after each version change to ensure that the core functionalities of the tool are maintained and the results are consistent with the previous versions. Efforts have also been put into developing scripts to aid in the process of automating certain sections of the V&V work. As some of the V&V efforts use Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) tools upon which the START framework is built, the START data were compared against outputs from tools like Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) for buffer zone populations and route lengths to ensure independence of the V&V process. Good agreement was observed between the START results and the independent V&V studies with the majority of the differences falling between 1% and 5% for populations within the buffer zone and route distance. This presentation describes the development and design of the START tool, V&V methods employed for various metrics of interest and their respective results, and future plans.

START, transportation, GIS, V&V↗

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations for a Department of Energy Standard Canister Loaded with Aluminum-Clad Spent Fuel

This report presents bounding pressurization and flammability evaluations from the radiolytic gas generation expected during extended (>50 years) dry storage of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) elements in a sealed Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The primary questions involving extended ASNF dry storage center around the adequacy of dry storage conditioning processes (i.e., drying) and the behavior of residual hydrated aluminum oxides on the cladding—specifically, the radiolytic breakdown of chemically bound water in these corrosion products. The objectives of the presented work include providing a bounding assessment of the pressure with respect to the DOE Standard Canister’s structural integrity limits and identifying the potential for forming flammable or explosive gas mixtures (i.e., exceedance of the lower flammability limit of the molecular hydrogen [H2] and oxygen [O2] concentrations). The evaluation results confirm the findings of previous, more complex M&S work. That is, the structural integrity of the canister remains unchallenged by a wide margin. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the presented pressure calculations consider a full breakdown of the chemisorbed water, including a consequent release of all available H2. In reality, the breakdown of water in these systems will likely remain incomplete, due to competing chemical and radiolytic reactions, thereby attaining an equilibrium in the storage environment.

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Processing of Spent Ion Exchange Resins in a Rotary Calciner - 12212

Processing Russian nuclear ion exchange resin KU-2 using a 'Rotary' calciner was conducted. The resulting product is a dry free flowing powder (moisture content 3 wt.%, Angle of repose of ≅ 20 deg.). Compared with the original exchange resin the volume of the final product is about 3 times less.. Rotary calciner product can be stored in metal drums or in special reinforced concrete cubicles. After thermal treatment in a rotary calciner, the spent resin product can be solidified in cement yielding the following attributes: - The cemented waste is only a 35% increase over the volume of powder product; - The volume of cement calciner product is almost 9 times less (8.7) than the volume of cement solidified resin; - The mechanical strength of cemented calciner product meets the radioactive waste regulations in Russia. (authors)

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Direct Encapsulation of Spent Ion-exchange Resins at the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant, Czech Republic - 12367

At the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant there are large amounts of spent ion exchange resins contained within storage tanks. These resins are a product of the operation of an Active Water Purification System within the Power Plant. Activity levels of the resins are in the range of 105 to 10{sup 6} Bq/l and the main isotopes present are Co-60, Cs-137, Mn-54 and Ag-110m. In order to maintain storage tank availability throughout the planned lifetime of the Power Plant these resins must be removed and disposed of safely. The storage tanks do not have an effective retrieval route for the resins and the installed agitation system is inoperable. A proven system for retrieving and directly encapsulating these resins to a standard required for the Czech repository is described, together with an overview of operational performance. Experience gained from this and other projects has highlighted some common challenges relating to the treatment of ion-exchange resins and sludges. There are common approaches that can assist in overcoming these challenges. 1. Transport resin / sludge type waste over as short a distance as possible to avoid issues with line plugging. 2. Transport these wastes once and once only wherever possible. 3. Try to keep the treatment process as simple as possible. With sludge or resin handling equipment consider the physical properties foremost - radiological issues can be addressed within any subsequent design. 4. Consider the use of dry-mix technologies. This avoids the requirement for expensive and complicated grouting plant. 5. Avoid the use of make up water for transport purposes if at all possible - it introduces secondary waste that needs to be treated at additional cost. 6. Consider alternative disposal techniques. SIAL{sup R} is AMEC's preferred technology as we developed it and understand it well - additionally the waste loading factors are much higher than for cement. 7. Consider final waste volumes when selecting the disposal technique. Disposal costs will probably make up the bulk of the total life-time cost for any retrieval / encapsulation project. 8. Have a selection of ion-exchange resin/sludge retrieval techniques available - it is difficult and time consuming to develop a technique that will cope with all eventualities, particularly when there are unknown conditions. It is much more productive to switch retrieval techniques as appropriate to deal with evolving conditions. (authors)

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Hot Isostatically Pressed Ceramic Waste forms for High Dose Spent Adsorbents - 18129

Decommissioning and clean-up of nuclear facilities requires the development of new technologies to condition radioactive wastes, producing passively safe waste packages of minimal volume, to reduce storage and disposal costs. We have applied hot isostatic pressing to demonstrate conceptual waste forms for high dose spent adsorbents (i.e. ion exchange materials) present on the Sellafield site, UK, and Fukushima Daiichi site, Japan. These radioactive wastes pose several challenges which demand early conditioning to produce a passively safe wasteform, including: a wet and granular nature, and hence dispersible as a result of loss of containment; a very high dose rates as a result of their selectivity for short lived radionuclides (e.g. Sr-90, Cs-137, Co-60); radiogenic self-heating, as a result of the concentration of such lived radio nuclides; hydrogen production as a result of radiolysis of entrained water [1]. Here, we demonstrate the conversion of natural inorganic ion exchange materials into multiphase ceramic waste forms, achieving a waste loading of 100 wt.% and density in excess of 97% theoretical. High resolution thermogravimetric analysis coupled with mass spectroscopy was utilised to characterise the evolution of water and volatiles during the in-can bake out step, prior to the HIP cycle. This allowed optimisation of the bake out parameters (temperature, time and vacuum) to enable complete removal of water and volatiles, affording ceramic bodies with minimal residual porosity by hot isostatic pressing at 1250 deg. C for 4 h in stainless steel canisters. Characterisation of the ceramic waste forms by SEM /EDX and X-ray diffraction revealed the nuclides of concern to be incorporated within well-known natural mineral and synthetic phases, with Cs partitioning into the K-feldspar. (authors)

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Analysis of Tc and U Spent Ion Exchange Resins from Hanford 200 West P and T Facility - 19202

The 200 West Area Pump-and-Treat (P and T) facility at the Hanford Site is being used to remove radionuclides such as uranium (U) and technetium-99 (Tc-99) from the contaminated groundwater. To support evaluation of U and Tc ion exchange (IX) treatment operational conditions and performance with various influent conditions, knowledge of resin capacity and contaminant retention is needed. To meet these objectives, samples of the spent Dowex{sup R} 21K and Purolite{sup R} A530E IX resins from the 200 West P and T facility used for the treatment of U and Tc, respectively, have been obtained and analyzed for the target analytes and other retained contaminants. The objectives of this work included 1) determination of the effective U and Tc loading on the resins, 2) evaluation of redox and chemical speciation of U and Tc retained by the resins and impact of the feed composition on the retention of U by the resin, and 3) quantification of other contaminants and groundwater constituents retained on the resins. Speciation of U and Tc-99 on the resin was determined by a combination of X-ray absorption fine structure, nuclear magnetic resonance, X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XAS), and optical spectroscopic techniques. Nondestructive analytical techniques including gamma energy analysis and low-energy photon spectroscopy were incorporated to quantify radionuclides retained on the resin. Scanning electron microscopy and energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy were used to observe the IX beads and quantify chemical constituents on the surface and penetration through the beads. Destructive analysis of the resin was explored through wet oxidation to identify and quantify co-contaminants sorbed to the resins. Inductively coupled plasma-optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES) and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) were used to analyze for metals, iodine, and specific isotopes retained on the resin, including Tc-99 and U-238. A single pertechnetate Tc-99 species was identified to be retained on the resin. For U, the obtained structural information was correlated with the laboratory findings using pristine resin as reference material to identify the nature of the U complexes and predict U retention by the resin as a function of variable influent conditions. Both resins demonstrated high loading with sulfate, silica, calcium, iron, zinc, and other groundwater constituents, suggesting that the competing anions, fouling, or a combination thereof significantly reduced their effective capacity for U and Tc-99. A significant amount of nonradioactive iodine-127 (I-127) and long-lived radioactive iodine-129 (I-129) isotope was also retained on the resins. Obtained quantitative information provided insights on the impact of water chemistry and the presence of common mineral constituents on the retention of contaminants of concern, including U, Tc-99, and I-129. (authors)

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Drying Spent Magnox Fuel for Interim Dry Storage

Spent Magnox fuel is usually stored under water for shielding and cooling following use in-reactor, but the storage water can react with Magnox clad fuel and cause corrosion and forms a sludge which generates a secondary waste product. One option to prevent unwanted corrosion and avoid expensive waste management is to dry the wet fuel. This project aims to test a drying process which will convert wet and corroded Magnox fuel to a stable form to demonstrate viability for conversion from wet to dry storage. Samples of corroded Magnox supplied by National Nuclear Laboratory. Corrosion product retrieved by various methods including dry scraping, ultrasonic treatment to form sludge and sludge drying to isolate suspension. TGA undertaken on Sample 1 and Sample 2, with brucite and hydromagnesite for comparison. Both samples showed ∼10% mass loss up to 250 deg. C attributable to water held in sample. Mass loss from dehydroxylation which liberates further water in both samples. TGA data plotted alongside chemically pure brucite and hydromagnesite shows expected similarities/differences between Sample 1(mostly brucite) and Sample 2 (brucite/hydromagnesite mixture). Following treatment, dried samples observed to slowly gain mass in ambient conditions. Presumed to be hygroscopic absorption of air water vapour as effect is reversible, with similar effect observed for hydromagnesite and brucite. Etched Magnox vacuum dried for 3.5 h at 90 deg. C to test for reaction with residual water - some discoloration but no noticeable corrosion observed. Drying etched Magnox metal to observe surface effects/corrosion during drying process.

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Pyrolysis of Radioactive Spent Resins in the PRIME Installation - 20190

Montair and Belgoprocess developed the pilot PRIME (Pyrolysis Resins In Mobile Electric) Installation for treatment of spent resins in one single reactor without pre-treatment and without intermixing of other waste, allowing for easy traceability and isotopic characterization of the end product. Both low level waste (LLW, < 2 mSv/h) and medium level waste (MLW, > 2 mSv/h) can be treated in the installation. The PRIME pilot installation is designed to treat 2 batches of 100 liter of saturated ion exchange resins over a period of 24 hours. A dosing unit with screw feeder is used for the dosing of the saturated ion exchange resins to the pyrolysis reactor. This completely new developed innovative pyrolysis reactor contains a special design mechanical stirrer and can operate at a temperature of up to 600 deg. C under inert conditions. As a result, the organic molecules will decompose at an accelerated rate until only the mineralized material remains. The lower temperature and the absence of oxygen also prevent the breakdown of ion exchange resins into (powdery) ash, which is a considerable advantage during further handling. Gases that are released during drying and pyrolysis are treated in an also newly developed thermal oxidizer, which uses an innovative, electrically heated design instead of a traditional natural gas- or fuel oil secondary combustion chamber design. After passing through the thermal oxidizer, the gases are cooled down to saturation temperature and treated in the wet scrubbing system. An extraction fan keeps the system under negative pressure to prevent the possibility of any off-gas leakage out of the system. A series of tests were performed successfully with wet cationic resins, anionic resins and a mixture of both. The results of these tests are described in the presentation. For intellectual property protection, the system and process of pyrolysis of organic waste and the system of thermal oxidation of pyrolysis gases described in this paper are patent pending. (authors)

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Dose rate verification for SNS spent structures - 25433

Residual dose rate measurements were conducted on two Spallation Neutron Source spent structures, target vessel no. 13 and proton beam window no. 5, after extraction from their service locations. These measurements were used to verify calculation methods for radionuclide inventory assessment that are typically performed for nuclear waste characterization and transportation. Neutronics analyses for predicting residual dose rates were carried out using complex and rigorous geometric models of the structures and their surroundings. Calculational results were analyzed and compared to the measured dose rates. (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Criticality Analysis of FSV Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Standard Canister

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). To manage this large variety of fuel types, DOE plans to employ standardized canisters for the transportation, long-term storage, and eventual disposal of SNF. Idaho National Laboratory is currently supporting DOE’s SNF Packaging Demonstration Project, in which Fort Saint Vrain (FSV) fuel assemblies will be loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper presents criticality calculations demonstrating that all four or five FSV fuel assemblies loaded into the DOE Standard Canister will remain subcritical in any expected normal or credible abnormal conditions. Previous criticality analyses were performed for one FSV fuel assembly and 12 Peach Bottom Core 2 fuel elements loaded into a DOE Standard Canister. This paper covers the criticality analysis performed for loading both four and five FSV fuel assemblies into a DOE Standard Canister. Various intact and degraded mode configurations were modeled in conducting the criticality calculations. This analysis encompassed three different configurations: (1) a single DOE Standard Canister loaded into a concrete storage overpack, (2) seven DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack, and (3) nine DOE Standard Canisters loaded into a concrete storage overpack. The overpack dimensions were varied for each of the three configurations, and transport, storage, and disposal scenarios were analyzed for each configuration. For transport scenarios, a pair of degradation cases was analyzed. In the first case, the fuel compacts became degraded and were removed from the fuel block, then deposited at the bottom of a horizontally placed canister, thereby simulating a drop event. The canister was considered to remain intact. In the second case, the spacing between horizontally placed canisters in a nine-canister overpack was reduced such that the canisters were piled on top of each other, simulating a drop event. For this case, no degradation of the canister internals or fuel was considered. For storage scenarios, the water moderator location in the system was varied to enable identification of the most reactive configurations. Dry and wet conditions were analyzed for the fuel materials, canister, and overpack. For disposal scenarios, two degradation cases were analyzed. In the first, the stainless-steel internals of the canister degraded to either hematite or goethite under both dry and wet conditions. In the second case, degraded FSV fuel formed a uranium-water slurry that filled the coolant/void holes. None of the cases presented exceeded the application specific upper subcritical limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Progress in the Verification and Validation Efforts for START: A Spent Fuel Routing Tool

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is planning for an integrated waste management approach to transport, store, and dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and other high-level radioactive waste (HLW) as part of the Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program [1]. In support of this effort, the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START) is being developed within the IWM program [2, 3]. This is a web-based decision support tool that can be used to analyze geospatial data related to the transportation of SNF and HLW. START is designed as a web-based application using an ArcGIS server through which the user can select the origin and destination of the route [4]. This is followed by selection of the mode of transportation of choice based on user preference. Some of the modes available to the user include rail, heavy haul truck, and barge. The option of utilizing more than one mode of transportation (intermodal transportation) is also implemented in START. A few examples of intermodal transportation include barge to rail, and heavy haul truck to rail. It must be noted that some routes might not have access to all modes of transportation, depending on the infrastructure availability at the origin and destination sites. Users can also select any stops or barriers they would like to introduce in the routes. This is followed by selection of the routing criteria of interest. Three primary routing options available to the user include minimum population, minimum distance, and minimum time. Apart from that, a few other options include accounting for a weighted average of the three aforementioned routing options. The next step involves the selection of the buffer distance of interest which includes the two choices available of 800 m and 2500 m, respectively. Finally, an option to select any prohibited rail carriers that the user does not wish to use is available. After making these selections, a route is ready to be created.

Gadey, Harish Reddy↗

Bounding Pressure and Flammability Evaluations of Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Department of Energy Standard Canisters

This paper presents bounding pressure and flammability evaluations for DOE Standard Canister loaded with DOE-managed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). The objective of these evaluations is to gain confidence in the safety and feasibility of possible loading configurations for extended (>50 years) periods of dry storage, with particular focus on the dry storage canister pressures and potential for formation of a flammable atmosphere. The primary concern about the extended dry storage of ASNF is radiolytic gas generation. The aluminum cladding of these materials tends to corrode, and these corrosion products—typically aluminum oxides, such as boehmite, bayerite, or gibbsite—could carry water. This makes ASNF dry storage canisters difficult to dry. The gamma radiation field in dry storage environments could cause a radiolytic breakdown of residual water, forming chemical species such as molecular hydrogen (H2). The release of these species could increase the canister pressure and lead to the generation of a flammable canister atmosphere. The bounding evaluations presented within this study surmise conservative, but credible, conditions and processes. This includes the assumption of a full breakdown of a large quantity of free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed water (bound in a trihydrate, i.e., Al2O3 • 3H2O, layer). The considered dry storage configurations include a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~46 cm (18 in) diameter (10 x 18) DOE Standard Canister loaded with 32 Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) ASNF elements, and a ~3 m (10 ft) long, ~61 cm (24 in) (10 x 24) diameter DOE Standard Canister loaded with 40 ATR ASNF elements. While the results of this study indicate the possibility of atmospheric hydrogen concentrations above the lower flammability limit, insufficient concentrations of oxygen will prevent the formation of flammable atmospheres. The maximum credible pressures remain well within the structural limits of the DOE Standard Canister.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Efficient recovery processes for the black mass from spent lithium-ion batteries

A method of recycling lithium-ion batteries is disclosed. The method includes isolating a composite electrode that comprises an electrode material adhered to a current collector with a polyvinylidene difluoride (PVDF) binder from a spent lithium-ion battery. The method also includes contacting the composite electrode in a polyol fluid capable of releasing the PVDF binder from the current collector without substantially altering either component. The composite electrode may be a cathode or an anode. The method also includes rapidly delaminating the electrode material from the current collector to give a free electrode material and a free current collector, and recovering each of the free electrode material and the free current collector from the mixture. The free electrode material may be reused to prepare another composite electrode, as well as a lithium-ion battery comprising the same, which are also disclosed.

Belharouak, Ilias↗

Relithiation process for direct regeneration of cathode materials from spent lithium-ion batteries

A method for the regeneration of cathode material from spent lithium-ion batteries is provided. The method includes dissolving a lithium precursor in a polyhydric alcohol to form a solution. Degraded cathode material containing lithium metal oxides are dispersed into the solution under mechanical stirring, forming a mixture. The mixture is heat treated within a reactor vessel or microwave oven. During this heat treatment, lithium is intercalated into the degraded cathode material. The relithiated electrode material is collected by filtration, washing with solvents, and drying. The relithiated electrode material is then ground with a lithium precursor and thermally treated at a relatively low temperature for a predetermined time period to obtain regenerated cathode material.

Belharouak, Ilias↗

DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED SECURITY AND SAFETY MONITORING SYSTEM FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL WASTE TRANSPORTATION

This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, related to designing, fabricating, and testing an integrated security and safety monitoring system (ISSMS) for railcars used to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in the United States. The system will comply with the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Order 460.2B “Departmental Materials Transportation Management” and the Association of American Railroads’ (AAR) standard S-2043 “Performance Specification for Trains Used to Carry High-level Radioactive Material” [1] developed specifically for railcars used to transport high-level radioactive material (HLRM). DOE is in the process of developing and testing an ISSMS that will satisfy both DOE requirements and AAR standards. DOE has already developed railcar designs for transportation of HLRM. In 2024, DOE’s Atlas railcar project completed the design, fabrication and testing of three railcar types: transportation cask-carrying, buffer, and security escort, resulting in AAR conditional approval to operate on freight rail networks in North America. DOE decided to combine the required security and safety systems into one system, and this combined system is the subject of the current effort. DOE is developing and proposes to implement the ISSMS for these railcars as part of the build out of the railcar fleet. DOE began planning for development of the ISSMS in February 2020. The project is divided into seven phases starting with conceptual design and continuing through production design, as shown in Figure 1. An earlier version of the system was tested as part of the Atlas railcar consist demonstration test run in 2023. This paper describes the design features and system testing using the Atlas project railcars, and laboratory testing completed to date. The paper will also describe the activities planned to support the DOE project to ship the High Burn-Up Research Cask (HBRC) in 2027.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

Preliminary Criticality and Radiation Shielding Analysis for the Storage and Transfer of MARVEL Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

This report documents the results of preliminary nuclear criticality and radiation shielding assessments during transfer and dry storage of irradiated Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) reactor fuel at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The assessments focus on transfer casks and storage canisters that are currently in use at INL, which may be compatible with the irradiated MARVEL reactor fuel. The criticality assessments were performed using the radiation transport code MCNP6 with 37 MARVEL reactor fuel elements in various configurations and scenarios. All transfer and storage configurations under dry conditions were below the assumed criticality safety limit of 0.93. Some storage and transfer configurations under wet conditions exceeded the criticality safety limit. This suggests that the appropriate administrative and engineering controls, in addition to reducing the number of MARVEL reactor fuel elements per transfer cask or storage canister, can be expected to ensure criticality safety under all scenarios. The radiation shielding assessments were performed by generating conservative neutron and photon source terms using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite of codes. These source spectra were used to estimate the dose equivalent rates using the radiation transport code MCNP6, both on contact and 1 m away from the fuel and transfer casks. The maximum estimated dose equivalent rate of 37 unshielded MARVEL reactor fuel elements on contact is approximately 42000 R/hr. The maximum estimated dose equivalent rates on contact to the ATR transfer cask, HFEF-5 transfer cask, and high load charger were approximately 233 mR/hr, 171 mR/hr, and 201 mR/hr, respectively. This suggests that with the appropriate administrative and engineering controls, all three transfer casks analyzed can be expected to provide sufficient radiation shielding to workers during transfer of irradiated MARVEL reactor fuel. These calculations are performed to support the planning and strategy for the MARVEL project and will demonstrate the technical viability of the different configurations discussed and help identify where engineered or administrative controls may be necessary. A complete criticality safety analysis and radiation shielding analysis, including validation and contingency and accident analysis must be completed by licensed and authorized personnel before any transfer or storage of MARVEL reactor nuclear fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗