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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adjusting a Full Body Model to Mitigate Inverse Kinematics Artifacts in Opensim

BACKGROUND: In support of Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (VIS) system development for Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) exercise systems in space, such as the European Enhanced Exploration Exercise Device (E4D) [1], dynamic quantities required to model the response of a proposed VIS while considering the effect of VIS motion on the forces between the human and VIS platform were obtained using motion capture data [2]. On occasion, large-amplitude oscillatory spikes were found in the subject’s linear and angular momentum derivatives, affecting analyses that depend on forces and moments derived from motion capture. The purpose of this investigation was to identify causes of these artifacts and techniques for their resolution. METHODS AND RESULTS: To obtain the required human dynamic quantities to drive the VIS simulation, motion capture data was collected containing recorded trajectories of passive retroreflective markers on body landmarks of an exercising subject. Since the full body Rajagopal model [3] was originally used to enhance gait analysis, upper body joints did not require large Ranges of Motion (ROM). We thus modified the Rajagopal model [4, 5] to allow it to be used for upper body intensive exercises like those common to the E4D. OpenSim Inverse Kinematics (IK) [6] was performed using these scaled subject models to generate the joint angles throughout the exercise while minimizing marker error. At times, the arms were observed to ‘snap’ from one configuration to another, causing spike artifacts. Following IK, a custom OpenSim plugin [7] was used to determine the required dynamic quantities including the rates of change of the linear and angular momenta of the human. Since motion capture is recorded at a larger time step than required by the VIS simulation, the human center of mass location was fit with splines and a second derivative taken to obtain the momentum derivative, allowing the VIS simulation to maintain conservation of momentum when appropriate. In a few cases during this stage, artifacts much larger than the expected noise of the second derivatives were introduced. Investigation of cases containing artifacts revealed several modifications that could be made to the OpenSim model to improve IK results. Since OpenSim models use Euler angles and rotation sequences, ‘gimbal lock’ would be encountered in the arms when raised 90 degrees to the side (e.g., T-pose, some hang clean exercise, etc.). This was resolved by reorienting the horizontal axes at the shoulder joint by 45 degrees, placing ‘gimbal lock’ outside common arm ROM, with the arm ROMs adjusted following this change. Elbow and wrist ROMs could also be adjusted to allow realistic motion while at the same time limiting the likelihood of unrealistic orientations. On occasion, the arms flipped backwards when raised above the head. This was prevented by using medial elbow markers in scaling and IK. When medial markers were not available, the acromial joint location in the unscaled model was shifted before model scaling to better align the arm with available markers. Lastly, artifacts which became apparent after taking the second derivatives of spline-fit data were found to occur in cases when the pelvis rotation limit prevented the full range of motion of an exercise. These issues were resolved by unclamping the pelvis rotation limit. Through this investigation, an understanding of conditions leading to IK artifacts was acquired allowing the automation of artifact detection. These artifact detection and mitigation techniques can be applied toward modeling of upper body motions in aerospace and other fields for improved IK results.

C A Bell↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During an In-Flight Airspeed Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport fatal accidents. Yet a well-trained and well-qualified crew is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral component of the entire commercial aviation system. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as an independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions and responses while dealing with an in-flight airspeed failure. Accident statistics often cite flight crew error (Baker, 2001) as the primary contributor in accidents and incidents in transport category aircraft. However, the Air Line Pilots Association (2011) suggests "a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of the aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system." This is generally acknowledged but cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how or how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggest crews handle failures on a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program data generally supports this assertion, even if the data is not released to the public. However without hard evidence, the contribution and means by which pilots achieve safety of flight is difficult to define. Thus, ways to improve the human ability to contribute or overcome deficiencies are ill-defined.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗

NASA NTRS2019

SCREAM: Space-based Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method

Given both ground-based performance shaping factors (PSFs) collected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and potential space-based PSFs collected by JSC's HH&P, this year's task is to determine how to combine them for future human reliability analysis (HRA) of space missions. All HRA to date for space missions have been based on ground data (i.e. 1-G environment). There is no space-based HRA approach. The target of this project to produce a "first of its kind" HRA approach for space missions. As humans go beyond Earth orbit and missions become longer, human performance and reliability is expected to degrade. The questions become by how much, when, and what, leading to defining the overall effect on crew risk. Knowing this information earlier rather than later will help us mitigate this risk by vehicle design, crew training, and operational workarounds.

Boyer, Roger L.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, and Psychosocial Adaptions within a Team

The Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (the Team Risk) is primarily performance-focused, with a secondary emphasis on behavioral health outcomes resulting from team performance and interpersonal interactions. Monitoring tools, measures, and countermeasures are aimed at enhancing team processes and team composition configurations to optimize team performance and functioning. Long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will include major challenges that could affect team performance, including social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, communication delays between crew and ground, limited or no crew rotation or evacuation options, limited or no resupply, and a high-consequence environment. Each of these conditions will affect the crew’s coordination, cooperation, psychological well-being, and performance. Although the International Space Station (ISS) remains important for studies that require spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the exploration environment that is required for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) teams research, and thus access to terrestrial or ground-based analogs of LDEM conditions is paramount. The emphasis on analogs for research is reflected in this updated evidence review of the Team Risk, and includes data from studies conducted at isolated, confined, extreme (ICE) environments (e.g., Antarctic stations), and from several mission simulation analogs such as the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) (HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014), also known as isolated, confined, controlled (ICC) environments. These studies have characterized many team factors regarding LDEMs, and the Team Risk has now matured from risk characterization to focusing more on countermeasure development. Because spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, no reliable data is available to quantify the impact of team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes during spaceflight missions. Until recently, no systematic attempt had been undertaken to measure the performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young research area for NASA, with substantial growth only since the 2000s, and with limited access to spaceflight performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking to identify specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. However, astronaut journals and interviews and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts (SMEs) provide testimonies that team performance during spaceflight is important for mission success and to maintain crew health. Team spaceflight data is now being collected as part of the Spaceflight Standard Measures task (Clement, 2021)—a set of core measurements related to many human spaceflight risks that are collected from astronauts before, during, and after long-duration missions. The team-related standard measures focus on team cohesion, team performance, group living, team climate, and team processes. Collection of standard measures data is ongoing and published data is not yet available. Finally, although spaceflight evidence is lacking, evidence gleaned from ground studies and spaceflight analog studies will help close the gaps outlined in the Team Risk. Ground-based studies provide quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses that can be used to understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and skills, job context), team processes, and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the Team Risk must be integrated with other individual-focused NASA Human Research Program (HRP) risks, including Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Sleep, and Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and emerging research indicates more integration may needed between the Team Risk and the physiologically oriented risks. Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB). A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the team often acts as a countermeasure. For example, support for team leaders and teammates can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed regarding teams during LDEMs and the remaining gaps in the research are described in the current report.

Lauren Blackwell Landon↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗

NASA NTRS1993

A survey of quality measures for gray-scale image compression

Although a variety of techniques are available today for gray-scale image compression, a complete evaluation of these techniques cannot be made as there is no single reliable objective criterion for measuring the error in compressed images. The traditional subjective criteria are burdensome, and usually inaccurate or inconsistent. On the other hand, being the most common objective criterion, the mean square error (MSE) does not have a good correlation with the viewer's response. It is now understood that in order to have a reliable quality measure, a representative model of the complex human visual system is required. In this paper, we survey and give a classification of the criteria for the evaluation of monochrome image quality.

Eskicioglu, Ahmet M.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Testing - Smart strategy for safety and mission quality

The paper is concerned with the need for a comprehensive test plan for the Space Station Freedom (SST) that would fully verify specification compliance and be based on an error budget. In particular, attention is given to some lessons learned from other NASA programs and the principal challenges for SSF testing, including phase C/D/E agreements, testing parameters, phase testing, and the human element. The importance of close teamwork between the NASA/Contractor systems engineers and assurance engineers is emphasized.

Rodney, George A.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Automation of POST Cases via External Optimizer and "Artificial p2" Calculation

During conceptual design speed and accuracy are often at odds. Specifically in the realm of launch vehicles, optimizing the ascent trajectory requires a larger pool of analytical power and expertise. Experienced analysts working on familiar vehicles can produce optimal trajectories in a short time frame, however whenever either "experienced" or "familiar " is not applicable the optimization process can become quite lengthy. In order to construct a vehicle agnostic method an established global optimization algorithm is needed. In this work the authors develop an "artificial" error term to map arbitrary control vectors to non-zero error by which a global method can operate. Two global methods are compared alongside Design of Experiments and random sampling and are shown to produce comparable results to analysis done by a human expert.

Dees, Patrick D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Evaluation of an Airborne Spacing Concept, On-Board Spacing Tool, and Pilot Interface

The number of commercial aircraft operations is predicted to increase in the next ten years, creating a need for improved operational efficiency. Two areas believed to offer significant increases in efficiency are optimized profile descents and dependent parallel runway operations. It is envisioned that during both of these types of operations, flight crews will precisely space their aircraft behind preceding aircraft at air traffic control assigned intervals to increase runway throughput and maximize the use of existing infrastructure. This paper describes a human-in-the-loop experiment designed to study the performance of an onboard spacing algorithm and pilots ratings of the usability and acceptability of an airborne spacing concept that supports dependent parallel arrivals. Pilot participants flew arrivals into the Dallas Fort-Worth terminal environment using one of three different simulators located at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA) Langley Research Center. Scenarios were flown using Interval Management with Spacing (IM-S) and Required Time of Arrival (RTA) control methods during conditions of no error, error in the forecast wind, and offset (disturbance) to the arrival flow. Results indicate that pilots delivered their aircraft to the runway threshold within +/- 3.5 seconds of their assigned arrival time and reported that both the IM-S and RTA procedures were associated with low workload levels. In general, pilots found the IM-S concept, procedures, speeds, and interface acceptable; with 92% of pilots rating the procedures as complete and logical, 218 out of 240 responses agreeing that the IM-S speeds were acceptable, and 63% of pilots reporting that the displays were easy to understand and displayed in appropriate locations. The 22 (out of 240) responses, indicating that the commanded speeds were not acceptable and appropriate occurred during scenarios containing wind error and offset error. Concerns cited included the occurrence of multiple speed changes within a short time period, speed changes required within twenty miles of the runway, and an increase in airspeed followed shortly by a decrease in airspeed. Within this paper, appropriate design recommendations are provided, and the need for continued, iterative human-centered design is discussed.

Swieringa, Kurt↗

NASA NTRS1993

The use of analytical models in human-computer interface design

Recently, a large number of human-computer interface (HCI) researchers have investigated building analytical models of the user, which are often implemented as computer models. These models simulate the cognitive processes and task knowledge of the user in ways that allow a researcher or designer to estimate various aspects of an interface's usability, such as when user errors are likely to occur. This information can lead to design improvements. Analytical models can supplement design guidelines by providing designers rigorous ways of analyzing the information-processing requirements of specific tasks (i.e., task analysis). These models offer the potential of improving early designs and replacing some of the early phases of usability testing, thus reducing the cost of interface design. This paper describes some of the many analytical models that are currently being developed and evaluates the usefulness of analytical models for human-computer interface design. This paper will focus on computational, analytical models, such as the GOMS model, rather than less formal, verbal models, because the more exact predictions and task descriptions of computational models may be useful to designers. The paper also discusses some of the practical requirements for using analytical models in complex design organizations such as NASA.

Gugerty, Leo↗

NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

To Create Safety Is Human

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations, are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Changing the Narrative About the Human Role in Accidents

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Do People Do?

operations↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

So What Do People Actually Do?

I is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

safety↗

DOE OSTI2026

Lab-Scale Cable-Driven Parallel Robot Prototype for Automated Prefabricated Component Manipulation

This paper presents the design and evaluation of a lab-scale cable-driven parallel robot (CDPR) developed as a flexible platform for automated installation of prefabricated components onto exterior building envelopes. Traditional manual installation methods for prefabricated components, which depend on scaffolding, cranes, cherry pickers, and verbal coordination, are not only labor-intensive and error-prone but also face significant limitations in dense urban environments due to site access constraints. To address these challenges, we developed a lab-scale CDPR platform capable of autonomously transporting building envelope components from a designated pickup zone to their target installation location, minimizing the need for human intervention. This study describes the system’s mechanical design, actuation architecture, real-time feedback system, and control strategy of the CDPR, and evaluates its performance in a laboratory environment. The robot’s actuation system uses torque control for end-effector manipulation. The robot’s real-time pose feedback comes from a construction-grade total station and a wireless inertial measurement unit (IMU), which together support precise end-effector control. Experimental results demonstrate the successful integration of the hardware, sensing, state estimation, and control subsystems. Preliminary tests showed that our lab-scale prototype can position the end effector with an error of less than 3 mm, which is a level of precision not previously achieved by existing CDPRs in construction applications. The key findings are twofold: (1) torque-only control is necessary but not sufficient for minimizing final pose error, and (2) incorporating real-time pose feedback can achieve the desired placement accuracy.

Liu, Yifang [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),↗

NASA NTRS2013

Glove-Enabled Computer Operations (GECO): Design and Testing of an Extravehicular Activity Glove Adapted for Human-Computer Interface

The Glove-Enabled Computer Operations (GECO) system enables an extravehicular activity (EVA) glove to be dual-purposed as a human-computer interface device. This paper describes the design and human participant testing of a right-handed GECO glove in a pressurized glove box. As part of an investigation into the usability of the GECO system for EVA data entry, twenty participants were asked to complete activities including (1) a Simon Says Games in which they attempted to duplicate random sequences of targeted finger strikes and (2) a Text Entry activity in which they used the GECO glove to enter target phrases in two different virtual keyboard modes. In a within-subjects design, both activities were performed both with and without vibrotactile feedback. Participants mean accuracies in correctly generating finger strikes with the pressurized glove were surprisingly high, both with and without the benefit of tactile feedback. Five of the subjects achieved mean accuracies exceeding 99 in both conditions. In Text Entry, tactile feedback provided a statistically significant performance benefit, quantified by characters entered per minute, as well as reduction in error rate. Secondary analyses of responses to a NASA Task Loader Index (TLX) subjective workload assessments reveal a benefit for tactile feedback in GECO glove use for data entry. This first-ever investigation of employment of a pressurized EVA glove for human-computer interface opens up a wide range of future applications, including text chat communications, manipulation of procedureschecklists, cataloguingannotating images, scientific note taking, human-robot interaction, and control of suit andor other EVA systems.

Adams, Richard J.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Glove-Enabled Computer Operations (GECO): Design and Testing of an Extravehicular Activity Glove Adapted for Human-Computer Interface

The Glove-Enabled Computer Operations (GECO) system enables an extravehicular activity (EVA) glove to be dual-purposed as a human-computer interface device. This paper describes the design and human participant testing of a right-handed GECO glove in a pressurized glove box. As part of an investigation into the usability of the GECO system for EVA data entry, twenty participants were asked to complete activities including (1) a Simon Says Games in which they attempted to duplicate random sequences of targeted finger strikes and (2) a Text Entry activity in which they used the GECO glove to enter target phrases in two different virtual keyboard modes. In a within-subjects design, both activities were performed both with and without vibrotactile feedback. Participants' mean accuracies in correctly generating finger strikes with the pressurized glove were surprisingly high, both with and without the benefit of tactile feedback. Five of the subjects achieved mean accuracies exceeding 99% in both conditions. In Text Entry, tactile feedback provided a statistically significant performance benefit, quantified by characters entered per minute, as well as reduction in error rate. Secondary analyses of responses to a NASA Task Loader Index (TLX) subjective workload assessments reveal a benefit for tactile feedback in GECO glove use for data entry. This first-ever investigation of employment of a pressurized EVA glove for human-computer interface opens up a wide range of future applications, including text "chat" communications, manipulation of procedures/checklists, cataloguing/annotating images, scientific note taking, human-robot interaction, and control of suit and/or other EVA systems.

Adams, Richard J.↗