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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2003

Third Generation RLV Structural Seal Development Programs at NASA GRC

NASA is currently developing technologies for the 3rd Generation Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) that is being designed to enter service around the year 2025. In particular, NASA's Glenn Research Center (GRC) is working on advanced high temperature structural seal designs including propulsion system and control surface seals. Propulsion system seals are required along the edges of movable panels in advanced engines, while control surface seals seal the edges and hinge lines of movables flaps and elevons on the vehicle. The overall goal is to develop reusable, resilient seals capable of operating at temperatures up to 2000 F. High temperature seal preloading devices (e.g., springs) are also being evaluated as a means of improving seal resiliency. In order to evaluate existing and potential new seal designs, GRC has designed and is installing several new test rigs capable of simulating the types of conditions that the seals would endure during service including temperatures, pressures, and scrubbing. Two new rigs, the hot compression test rig and the hot scrub test rig, will be used to perform seal compression and scrub tests for many cycles at temperatures up to 3000 F. Another new test rig allows simultaneous flow and scrub tests to be performed on the seals at room temperature to evaluate how the flow blocking performance of the seals varies as they accumulate damage during scrubbing. This presentation will give an overview of these advanced seal development efforts.

Dunlap, Patrick H., Jr.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

To Create Safety Is Human

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations, are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Changing the Narrative About the Human Role in Accidents

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Do People Do?

It is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

operations↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

So What Do People Actually Do?

I is often said that to err is human. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure.

safety↗
NASA NTRS2021

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRS2021

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Urban Air Mobility↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, thus, improving the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Cybersecurity↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Using Recorded Airspace Traffic Data to Create Simulation Scenarios for Trajectory-Based Operations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is supporting research to transition from the current air traffic management paradigm to Trajectory-Based Operations targeting the 2035-2045 timeframe. Trajectory-Based Operations in the National Airspace System focuses on modernizing current operations and technology to increase efficiency, predictability, resilience, and flexibility while migrating toward greater operational autonomy across the airspace. To understand the impact of new technologies and procedures that enable Trajectory-Based Operations, simulation studies must be conducted using realistic scenarios. This paper describes techniques that can be employed when using recorded airspace traffic data to create scenarios representative of a 2040 Trajectory-Based Operations airspace. The paper provides a use case example and suggests how this methodology may be applied to other simulations studying concepts, technologies, and procedures in a future airspace system.

Billy K. Buck↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Why Didn't They Just Follow the Procedure?

It is often said that to err is human and that procedures are in place to prevent people from making mistakes. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. And while it's true that good procedures can help avoid error, it's also the case that procedures have their own limitations. This talk highlights the limits of procedures and the resilience people bring to operations. It discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are the creators of safety rather than only the source of error and failure, and it proposes an approach to the design of procedures that supports the human operator.

operations↗
NASA NTRS2017

Preliminary Investigation of Impact of Technological Impairment on Trajectory-Based Operations

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) incorporates collaborative air traffic management and Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) in order to significantly increase the capacity, efficiency, and predictability of operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), without decreasing safety. This is enabled by airspace users and service providers sharing knowledge about operations that allows prediction of the complete 4D flight trajectory with as little uncertainty as possible. Additionally, new software and hardware technology is critical to reaching NextGen goals, especially with regard to TBO. What if the technologies that are critical for TBO were to be impaired or fail completely? Should there be a malfunction of a piece of the technology, it must be ensured that the whole system does not break down completely or suffer severe impairment. Instead, operations need to be maintained proportionally to the problem and safety needs to be ensured (graceful degradation). This paper proposes a systematic framework to investigate the vulnerability of TBO to technology disruption, and determine the impact of technological impairment on TBO. Two representative technologies are chosen for detailed investigation and the impact of their impairment on the degradation of TBO is illustrated using a weather-related scenario. XXXX There are several possible directions of future work. We believe it is desirable to develop methods to quantitatively assess the impact of technological disruption on TBO and to have the simulation tools to validate the impact. The availability of prognostics and health management methods could be leveraged to predict technological failure/disruption, thus predicting how TBO will be a ected, and possibly pro-actively mitigating the impact. It is important to develop large-scale scenarios where the e ect of technological impairment is prominent, and identify methods to quantitatively assess the extent of TBO degradation. An important goal of such an investigation is the development of failure-resistant resilient trajectory-based oper- ations. Resilience14, 15 is the property of a system to \bounce back" and resume at least a signi cant portion of its functionalities after degradation due to technological impairment(s). A systems resilience includes properties such as \bu ering capacity" (quantifying disruptions the system can absorb or adapt to without a fundamental breakdown in performance or in the systems structure), \ exibility" (ability to restructure itself in response to external changes or pressures), "margin" (how closely the system is currently operating rela- tive to one or another kind of performance boundary), \tolerance" (whether the system gracefully degrades as stress/pressure increase, or collapses quickly when pressure exceeds adaptive capacity), etc. Future work needs to focus on quantifying and improving the resilience of TBO, and identifying resilient design solutions for aviation.

TBO↗
NASA NTRS2019

Deep Learning Method for Detecting Precursors to Adverse Events

With the recent advancements in Deep Learning methods, the ability to model large complex heterogeneous data sets are fundamentally changing industry and research. Coupled with hardware improvements, and ease of implementation, a wide variety of deep neural network architectures can quickly be developed to solve a sweeping range of problems such as: object detection in images, automatic healthcare diagnosis using heterogenous data sources, real time language translating and sentence prediction, upscaling low resolution images, and forecasting of multivariate timeseries. Generally, many of these architectures outperform classical machine learning approaches in their respective tasks, however, this typically comes at a cost of interpretability. These black box algorithms generally suffer from lack of transparency in both model complexity as well as the rationale behind the prediction. This lack of comprehension, is driving an emerging area of interest in “Explainable AI”. An algorithm called: “Deep Temporal Multiple Instance Learning”1 was a recently developed to identify precursors to adverse events and has been applied in the aviation domain. The deep learning architecture is designed to capture the evolution of the probability of the outcome over the time preceding the adverse event using a multiple instance learning approach as illustrated in Figure 1. Precursors are defined when the probability of the event has exceeded a threshold at some point in the timeseries, at which point, a sensitivity analysis is performed to determine contributing factors. The contributing factors are used to explain and define the precursor during the periods where the probability score is high. The identified contributing factors are then presented to subject matter experts to provide objective insights into the leading factors associated with the particular adverse event. The algorithm has been tested on flight data from a commercial airline and has the ability to discover precursors to known adverse events that take the form of safety critical operations, such as unstable approach events on final approach. Apart from detecting precursors to adverse events, the converse can also be leveraged to discover corrective actions. These positive actions manifest themselves as periods in the timeseries when the precursor score has been lowered from an elevated state; meaning that if the system had been left uncorrected, it would have eventually reached the adverse event state. Characterizing these state changes can help identify successful interventions that may not have been known before. Policy makers and procedure designers can use this additional knowledge to craft more safety and efficient resilient procedures for future operations and therefore improve the overall performance of the National Airspace.

Matthews, Bryan L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Pilots participated willingly and enthusiastically in the study, and generally had little difficulty recalling critical incidents. The results suggest that pilot interviews can be a productive method of gathering information on incidents that might not otherwise be reported. Some of the issues described in the reports have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. In other cases, incident reports involved human factors that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2012

Performance Testing of Yardney MCMB-LiNiCoAlO2 Lithium-ion Cells Possessing Electrolytes with Improved Safety Characteristics

Many future NASA missions aimed at exploring the Moon and Mars require high specific energy rechargeable batteries that possess enhanced safety characteristics. There is also a strong desire to develop Li-ion batteries with improved safety characteristics for terrestrial applications, most notably for HEV and PHEV automotive applications. In previous work focused upon evaluating various potential flame retardant additives1, triphenyl phosphate (TPP)2 was observed to have the most desirable attributes, including good life characteristics and resilience to high voltage operation. We have employed a number of approaches in the design of promising TPP-based electrolytes with improved safety, including: (a) varying the flame retardant additive (FRA) content (from 5 to 15%), (b) the use of fluorinated co-solvents, (c) the use of additives to improve compatibility, and (c) the use of ester co-solvents to decrease the viscosity and increase the conductivity. In recent work, we have demonstrated a number of these electrolyte formulations to be compatible with a number of chemistries, including: MCMB carbon-LiNi0.8Co0.2O2, graphite-LiNi0.8Co0.15Al0.05O2, Li-Li(Li0.17Ni 0.25 Mn 0.58 )O2, Li-LiNiCoMnO2 and graphite- LiNiCoMnO2.3,4 In the current study, we have demonstrated the performance of a number of TPP-containing electrolytes in 7 Ah prototype MCMB-LiNiCoO2 cells. We will describe the results of a number of performance tests, including: a) 100% DOD cycle life testing at various temperatures, b) discharge rate characterization as a function of temperature, c) charge rate characterization as a function of temperature, and d) impedance as a function of temperature. In addition to displaying good life characteristics, being comparable to baseline chemistries, a number of cells were observed to provide good performance over a wide temperature range.

Li-ion batteries↗
NASA NTRS2015

Identification of Human Factors in Unmanned Aviation Via Pilot Incident Reports

There is a need for incident data relevant to the operation of civilian unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the National Air Space (NAS). Currently, very limited incident and accident data are available from military sources, and the tightly-restricted civilian UAS industry has produced very few incident reports that could shed light on design issues relevant to human factors. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from UAS pilots, and using the information to identify areas where human factors guidelines will be of assistance. Experienced UAS pilots are participating in small focus groups in which they are prompted to describe critical incidents that either reveal a system flaw, or highlight a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. The de-identified incidents are being analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot in dealing with the incident. Preliminary findings will be described.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS2016

C2-Related Incidents Reported by UAS Pilots

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. During each focus group session, a note taker produced a de-identified written record of the incident narratives. At the end of the session, participants reviewed each written incident report, and made edits and corrections as necessary. The incidents were later analyzed to identify contributing factors, with a focus on design issues that either hindered or assisted the pilot during the events. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation focuses on incidents that involved the management of the command and control (C2) link. The identified issues include loss of link, interference from undesired transmissions, voice latency, accidental control transfer, and the use of the lost link timer, or lost link OK features.

unmanned aircraft systems↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Lessons from Incident Reports

An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. Participants were asked to only report incidents that could be included in a public document. A total of 90 incidents were reported. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Lessons from Incident Reports

It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation begins with an overview of RPAS human factors and then considers the emerging issues identified by pilot reports.

incidents↗