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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 73 records · Page 4

Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage Structures and Thermal Design

The Ares 1 Upper Stage was part of the vehicle intended to succeed the Space Shuttle as the United States manned spaceflight vehicle. Although the Upper Stage project was cancelled, there were many lessons learned that are applicable to future vehicle design. Lessons learned that are briefly detailed in this Technical Memorandum are for specific technical areas such as tank design, common bulkhead design, thrust oscillation, control of flight and slosh loads, purge and hazardous gas system. In addition, lessons learned from a systems engineering and vehicle integration perspective are also included, such as computer aided design and engineering, scheduling, and data management. The need for detailed systems engineering in the early stages of a project is emphasized throughout this report. The intent is that future projects will be able to apply these lessons learned to keep costs down, schedules brief, and deliver products that perform to the expectations of their customers.

Ahmed, Rafiq↗

Selected Lessons Learned in Space Shuttle Orbiter Propulsion and Power Subsystems

Over its 30 years of space flight history, plus the nearly 10 years of design, development test and evaluation, the Space Shuttle Orbiter is full of lessons learned in all of its numerous and complex subsystems. In the current paper, only selected lessons learned in the areas of the Orbiter propulsion and power subsystems will be described. The particular Orbiter subsystems include: Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), Hydraulics and Water Spray Boiler (WSB), Mechanical Flight Controls, Main Propulsion System (MPS), Fuel Cells and Power Reactant and Storage Devices (PRSD), Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS), Reaction Control System (RCS), Electrical Power Distribution (EPDC), electrical wiring and pyrotechnics. Given the complexity and extensive history of each of these subsystems, and the limited scope of this paper, it is impossible to include most of the lessons learned; instead the attempt will be to present a selected few or key lessons, in the judgment of the authors. Each subsystem is presented separate, beginning with an overview of the hardware and their function, a short description of a few historical problems and their lessons, followed by a more comprehensive table listing of the major subsystem problems and lessons. These tables serve as a quick reference for lessons learned in each subsystem. In addition, this paper will establish common lessons across subsystems as well as concentrate on those lessons which are deemed to have the highest applicability to future space flight programs.

Hernandez, Francisco J.↗

NASA Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicle Development Approach Builds on Lessons Learned from Past and Present Missions

A viewgraph presentation of NASA crew and cargo launch vehicle development building upon lessons learned from past and present missions is shown. The topics include: 1) U.S. Vision for Space Exploration; 2) NASA's Exploration Road Map; 3) The Moon-The First Step to Mars and Beyond; 4) Building on a Foundation of Proven Technologies; 5) Constellation Launch Vehicle Elements; 6) 1.5 Launch Earth Orbit/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous; 7) The Journey Continues; 8) Design Philosophy for Mission Success; 9) Lessons Learned: Implementation Tenets; and 10) Lessons Learned: Early Integration with the Operators.

Dumbacher, Dan↗

NASA Lessons Learned from Space Lubricated Mechanisms

This document reviews the lessons learned from short-life and long life lubricated space mechanisms. A short-life lubricated mechanisms complete their life test qualification requirements after a few cycles. The mechanisms include the hinges, motors and bearings for deployment, release mechanisms, latches, release springs and support shops. Performance testing can be difficult and expensive but must be accomplished. A long-life lubricated mechanisms requires up to 5 years of life testing, or 10 to 100 years of successful flight. The long-life mechanisms include reaction wheels, momentum wheels, antenna gimbals, solar array drives, gyros and despin mechanisms. Several instances of how a mechanisms failed either in test, or in space use, and the lessons learned from these failures are reviewed. The effect of the movement away from CFC-113 cleaning solvent to ODC (Ozone-Depleting Chemical) -free is reviewed, and some of the alternatives are discussed.

Predmore, Roamer E.↗

Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space

This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.

Planetary Protection↗

Lessons Learned in Hydrogen System Operation

NASA has learned extensive lessons on the operations of hydrogen systems during the developments and operations of space hardware. A subset of these lessons that are useful for aircraft and terrestrial applications using liquid hydrogen are presented to help disseminate the information learned. Discussion includes test data, analysis, and observations on cryogenic insulation systems, stratification and temperature gradients within tank systems, fittings to reduce leakage, and integration of refrigeration systems within a cryogenic fluids system.

Liquid Hydrogen↗

Lessons Learned and Flight Results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System Project

A viewgraph presentation on the lessons learned and flight results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project is shown. The topics include: 1) F-15 IFCS Project Goals; 2) Motivation; 3) IFCS Approach; 4) NASA F-15 #837 Aircraft Description; 5) Flight Envelope; 6) Limited Authority System; 7) NN Floating Limiter; 8) Flight Experiment; 9) Adaptation Goals; 10) Handling Qualities Performance Metric; 11) Project Phases; 12) Indirect Adaptive Control Architecture; 13) Indirect Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; 14) Gen II Direct Adaptive Control Architecture; 15) Current Status; 16) Effect of Canard Multiplier; 17) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop; 18) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop Freq. Resp.; 19) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop with Adaptation; 20) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop with Adaptation; 21) Gen 2 NN Wts from Simulation; 22) Direct Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; and 23) Conclusions

Bosworth, John↗

Development of X-33/X-34 Aerothermodynamic Data Bases: Lessons Learned and Future Enhancements

A synoptic of programmatic and technical lessons learned in the development of aerothermodynamic data bases for the X-33 and X-34 programs is presented in general terms and from the perspective of the NASA Langley Research Center Aerothermodynamics Branch. The format used is that of the aerothermodynamic chain, the links of which are personnel, facilities, models/test articles, instrumentation, test techniques, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD). Because the aerodynamic data bases upon which the X-33 and X-34 vehicles will fly are almost exclusively from wind tunnel testing, as opposed to CFD, the primary focus of the lessons learned is on ground-based testing.

Miller, C. G.↗

Lessons Learned from Applying Design Thinking in a NASA Rapid Design Study in Aeronautics

In late 2015, NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) funded an experiment in rapid design and rapid teaming to explore new approaches to solving challenging design problems in aeronautics in an effort to cultivate and foster innovation. This report summarizes several lessons learned from the rapid design portion of the study. This effort entailed learning and applying design thinking, a human-centered design approach, to complete the conceptual design for an open-ended design challenge within six months. The design challenge focused on creating a capability to advance experimental testing of autonomous aeronautics systems, an area of great interest to NASA, the US government as a whole, and an entire ecosystem of users and developers around the globe. A team of nine civil servant researchers from three of NASA's aeronautics field centers with backgrounds in several disciplines was assembled and rapidly trained in design thinking under the guidance of the innovation and design firm IDEO. The design thinking process, while used extensively outside the aerospace industry, is less common and even counter to many practices within the aerospace industry. In this report, several contrasts between common aerospace research and development practices and design thinking are discussed, drawing upon the lessons learned from the NASA rapid design study. The lessons discussed included working towards a design solution without a set of detailed design requirements, which may not be practical or even feasible for management to ascertain for complex, challenging problems. This approach allowed for the possibility of redesigning the original problem statement to better meet the needs of the users. Another lesson learned was to approach problems holistically from the perspective of the needs of individuals that may be affected by advances in topic area instead of purely from a technological feasibility viewpoint. The interdisciplinary nature of the design team also provided valuable experience by allowing team members from different technological backgrounds to work side-by-side instead of dividing into smaller teams, as is frequently done in traditional multidisciplinary design. The team also learned how to work with qualitative data obtained primarily through the 70-plus interviews that were conducted over the course of this project, which was a sharp contrast to using quantitative data with regards to identifying, capturing, analyzing, storing, and recalling the data. When identifying potential interviewees who may have useful contributions to the design subject area, the team found great value in talking to non-traditional users and potential beneficiaries of autonomous aeronautics systems whose impact on the aeronautics autonomy ecosystem is growing swiftly. Finally, the team benefitted from using "sacrificial prototyping," which is a method of rapidly prototyping draft concepts and ideas with the intent of enabling potential users to provide significant feedback early in the design process. This contrasts the more common approach of using expensive prototypes that focus on demonstrating technical feasibility. The unique design approach and lessons learned by the team throughout this process culminated in a final design concept that was quite different than what the team originally assumed would be the design concept initially. A summary of the more usercentered final design concept is also provided.

McGowan, Anna-Maria↗

Planning and scheduling lessons learned study, executive summary

The study was performed to document the lessons on planning and scheduling activities for a number of missions and institutional facilities in such a way that they can be applied to future missions; to provide recommendations to both projects and Code 500 that will improve the end-to-end planning and scheduling process; and to identify what, if any, mission characteristics might be related to certain lessons learned. The results are a series of recommendations of both a managerial and technical nature related to the underlying lessons learned.

Robinson, Toni↗

Cumulus Lessons Learned: Building, Testing, and Sharing a Cloud Archive

Cumulus is a scalable, extensible cloud-based archive system which is capable of ingesting, archiving, and distributing data from both existing on-prem sources and new cloud-native missions. As we have built and evolved the system with contributions from seven NASA EOSDIS organizations, we have learned several lessons about how to build a robust, broadly-applicable, microservices-based cloud system for geospatial data which we will share in this talk.

Quinn, Patrick↗

The role of failure/problems in engineering: A commentary of failures experienced - lessons learned

The written version of a series of seminars given to several aerospace companies and three NASA centers are presented. The results are lessons learned through a study of the problems experienced in 35 years of engineering. The basic conclusion is that the primary cause of problems has not been mission technologies, as important as technology is, but the neglect of basic principles. Undergirding this is the lack of a systems focus from determining requirements through design, verification, and operations phases. Many of the concepts discussed are fundamental to total quality management (TQM) and can be used to augment this product enhanced philosophy. Fourteen principles are addressed with problems experienced and are used as examples. Included is a discussion of the implication of constraints, poorly defined requirements, and schedules. Design guidelines, lessons learned, and future tasks are listed. Two additional sections are included that deal with personal lessons learned and thoughts on future thrusts (TQM).

Ryan, R. S.↗

The lift-fan powered-lift aircraft concept: Lessons learned

This is one of a series of reports on the lessons learned from past research related to lift-fan aircraft concepts. An extensive review is presented of the many lift-fan aircraft design studies conducted by both government and industry over the past 45 years. Mission applications and design integration including discussions on manifolding hot gas generators, hot gas dusting, and energy transfer control are addressed. Past lift-fan evaluations of the Avrocar are discussed. Lessons learned from these past efforts are identified.

Deckert, Wallace H.↗

Habitability and Human Factors: Lessons Learned in Long Duration Space Flight

This study documents the investigation of qualitative habitability and human factors feedback provided by scientists, engineers, and crewmembers on lessons learned from the ISS Program. A thorough review and understanding of this data is critical in charting NASA's future path in space exploration. NASA has been involved in ensuring that the needs of crewmembers to live and work safely and effectively in space have been met throughout the ISS Program. Human factors and habitability data has been collected from every U.S. crewmember that has resided on the ISS. The knowledge gained from both the developers and inhabitants of the ISS have provided a significant resource of information for NASA and will be used in future space exploration. The recurring issues have been tracked and documented; the top 5 most critical issues have been identified from this data. The top 5 identified problems were: excessive onsrbit stowage; environment; communication; procedures; and inadequate design of systems and equipment. Lessons learned from these issues will be used to aid in future improvements and developments to the space program. Full analysis of the habitability and human factors data has led to the following recommendations. It is critical for human factors to be involved early in the design of space vehicles and hardware. Human factors requirements need to be readdressed and redefined given the knowledge gained during previous ISS and long-duration space flight programs. These requirements must be integrated into vehicle and hardware technical documentation and consistently enforced. Lastly, space vehicles and hardware must be designed with primary focus on the user/operator to successfully complete missions and maintain a safe working environment. Implementation of these lessons learned will significantly improve NASA's likelihood of success in future space endeavors.

Baggerman, Susan D.↗

Spacecraft Line-of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned and Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper describes the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Lessons Learned↗

Lessons Learned from Recent Failure and Incident Investigations of Composite Structures

During the past few decades, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has supported several large-scale failure and incident investigations and numerous requests for engineering consultations. Although various extenuating circumstances contributed to each of these incidents, in all cases, the failure resulted from accumulation and/or propagation of damage that reduced the load carrying capability of the structure to a level below that which was needed to sustain structural loads. A brief overview of various failure and incident investigations supported by LaRC, including some of the computational and experimental methodologies that have been applied, is presented. An important outcome of many of these failure and incident investigations is the development of an improved understanding of not only the state-of-the-art in experimental and analytical methods but also the state-of-the-art in the design and manufacturing processes that may contribute to such failures. In order to provide insight into such large-scale investigations, a series of lessons learned were captured. Awareness of these lessons learned is highly beneficial to engineers involved in similar investigations. Therefore, it is prudent that the lessons learned are disseminated such that they can be built upon in other investigations and in ensuing research and development activities.

Ransom, J. B.↗