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Finding a time-ordered signature within large graphs is a computationally complex problem due to the combinatorial explosion of potential patterns. GRADIENT is designed to search and understand that problem space.
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A new initiative underway at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory is intended to prevent hackers from gaining control of parts of the nation's power grid, potentially damaging electrical equipment and causing localized power outages. Our nation's power grid is evolving to be more responsive to changing power needs, more able to integrate renewable energy, more efficient, and more reliable. One key element of this evolution is adding communication and control devices to the power grid, closer to the end user, so that utilities have greater situational awareness of the grid and can respond quickly to disturbances. But these new devices and their communications requirements can also open up the power grid to potential cyber attacks.
Cyber-system defenders face the challenging task of protecting critical assets and information continually against multiple types of malicious attackers. Defenders typically operate within resource constraints while attackers operate at relatively low costs. As a result, design and development of resilient cyber-systems that can support mission goals under attack while accounting for the dynamics between attackers and defenders is an important research problem.
The cyber-physical security threat to buildings is complex, non-linear, and rapidly evolving as operational and information technologies converge and connect buildings to cyberspace. Cyberattacks on buildings can exploit smart building controls and breach corporate networks, causing financial and reputational damage. This may result in the loss of sensitive building information or the disruption of, or damage to, the systems necessary for the safe and efficient operation of buildings. For the buildings and facility infrastructure, there is a need for a robust national cybersecurity strategy for buildings, guidance on the selection and implementation of appropriate cybersecurity controls for buildings, an approach to evaluate the maturity and adequacy of the cybersecurity programs. To provide an approach for evaluating the maturity of the cybersecurity programs for building control systems, the US Department of Energy’s widely used Cybersecurity Capability and Maturity Model (C2M2) has been adapted into a building control systems version. The revised model, the Buildings-C2M2 (B-C2M2) provides maturity level indicators for cybersecurity programmatic domains. A “B-C2M2 Lite” version allows facility managers and building control system engineers, or information technology personnel to perform rapid self-assessments of their cybersecurity program. Both tools have been pilot tested on several facilities. This paper outlines the concept of a maturity model, describes the B-C2M2 tools, presents results and observations from the pilot assessments, and lays out plans for future work.
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This paper will describe a practical methodology for understanding the cyber risk of a digital asset. This research attempts to gain a greater understanding of the cyber risk posed by a hardware-based computer asset by considering it as a sum of its hardware and software based sub-components.
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This partner fact sheet features research done at the ESIF in partnership with Bosch and Bonneville Power Administration.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
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Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) play critical roles in industrial control systems (ICS). Providing hardware peripherals and firmware support for control programs (i.e., a PLC’s “payload”) written in languages such as ladder logic, PLCs directly receive sensor readings and control ICS physical processes. An attacker with access to PLC development software (e.g., by compromising an engineering workstation) can modify the payload program and cause severe physical damages to the ICS. To protect critical ICS infrastructure, we propose to model runtime behaviors of legitimate PLC payload program and use runtime behavior monitoring in PLC firmware to detect payload attacks. By monitoring the I/O access patterns, network access patterns, as well as payload program timing characteristics, our proposed firmware-level detection mechanism can detect abnormal runtime behaviors of malicious PLC payload. Using our proof-of-concept implementation, we evaluate the memory and execution time overhead of implementing our proposed method and find that it is feasible to incorporate our method into existing PLC firmware. In addition, our evaluation results show that a wide variety of payload attacks can be effectively detected by our proposed approach. The proposed firmware-level payload attack detection scheme complements existing bumpin- the-wire solutions (e.g., external temporal-logic-based model checkers) in that it can detect payload attacks that violate realtime requirements of ICS operations and does not require any additional apparatus.
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