Detecting Payload Attacks on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)

Abstract

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) play critical roles in industrial control systems (ICS). Providing hardware peripherals and firmware support for control programs (i.e., a PLC’s “payload”) written in languages such as ladder logic, PLCs directly receive sensor readings and control ICS physical processes. An attacker with access to PLC development software (e.g., by compromising an engineering workstation) can modify the payload program and cause severe physical damages to the ICS. To protect critical ICS infrastructure, we propose to model runtime behaviors of legitimate PLC payload program and use runtime behavior monitoring in PLC firmware to detect payload attacks. By monitoring the I/O access patterns, network access patterns, as well as payload program timing characteristics, our proposed firmware-level detection mechanism can detect abnormal runtime behaviors of malicious PLC payload. Using our proof-of-concept implementation, we evaluate the memory and execution time overhead of implementing our proposed method and find that it is feasible to incorporate our method into existing PLC firmware. In addition, our evaluation results show that a wide variety of payload attacks can be effectively detected by our proposed approach. The proposed firmware-level payload attack detection scheme complements existing bumpin- the-wire solutions (e.g., external temporal-logic-based model checkers) in that it can detect payload attacks that violate realtime requirements of ICS operations and does not require any additional apparatus.