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This document provides guidelines for the accomplishment of Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) on the Apollo program. It is a procedure for analysis of hardware items to determine those items contributing most to system unreliability and crew safety problems.
One inherent characteristic of requrements engineering is a lack of certainty during this early phase of a project. Nevertheless, decisions about requirements must be made in spite of this uncertainty. Here we describe the context in which we are exploring this, and some initial work to support elicitation of uncertain requirements, and to deal with the combination of such information from multiple stakeholders.
A flywheel testing facility is being constructed at the NASA Glenn Research Center. This facility is to be used for life cycle testing of various flywheel rotors. The lifecycle testing consists of spinning a rotor from a low rpm (approx. 20,000 ) to a high rpm (approx. 60,000) and then back to the low rpm. This spin cycle will model that which the rotor will see during use. To simulate the lifetime of the rotor, the spin cycle will be performed tens of thousands of times. A typical life cycle spin test is expected to last six months. During this time the rotor will be spun through a cycle every five minutes. The test will run continuously for the six month period barring a flywheel failure. Since it is not reasonable to have the surrounding area evacuated of personnel for the duration of the testing, the flywheel facility has to be designed to withstand a flywheel rotor failure and insure that there is no danger to any personnel in the adjacent buildings or surrounding areas. In order to determine if the facility can safely contain a flywheel rotor failure an analysis of the facility in conjunction with possible flywheel failure modes was performed. This analysis is intended as a worst case evaluation of the burst liner and vacuum tank's ability to contain a failure. The test chamber consists of a cylindrical stainless steel vacuum tank, two outer steel containment rings, and a stainless steel burst liner. The stainless steel used is annealed 302, which has an ultimate strength of 620 MPa (90,000 psi). A diagram of the vacuum tank configuration is shown. The vacuum tank and air turbine will be located below ground in a pit. The tank is secured in the pit with 0.3 m (12 in.) of cement along the base and the remaining portion of the tank is surrounded by gravel up to the access ports. A 590 kg (1300 lb.) bulkhead is placed on top of the pit during operation and the complete facility is housed within a concrete structure which has 7.5 cm (3 in.) thick walls. A cutaway of the facility is shown.
In the study of entry, descent, and landing, Monte Carlo sampling methods are often employed to study the uncertainty in the designed trajectory. The large number of uncertain inputs and outputs, coupled with complicated non-linear models, can make interpretation of the results difficult. Three methods that provide statistical insights are applied to an entry, descent, and landing simulation. The advantages and disadvantages of each method are discussed in terms of the insights gained versus the computational cost. The first method investigated was failure domain bounding which aims to reduce the computational cost of assessing the failure probability. Next a variance-based sensitivity analysis was studied for the ability to identify which input variable uncertainty has the greatest impact on the uncertainty of an output. Finally, probabilistic sensitivity analysis is used to calculate certain sensitivities at a reduced computational cost. These methods produce valuable information that identifies critical mission parameters and needs for new technology, but generally at a significant computational cost.
Analytical model for determining spacecraft reliability of Rangers VI through IX during five phases of flight based on system failure effects analysis
The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program assembly control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure effects analysis and the creation of special failure generating software for testing purposes are described.
To insure controllability of the baseline design for a 7500 pound thrust, 10:1 throttleable, dual expanded cycle, Hydrogen-Oxygen, orbit transfer rocket engine, an Integrated Controls and Health Monitoring concept was developed. This included: (1) Dynamic engine simulations using a TUTSIM derived computer code; (2) analysis of various control methods; (3) Failure Modes Analysis to identify critical sensors; (4) Survey of applicable sensors technology; and, (5) Study of Health Monitoring philosophies. The engine design was found to be controllable over the full throttling range by using 13 valves, including an oxygen turbine bypass valve to control mixture ratio, and a hydrogen turbine bypass valve, used in conjunction with the oxygen bypass to control thrust. Classic feedback control methods are proposed along with specific requirements for valves, sensors, and the controller. Expanding on the control system, a Health Monitoring system is proposed including suggested computing methods and the following recommended sensors: (1) Fiber optic and silicon bearing deflectometers; (2) Capacitive shaft displacement sensors; and (3) Hot spot thermocouple arrays. Further work is needed to refine and verify the dynamic simulations and control algorithms, to advance sensor capabilities, and to develop the Health Monitoring computational methods.
A test chip set being developed to aid in the qualification of spaceborne Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) is described. The chip set consists of a process monitor for process parameter verification, a fault chip for yield analysis, a reliability chip for ASIC failure rate analysis, and total ionizing dose and single event upset chips for radiation effect analysis. The test structures contained in these chips are discussed along with representative test results.
Receiver-autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) of GPS data is examined by means of a simulation of the availability of a RAIM system that can provide both a GPS coverage model and a Markov reliability model. State probabilities of GPS failure scenarios are assigned with the Markov model with a maximum of 6 simultaneous satellite failures. The parametric analysis of the failures on GPS RAIM availability includes the maximum allowable value of the horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP), the mean time to repair, and the efficacy of incorporating altimeter measurements. When the HDOP requirement is relaxed the number of RAIM outages is minimized, and poor satellite geometry can lead to a large HDOP. The use of an altimeter can also reduce outages, and RAIM availability increases with optimistic values for the mean time to repair.
We consider the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with common-cause failures in this paper. Phased-mission systems (PMS) are systems supporting missions characterized by multiple, consecutive, and nonoverlapping phases of operation. System components may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements throughout the course of the mission. As a result, component behavior and relationships may need to be modeled differently from phase to phase when performing a system-level reliability analysis. This consideration poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors. It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and thus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF.We propose a separable phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with dependent common-cause failures as one way to meet the above challenges in an efficient and elegant manner. Our methodology is twofold: first, we separate the effects of CCF from the PMS analysis using the total probability theorem and the common-cause event space developed based on the elementary common-causes; next, we apply an efficient phase-modular approach to analyze the reliability of the PMS. The phase-modular approach employs both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate. We provide an example of a reliability analysis of a PMS with both static and dynamic phases as well as CCF as an illustration of our proposed approach. The example is based on information extracted from a Mars orbiter project. The reliability model for this orbiter considers the various phases of Launch, Cruise, Mars Orbit Insertion, and Orbit. Some of the CCF for the orbiter in this mission include environmental effects, such as micrometeoroids, human operator errors, and software errors.
Work performed during Phase one is summarized and the significant technical and programmatic accomplishments occurring during this period are documented. Besides a summary of the results, methodologies, trade studies, design, fabrication, and hardware conditions; the following are included: the evolving Maintainability Plan, Reliability Program Plan, Failure Summary and Analysis Report, and the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis.
This report investigates two of the most common modes of localized failures, namely, periodic fiber-bridged matrix cracks and transverse matrix cracks. A modification of Daniels' bundle theory is combined with Weibull's weakest link theory to model the statistical distribution of the periodic matrix cracking strength for an individual layer. Results of the model predictions are compared with experimental data from the open literature. Extensions to the model are made to account for possible imperfections within the layer (i.e., nonuniform fiber lengths, irregular crack spacing, and degraded in-situ fiber properties), and the results of these studies are presented. A generalized shear-lag analysis is derived which is capable of modeling the development of transverse matrix cracks in material systems having a general multilayer configuration and under states of full in-plane load. A method for computing the effective elastic properties for the damaged layer at the global level is detailed based upon the solution for the effects of the damage at the local level. This methodology is general in nature and is therefore also applicable to (0(sub m)/90(sub n))(sub s) systems. The characteristic stress-strain response for more general cases is shown to be qualitatively correct (experimental data is not available for a quantitative evaluation), and the damage evolution is recorded in terms of the matrix crack density as a function of the applied strain. Probabilistic effects are introduced to account for the statistical nature of the material strengths, thus allowing cumulative distribution curves for the probability of failure to be generated for each of the example laminates. Additionally, Oh and Finney's classic work on fracture location in brittle materials is extended and combined with the shear-lag analysis. The result is an analytical form for predicting the probability density function for the location of the next transverse crack occurrence within a crack bounded region. The results of this study verified qualitatively the validity of assuming a uniform crack spacing (as was done in the shear-lag model).
The design, implementation, and verification of the flight control software used in the F-8 DFBW program are discussed. Since the DFBW utilizes an Apollo computer and hardware, the procedures, controls, and basic management techniques employed are based on those developed for the Apollo software system. Program Assembly Control, simulator configuration control, erasable-memory load generation, change procedures and anomaly reporting are discussed. The primary verification tools--the all-digital simulator, the hybrid simulator, and the Iron Bird simulator--are described, as well as the program test plans and their implementation on the various simulators. Failure-effects analysis and the creation of special failure-generating software for testing purposes are described. The quality of the end product is evidenced by the F-8 DFBW flight test program in which 42 flights, totaling 58 hours of flight time, were successfully made without any DFCS inflight software, or hardware, failures.
The occurrence of a crack in the HPFTP first stage impeller of pump 2608 R2 during test 750-245 prompted this analysis to examine possible causes of the failure. Preliminary analysis, using an existing NASTRAN model of the impeller, showed a deficiency in the model's ability to reliably calculate stress in the area of concern (outboard edge of the impeller shroud). A new NASTRAN model was constructed to better define the stress state in the area of crack initiations. Static stress analysis and normal models analysis were performed on the new model. Results are presented.
The Gateway Integrated ECLSS Model (GIEM) is a set of two independent models, made in Aspen Custom Modeler (ACM) and Thermal Desktop (TD), of the Gateway stack and each modules' associated environment control and life support system (ECLSS). The GIEM utilizes the 41-Node Metabolic Man (METMAN) to simulate crew inside the Gateway consuming O2 and producing CO2, H2O, and heat for the ECLSS to remove. The modules and visiting vehicles all have different levels of ECLSS capabilities and may rely on other modules and Intermodular Ventilation (IMV), which is used to exchange gas between the modules, to ensure the entire Gateway environment is controlled. If IMV were to fail or be turned off, some vehicles may have limited access to necessary ECLSS functions. This analysis focuses on evaluating O2, CO2, and H2O levels when crew are in vehicles without their own life support and IMV has failed to evaluate how long before the atmosphere is unsafe for the crew. This analysis uses the integrated nature of the GIEM to look at time to effect for O2 depletion and CO2 and H2O buildup when crew are working in vehicles that have been cut off from the ECLSS-active portion of the stack. This information is used to inform for how long crew can safely continue working in the ECLSS-inactive vehicles before experiencing a requirement violation or physical limitation and can be referenced when developing maintenance and emergency response concept of operations (ConOps).
In order to demonstrate the advanced CMC technology under development within the Ultra Efficient Engine Technology (UEET) program, it has been planned to fabricate, test and analyze an all CMC turbine vane made of a SiC/SiC composite material. The objective was to utilize a 5-II Satin Weave SiC/CVI SiC/ and MI SiC matrix material that was developed in-house under the Enabling Propulsion Materials (EPM) program, to design and fabricate a stator vane that can endure successfully 1000 hours of engine service conditions operation. The design requirements for the vane are to be able to withstand a maximum of 2400 F within the substrate and the hot surface temperature of 2700 F with the aid of an in-house developed Environmental/Thermal Barrier Coating (EBC/TBC) system. The vane will be tested in a High Pressure Burner Rig at NASA Glenn Research Center facility. This rig is capable of simulating the engine service environment. The present paper focuses on a probabilistic assessment of the vane. The material stress/strain relationship shows a bilinear behavior with a distinct knee corresponding to what is often termed as first matrix cracking strength. This is a critical life limiting consideration for these materials. The vane is therefore designed such that the maximum stresses are within this limit so that the structure is never subjected to loads beyond the first matrix cracking strength. Any violation of this design requirement is considered as failure. Probabilistic analysis is performed in order to determine the probability of failure based on this assumption. In the analysis, material properties, strength, and pressures are considered random variables. The variations in properties and strength are based on the actual experimental data generated in house. The mean values for the pressures on the upper surface and the lower surface are known but their distributions are unknown. In the present analysis the pressures are considered normally distributed with a nominal variation. Temperature profile on the vane is obtained by performing a CFD analysis and is assumed to be deterministic.
It is probable that no two engine companies determine the life of their engines or their components in the same way or apply the same experience and safety factors to their designs. Knowing the failure mode that is most likely to occur minimizes the amount of uncertainty and simplifies failure and life analysis. Available data regarding failure mode for aircraft engine blades, while favoring low-cycle, thermal-mechanical fatigue (TMF) as the controlling mode of failure, are not definitive. Sixteen high-pressure turbine (HPT) T-1 blade sets were removed from commercial aircraft engines that had been commercially flown by a single airline and inspected for damage. Each set contained 82 blades. The damage was cataloged into three categories related to their mode of failure: (1) TMF, (2) Oxidation/erosion (O/E), and (3) Other. From these field data, the turbine blade life was determined as well as the lives related to individual blade failure modes using Johnson-Weibull analysis. A simplified formula for calculating turbine blade life and reliability was formulated. The L10 blade life was calculated to be 2427 cycles (11 077 hr). The resulting blade life attributed to O/E equaled that attributed to TMF. The category that contributed most to blade failure was Other. If there were no blade failures attributed to O/E and TMF, the overall blade L(sub 10) life would increase approximately 11 to 17 percent.