Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “NONPROLIFERATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 577 records · Page 32

Gary Laughlin IHNS Intro to 2015 HPC Annual Report

The International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security (IHNS) Program Management Unit (PMU) oversees a broad portfolio of Sandia’s programs in areas ranging from global nuclear security to critical asset protection. We use science and technology, innovative research, and global engagement to counter threats, reduce dangers, and respond to disasters. The PMU draws on the skills of scientists and engineers from across Sandia. Our programs focus on protecting US government installations, safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials, facilitating nonproliferation activities, securing infrastructures, countering chemical and biological dangers, and reducing the risk of terrorist threats. We conduct research in risk and threat analysis, monitoring and detection, decontamination and recovery, and situational awareness. We develop technologies for verifying arms control agreements, neutralizing dangerous materials, detecting intruders, and strengthening resiliency. Our programs use Sandia’s High-Performance Computing resources for predictive modeling and simulation of interdependent systems, for modeling dynamic threats and forecasting adaptive behavior, and for enabling decision support and processing large cyber data streams. In this report, we highlight four advanced computation projects that illustrate the breadth of the IHNS mission space.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Estimating the AmLi Neutron Spectrum from Measured Ring Ratios

These are a set of slides on estimating the AmLi neutron spectrum from measured ring ratios. The IAEA uses an AmLi source in the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) to verify compliance with nonproliferation treaties. The UNCL requires calibration with known uranium samples. The AmLi spectrum isn’t known well enough to allow simulated calibrations. Alphas lose energy traveling through AmO 2 particle of unknown size. Energy reduction below Li threshold enhances O contribution. Unknown Li matrix material affects neutron production and thermalization. There is large variation in spectra from each element. Other topics covered include: applications, physics considerations, current spectra, measurement overview, measurement results - variation between sources, simulations, spectra fitting, other simulations, and conclusions.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Ceramic Seal.

Containment/Surveillance (C/S) measures are critical to any verification regime in order to maintain Continuity of Knowledge (CoK). The Ceramic Seal project is research into the next generation technologies to advance C/S, in particular improving security and efficiency. The Ceramic Seal is a small form factor loop seal with improved tamper-indication including a frangible seal body, tamper planes, external coatings, and electronic monitoring of the seal body integrity. It improves efficiency through a self-securing wire and in-situ verification with a handheld reader. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), under sponsorship from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D), have previously designed and have now fabricated and tested Ceramic Seals. Tests have occurred at both SNL and SRNL, with different types of tests occurring at each facility. This interim report will describe the Ceramic Seal prototype, the design and development of a handheld standalone reader and an interface to a data acquisition system, fabrication of the seals, and results of initial testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NGSPN @ BNL

Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department hosted the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) at BNL September 6-9, 2016. Thirteen representatives from seven Department of Energy National Laboratories, including two from BNL, participated in the four-day meeting. The NGSPN meeting was sponsored by the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which provided funding for BNL’s development and conduct of the meeting program and the participant’s labor and travel. NGSPN meetings were previously held at Savannah River National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The purpose of NGSPN is to provide a forum for early-career international safeguards practitioners to network with their peers, to meet international safeguards experts from other institutions and to learn about organizations other than their employers who contribute to international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CGMF & FREYA Verification in MCNP6

At the present time, the new and updated fission event generators included in MCNP6.2 have been verified to be functioning properly through a variety of detailed tests. This work describes the detailed verification steps taken to ensure these complicated fission event generators, FREYA and CGMF, are integrated into MCNP6 properly. Ultimately, with the knowledge that MCNP6 is making use of these models appropriately, we can now begin to validate the models against benchmarked experiments. Some benchmarks, including criticality and subcritical experiments interested in multiplication and bulk counting rates, are easy to model and understand but are likely insensitive to the detailed nature of these models. It will take some new measurements with coincidence detection capabilities to be able to stress the physics within each of these fission event generator models. Once the models are validated and it is understood where the models can truly be predictive, then we can study what SNM observables can be characterized for nonproliferation applications.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Nominations for the 2017 NNSA Pollution Prevention Awards

In the field of nuclear forensics, one of the biggest challenges is to dissolve postdetonation debris for analysis. Debris generated after a nuclear detonation is a glassy material that is difficult to dissolve with chemicals. Traditionally, concentrated nitric acid, hydrofluoric acid, or sulfuric acid are employed during the dissolution. These acids, due to their corrosive nature, are not suitable for in-field/on-site sample preparations. Uranium oxides are commonly present in nuclear fuel processing plants and nuclear research facilities. In uranium oxides, the level of uranium isotope enrichment is a sensitive indicator for nuclear nonproliferation and is monitored closely by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure there is no misuse of nuclear material or technology for nuclear weapons. During an IAEA on-site inspection at a facility, environmental surface swipe samples are collected and transported to the IAEA headquarters or network of analytical laboratories for further processing. Uranium oxide particles collected on the swipe medium are typically dissolved with inorganic acids and are then analyzed for uranium isotopic compositions. To improve the responsiveness of on-site inspections, in-field detection techniques have been recently explored. However, in-field analysis is bottlenecked by time-consuming and hazardous dissolution procedures, as corrosive inorganic acids must be used. Corrosive chemicals are difficult to use in the field due to personnel safety considerations, and the transportation of such chemicals is highly regulated. It was therefore necessary to develop fast uranium oxide dissolution methods using less hazardous chemicals in support of the rapid infield detection of anomalies in declared nuclear processes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Uranium Conversion & Enrichment

The isotopes of uranium that are found in nature, and hence in ‘fresh’ Yellowcake’, are not in relative proportions that are suitable for power or weapons applications. The goal of conversion then is to transform the U 3 O 8 yellowcake into UF 6 . Conversion and enrichment of uranium is usually required to obtain material with enough 235 U to be usable as fuel in a reactor or weapon. The cost, size, and complexity of practical conversion and enrichment facilities aid in nonproliferation by design.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at some sites to above 3% at others. Based on the data received, the global average uptime for NSDD RPMs was above 96% for fiscal year 2016. NSDD takes all of these factors into account in making recommendations to partner countries on how to most effectively manage and maintain site operations. NSDD utilizes reports and other information products created by data analysts to efficiently allocate the resources needed to detect and ultimately interdict illicit nuclear and radiological material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Safeguards as a Career Path

Presenting along with Introductory Nonproliferation Teaching and Learning Module to provide an intro to working at LANL at Utah State on February 21, 2017.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The European Expression Of Interest For High Purity U-233 Materials

The purpose of this letter report is to document the response for an Expression of Interest (EOI) sent to the European Safeguards and research and development (R&D) scientific communities for the distribution of small amounts of high purity 233 U materials for use in safeguards, nonproliferation, and basic R&D in the nuclear disciplines. The intent for the EOI was to gauge the level of international interest for these materials from government and research institutions with programmatic missions in the nuclear security or nuclear R&D arena. The information contained herein is intended to provide information to assist key decision makers in DOE as to the ultimate disposition path for the high purity materials currently being recovered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and only those items for which there is no United States (U.S.) sponsor identified.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Scalable Metadata Management for a Large Multi-Source Seismic Data Repository

In this work, we implemented the key metadata management components of a scalable seismic data ingestion framework to address limitations in our existing system, and to position it for anticipated growth in volume and complexity. We began the effort with an assessment of open source data flow tools from the Hadoop ecosystem. We then began the construction of a layered architecture that is specifically designed to address many of the scalability and data quality issues we experience with our current pipeline. This included implementing basic functionality in each of the layers, such as establishing a data lake, designing a unified metadata schema, tracking provenance, and calculating data quality metrics. Our original intent was to test and validate the new ingestion framework with data from a large-scale field deployment in a temporary network. This delivered somewhat unsatisfying results, since the new system immediately identified fatal flaws in the data relatively early in the pipeline. Although this is a correct result it did not allow us to sufficiently exercise the whole framework. We then widened our scope to process all available metadata from over a dozen online seismic data sources to further test the implementation and validate the design. This experiment also uncovered a higher than expected frequency of certain types of metadata issues that challenged us to further tune our data management strategy to handle them. Our result from this project is a greatly improved understanding of real world data issues, a validated design, and prototype implementations of major components of an eventual production framework. This successfully forms the basis of future development for the Geophysical Monitoring Program data pipeline, which is a critical asset supporting multiple programs. It also positions us very well to deliver valuable metadata management expertise to our sponsors, and has already resulted in an NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation commitment to a multi-year project for follow-on work.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Campus Capability Plan

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Campus Capability Plan for 2018-2028. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is one of three national laboratories that are part of the National Nuclear Security Administration. LLNL provides critical expertise to strengthen U.S. security through development and application of world-class science and technology that: Ensures the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; Promotes international nuclear safety and nonproliferation; Reduces global danger from weapons of mass destruction; Supports U.S. leadership in science and technology. Essential to the execution and continued advancement of these mission areas are responsive infrastructure capabilities. This report showcases each LLNL capability area and describes the mission, science, and technology efforts enabled by LLNL infrastructure, as well as future infrastructure plans.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DN/DG Screening of Environmental Swipe Samples: FY2016 Report

The Delayed Neutron Delayed Gamma (DNDG) technique provides a new analytical capability to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. IAEA’s Long Term R&D (LTRD) plan has a stated high urgency need to develop elemental and isotopic signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activities and processes (LTRD 2.2). The new DNDG capability is used to co-detect both uranium and plutonium as an extension of a DN only method that is already being utilized by the IAEA for the analysis of swipes to inform on undeclared nuclear activities. Analytical method involving irradiation of swipe samples potentially containing trace quantities of fissile material in a thermal neutron field, followed by the counting of delayed neutrons, is a well-known technique in the field of safeguards and nonproliferation. It is used for detecting the presence of microscopic amounts of fissile material, (typically a linear combination of 233 U, 235 U, 239 Pu, and 241 Pu)and quantifying it in terms of the equivalent mass of 235U. The delayed neutron (DN) technique is very sensitive and is been routinely employed at the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Both uranium and plutonium are of high safeguards value. However, the DN technique is not well suited for distinguishing between U and Pu isotopes since the decay curves overlap closely. The delayed gamma (DG) technique will help detect the presence of 239Pu in a mixture of U and Pu. Thus the DNDG approach combines the best of both worlds; the sensitivity of DN counting and the isotopic specificity of DG counting. The present work seeks to build on the delayed neutron and delayed gamma methods that have been developed at ORNL. It is recognized that the distribution profile of heavy fission products remains fairly invariant for the fissile nuclides whereas the distribution of light fission products varies from one isotope to another. That is, the ratio of the yield of a light fission fragment to a heavy fission fragments is isotope specific. Measurement of the ratio of the net full energy peak (FEP) from low/high mass fission products is an elegant way to characterize the fraction of fissile materials present in a mixture. By empirically calibrating the ratio of the net FEP as a function of known concentration of the binary mixture, one can determine the fraction of fissile isotopes in an unknown sample. In the work done in fiscal year (FY) 2016, samples of single fissile material isotopes as well as binary mixtures were irradiated in a well thermalized irradiation field in the HFIR. Delayed neutron counting was performed using the neutron counter at the HFIR Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) laboratory. Delayed gamma counting was performed using a shielded high purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Delayed neutron decay curve results highlighted the difficulty of distinguishing between U and Pu isotopes, and the need for including the delayed gamma component. Based on delayed gamma spectrometry, twelve ratios of low mass/high fission product gamma ray FEP have been identified as valid candidates. Linearity of the ratios, as a function of 239 Pu fraction in 235 U+ 239 Pu mixtures, was confirmed for the low mass/high mass candidates that were selected. The DNDG method we are spearheading allows not only the presence of total fissile content to be detected, but whether the material is predominantly U or predominantly Pu, or a mixture. This provides additional SG relevant information.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Room temperature Sieving of Hydrogen Isotopes Using 2-D Materials

Hydrogen isotope separation is critical to the DOE’s mission in environmental remediation and nuclear nonproliferation. Isotope separation is also a critical technology for the NNSA, and the ability to perform the separations at room temperature with a relatively small amount of power and space would be a major advancement for their respective missions. Recent work has shown that 2-D materials such as graphene and hexagonal boron nitride can act as an isotopic sieve at room temperature; efficiently separating hydrogen isotopes in water with reported separation ratios of 10:1 for hydrogen: deuterium separation for a single pass. The work performed here suggests that this technique has merit, and furthermore, we are investigating optimization and scale up of the required 2-D material based membranes.

08 HYDROGEN↗

LAFD: TA-3 NISC & SCC Facility Familiarization Tour, OJT #53356

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, the Laboratory, or the Lab) conducts familiarization tours for Los Alamos County Fire Department (LAFD) personnel at the Strategic Computing Complex (SCC), TA-03-2327, and the Nonproliferation & International Security Complex (NISC), TA-03-2322. These tours are official LANL business; their purpose is to orient the firefighters to the SCC and the NISC so that they can respond efficiently and quickly to a variety of emergency situations. The tour includes ingress and egress of the buildings, layout and organization of the buildings, evacuation procedures, and areas of concern to emergency responders within these buildings. LAFD firefighters have the training, skills, and abilities to perform these emergency responder tasks; other LANL personnel who have the required clearance level cannot perform these tasks. This handout provides details of the information, along with maps and diagrams, to be presented during the familiarization tours. The report will be distributed to the trainees at the time of the tour. A corresponding checklist will also be used as guidance during the familiarization tours to ensure that all required information is presented to the LAFD personnel.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

OR14-V-Uncertainty-PD2La Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay Final Report

The various methods of nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) have applications in nuclear nonproliferation, including detection and identification of illicit SNM at border crossings and quantifying SNM at nuclear facilities for safeguards. No assay method is complete without “error bars,” which provide one way of expressing confidence in the assay result. Consequently, NDA specialists typically provide error bars and also partition total uncertainty into “random” and “systematic” components so that, for example, an error bar can be developed for the total mass estimate in multiple items. Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for NDA has always been important, but it is recognized that greater rigor is needed and achievable using modern statistical methods.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Comparison Framework for Reactor Anti-Neutrino Detectors in Near-Field Nuclear Safeguards Applications

Electron anti-neutrino ( e) detectors can support nuclear safeguards, from reactor monitoring to spent fuel characterization. In recent years, the scientific community has developed multiple detector concepts, many of which have been prototyped or deployed for specific measurements by their respective collaborations. However, the diversity of technical approaches, deployment conditions, and analysis techniques complicates direct performance comparison between designs. We have begun development of a simulation framework to compare and evaluate existing and proposed detector designs for nonproliferation applications in a uniform manner. This report demonstrates the intent and capabilities of the framework by evaluating four detector design concepts, calculating generic reactor antineutrino counting sensitivity, and capabilities in a plutonium disposition application example.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗