Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “IAEA”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

IAEA ACTI Presentation

Demonstrate Technologies to Significantly Reduce the Cost and Schedule for Construction of Advanced Reactors. Make these technologies available to reactor developers by the 2030s, to improve the economics of deploying Advanced Reactors. Selected technologies will not require major R& D efforts. Technologies are ready for demonstration for use in the nuclear environment. Cost-shared public-private partnership 70% DOE-NE / 30% GEH & TVA Phase 1: Duration 14 months; Vertical Shaft Excavation Steel Bricks™ - Modular Walling Systems Holdings Limited Advanced Monitoring and Digital Twins Learn By Doing!

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes

A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.

Hogue, Karen↗
DOE OSTI2023

Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Cask Top Fast Neutron Mapping (FY2023 Mid-Year Report)

This project is developing a prototype scanner array verification system for detection of missing fuel assemblies in spent-fuel storage casks. The prototype consists of six fast-neutron scintillator detectors mounted to a linear actuator frame that is placed on the top of a spent fuel cask to scan across all fuel assembly positions. The scanner array was assembled and tested at LLNL in FY2022. A field test schedule has been requested at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Cask Farm site for FY2023. Note that the Cask Farm contractor determines this scheduling and not INL directly. Further system automation will be designed and implemented with the goal of obtaining a level of system operation that meets IAEA needs. This includes integration of the scanner array and data-acquisition control software into a single interface for operator use. In addition, commercial operators and the IAEA may have special requirements for portability, shipping, lifting, and installation. Prior to the Field Test at INL, the system will be operated at LLNL to exercise lifting procedure and linear actuators, monitor stability of detector energy and pulse-shape discrimination calibration, and test system software integration efforts. Following the Field Test, we will present results and discuss the technology with the IAEA. We will incorporate additional improvements to the system based on lessons learned from the field test and feedback from the IAEA. If successful, the technology can be transferred to the IAEA or other stakeholders for assessment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

FY26 Mid-Year Report Self-Diagnostic Capabilities for Neutron Instruments

This year we will transfer the latest version of INCC6 with last year’s self-diagnostic features to the IAEA. In FY25 we completed the development of three automated self diagnostic features into INNC6. The completion of these features marked the final stable version of INCC 6.0 ready for release to the IAEA and other users. In the first half of the Fiscal Year 2026 we have worked with LANL’s Feynman Center and Export Control office to attain a license for exporting INCC6 to the IAEA. We have successfully attained the export license for INCC6, and contacts at the IAEA have been granted permission to receive INCC6. We are in the final stage of writing the version 6 user manual. Once this is complete, we will deliver INCC6 to the IAEA for testing.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗