Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Abstract

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.