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At least 523 records · Page 29
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.

Hogue, Karen↗
DOE OSTI2017

Database dedicated to nuclear criticality events that occurred in fuel cycle facilities

Nuclear fuel cycle facilities can encounter events, resulting from human errors, failure of safety organization or technical failures. However, the application of the concept of defense in depth, especially the first two levels (prevention of abnormal situations and detection) requires to ensure safety in such undesirable situations. Furthermore, the periodic safety reviews of each nuclear fuel cycle facility involve the evaluation of the safety of these facilities with regard to the regulation evolution, the best safety practices, the facility evolution (modifications, aging...) and the global feedback. Part of this work is based on the analysis of the feedback and lessons learned from the events that occurred during the past period. This specific work indeed provides lessons about the operating conditions of the facility and highlights malfunctions that have occurred during operations, maintenance or restart after a shutdown. Taking into account this feedback, IRSN developed a database gathering the events which have affected the safety of French fuel cycle facilities (from conversion to waste storage, laboratories and experimental facilities, facilities under dismantling and decommissioning). Among all the recorded events, it is possible to extract in particular those impacting the criticality safety. In order to extend the analysis of these events, the IRSN criticality safety department developed a specific database dedicated to criticality risks. The 'criticality events' database is continuously updated on the basis of the declared events and their analysis by engineers from the criticality safety department. At this time, about 600 events are described and analyzed in this database. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Role of the Nuclear Science User Facilities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF), established in 2007 as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) National Scientific User Facility is chartered to provide cost-free access to unique and important research and development capabilities and infrastructure to nuclear energy-focused researchers. Originally, the NSUF was formed to utilize excess capacity in the ATR and the Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) hot cells. In the eight years since its inception, the NSUF has expanded to include most of the capabilities at the Idaho National Laboratory as well as twelve external 'partner' facilities. The inclusion of the partner facilities makes the NSUF the first distributed user facility, a 'laboratory without walls.' Users can apply for access to any of the NSUF INL or partner facilities using the same process, either through the annual Office of Nuclear Energy Consolidated Innovative Nuclear Research funding announcement or the NSUF Rapid Turnaround Experiment (RTE) opportunities, offered three times each year. In support of the capability access mission, the NSUF also offers access to additional resources. In order to help researchers connect with the appropriate capabilities, the NSUF has developed a comprehensive searchable database of nuclear energy R and D infrastructure in the US and worldwide. Additionally, the NSUF hosts a Fuels and Materials Sample Library (FMSL) that includes an ever-expanding set of previously irradiated materials, supporting un-irradiated archive material and fabrication and irradiation data for the materials. The capabilities of the NSUF partner facilities, the NEID, the fuels and materials sample library and the access application information is all available at the NSUF web site: ATRNSUF.INL.gov. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Research and Development Capabilities available through the Nuclear Science User Facilities

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF), established in 2007 as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) National Scientific User Facility is chartered to provide cost-free access to unique and important research and development capabilities and infrastructure to nuclear energy-focused researchers. Originally, the NSUF was formed to utilize excess capacity in the ATR and the Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) hot cells. In the eight years since its inception, the NSUF has expanded to include most of the capabilities at the Idaho National Laboratory as well as twelve external 'partner' facilities. The inclusion of the partner facilities makes the NSUF the first distributed user facility, a 'laboratory without walls.' Users can apply for access to any of the NSUF INL or partner facilities using the same process, either through the annual Office of Nuclear Energy Consolidated Innovative Nuclear Research funding announcement or the NSUF Rapid Turnaround Experiment (RTE) opportunities, offered three times each year. In support of the capability access mission, the NSUF also offers access to additional resources. In order to help researchers connect with the appropriate capabilities, the NSUF has developed a comprehensive searchable database of nuclear energy R and D infrastructure in the US and worldwide. Additionally, the NSUF hosts a Fuels and Materials Sample Library (FMSL) that includes an ever-expanding set of previously irradiated materials, supporting un-irradiated archive material and fabrication and irradiation data for the materials. The capabilities of the NSUF partner facilities, the NEID, the fuels and materials sample library and the access application information is all available at the NSUF web site: ATRNSUF.INL.gov. (author)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2013

Developing a concept for a national used fuel interim storage facility in the United States

In the United States (U.S.) the nuclear waste issue has plagued the nuclear industry for decades. Originally, spent fuel was to be reprocessed but with the threat of nuclear proliferation, spent fuel reprocessing has been eliminated, at least for now. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [1] was established, authorizing development of one or more spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste geological repositories and a consolidated national storage facility, called a 'Monitored Retrievable Storage' facility, that could store the spent nuclear fuel until it could be placed into the geological repository. Plans were under way to build a geological repository, Yucca Mountain, but with the decision by President Obama to terminate the development of Yucca Mountain, a consolidated national storage facility that can store spent fuel for an interim period until a new repository is established has become very important. Since reactor sites have not been able to wait for the government to come up with a storage or disposal location, spent fuel remains in wet or dry storage at each nuclear plant. The purpose of this paper is to present a concept developed to address the DOE's goals stated above. This concept was developed over the past few months by collaboration between the DOE and industry experts that have experience in designing spent nuclear fuel facilities. The paper examines the current spent fuel storage conditions at shutdown reactor sites, operating reactor sites, and the type of storage systems (transportable versus non-transportable, welded or bolted). The concept lays out the basis for a pilot storage facility to house spent fuel from shutdown reactor sites and then how the pilot facility can be enlarged to a larger full scale consolidated interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Interactive and Reproducible Computing With Jupyter Tools at Facilities

Increasingly Jupyter tools are being adopted and incorporated into High Performance Computing (HPC) and scientific user facilities. Adopting Jupyter tools enables more interactive and reproducible computational work at facilities across data life cycles. As the volume, variety, and scope of data grow, scientists need to be able to analyze and share results in user friendly ways. Human-centered research highlights design challenges around computational notebooks, and our qualitative user study shifts focus to better characterize how Jupyter tools are being used in HPC and science user facilities today. We conducted twenty-nine interviews, and obtained 103 survey responses from NERSC Jupyter users, to better understand the increasing role of interactive computing tools in DOE sponsored scientific work. We examine a range of issues that emerge using and supporting Jupyter in HPC ecosystems, including: how Jupyter is being used by scientists in HPC and user facility ecosystems; how facilities are purposefully supporting Jupyter in their ecosystems; feedback NERSC users have about the facility’s deployment, and, discuss features NERSC indicated would be helpful. We offer a variety of takeaways for staff supporting Jupyter at facilities, Project Jupyter and related open source communities, and funding agencies supporting interactive computing work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Societal-Equity-Enhancing Criteria and Facility-Host Incentives Supporting Five Key Elements in the January 2012 Blue Ribbon Commission Report - 13015

In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would abandon USA's only candidate SNF/HLW-disposal facility since 1987. In 2010, all related activities were stopped and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future was established 'to recommend a new strategy for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle', which it did in January 2012, emphasizing eight key elements. However, Key Element 1, 'A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear facilities', is qualitative/indeterminate rather than quantitative/measurable. It is thus highly-susceptible to semantic permutations that could extend rather than, as intended, expedite the siting of future nuclear facilities unless it also defines: a) Whose consent is needed?; and b) What constitutes consent? The following 'generic', radiation-risk- and societal-equity-based criteria address these questions: 1. Identify areas affected by projected radiation and other health risks from: a. The proposed nuclear facility (facility stakeholders); and b. The related nuclear-materials-transportation routes (transportation stakeholders); then 2. Surround each stakeholder area with a buffer zone and use this enlarged foot print to identify: a. Stakeholder hosts; and b. Areas not hosting any stakeholder category (interested parties). 3. Define 'consent-based' as being at least 60 percent of the 'population' in the respective stakeholder category and apply this yardstick to both 'in favor' and 'against' votes. Although criteria 1 and 2 also need facility-based definitions to make Key Element 1 measurable, the described siting approach, augmented by related facility-host incentives, would expedite the schedule and reduce the cost for achieving Key Elements 4-6 and 8, politics permitting. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Decommissioning Demonstration - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station South Yard Facility - 16544

Following the decision to retire Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Southern California Edison (SCE) staffed a multi-discipline team to investigate decommissioning best practices. SCE also tasked this team with reducing the overall radiological footprint and radioactive material inventory in the near term. The SCE decommissioning activities investigation team targeted projects at the facility which could reduce the source term and risk, and investigate management approaches with decommissioning contractors. SCE, through this team, contracted EnergySolutions to provide a solution for processing and disposal of equipment and materials at a storage facility south of the plant. The South Yard Facility included offices, instrument repair facilities, a large machine shop, outage equipment storage, waste management facilities, and decontamination facilities. SCE contracted EnergySolutions to manage, supervise, plan, and provide labor for the disposition of the legacy waste stored at the South Yard to include the Radioactive Equipment/Materials Storage (REMS) Pad and South Yard Facility. Under the Contractor Work Authorization (CWA), SCE authorized EnergySolutions to consolidate, package, transport, and dispose of the Low Level Radioactive Waste (Class A) and Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste from the aforementioned areas. The scope also included disposition of material that was expected to be free from radiological contamination, but required management as a hazardous waste. The legacy waste consisted of an inventory of containers designated as trash provided by SCE, as well as, all materials stored within the rooms of the SYF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Commissioning and Startup of a New Category 2 Nuclear Facility for RH TRU Sludge Packaging - 18614

For many years the Department of Energy (DOE) has been executing a plan to eliminate all threats of Radiological release to the Columbia River from the Hanford site, in Richland, Washington. While the River Corridor Closure Project is nearing completion, one of the last remaining facilities along the Columbia River is the 100K reactor complex. Since the 1950's the 105KW fuel storage basin has contained varying levels of spent reactor fuel and products of the degradation of aging stored fuel. Having previously removed all of the distinguishable spent fuel components, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is now in the final stages of readiness review to commence removal of the residual sludge material that has accumulated in the basin throughout the years of operation. There is approximately 27 m3 of sludge in the 105KW basin currently. This sludge material exhibits a very high radiation dose rate with levels reaching 100 R/hr. It is also very difficult to mobilize and transfer due to its physical characteristics. CH2M engineers have developed a novel mechanical system for mobilization and transfer of the sludge to specially designed storage containers. Once transferred to these containers, the sludge will be moved away from the river and taken to T Plant, a decontamination and repair facility on site, for interim storage, while a project to treat and package the material for final disposition is established. The Sludge Removal Project (SRP) is a $309 M capital line item project that was established to achieve the goals of this mission. Part of the project is to develop and install the equipment needed to do the transfer, and part of the project is to construct a new Category 2 sludge packaging facility. Construction of the facility is now complete, all equipment is installed and the project is well into the commissioning phase. Over the final three months of 2017, the project progressed into the final stages of readiness to transition to operations. This will represent the first commissioning of a new Category 2 process and facility at Hanford in over 10 years. The SRP team has crossed over many hurdles in establishing a workable plan for the safety basis for installing, commissioning and transitioning to operations within the boundaries of an existing Facility Safety Analysis Report. The project team has also applied extensive use of a mockup facility in the development and execution of the path to readiness and commencement of operations. At the time of the conference, the project will have completed a DOE Operational Readiness Review and will be very near of just entering full operation. This paper will share the experiences of the project team through these final steps and lessons learned on making the project successful. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

A Multidisciplinary Paradigm and Approach to Protecting Human Health and the Environment, Society, and Stakeholders at Nuclear Facilities - 12244

As the Department of Energy (DOE) continues to remediate its lands, and to consider moving toward long-term stewardship and the development of energy parks on its industrial, remediated land, it is essential to adequately characterize the environment around such facilities to protect society, human health, and the environment. While DOE sites re considering several different land-use scenarios, all of them require adequate protection of the environment. Even if DOE lands are developed for energy parks that are mainly for industrializes sections of DOE lands that will not be remediated to residential standards, there is still the need to consider the protection of human health and the environment. We present an approach to characterization and establishment of teams that will gather the information, and integrate that information for a full range of stakeholders from technical personnel, to public policy makers, and that public. Such information is needed to establish baselines, site new energy facilities in energy parks, protect existing nuclear facilities and nuclear wastes, improve the basis for emergency planning, devise suitable monitoring schemes to ensure continued protection, provide data to track local and regional response changes, and for mitigation, remediation and decommissioning planning. We suggest that there are five categories of information or data needs, including 1) geophysical, sources, fate and transport, 2) biological systems, 3) human health, 4) stakeholder and environmental justice, and 5) societal, economic, and political. These informational needs are more expansive than the traditional site characterization, but encompass a suite of physical, biological, and societal needs to protect all aspects of human health and the environment, not just physical health. We suggest a Site Committee be established that oversees technical teams for each of the major informational categories, with appropriate representation among teams and with a broad involvement of a range of governmental personnel, natural and social scientists, Native Americans, environmental justice communities, and other stakeholders. Such informational teams (and Oversight Committee) would report to a DOE-designated authority or Citizen's Advisory Board. Although designed for nuclear facilities and energy parks on DOE lands, the templates and information teams can be adapted for other hazardous facilities, such as a mercury storage facility at Oak Ridge. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of operational availability for the PIP-II Superconducting Radio Frequency linear accelerator facility

Operational availability is a critical performance measure for an accelerator facility in modern time. A high availability enables the facility to serve a wide range of users simultaneously. Consequently, besides pure accelerator physics considerations, newly proposed accelerator facilities account for the availability and reliability aspects in the design phases. It allows incorporation of appropriate mitigation strategies for the most vulnerable systems in the machine and therefore, minimizes unscheduled interruptions during the operation. This report lays out a methodology for the availability assessment of the complete particle accelerator facility and presents an initial assessment of the availability of the newly proposed Proton Improvement Plan-II (PIP-II) accelerator facility at Fermilab. The paper describes a comprehensive reliability model of the PIP-II facility that comprises not only 800 MeV linear accelerator (linac) system but also essential utility systems in the form of cryogenic, water, power and air systems. The paper details estimations of the availability of the PIP-II facility for two operational modes i.e. the nominal operational mode featuring 800 MeV beam and critical operational mode involving operation with the lowest objective beam energy of 600 MeV.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning of the Hematite Former Fuel Cycle Facility using a decision flow logic based work control process

The remediation and decommissioning of the Hematite Former Fuel Cycle Facility (FFCF), the Hematite Facility, is currently being carried out by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC under the Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP). The Hematite Facility is located near the town of Hematite, Missouri, USA. The Hematite Facility consists of 228 acres of land with primary operations historically being conducted within the central portion of the property that is roughly 10 acres including Burial Pits and the Site Pond area. Decommissioning and remediation activities are being performed with the eventual objective of the release of the property. Primary contaminants include the legacy disposal and contamination of natural and enriched uranium from the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as chemicals used during the facility operations. Two major regulatory bodies, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), provide critical roles in the approval and oversight of the current regulatory path to remediation, decommissioning and eventual release. Further, remediation and decommissioning activities are performed under the implementing policies, plans, and procedures under the Hematite Decommissioning Plan (DP) and the Record of Decision (ROD). Remediation and decommissioning tasks at the Hematite Former Fuel Cycle Facility, referred to as the Hematite Facility, are performed against a disciplined decision logic flow that applies accumulated technical and monitoring data to determine each step of the excavation, exhumation, and removal of wastes from the Burial Pits and the remaining Areas of Concern (AOC). Decision flow logic is based upon the nuclear criticality safety controls and threshold conditions, relative level of radioactive and chemical contamination, security protocol, and final waste stream disposition. The end result is to remediate the residual radioactive and chemical contamination to approved dose-based and risk-based cleanup criteria as negotiated with U.S. Federal and State Regulators. The purpose of the paper is to provide a summary of the successful implementation of the decision flow logic to the remediation and decommissioning tasks performed to date. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Detection and Characterization of Underground Facilities by Stochastic Inversion and Modeling of Data from the New Generation of Synthetic Aperture Satellites (Final Report)

Many clandestine development and production activities can be conducted underground to evade surveillance. The purpose of the study reported here was to develop a technique to detect underground facilities by broad-area search and then to characterize the facilities by inversion of the collected data. This would enable constraints to be placed on the types of activities that would be feasible at each underground site, providing a basis the design of targeted surveillance and analysis for more complete characterization. Excavation of underground cavities causes deformation in the host material and overburden that produces displacements at the ground surface. Such displacements are often measurable by a variety of surveying or geodetic techniques. One measurement technique, Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR), uses data from satellite-borne (or airborne) synthetic aperture radars (SARs) and so is ideal for detecting and measuring surface displacements in denied access regions. Depending on the radar frequency and the acquisition mode and the surface conditions, displacement maps derived from SAR interferograms can provide millimeter- to centimeter-level measurement accuracy on regional and local scales at spatial resolution of {approx}1-10 m. Relatively low-resolution ({approx}20 m, say) maps covering large regions can be used for broad-area detection, while finer resolutions ({approx}1 m) can be used to image details of displacement fields over targeted small areas. Surface displacements are generally expected to be largest during or a relatively short time after active excavation, but, depending on the material properties, measurable displacement may continue at a decreasing rate for a considerable time after completion. For a given excavated volume in a given geological setting, the amplitude of the surface displacements decreases as the depth of excavation increases, while the area of the discernable displacement pattern increases. Therefore, the ability to detect evidence for an underground facility using InSAR depends on the displacement sensitivity and spatial resolution of the interferogram, as well as on the size and depth of the facility and the time since its completion. The methodology development described in this report focuses on the exploitation of synthetic aperture radar data that are available commercially from a number of satellite missions. Development of the method involves three components: (1) Evaluation of the capability of InSAR to detect and characterize underground facilities ; (2) inversion of InSAR data to infer the location, depth, shape and volume of a subsurface facility; and (3) evaluation and selection of suitable geomechanical forward models to use in the inversion. We adapted LLNL's general-purpose Bayesian Markov Chain-Monte Carlo procedure, the 'Stochastic Engine' (SE), to carry out inversions to characterize subsurface void geometries. The SE performs forward simulations for a large number of trial source models to identify the set of models that are consistent with the observations and prior constraints. The inverse solution produced by this kind of stochastic method is a posterior probability density function (pdf) over alternative models, which forms an appropriate input to risk-based decision analyses to evaluate subsequent response strategies. One major advantage of a stochastic inversion approach is its ability to deal with complex, non-linear forward models employing empirical, analytical or numerical methods. However, while a geomechanical model must incorporate adequate physics to enable sufficiently accurate prediction of surface displacements, it must also be computationally fast enough to render the large number of forward realizations needed in stochastic inversion feasible. This latter requirement prompted us first to investigate computationally efficient empirical relations and closed-form analytical solutions. However, our evaluation revealed severe limitations in the ability of existing empirical and analytical forms to predict deformations from underground cavities with an accuracy consistent with the potential resolution and precision of InSAR data. We followed two approaches to overcoming these limitations. The first was to develop a new analytical solution for a 3D cavity excavated in an elastic half-space. The second was to adapt a fast parallelized finite element method to the SE and evaluate the feasibility of using in the stochastic inversion. To date we have demonstrated the ability of InSAR to detect underground facilities and measure the associated surface displacements by mapping surface deformations that track the excavation of the Los Angeles Metro system. The Stochastic Engine implementation has been completed and undergone functional testing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Features Evaluation of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. It will be used to conduct basic and applied nuclear research, produce medical isotopes, and train young nuclear specialists. The facility has an electron accelerator-driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 - Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The subcritical assembly is seated in a water tank, which is a part of the primary cooling loop. During normal operation, the water coolant operates at room temperature and the total facility power is ~300 KW. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/B-VII.0 nuclear data libraries. Negative reactivity temperature feedback was consistently observed, which is important for the facility safety performance. Due to the design of WWR-M2 fuel assemblies, slight water temperature increase and the corresponding water density decrease produce large reactivity drop, which offset the reactivity gain by mistakenly loading an additional fuel assembly. The increase of fuel temperature also causes sufficiently large reactivity decrease. This enhances the facility safety performance because fuel temperature increase provides prompt negative reactivity feedback. The reactivity variation due to an empty fuel position filled by water during the fuel loading process is examined. Also, the loading mistakes of removing beryllium reflector assemblies and replacing them with dummy assemblies were analyzed. In all these circumstances, the reactivity change results do not cause any safety concerns.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Dose Modeling for Harborview Research and Training Facility

The Harborview Research and Training (R&T) Facility at the University of Washington (UW) was accidently contaminated from a breached sealed source of Cesium-137. The release occurred during removal of the sealed source from its holder within a portable hot cell in the loading dock area near room 220. The loading dock and northeast corner of the building above the ground floor were impacted by the release, whereas the remaining portions of the R&T Facility were minimally affected. Detailed descriptions of the R&T Facility and the affected area/rooms are included in Section 2. The RESRAD Team in the Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory visited the site on August 12, 2019, and interviewed the R&T Facility building manager and staff working in the building at that time. Site- and building-specific data were collected including building floor plan CAD drawings, building occupants’ working hours, contaminated rooms photos and their dimensions, building air exchange rates, building materials and “curtain wall” details, and so forth. These data are being used in the dose modeling for potential occupants of the building after it is remediated. The dose modeling was performed using the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, which is designed for the evaluation of radiologically contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003). Two hypothetical building occupants of the Harborview R&T Facility were evaluated: a researcher occupying room 726 (a research laboratory on the seventh floor) and a custodian occupying room 220 (loading dock and trash compactor room with a rollup door). A maintenance worker that will be spending less time in impacted areas was not modeled because it will be bounded by other two hypothetical building occupants modeled. A summary description of the RESRAD-BUILD is provided in Appendix A, and the modeling of potential doses to a researcher and a custodian is described in detail in Section 3. A summary and a discussion of the dose modeling results are included in Section 4. The parameters used in the RESRAD-BUILD modeling are included in Appendix B. This report documents the dose modeling results; it does not describe measurements of the actual radioactivity levels at the Harborview R&T Facility, nor does it set any expectation for the actual final radioactivity levels. The radiation doses presented are modeling results based on the generic screening values of Cs-137 and several conservative assumptions and are meant only to assist in decision making regarding decontamination of the Harborview R&T Facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗