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At least 451 records · Page 25

Cylinder Occupancy and Measurement Suite

This software automatically records data from the Unattended Cylinder Verification Station, determines the state of the instrument, captures images of uranium hexafluoride shipment cylinders, and determines their weight. The code has been developed primarily for the International Atomic Energy Agency, but this type of instrument could be of interest to any facility operator in the uranium supply chain that handles uranium hexafluoride shipment cylinders (e.g. the 30B and 48Y cylinder). Operators may be interested in having this instrument confirm shipper declared measurement values upon receipt of a cylinder. They may also use it to aid in process monitoring if the quantity of material in the cylinder changes due to a processing activity.

Stewart, Scott L↗

Single-Use Destructive Assay for Uranium Hexafluoride Sampling

Sampling uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for the determination of enrichments by destructive analysis (DA) is a critical component in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s layered safeguards approach for uranium processing facilities. Typically, gram-quantity UF6 samples are collected during inspections and stored under tag-and-seal until transportation to an off-site analytical laboratory. The shipping times can be long, and evolving restrictions on radioactive/corrosive materials shipments may increasingly limit the IAEA’s ability to transport UF6 samples easily. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed a low-cost UF6 sampling technology called Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) that addresses these challenges, as well as provides DA sample geometries that can be tailored for different analytical methods, including potential on-site analyses. The SUDA samplers, along with a unique holder, are designed for direct attachment to existing taps at uranium processing facilities, allowing gaseous UF6 to come into direct contact with a zeolite film. The SUDA technology features the ability to capture uranium in a more easily shipped and handled form as the solid, more stable, and relatively less hazardous hydrated uranyl fluoride (UO2F2•nH2O), which is formed through the controlled hydrolysis of UF6. We have recently simulated uranium collection under enrichment plant sampling conditions to further improve our understanding of SUDA sampling. Presented here is our recent work on measuring the relationship between sampling conditions and uranium collection, which includes control of the uranium-mass-to-zeolite ratio and assessing variable UF6 gas and sampling parameters that can affect collection using the SUDA sampler.

Pope, Timothy R.↗

ANS Winter 2022: ATF-2C Physics Safety and Scoping Analysis

ATF-2C comprises four tiers with six rodlets each. The experiment test train (TT) is situated in Loop 2A in the center flux trap (CFT) of the ATR, in which typical pressurized water reactor (PWR) conditions shall be approximated. Tier 1 (bottom) of the TT tests Framatome silicon carbide (SiC) cladding, containing molybdenum heater rods. Low-enriched uranium (LEU) Framatome rodlets with chrome-coated M5 cladding have been modeled in their place for the physics safety analysis to allow the substitution of this tier with fuel if needed. Tier 2 tests LEU Framatome rodlets with M5 cladding, which had irradiated in ATR in prior ATF experiments. Tier 3 tests General Atomics SiC composite cladding, also containing molybdenum heater rods. Tier 4/5/6 (top) tests the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)/Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) fueled rodlets. This upper tier tests LEU rodlets with chrome-coated MDA cladding—several with temperature or pressure instrumentation. To flatten the axial power profile, lower portion of Tier 4/5/6 is surrounded by a hafnium (Hf) shroud, and the bottom two UO2 pellets are of natural enrichment. The ATF-2C TT is to be irradiated in the CFT of ATR (Fig. 1) for three or four 60-day cycles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.

Hogue, Karen↗

ESTABLISHING ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Drawing upon globally recognized efforts by a variety of institutions, the paper develops a practical and defensible framework for consideration and use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the adoption of credible ethical standards for autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS). The analysis is based on a future hypothetical AIS that identifies signatures of misuse, diversion, and other research and development (R&D). The hypothetical system serves as an exemplar for subject matter expert (SME) workshop participants to begin to answer ethical AIS questions around how these systems should be governed and maintained, what the internal and external considerations associated with artificial intelligence (AI) tools are, and where the boundaries between ethical and non-ethical uses are. The ethical AIS workshop explored several important topics: (a) Recommendations that can be currently implemented by the IAEA, (b) Proposed defensible criteria and metrics aligned with an ethical AI for safeguards implementation, (c) Discussion of future needs and capabilities, and (d) Derive appropriate next steps and actions to support filling current technological, operational, and cultural gaps and realizing an effective ethical AI for safeguards framework. The Establishing Ethical Guidelines for Applying AI to IAEA Safeguards project creates awareness in the community of the ethical AIS approach.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Review on the State of the Art of Machine Learning and Satellite Imaging: Detecting Scene Changes in Selected Nuclear Fuel Cycle Datasets

The timely detection of clandestine nuclear facilities is one of the greatest challenges faced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA). Idaho National Laboratory is currently applying machine learning (ML) to existing satellite imagery (SI) datasets to find facilities within the nuclear fuel life cycle, with primary focus placed on identifying critical predecessor (i.e., fuel fabrication and fuel enrichment) and successor (i.e., nuclear power plants) facilities. This could provide a satellite image methodology that the IAEA could leverage to discover clandestine facilities. The work presented in this paper describes the evolution of a workflow developed by this team for object detection related to critical infrastructure by expanding that workflow for the purpose of identifying nuclear fuel cycle components and automating dependency assessments. This will be done using two methods housed within a single pipeline. The first method involves implementing a DenseNet161 convolutional neural network to classify the images and explain the results using Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME). The second method implements You Only Look Once version 5 (YoloV5), to detect objects within images, provide a probability for the detection, and provide a bounding box that corresponds to the object of interest. The results of this work are anticipated to provide a clear picture of this portion of the nuclear fuel cycle and perform as a stand-alone tool for image assessment that can be expanded to additional fuel cycle components and implemented in international safeguards and national security domains. This capability addresses the IAEA’s need to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities within a state while encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Human Performance Analysis Depending on Operator Expertise (Student vs. Operator) and Simulator Complexity (Rancor Microworld vs. Compact Nuclear Simulator)

Human reliability analysis (HRA) evaluates human errors and provides human error probabilities (HEPs) for application in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which is a comprehensive safety assessment method for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Generally, HRA methods estimate HEPs based on human reliability data collected from actual historical measurement, simulator experiments, or expert judgement. Most recent HRA data collection studies focus on collecting data via full-scope main control room (MCR) simulators with actual licensed reactor operators. Contrary to this, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has adopted a different approach, which attempts to collect HRA data based on experiment using simplified simulators and student participants by following the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP). This approach has a couple of advantages compared to full-scope data collection. Representatively, it has relatively low entry point for collecting HRA data, and secures large sample sizes with reasonable cost and labor. In the previous studies, we developed the SHEEP framework, then verified whether the data collected through the framework could support a representative full-scope data collection study, i.e., the Human Reliability Data Extraction (HuREX) study. Also, we analyzed human performance measurements depending on participant type (i.e., student vs. operator). In this paper, we analyze human performance data collected from an experiment comparing operator expertise and simulator complexity when using the more simplified simulator developed by INL, i.e., Rancor Microworld and the less simplified simulator, i.e., Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS) developed by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests and correlation analysis are used for analyzing the experimental data.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Experimental Investigation of Students’ Learning Effects When Using a Simplified Nuclear Simulator

Securing enough data has been a main challenge in human reliability analysis (HRA). Many researchers and institutes have made a lot of efforts for collecting HRA data to produce reasonable human error probabilities (HEPs) as well as reduce the uncertainty of HRA quantification. Representatively, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC), Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) have led lots of empirical research regarding the HRA data collection. The U.S. NRC and KAERI have mainly carried out full-scope simulator research collecting HRA data through experiments using full-scope simulators with actual operators. In contrast, INL has experimentally collected the data using simplified simulators and student operators. INL has proposed the Simplified Human Error Experimental Program (SHEEP) framework to complement full-scope data collection efforts by suggesting a way to infer full-scope data based on experimental data collected from students operating simplified simulators, specifically the Rancor Microworld Simulator (Rancor) and the Compact Nuclear Simulator (CNS). The aim of the SHEEP framework is to lower the entry point for collecting useful HRA data by securing large sample sizes at a reasonable amount of cost and labor while also guaranteeing a high degree of freedom when designing experiments. The authors’ previous research investigated whether data collected from the SHEEP framework could support a representative full-scope study. Besides, human performance differences between professional and student operators when using Rancor and CNS have been analyzed to understand the lack of fidelity of the simplified simulators and student operators within the SHEEP study. As a follow up research, this study experimentally investigates students’ learning effects and the performance trends over a certain period when using Rancor. This study aims to find out 1) how much training or education is required to collect HRA data from non-experts (i.e., students) when using Rancor and 2) how much differences there are in human performance measures between students and professional operators. In this study, a longitudinal experiment is developed. The four experiment trials with two weeks interval are carried out for sixteen undergraduate students majoring nuclear engineering at Chosun University. Totally four scenarios randomly selected from ten Rancor scenarios are used in each experiment trial. Four human performance measurements (i.e., workload, situation awareness, time and error) are considered in the experiment. Lastly, the trend of students’ performance is compared with operator data having been collected from the previous experiment.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Direct analysis of cotton swipes for uranium and plutonium isotopic determination by microextraction-ICP-MS

The determination of uranium and plutonium isotopic abundance on environmental samples collected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors is vital for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and material under the international nuclear safeguards regime. Current analytical protocols require time-consuming sample preparation steps prior to subsequent measurement by inorganic mass spectrometry (MS). Recent efforts from this laboratory have focused on developing sample preparation methods for faster analysis, potentially allowing higher sample throughput[1]. Alternative methods including microextraction sampling in conjunction with inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) have been recently explored. This methodology, microextraction-ICP-MS, was developed such that uranium and plutonium could be extracted from the swipe surface and directed into the ICP-MS for an in-situ measurement, eliminating the need for swipe ashing and digestion. A commercial off-the-shelf microextraction system was customized with an automated movable XY stage that can be programmed to save sampling locations, allowing for automated rapid sampling of swipe surfaces. Additional efforts have focused on the utilization of collision cell technology to the microextraction ICP-MS method. This would eliminate the need for lengthy column chemistry procedures to purify separated uranium and plutonium fractions before analysis. Here, the extracted U/Pu analyte is measured by reacting the uranium ions with CO2 in the collision cell of an ICP-MS, shifting the uranium to UO+, which will not interfere with the plutonium isotopic determination. The developed method utilizing collision cell – ICP-MS technology has demonstrated the ability to measure plutonium isotope ratios in the presence of high uranium concentration on the transient signal from the microextraction system utilizing certified reference materials from JRC-Geel and the New Brunswick Laboratory Program Office.

Bradley, Veronica↗

Contribution Slides for External IAEA Conference Radiation Chemistry Review

Contribution slides for an invited talk (presented by Professor Mohamad Al-Sheikhly, University of Maryland ) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)- Virtual Workshop on Radiation Technology for Industry and Environment. The title of the review talk is "Future Trends in Radiation Technology Applications in Advancing Science and Engineering".

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Considerations for Regulation and Practical Implementation of Analyses of Inadvertent Human Intrusion - 20169

Recommendations from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identify the need to consider potential inadvertent human intrusion into a near-surface radioactive waste disposal facility when developing limits for radionuclide concentrations that can be disposed. The recommendations also provide perspective on expectations for performance criteria and general assumptions for such analyses. Inadvertent human intrusion analyses are conducted to address the potential failure of institutional controls and loss of memory of a disposal facility. The analyses consider potential consequences of human actions that result in unknowingly bringing waste to the surface. Inadvertent human intrusion scenarios consider potential impacts to someone involved in an activity that actually disturbs the waste (e.g., drilling or excavation of a basement) or that exposes the person to emanations from the waste (e.g., radioactive gases) and also for the case where there may be longer term exposures to waste that has been brought to the surface. In practice, inadvertent human intrusion analyses have proven to be a critical consideration for the development of waste classification systems and for the determination of disposal requirements and limitations on wastes that can be disposed at shallow depths. The IAEA implemented a project on Human Intrusion in the context of Disposal of Radioactive waste (HIDRA) to further explore the regulatory expectations and practical implementation of analyses of potential inadvertent human intrusion. The paper begins with a discussion of international recommendations related to consideration of inadvertent human intrusion and then summarizes examples of some topical considerations related to addressing inadvertent human intrusion that are being discussed as part of the second phase of the HIDRA project. The topical considerations are planned to be addressed in a formal IAEA publication. All information in this paper simply reflects on-going project discussions and no formal recommendations are implied for these topical considerations at this time. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Need for International Consensus and Acceptance of Free Released Material - 20177

World Nuclear Association (WNA) believes that the waste hierarchy is best implemented when a good compromise exists between disposal and reuse/recycling methods of valuable materials and waste generated by the nuclear industry. The rapid normalization of recycling in both domestic and industrial worlds strengthens WNA's position, as new facilities worldwide emerge providing treatment for clearance. As a foundation for reuse and recycling, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided international guidance on clearance (Safety Guide RSG 1.7) [1], defining associated threshold values approved by all member states. Nevertheless, despite this consensus, a lack of alignment of national regulations has occurred as countries have departed for this international guidance, leading to confusion, even between neighborhood countries. As a consequence, this discrepancy between national rules, despite industrial and technical international consensus based on radiological and environmental considerations appeared as a brake, weakening public acceptance as well as nuclear industry credibility. As a matter of fact, what is allowed in one side of a border may be forbidden on the other side. Conversely, an international consensus on clearance would promote: - Sustainability improvements, including preservation of natural and rare resources resulting from optimized recycling and reuse practices; - A broader acceptance of free released materials; - taking advantage of the available technologies worldwide in materials treatment aiming for clearance; - Increased sharing and use of methods, know-how and operators, leading to better efficiency, innovation, improvement as well as technical and financial mastery. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implications of End Points on Remediation - 20476

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being implemented as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste. The Port Hope Project includes a unique and important component - the remediation of approximately 1,200 private residences and businesses to include both interior and exterior verification of soil and surface-contaminated objects. Planning and consultation for the PHAI clean-up criteria and remediation verification standard operating procedures (RVSOP) were initiated in the early 2000's. The criteria were developed through a cooperative effort involving the PHAI, scientific specialists, federal and provincial government agencies, peer reviewers, the municipalities and members of the public. Subsequent verification procedures which detail the unique systematic methods to verify compliance with the clean-up criteria were developed by CNL in consultation with federal regulators and relevant stakeholders. Now, specifically with the Port Hope Small-Scale Sites project having been underway for a year and approximately 38 properties in some stage of remediation, it has become increasingly evident that the practical application of the clean-up criteria and RVSOP methodology is posing unique challenges that are having direct impact on project execution. The current RVSOP approach is based on discrete sample verification not allowing failure of any one sample. When implemented in the field, particularly at the Small-Scale Sites, it leads to a much more extensive excavation than what was accounted for in the original design, the implications of which are substantial delays in project progress and much more significant impact on the individual properties than originally anticipated. This paper will examine the evolution of PHAI clean-up criteria, subsequent RVSOP methodology and its impact on current project execution and the justification for exploring potential revisions to methods of remediation verification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Choosing the Best Modeling Platform for Radiological Risk Assessment Models - 20468

Radiological risk assessments, in the form of performance or safety assessments, are often required under regulations or guidance for remediation of contaminated land, decommissioning of contaminated buildings or structures, and radioactive waste disposal. These risk assessments are usually supported by fate and transport models that address decay and ingrowth of radionuclides, as well as their movement through engineered systems and the natural environment. These models are often projected thousands, or more, years into the future, largely because the radioactive species change through decay and ingrowth, and hence the magnitude of the radioactive effect changes with time. There are many computer codes that are available to address this type of modeling. They range from addressing specific pathways or processes such as infiltration of water, groundwater, surface water, air, biota, diffusion and advection of water and gases, to those that try to couple all processes together to evaluate the impact of fate and transport through the entire system to places in space and time to which access is assumed. These different types of codes are sometimes separated with the monikers process-level and systems-level codes, although it is often not clear that this separation does justice to the capabilities of the many codes that are available to evaluate fate and transport of radionuclides. The focus of this paper is the latter group of modeling codes. Several systems level modeling codes exist and are used. There are differences between these codes in terms of utility, flexibility, complexity and cost. The purpose of this paper is to compare a few of these codes in the context of work currently being performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Working Group 1 (WG1). The MODARIA II WG1's main focus is how stakeholder engaged decision analysis can, or should, be applied to radiological contamination problems so that better, longstanding, sustainable, solutions are reached. However, the WG1 also recognizes the potential impact of the modeling tools that are chosen to address radiological risk, which is often a primary objective of decision making for radiological problems. Other objectives might also be important, such as constraining costs, obtaining financing, minimizing impact on ecosystems, saving cultural resources, saving jobs, farmland, environmental justice, etc., in a full decision analysis for a given radiological contamination problem, but none of these other objectives have the same types of complex modeling needs as minimize radiological dose. Consequently, a further focus of WG1 is to evaluate the potential impacts on decision making of the choice of fate and transport, and risk assessment, modeling codes that are used to support decision making. The WG1 will produce a report at the end of 2020 that will focus on an approach to effective decision making and stakeholder engagement. The report will also consider the role that performance assessment modeling should play in the decision-making process, including the impact of the choice of modeling tools or computer codes on risk-informed decision making. Several sites around the World have been made available by Member States for these model comparisons, and several modeling tools have been considered. However, the focus of this paper is on two of the sites, one in Belgium and one in Ukraine, and on three of the tools: NORMALYSA (NORM And Legacy Site Assessment); GoldSim{sup C}, and AMBER{sup C}. The final report from this working group will also cover other modeling tools, including RESRAD, and PC-Cream{sup R}. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Lessons Learned from the First Year of Property Remediation - 20475

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being carried out as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The larger of the two PHAI scopes of work - the Port Hope Project - involves the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic LLRW from 18 major sites in Port Hope, the construction of an engineered aboveground mound where the waste will be safely contained and the long-term maintenance and monitoring of the facility. Construction of the waste water treatment plant, the first three of four cells in the mound and supporting infrastructure is complete, with construction of the fourth cell in progress. In 2017 with the movement of on-site waste at this facility began and is now complete. Waste excavation and transportation from off-site locations within the community began in 2018; the cleanup of four temporary storage sites is now complete and remediation at several other major sites is underway. The Port Hope Project also includes a survey of the interior and exterior investigation of approximately 4,800 properties, primarily residential, in the urban area of Port Hope for the presence or absence of historic LLRW. The current projection is that approximately 1,250 privately owned residential and commercial properties known as Small-Scale Sites (SSS) will be identified as having waste exceeding the PHAI clean-up criteria. This paper will outline some of the challenges and lessons learned from the first year of SSS remediation including contractual, data and design issues; interaction with and managing expectations of stakeholders; weather, site and structure conditions as well as municipal permitting, resourcing, transportation and remediation verification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approach to nuclear criticality in IAN-R1 research reactor

The Republic of Colombia is operating a small 100 kW(t) research reactor. The reactor was provided to Colombia under the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program, and which was fueled with MTR HEU fuel enriched nominally to 93% U{sup 235}. With the cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, it was prepared a new safety analysis report for performing an HEU to LEU conversion of the IAN-R1 reactor and manufacture TRIGA type LEU (19.7%, enriched) fuel to replace the original MTR-HEU fuel plate assemblies. This paper describes the activities which were achieved during the approach to nuclear criticality. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Applicability study of Bayesian optimization in core neutronic design using a toy model

At the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), an innovative design approach named ARKADIA (Advanced Reactor Knowledge- and AI-aided Design Integration Approach through the whole plant life cycle) for advanced nuclear reactors is currently under development. One task in ARKADIA is to build a system that automatically optimizes core and fuel designs by conducting core neutronic and thermal-hydraulic calculations, fuel integrity evaluations, and plant dynamic analyses. This system will be implemented to automatically find an optimal design that minimizes (or maximizes) objective function defined by core performance while varying the core and fuel design parameters such as fuel pin diameter, core height and diameter. In this study, as the first step of system development, we focused only on core neutronic design and conducted a study of automatic optimization. As the optimization algorithm, Bayesian optimization (BO), an effective method for optimization problems with expensive computational cost of objective function, was utilized. The applicability of BO was studied based on single- and two-objective optimization examples of core neutronic design in a toy model. As a result, in the former, it was shown that BO can give the optimal solution, which matches the reference solution calculated by a brute force calculation well, with a small number of required calculations. Usability on core neutronic designs, where the computational cost per case is high, was confirmed. In the latter, it was found that BO can give a Pareto solutions-set that shows good agreement with the reference solution. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗