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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Virtual Facility at Fermilab: Infrastructure and Services Expand to Public Clouds

In preparation for its new Virtual Facility Project, Fermilab has launched a program of work to determine the requirements for running a computation facility on-site, in public clouds, or a combination of both. This program builds on the work we have done to successfully run experimental workflows of 1000-VM scale both on an on-site private cloud and on Amazon AWS. To do this at scale we deployed dynamically launched and discovered caching services on the cloud. We are now testing the deployment of more complicated services on Amazon AWS using native load balancing and auto scaling features they provide. The Virtual Facility Project will design and develop a facility including infrastructure and services that can live on the site of Fermilab, off-site, or a combination of both. We expect to need this capacity to meet the peak computing requirements in the future. The Virtual Facility is intended to provision resources on the public cloud on behalf of the facility as a whole instead of having each experiment or Virtual Organization do it on their own. We will describe the policy aspects of a distributed Virtual Facility, the requirements, and plans to make a detailed comparison of the relative cost of the public and private clouds. Furthermore, this talk will present the details of the technical mechanisms we have developed to date, and the plans currently taking shape for a Virtual Facility at Fermilab.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

The MPACT 2020 Milestone: Safeguards and Security by Design of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities.

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.

Hogue, Karen↗
DOE OSTI2017

Database dedicated to nuclear criticality events that occurred in fuel cycle facilities

Nuclear fuel cycle facilities can encounter events, resulting from human errors, failure of safety organization or technical failures. However, the application of the concept of defense in depth, especially the first two levels (prevention of abnormal situations and detection) requires to ensure safety in such undesirable situations. Furthermore, the periodic safety reviews of each nuclear fuel cycle facility involve the evaluation of the safety of these facilities with regard to the regulation evolution, the best safety practices, the facility evolution (modifications, aging...) and the global feedback. Part of this work is based on the analysis of the feedback and lessons learned from the events that occurred during the past period. This specific work indeed provides lessons about the operating conditions of the facility and highlights malfunctions that have occurred during operations, maintenance or restart after a shutdown. Taking into account this feedback, IRSN developed a database gathering the events which have affected the safety of French fuel cycle facilities (from conversion to waste storage, laboratories and experimental facilities, facilities under dismantling and decommissioning). Among all the recorded events, it is possible to extract in particular those impacting the criticality safety. In order to extend the analysis of these events, the IRSN criticality safety department developed a specific database dedicated to criticality risks. The 'criticality events' database is continuously updated on the basis of the declared events and their analysis by engineers from the criticality safety department. At this time, about 600 events are described and analyzed in this database. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Role of the Nuclear Science User Facilities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF), established in 2007 as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) National Scientific User Facility is chartered to provide cost-free access to unique and important research and development capabilities and infrastructure to nuclear energy-focused researchers. Originally, the NSUF was formed to utilize excess capacity in the ATR and the Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) hot cells. In the eight years since its inception, the NSUF has expanded to include most of the capabilities at the Idaho National Laboratory as well as twelve external 'partner' facilities. The inclusion of the partner facilities makes the NSUF the first distributed user facility, a 'laboratory without walls.' Users can apply for access to any of the NSUF INL or partner facilities using the same process, either through the annual Office of Nuclear Energy Consolidated Innovative Nuclear Research funding announcement or the NSUF Rapid Turnaround Experiment (RTE) opportunities, offered three times each year. In support of the capability access mission, the NSUF also offers access to additional resources. In order to help researchers connect with the appropriate capabilities, the NSUF has developed a comprehensive searchable database of nuclear energy R and D infrastructure in the US and worldwide. Additionally, the NSUF hosts a Fuels and Materials Sample Library (FMSL) that includes an ever-expanding set of previously irradiated materials, supporting un-irradiated archive material and fabrication and irradiation data for the materials. The capabilities of the NSUF partner facilities, the NEID, the fuels and materials sample library and the access application information is all available at the NSUF web site: ATRNSUF.INL.gov. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Research and Development Capabilities available through the Nuclear Science User Facilities

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF), established in 2007 as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) National Scientific User Facility is chartered to provide cost-free access to unique and important research and development capabilities and infrastructure to nuclear energy-focused researchers. Originally, the NSUF was formed to utilize excess capacity in the ATR and the Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) hot cells. In the eight years since its inception, the NSUF has expanded to include most of the capabilities at the Idaho National Laboratory as well as twelve external 'partner' facilities. The inclusion of the partner facilities makes the NSUF the first distributed user facility, a 'laboratory without walls.' Users can apply for access to any of the NSUF INL or partner facilities using the same process, either through the annual Office of Nuclear Energy Consolidated Innovative Nuclear Research funding announcement or the NSUF Rapid Turnaround Experiment (RTE) opportunities, offered three times each year. In support of the capability access mission, the NSUF also offers access to additional resources. In order to help researchers connect with the appropriate capabilities, the NSUF has developed a comprehensive searchable database of nuclear energy R and D infrastructure in the US and worldwide. Additionally, the NSUF hosts a Fuels and Materials Sample Library (FMSL) that includes an ever-expanding set of previously irradiated materials, supporting un-irradiated archive material and fabrication and irradiation data for the materials. The capabilities of the NSUF partner facilities, the NEID, the fuels and materials sample library and the access application information is all available at the NSUF web site: ATRNSUF.INL.gov. (author)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Interactive and Reproducible Computing With Jupyter Tools at Facilities

Increasingly Jupyter tools are being adopted and incorporated into High Performance Computing (HPC) and scientific user facilities. Adopting Jupyter tools enables more interactive and reproducible computational work at facilities across data life cycles. As the volume, variety, and scope of data grow, scientists need to be able to analyze and share results in user friendly ways. Human-centered research highlights design challenges around computational notebooks, and our qualitative user study shifts focus to better characterize how Jupyter tools are being used in HPC and science user facilities today. We conducted twenty-nine interviews, and obtained 103 survey responses from NERSC Jupyter users, to better understand the increasing role of interactive computing tools in DOE sponsored scientific work. We examine a range of issues that emerge using and supporting Jupyter in HPC ecosystems, including: how Jupyter is being used by scientists in HPC and user facility ecosystems; how facilities are purposefully supporting Jupyter in their ecosystems; feedback NERSC users have about the facility’s deployment, and, discuss features NERSC indicated would be helpful. We offer a variety of takeaways for staff supporting Jupyter at facilities, Project Jupyter and related open source communities, and funding agencies supporting interactive computing work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Decommissioning Demonstration - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station South Yard Facility - 16544

Following the decision to retire Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Southern California Edison (SCE) staffed a multi-discipline team to investigate decommissioning best practices. SCE also tasked this team with reducing the overall radiological footprint and radioactive material inventory in the near term. The SCE decommissioning activities investigation team targeted projects at the facility which could reduce the source term and risk, and investigate management approaches with decommissioning contractors. SCE, through this team, contracted EnergySolutions to provide a solution for processing and disposal of equipment and materials at a storage facility south of the plant. The South Yard Facility included offices, instrument repair facilities, a large machine shop, outage equipment storage, waste management facilities, and decontamination facilities. SCE contracted EnergySolutions to manage, supervise, plan, and provide labor for the disposition of the legacy waste stored at the South Yard to include the Radioactive Equipment/Materials Storage (REMS) Pad and South Yard Facility. Under the Contractor Work Authorization (CWA), SCE authorized EnergySolutions to consolidate, package, transport, and dispose of the Low Level Radioactive Waste (Class A) and Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste from the aforementioned areas. The scope also included disposition of material that was expected to be free from radiological contamination, but required management as a hazardous waste. The legacy waste consisted of an inventory of containers designated as trash provided by SCE, as well as, all materials stored within the rooms of the SYF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Commissioning and Startup of a New Category 2 Nuclear Facility for RH TRU Sludge Packaging - 18614

For many years the Department of Energy (DOE) has been executing a plan to eliminate all threats of Radiological release to the Columbia River from the Hanford site, in Richland, Washington. While the River Corridor Closure Project is nearing completion, one of the last remaining facilities along the Columbia River is the 100K reactor complex. Since the 1950's the 105KW fuel storage basin has contained varying levels of spent reactor fuel and products of the degradation of aging stored fuel. Having previously removed all of the distinguishable spent fuel components, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is now in the final stages of readiness review to commence removal of the residual sludge material that has accumulated in the basin throughout the years of operation. There is approximately 27 m3 of sludge in the 105KW basin currently. This sludge material exhibits a very high radiation dose rate with levels reaching 100 R/hr. It is also very difficult to mobilize and transfer due to its physical characteristics. CH2M engineers have developed a novel mechanical system for mobilization and transfer of the sludge to specially designed storage containers. Once transferred to these containers, the sludge will be moved away from the river and taken to T Plant, a decontamination and repair facility on site, for interim storage, while a project to treat and package the material for final disposition is established. The Sludge Removal Project (SRP) is a $309 M capital line item project that was established to achieve the goals of this mission. Part of the project is to develop and install the equipment needed to do the transfer, and part of the project is to construct a new Category 2 sludge packaging facility. Construction of the facility is now complete, all equipment is installed and the project is well into the commissioning phase. Over the final three months of 2017, the project progressed into the final stages of readiness to transition to operations. This will represent the first commissioning of a new Category 2 process and facility at Hanford in over 10 years. The SRP team has crossed over many hurdles in establishing a workable plan for the safety basis for installing, commissioning and transitioning to operations within the boundaries of an existing Facility Safety Analysis Report. The project team has also applied extensive use of a mockup facility in the development and execution of the path to readiness and commencement of operations. At the time of the conference, the project will have completed a DOE Operational Readiness Review and will be very near of just entering full operation. This paper will share the experiences of the project team through these final steps and lessons learned on making the project successful. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of operational availability for the PIP-II Superconducting Radio Frequency linear accelerator facility

Operational availability is a critical performance measure for an accelerator facility in modern time. A high availability enables the facility to serve a wide range of users simultaneously. Consequently, besides pure accelerator physics considerations, newly proposed accelerator facilities account for the availability and reliability aspects in the design phases. It allows incorporation of appropriate mitigation strategies for the most vulnerable systems in the machine and therefore, minimizes unscheduled interruptions during the operation. This report lays out a methodology for the availability assessment of the complete particle accelerator facility and presents an initial assessment of the availability of the newly proposed Proton Improvement Plan-II (PIP-II) accelerator facility at Fermilab. The paper describes a comprehensive reliability model of the PIP-II facility that comprises not only 800 MeV linear accelerator (linac) system but also essential utility systems in the form of cryogenic, water, power and air systems. The paper details estimations of the availability of the PIP-II facility for two operational modes i.e. the nominal operational mode featuring 800 MeV beam and critical operational mode involving operation with the lowest objective beam energy of 600 MeV.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Features Evaluation of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. It will be used to conduct basic and applied nuclear research, produce medical isotopes, and train young nuclear specialists. The facility has an electron accelerator-driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 - Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The subcritical assembly is seated in a water tank, which is a part of the primary cooling loop. During normal operation, the water coolant operates at room temperature and the total facility power is ~300 KW. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/B-VII.0 nuclear data libraries. Negative reactivity temperature feedback was consistently observed, which is important for the facility safety performance. Due to the design of WWR-M2 fuel assemblies, slight water temperature increase and the corresponding water density decrease produce large reactivity drop, which offset the reactivity gain by mistakenly loading an additional fuel assembly. The increase of fuel temperature also causes sufficiently large reactivity decrease. This enhances the facility safety performance because fuel temperature increase provides prompt negative reactivity feedback. The reactivity variation due to an empty fuel position filled by water during the fuel loading process is examined. Also, the loading mistakes of removing beryllium reflector assemblies and replacing them with dummy assemblies were analyzed. In all these circumstances, the reactivity change results do not cause any safety concerns.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Dose Modeling for Harborview Research and Training Facility

The Harborview Research and Training (R&T) Facility at the University of Washington (UW) was accidently contaminated from a breached sealed source of Cesium-137. The release occurred during removal of the sealed source from its holder within a portable hot cell in the loading dock area near room 220. The loading dock and northeast corner of the building above the ground floor were impacted by the release, whereas the remaining portions of the R&T Facility were minimally affected. Detailed descriptions of the R&T Facility and the affected area/rooms are included in Section 2. The RESRAD Team in the Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory visited the site on August 12, 2019, and interviewed the R&T Facility building manager and staff working in the building at that time. Site- and building-specific data were collected including building floor plan CAD drawings, building occupants’ working hours, contaminated rooms photos and their dimensions, building air exchange rates, building materials and “curtain wall” details, and so forth. These data are being used in the dose modeling for potential occupants of the building after it is remediated. The dose modeling was performed using the RESRAD-BUILD computer code, which is designed for the evaluation of radiologically contaminated buildings (Yu et al. 2003). Two hypothetical building occupants of the Harborview R&T Facility were evaluated: a researcher occupying room 726 (a research laboratory on the seventh floor) and a custodian occupying room 220 (loading dock and trash compactor room with a rollup door). A maintenance worker that will be spending less time in impacted areas was not modeled because it will be bounded by other two hypothetical building occupants modeled. A summary description of the RESRAD-BUILD is provided in Appendix A, and the modeling of potential doses to a researcher and a custodian is described in detail in Section 3. A summary and a discussion of the dose modeling results are included in Section 4. The parameters used in the RESRAD-BUILD modeling are included in Appendix B. This report documents the dose modeling results; it does not describe measurements of the actual radioactivity levels at the Harborview R&T Facility, nor does it set any expectation for the actual final radioactivity levels. The radiation doses presented are modeling results based on the generic screening values of Cs-137 and several conservative assumptions and are meant only to assist in decision making regarding decontamination of the Harborview R&T Facility.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Public Views on Nuclear Facility Siting and Radioactive Waste Management in the United States: Methodology and Response Reference Report for the 2017 Energy and Environment Survey

This report presents the questions and responses to a nationwide survey of U.S. residents taken May 2017. The focus of the 2017 survey is public perceptions on (1) nuclear energy and new nuclear technology, such as small modular reactors; (2) the risks and benefits of nuclear energy; (3) different options for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF); and (4) the role of individuals, organizations and elected officials in locating SNF facilities. Highlights of survey results related to nuclear energy found the U.S. public (1) wants nuclear energy to continue to contribute 20% of total electrical power produced for the next 20 years; (2) is more supportive of adding new reactors at existing sites than at new sites; and (3) is more supportive of small modular reactors than traditional reactors. Highlights related to risks and benefits of nuclear energy include (1) the public believes that terrorist attacks are the greatest threat and that energy independence is the greatest benefit; (2) 56% of the public believes that nuclear power has both high benefit and high risk; (3) the 2011 accident at the Fukushima nuclear facility continues to negatively influence the perceived benefits and risks of nuclear energy except for those who perceive nuclear power as low risk and high benefit; (4) building new reactors is supported by those who perceive nuclear power as low risk and high benefit, and opposed by those who perceive it as high risk and low benefit. Highlights related to SNF management options include (1) support remains higher for permanent disposal than either consolidated interim storage or continued on-site storage; (2) support for private initiatives for interim storage in New Mexico and Texas are higher than generic storage and disposal options; (3) the general public is more likely to increase support if a majority of the local and state residents support an SNF facility. Highlights related to the role of individuals, organizations, and elected officials include (1) 54% of the public agrees that if an SNF facility is deemed safe by regulators, political considerations should not derail the location; (2) 47% of the US public agrees that non-governmental organizations should be able to provide input to locating an SNF facility; (3) 36% of the public believes that the federal government should lead siting of an SNF facility while 25% believes private companies should lead; (4) 81% of the public believes local residents and farmers/ranchers should have a say in the final decision on locating a SNF facility and 56% believe that they should have veto power; and (5) only 27% of the public believes the state governor should have a say and veto power.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Multitiered Groundwater and Intruder Radionuclide Screening

Solid Waste Management (SWM) operates the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) where low level on-site and off-site solid waste streams are buried. The facility has been in operation since late 1994 and is currently projected to remain in operation until 2065. This facility can accommodate a broad range of waste forms resulting from the six different types of disposal unit (DU) options (i.e., varying degrees of engineered barriers → trenches to concrete vaults). This facility is currently operating under a Performance Assessment (PA) issued back in 2008 (WSRC 2008), along with several subsequent supporting Special Analyses (SAs). The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed the prior PAs and SAs and was tasked to update the facility’s upcoming PA, most likely to be issued during FY2023. For operating the E-Area facility, a Consolidated Waste Tracking System (CWTS) is actively employed by waste generators where every radionuclide entering the facility, to be buried in one of its many DUs1, must be either directly or indirectly tracked. Since there are many radionuclides in existence (>3,000), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), specially ICRP Publication 107, has provided guidance on the subset of radionuclides requiring further assessment in landfills such as the ELLWF. The ICRP 107 publication provides critical radiological information on 1,252 radionuclides consisting of 97 elements. This database, along with the current dose coefficients that have been developed for these radionuclides in DOE-STD-1196-2011 (DOE 2011), is the critical starting point for developing a consistent inventory limit system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Baseline Hypothetical Facility for the Production of 131 I and 99 Mo using Activation Targets

This report describes a hypothetical facility for production of medical radioisotopes via activation under the Proliferation Resistance and Optimization (PRO-X) program. The facility uses neutron activation of non-special nuclear material (SNM) to produce the medical isotopes 131 I and 99 Mo at a throughput of 60 Ci/week of 131 I and 5 Ci/week of 99 Mo. The hypothetical design was carried out using a 10 MWt research reactor. The precursors used for the activation process were TeO2 for 131 I and MoO 3 for 99 Mo. The processes are performed in 3 hot cells used for target receipt, extraction, purification low specific activity (LSA) generator introduction, and packaging. A fourth hotcell is used for waste processing. The hot cell processing area takes up a footprint of 15.4 m 2 with the total footprint of the facility, including space for administrative offices, non-rad labs, quality assurance, and radiation buffer areas set at 763 m 2 . Waste is produced at a weekly rate of 257.8 g low activity solid waste and 8032.7 mL of low activity liquid waste, 8032 mL of which is water. This baseline hypothetical facility for production of medical isotopes via activation was then compared and contrasted to the hypothetical facility for production of medical isotopes via fission products to show the differences in approach for the two production modes. The two production modes had several highlighted differences including the overall facility and hot cell layout, the type and amount of waste produced by the respective facilities, and economic factors impacting production mode. Finally, a decision tree for which production mode might be more beneficial for an entrant into medical isotope production was developed based on the differences examined and the desired output of medical isotopes desired by the entrant.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Recent Upgrades at the Safety and Tritium Applied Research Facility

This paper gives a brief overview of the Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) facility operated by the Fusion Safety Program (FSP) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). FSP researchers use the STAR facility to carry out experiments in tritium permeation and retention in various fusion materials, including wall armor tile materials. FSP researchers also perform other experimentation as well to support safety assessment in fusion development. This lab, in its present two-building configuration, has been in operation for over ten years. The main experiments at STAR are briefly described. This paper discusses recent work to enhance personnel safety at the facility. The STAR facility is a Department of Energy less than hazard category 3 facility; the personnel safety approach calls for ventilation and tritium monitoring for radiation protection. The tritium areas of STAR have about 4 to 12 air changes per hour, with air flow being once through and then routed to the facility vent stack. Additional radiation monitoring has been installed to read the laboratory room air where experiments with tritium are conducted. These ion chambers and bubblers are used to verify that no significant tritium concentrations are present in the experiment rooms. Standby electrical power has been added to the facility exhaust blower so that proper ventilation will now operate during commercial power outages as well as the real-time tritium air monitors.

tritium facility upgrades↗