Hardened Containment Vent System Dose Considerations for FLEX
Fukushima lessons learned include adding diverse and flexible mitigation strategies, or FLEX, that will increase defense-in-depth for beyond-design-basis (BDB) scenarios to address an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP). FLEX and NRC order EA-13-109 require improvements to the reliability of Hardened Containment Vent Systems (HCVS) for Mark I and II boiling water reactors (BWR) for venting of the core under severe accident conditions. NEI HCVSWP-02 provides generic guidance to determine radiological dose from HCVS piping. This paper presents a more refined analysis tool and method to assess the doses from the HCVS piping resulting from a failed core during an ELAP for a representative Mark I BWR. The dose rates up to 4' from the HCVS pipe at 8 hours after ELAP and over time at 3' are provided for the different cases. HCVS pipe length can affect dose rates farther from the pipe. As expected, dose rates versus time for representative plant case 2 drop off quickly as the HCVS activity is vented out. The dose rate results show that significant protection for personnel would be required in the areas near HCVS piping during certain time frames of containment venting. Equipment in the vicinity of the vent piping should also be evaluated for impact of radiation exposure. The results for the representative plant cases are higher and lower than the scaled NEI results depending on the model assumptions, limitations and considerations which can change as the HCVS design evolves. Using the NEI paper with scaling factors may not be conservative for all applications.