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DOE OSTI2025

Workshop Report: Rural Electric Cooperative Distributed Energy Resource Business Model Development Workshops

The United States' energy future is being shaped by decades of technology innovation, rapidly changing consumer requirements, and governmental focus on securing reliable, low-cost energy sources. With expanded electrification and increased emphasis on grid reliability coupled with the heightened complexity and risks associated with transmission infrastructure, the use of distributed energy resources (DERs) is more commonly being considered a safe, efficient, and cost-effective way to maintain grid resilience and reliability. Amidst improvements in performance, decreasing costs, and unprecedented federal policy support for DERs, electric cooperatives are considering new opportunities to use these assets to ensure secure and reliable operations for millions of customers. In light of these developments, a series of workshops were held to collaborate on the development of business models for DERs in rural electric cooperative ecosystems. The first workshop was held July 11, 2024, at the Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association Inc. headquarters in Westminster, Colorado (hereafter referred to as the "Tri-State Workshop"). The second workshop was hosted by PNGC Power on Oct. 9, 2024, in Portland, Oregon (hereafter referred to as the "PNGC Power Workshop"). These workshops convened representatives from G&Ts, distribution cooperatives,2 the energy industry, the financial community, the U.S. government, national and regional organizations, and national laboratories to share perspectives on the unique needs, challenges, and opportunities that they face as DERs are further integrated into the grid. The workshops were designed to address the following objectives: (1) develop the enabling attributes of electric cooperative DER business models, (2) explore pathways for generating community benefits from these assets, and (3) identify technical challenges and market risks for DERs in rural electric cooperative service territories. This report outlines key findings and major themes identified by workshop participants that federal agencies, G&Ts, distribution cooperatives, and other entities can consider to advance electric cooperative DER business models.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Bridging the Gap on Data, Metrics, and Analyses for Grid Resilience to Weather Events: Information that utilities can provide regulators, state energy offices, and other stakeholders

A growing number of states require regulated utilities to file resilience plans to improve the electric grid’s ability to anticipate, withstand, adapt to and recover from increasingly severe weather events. This report aims to help state regulators identify and request data, metrics, and analyses from utilities and use it in decisions on utility resilience plans and investments. The report reviews state requirements and utility plans focused on overall grid resilience, climate change resilience and vulnerabilities, infrastructure modernization, storm protection, and wildfire mitigation. It details types of data, metrics, and analyses across five categories--and provides examples of each from the utility plans. The first category is vulnerability assessments, or evaluations of the susceptibility of systems, communities, or assets to potential harm from identified hazards. The second is data on hazards and the exposure of utility assets and customers to these hazards. The third is attribute metrics, or system characteristics that contribute to or describe the resilience of a system. The fourth is performance metrics, which are impacts of resilience investments on system performance--typically a reduction of negative impacts from hazard events. Finally, evaluation and prioritization are analyses that utilities conduct to estimate impacts from resilience measures (evaluation) and prioritize measures based on costs and estimated impacts (prioritization). The report concludes with examples of key trends and emerging best practices for states and utilities, and identifies areas for further research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Research Reactors Division Infrastructure Investment Plan for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) is a unique national asset. Operational for nearly 60 years, continued investment into the aging infrastructure is necessary to ensure operation for another 6 decades. Additionally, growing missions require HFIR as well as important upgrades. Consequently, carefully integrated planning is required to ensure that infrastructure investments are timely executed to ensure long-term, reliable operation of HFIR. Concerns about challenges to the operational reliability of HFIR resulted in a recommendation from the 2023 Operations Review by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Basic Energy Sciences that a HFIR management strategy be developed to address the infrastructure needs. This report defines the investment needs, which are evolving as new upgrade efforts are better defined. HFIR is part of the three-source strategy within the Neutron Sciences Directorate (NScD) and contributes to the five strategic science areas outlined in the NScD 10 Year Strategic Science Plan: quantum materials, soft matter, materials and engineering, chemistry, and biosciences. Fundamental to this strategy are three core values: operational excellence, responsible stewardship, and servant leadership. These values guide our mission of safe and reliable operation of the reactor and require a strong and just nuclear safety culture, a solemn respect for responsible care of the facility, good workforce development, robust procedures and processes, an effective communication strategy, world-class asset management, a determined customer focus, and a commitment to protecting the environment, the safety and health of the public and our people, and the quality of work performed within our facility. These principles are all essential to operate HFIR at a world-class level. The Research Reactors Division (RRD) will lead a new era of neutron science and isotope production at HFIR through responsible and purposeful leadership and unwavering support of the science community. The approach outlined in this plan highlights the direction leadership is taking to ensure that HFIR is ready to support the science challenges and national needs of the future and that the United States maintains world leadership in neutron sciences. The plan is in alignment with the DOE’s desire to continue operating HFIR and with the NScD strategic science goals for the future. HFIR is an aging facility with numerous infrastructure challenges and needs. It has an aging workforce in relation to the general population of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), with many expected retirements over the next 5–10 years. With an increase in work scope caused by changing national priorities and science goals, several critical hires have been identified. To manage HFIR’s infrastructure needs, a prioritized list of equipment upgrades has been identified along with an analysis of future staffing requirements. A desire to operate HFIR at eight cycles per year will necessarily require some significant changes to procedures and processes currently in place as well as targeted staffing additions. Many of the equipment upgrades identified in this plan will significantly increase the reliability of the plant, thus contributing to the effort to reach the goal of safely operating eight cycles per year. A plan to attain eight-cycle operation is being prepared in parallel with the activities identified in this plan, although the actions identified to satisfy both plans will overlap. This plan identifies new infrastructure needs—for both plant equipment and staffing—thus necessitating formulation of future budget requests to fund the increased work scope and improvement activities. Some activities are currently being scheduled with the expectation that funding will be received. Any delays to funding or reductions of funding from the identified cost estimations will directly and negatively affect the plan’s implementation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Final Design for Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with Lithium Absorbers to Provide Validation Benchmarks for Y-12 Electrorefining Facility

One of the main goals of the Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) project is to use existing Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) assets to create critical experiment plutonium and uranium test beds for materials important to criticality safety that have insufficient benchmark evaluations. The plutonium test bed experiments were completed in 2018 and are published in the 2020 edition of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. The uranium test bed assemblies were completed in 2023 and accepted in the 2024 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) group at Y-12 National Security Complex has identified programmatic need for validation cases for uranium electrorefining operations at Y-12. The electrorefining operation credits lithium enriched in 6 Li in addition to 35 Cl as absorbers in the design criticality safety evaluation for precluding criticality under upset conditions in the large and geometrically unfavorable electro-refiner. There is, however, inadequate experimental validation for the 6 Li absorbers. As an extension of the TEX uranium test bed, TEX-Cl critical experiments were performed with sodium chloride salt to address the 35 Cl thermal absorption as well as other validation needs at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These experiments were completed in 2024 and accepted into the 2025 ICSBEP Handbook. To continue the methodology used in TEX-Cl, TEX-Li aims to accomplish the same. The overall design of both experiments was to use commercially available, high purity, salts with polyethylene moderator and HEU plates to configure a critical assembly. Three experiments are planned for TEX-Li using encapsulated lithium carbonate (Li 2 CO 3 ), with natural 6 Li abundance. For all experiments, the highly enriched uranium (HEU) Jemima plates will be used as fissile material. Multiple layers will be stacked together with encapsulated Li 2 CO 3 alternated with polyethylene in standard configurations. Standard stacking was found to be optimal in matching the different sensitivity profiles provided by the Y-12 models. Three configurations are proposed with varying polyethylene moderation and a constant 1/4” absorber thickness. The first uses 11 layers of 5/4” polyethylene, the second uses 9 layers of 3/4” polyethylene, and the third uses 10 layers of 1/2” polyethylene. Calculations showed that some alternative forms of lithium-based materials provided slightly less-optimal sensitivity profiles when compared to lithium carbonate but come with other drawbacks. These alternatives included lithium aluminate (LiAlO 2 ), Aluminum-2050 alloy, Aluminum-8090, Aluminum-2095, lithium hydride (LiH), and lithium fluoride (LiF). Lithium aluminate and aluminum-2050 provided comparable sensitivity profiles when compared to lithium carbonate and can be used instead if lithium carbonate cannot be readily procured. After a broad material study, lithium carbonate outperformed any alternative material with a balance in affordability and workability. The assessment of experimental uncertainties of the non-absorber and absorber components was predicted to be 0.00089 and 0.00093 Δk eff , respectively. The largest uncertainties may be reduced with precision dimensional inspection of the components. Many of the parts and equipment for IER 575 have already been fabricated or procured for previous projects and therefore do not contribute significantly to the overall cost of this experiment. This includes the Jemima plates and Comet critical assembly machine, which are existing NCSP assets, as well as the aluminum platen and polyethylene reflector rings, which were fabricated and authorized for the TEX experiment involving HEU with polyethylene. Lithium carbonate containers will be procured by LANL and will be filled by LLNL. The total material costs for TEX-Li experiments are estimated to be on the order of $\$$47,400. Precision inspection, including dimensional, mass, density, and impurity, is recommended for all components for an estimated cost of $\$$12,000.

35Cl↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Transactive Energy Network Template Metamodel

While transactive energy, which is defined as an allocation of electricity based on dynamically discovered values or prices, has been extensively studied, its uptake and use has been slow. This report describes a tool, the transactive network template, which should hasten the creation and uptake of transactive energy networks. Some basic principles of transactive energy are familiar from existing wholesale electricity markets. Locational prices are calculated today for zones within bulk electric transmission systems. Locational prices differ while accounting for the locational costs of electricity generation and the losses and constraints incurred when electricity is transmitted from generators and distributed to consumers. A transactive energy network might include these transmission zones. However, current research strives to apply transactive energy also in electricity distribution circuits, buildings, and even for individual generating and consuming devices. At the same time, researchers explore how to apply transactive energy in real time during increasingly shorter time intervals. Automated computational agents become necessary as transactive energy becomes applied to smaller circuit zones and at faster dynamic timescales. A transactive energy network is an example of a multi-agent system. Each zone in the network is represented by its transactive agent, which makes decisions for and acts on behalf of a business entity that is responsible for and manages one of the circuit regions. A transactive energy network is also an example of a decentralized, distributed control system. Control decisions and responsibilities are distributed among the network’s transactive agents. The transactive agents are independent; that is, there typically is no centralized authority or oversight function. Instead, transactive agents exchange transactive signals and thereby negotiate the prices and quantities of electricity that they will exchange. Initially, the circuit regions and responsibilities of transactive agents appear to be very dissimilar. Each circuit region may comprise transmission, distribution, or building-level circuits. Each has a unique position and electrical connectivity within the transactive energy network. Each possesses unique assets that either generate or consume electricity, and these (e.g., renewable energy generator, diesel generator, aggregate utility load, building load, space conditioning, refrigerator, etc.) may further differ in their price flexibility and in their strategies for responding to dynamic electricity prices. Given such diversity, an implementer’s first inclination might be to start from scratch to define all these devices and to engineer their seemingly unique interactions. Given that each implementer’s perspective may be narrow within a transactive energy network, it is unlikely that uniquely engineered systems would interact well. This is where the transactive network template is applicable. The transactive network template is a metamodel that has been developed to guide implementers as they configure their own transactive agent within a network of such agents. The object-oriented design of the transactive network template provides basic code object types that may be used and extended by implementers to represent each of the assets in their circuit region. These objects further facilitate the transactive agent’s necessary computations, which are divided among responsibilities to schedule power usage, balance electric supply and demand, and coordinate the exchange of electricity with the other transactive agents. This report addresses the conceptual transactive network template design. Implementers are directed to more formal design documents and reference implementations. A Python™-based1 reference implementation of the transactive network template has been coded, and three implementations have been configured to represent a national laboratory and two university campuses. Version 2 of the transactive node template generalizes the market class and its methods to facilitate multiple, and more diverse market coordination mechanisms than were facilitated by and demonstrated using Version 1. Version 3 includes new Appendix B, which addresses the designs of methods that would make dynamic prices track approved electricity rates. In the future, the author wishes to make the transactive network template more generally applicable to networks that require more accurate power flow. Development of the transactive network template is jointly funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy and the DOE Office of Electricity. In late 2015, one of the first projects to be funded by the DOE Grid Laboratory Modernization Laboratory Consortium was the Clean Energy and Transactive Campus project, led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. DOE funds were matched by an investment by the Washington Department of Commerce through its Clean Energy Fund. The transactive network template was developed to guide the implementation of transactive energy networks within this project’s scope.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

PV Operations Software Transparency: A PVMAC Industry Snapshot

The rapid growth of photovoltaic (PV) deployment has increased reliance on software platforms for monitoring, workflow automation, diagnostics, and performance analytics. As these tools play a central role in asset management and operations and maintenance (O&M), greater transparency in methodologies, data handling, and validation practices benefits the broader PV ecosystem. To better understand current practices and identify opportunities for improved clarity and interoperability, 24 software providers contributed detailed responses through the PV O&M Analytics Collaborative (PVMAC) initiative, the first structured questionnaire of its kind in the industry, covering onboarding, interoperability, data quality, diagnostics, AI/ML, and other operational categories. These providers represent over 1.1 TW of solar assets under management. The analysis shows broad adoption of digital twins, AI/ML, and API integrations, but also highlights challenges in onboarding processes, inconsistent definitions and methodologies, variability in key performance indicator (KPI) calculations, and limited independent validation. Greater standardization, clearer documentation, and stronger validation frameworks could improve transparency, comparability, and trust across PV operations software platforms.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Power Management Solution for Growing Loads at Airport Rental Facilities

Growing electrical loads across airport facilities could expand beyond local grid capacities. Coordinating flexible loads with generation and storage assets can reduce coincident peaks, mitigate costly upgrades, and reduce electricity costs. This report outlines how The Athena Team has developed a suite of tools, resources, and solutions to leverage load flexibility with energy assets to harness this value potential.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

CyberMESA: Evaluation Procedures and Metrics for Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A report detailing the cybersecurity evaluation and assessment procedures for EV charging infrastructure. This report is authored by three national lab contributors. INL, PNNL, NRL. The grid integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI) is a large and complex system of systems (SoS) made up of components from many manufacturers and integrated by various companies responsible for their operation and maintenance. This complexity makes it challenging to implement security standards like IEC 62443 across the entire infrastructure. This document aims to aid in the vulnerability assessments of individual devices, such as Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), to support vendors in adopting and implementing security standards such as UL 2900, NIST SP 800-53 and Common Criteria (CC) (ISO/IEC 15408). This document serves as a guide to help evaluate the cybersecurity posture of EVCI assets. It aims to provide a consistent method for evaluating EVCI, enabling cybersecurity research teams to systematically test a wide range of electric vehicle (EV) assets. The target audiences include cybersecurity research teams, vendor development teams, automotive OEMs, and third-party evaluators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performance Characterization of InCharge™ ICE-66 V2X Bidirectional DC Fast Charger

Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology extends the role of Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle’s (PHEV) and Battery Electric Vehicle’s (BEV) batteries beyond transportation by enabling bidirectional power transfer between the vehicle's onboard energy storage and the utility grid. Modern battery-powered vehicles are equipped with high-capacity battery packs that remain stationary and underutilized for the majority of their operational life. A vehicle used for daily commuting may be parked and connected to charging infrastructure for 18–20 hours per day, representing a significant untapped energy resource. When considered at scale, the aggregated storage capacity of a modest fleet of 10–15 vehicles within a single parking facility can reach the MWh range, sufficient to partially offset peak demand for a mid-size commercial building or contribute meaningful ancillary services to the local grid. The ability to charge during off-peak periods when electricity prices are low and discharge during peak demand when prices are high positions EV batteries as distributed energy arbitrage assets, with the potential to offset vehicle ownership and charging costs. Beyond energy arbitrage, V2G-capable assets can provide ancillary grid services through active and reactive power injections. Active power supports grid frequency regulation, while reactive power supports local voltage regulation. Together, these capabilities establish V2G as a technically promising and economically relevant pathway toward greater integration of battery-powered vehicles into the broader energy system.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hydropower Infrastructure - LAkes, Reservoirs, and RIvers (HILARRI), v4

HILARRI is a database of links between major datasets of operational hydropower dams and powerplants, and inland water bodies. These connections are critical for conducting large-scale analysis of hydropower infrastructure and their associated natural and engineered water systems. Features include: – Dams from the National Inventory of Dams (2025) and the Global Reservoir and Dam Database (GRanD v1.3) – Hydropower plants from the Existing Hydropower Assets dataset (EHA 2025) – Power plants that are listed in the 2025 U.S. Hydropower Development Pipeline Data or were listed in previous versions of the dataset These hydropower infrastructure features are linked to several major datasets that provide hydrologic and hydraulic information relevant for analysis of hydropower systems that includes the integral water resources. That information comes from: – Products from the National Hydrography Dataset (NHD) – NHDPlusV2 Medium Resolution river network flowlines, – NHD waterbodies (limited to lakes and reservoirs), – NHD Watershed Boundary Dataset (HUC12-level for the Conterminous United States (CONUS)) – NHD High Resolution waterbodies – HydroLAKES water bodies (lakes and reservoirs) – LAGOS-US lakes and reservoirs – EPA National Lakes Assessment (2007, 2012, 2017, and 2022) – The Reservoir Sedimentation Database (RESSED) – EPA SuRGE sampling locations Unique identifiers are used to facilitate joining to the original full datasets. For example, characteristics of NHD flowlines such as estimated average flow rate can be joined from the NHDPlusV2 dataset to a dam or power plant listed in HILARRI based on the ID field, “COMID”, that is common to both datasets. HILARRI only includes basic information about identifiers, location, and data quality or usage notes. It does not contain the attributes or time series data associated with these sites. The HILARRI dataset incorporates information from several datasets to facilitate more effective and accurate analysis of hydropower infrastructure and their associated waterbodies. For example, dams were checked against the most recent American Rivers Dam Removal Database to identify and flag facilities that may no longer exist. Additionally, dams that are listed multiple times in the NID are identified and flagged to avoid double-counting when analyzing and summarizing information. Other quality flags include certainty of operational hydropower (i.e., if one or more datasets indicates hydropower at a particular location), whether an associated water body is accurate or composed of multiple polygons, or whether there is a known issue with reported characteristics in one of the underlying datasets. These additional data flags are designed to increase confidence in data usage for individual to large-scale analyses.

Hansen, Carly [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000193280838)↗
DOE OSTI2025

HydroFish: freshwater fish co-occurrence with hydropower plants and non-powered dams in conterminous United States sub-basins

The HydroFish dataset lists all existing hydropower plants (EHAs) and non-powered dams (NPDs; ≥ 0.001 MW potential nominal capacity), delineates the hydrologic sub-basins in which they are situated, and then lists all freshwater fish species reported to occur in those sub-basins. This dataset was compiled using the HydroBio dataset (https://hydrosource.ornl.gov/data/datasets/hydrobio/) and contains 24 total variables that describe hydrologic sub-basins, each unique EHA (plant ID and name, geographic coordinates, permit type, capacity, etc.) and NPD (ID value, known names, geographic coordinates, and estimated potential nominal capacity), and freshwater fish species in the sub-basin (common and scientific name, origin, and migratory and threat status). The HydroBio dataset was built using Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Existing Hydropower Assets Dataset (2024 version) and Non-powered Dam Technical Potential Dataset (2024 version), and NatureServe’s fish species distribution dataset (2023 version). The dataset also contains summary variables that report the unique number of EHAs, NPDs, and freshwater fish species per sub-basin. The HydroFish dataset contains two unique data files: 1) a .csv metadata file describing the dataset variables, and 2) a .csv data file containing the actual dataset. Note that there may be many rows per unique existing hydropower plant or non-powered dam given that distinct species are listed per existing plant or NPD per sub-basin. The dataset is downloadable as a zip file containing the metadata and dataset files.

Bozeman, Bryan [Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORN↗
DOE OSTI2026

Alaska Observed Hydropower Generation

This dataset contains compiled observed hydropower generation for hydropower plants in Alaska. Data have been compiled from data provided to the Energy Information Administration by asset owners, data contained in annual reports produced by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Alaska Anchorage (Alaska Electric Power Statistics and Alaska Energy Statistics) and data provided to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission by asset owners. This dataset provides available generation data from all sources in monthly and annual files, with quality flags, and generation data identifying the highest quality source in monthly and annual files.

Broman, Daniel [Pacific Northwest National Laborat↗
DOE OSTI2022

ARPA-E PERFORM datasets

Time-coincident load, wind, and solar data including actual and probabilistic forecast datasets at 5-min resolution for ERCOT, MISO, NYISO, and SPP. Wind and solar profiles are supplied for existing sites as well as planned sites based on interconnection queue projects as of 2021. For ERCOT actuals are provided for 2017 and 2018 and forecasts for 2018, and for the remaining ISOs actuals are provided for 2018 and 2019 and forecasts for 2019. There datasets were produced by NREL as part of the ARPA-E PERFORM project, an ARPA-E funded program that aim to use time-coincident power and load seeks to develop innovative management systems that represent the relative delivery risk of each asset and balance the collective risk of all assets across the grid. For more information on the datasets and methods used to generate them see https://github.com/PERFORM-Forecasts/documentation.

5-min data↗