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Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards Hour [Sides]

This presentation provides an overview of nonproliferation and safeguards, introduces neutron coincidence counting, reviews spent fuel characterization for power reactors and research reactors, and outlines safeguards at Los Alamos.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

How To Maintain Effective IAEA Safeguards While Reducing Facility Impact

For almost twenty years, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been visiting the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site where excess plutonium has been placed under IAEA safeguards as part of the United States Volunatary Offer Agreement. During that time, the mission of K-Area Complex has expanded from storage of nuclear matieral to glovebox operations in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition program. With this change in mission, it is becoming increasingly challenging to manage facility staff radiation exposure and operating activities during the IAEA’s annual Physcial Inventory Verifications (PIV). This study has identified both near-term and long-term recommendations for IAEA monitoring protocols that would allow the IAEA to maintain effective safeguards of the material while decreasing the impact to the facility. A statisitical analysis has shown that reducing the number of containers measured during an annual PIV from 12 to 4 still ensures a high level of confidence in the confidence while reducing the inspector time in the facility amd with a corresponding significant reduction in personnel radiation exposure. A modified installation pattern of Remotely Monitored Sealing Arrays (RMSAs) is also proposed utilizing only the outer rows of arrays of stored material containers in the Stack Area (SA). The modified RMSA placement will provide equivalent protection, while significantly reducing personnel radiological exposure, manpower requirements and associated costs. With advances in technology, there are additional potential options in containment/surveillance and continuity of knowledge that would allow the agency to be outside of the facility during PIV measurements and have confidence in the accuracy and authencitity of the results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Implementation of IAEA Safeguards

The historical evolution of safeguards implementation, Four safeguards strengthening measures implemented by the IAEA post-Iraq, The importance of an additional protocol

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards Knowledge Repository Users' Manual

This document provides instructions for the use of the Safeguards Knowledge Repository (SKR). SKR was developed through a multi-laboratory collaboration funded by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Power of Priors: Improved Enrichment Safeguards

International safeguards currently rely on material accountancy to verify that declared nuclear material is present and unmodified. Although effective, material accountancy for large bulk facilities can be expensive to implement due to the high precision instrumentation required to meet regulatory targets. Process monitoring has long been considered to improve material accountancy. However, effective integration of process monitoring has been met with mixed results. Given the large successes in other domains, machine learning may present a solution for process monitoring integration. Past work has shown that unsupervised approaches struggle due to measurement error. Although not studied in depth for a safeguards context, supervised approaches often have poor generalization for unseen classes of data (e.g., unseen material loss patterns). This work shows that engineered datasets, when used for training, can improve the generalization of supervised approaches. Further, the underlying models needed to generate these datasets need only accurately model certain high importance features.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Keeping LANL at the forefront of list mode capability for safeguards and MC&A [Slides]

Neutron based detection forms key capability to enable and support international and domestic nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation missions. Key stakeholders include International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), regional safeguards inspectorates, domestic stakeholders. LANL has been historically a leader in development of Non-destructive Assay (NDA) instruments and associated data acquisition hardware and software.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Summary of the Workshop on M400 High-Resolution CZT Detector Safeguards Applications

In September 2023, the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control sponsored a workshop on M400 high-resolution cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector safeguards applications under its Safeguards Technology Development Program. The workshop brought together internationally recognized subject matter experts (SMEs) in the field of gamma spectrometry and uranium/plutonium isotopic analysis and experts from H3D Inc. (H3D), the vendor for M400.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

New NDA Methods for Thorium Fuel Cycle Safeguards (Mid-Project Report)

This project is developing new Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) safeguards techniques for emergent thorium fuel cycles based on Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA), which can assay 233 U and 235 U when they are present together in a sample with potentially high gamma-ray backgrounds from fission products and 232 U. Existing passive techniques face large challenges for this task so new active interrogation methods are needed. This effort is also exploring how gamma-ray signatures can complement NRTA for enhanced assayed performance. This project leverages an NRTA system being developed at PNNL in collaboration with MIT, which uses a commercially available deuterium-tritium neutron generator at short standoff (~2 m). We aim to assess the feasibility and performance of these new NDA techniques for the range of relevant samples in thorium fuel cycles. Key advancements described in this mid-project report include NRTA system design for thorium safeguards measurements, characterization of 233 U oxide powder at PNNL, a survey of detector technologies suitable for NRTA in high gamma background environments, successful preliminary demonstration of a quantitative isotopic estimation algorithm, and first NRTA measurements of a thorium sample.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MPACT Safeguards Modeling: FY25 Update

Sandia National Laboratories develops and maintains several open-source software packages to support material accountancy analyses. This includes the Material Accountancy Performance Indicator Toolkit (MAPIT), the Fissile Facility Flow Modeler (F3M) and the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model Library (SSPM-L). MAPIT is responsible for performing statistical safeguards analyses on bulk and itemized data from nuclear fuel cycle facilities and can operate on real or synthetic data. MAPIT is the only open-source software for such analyses. F3M is a library of modules, built in MATLAB Simulink, that contain pre made blocks to represent different generic fuel cycle processes. These blocks can be used together in a modular fashion to represent and simulate nuclear fuel cycle processes with the goal of improving facility-level accountancy during the design phase. F3M is also an open-source library. Finally, the SSPM-L library is a series of completed models built from F3M. The library includes facility models such as a generic PUREX facility and a fuel fabrication facility. The SSPM-L library is not open source, but is available to collaborators with a relevant use case. These tools include modeling and simulation pipelines to simulate nuclear fuel cycle facilities and the underlying software needed to simulate measurement uncertainty and perform statistical analyses. Together, these tools can perform end-to-end nuclear material accountancy analyses. This report documents the various improvements made to these tools in FY25. Specifically, we added new statistical test, new statistical modeling capabilities, new fuel cycle facility models, and launched a new open-source model component library.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

AI for Nuclear Safeguards Verification

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilizes AI/ML to analyze open-source information, including satellite imagery and scientific publications, to verify the completeness of State declarations regarding nuclear activities. AI/ML already assist the IAEA with automating processes and analysis of large datasets, including satellite imagery and unstructured data, improving efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation. AI/ML in nuclear safeguards come with its own challenges that include the need for large, unbiased datasets, the risk of AI-generated fake information, including the potential for manipulation of satellite imagery.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

FY09 Advanced Instrumentation and Active Interrogation Research for Safeguards

Multiple small-scale projects have been undertaken to investigate advanced instrumentation solutions for safeguard measurement challenges associated with advanced fuel cycle facilities and next-generation fuel reprocessing installations. These activities are in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program and its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control for Transmutation (MPACT) campaign. 1) Work was performed in a collaboration with the University of Michigan (Prof. Sara Pozzi, co-PI) to investigate the use of liquid-scintillator radiation detectors for assaying mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, to characterize its composition and to develop advanced digital pulse-shape discrimination algorithms for performing time-correlation measurements in the MOX fuel environment. This work included both simulations and experiments and has shown that these techniques may provide a valuable approach for use within advanced safeguard measurement scenarios. 2) Work was conducted in a collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Dr. Paul Hausladen, co-PI) to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the fast-neutron coded-aperture imaging technique for locating and characterizing fissile material, and as a tool for performing hold-up measurements in fissile material handling facilities. This work involved experiments at Idaho National Laboratory, using MOX fuel and uranium metal, in both passive and active interrogation configurations. A complete analysis has not yet been completed but preliminary results suggest several potential uses for the fast neutron imaging technique. 3) Work was carried out to identify measurement approaches for determining nitric acid concentration in the range of 1 – 4 M and beyond. This work included laboratory measurements to investigate the suitability of prompt-gamma neutron activation analysis for this measurement and product reviews of other commercial solutions. Ultrasonic density analysis appears to be the best candidate technology for determining nitric acid concentrations but the PGNAA approach may also be applicable. 4) Work was also carried out to begin investigating the use of remote UV imaging to detect air-ionization induced by alpha particle emission from plutonium. This approach has been shown elsewhere as a useful tool for detecting and quantifying plutonium contamination and has the potential of providing a unique and powerful approach for quantifying hold-up in reprocessing facilities. Based on these simple scoping experiments the potential far-reaching capabilities of the measurement are clear.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Enhanced AFCI Sampling, Analysis, and Safeguards Technology Review

The focus of this study includes the investigation of sampling technologies used in industry and their potential application to nuclear fuel processing. The goal is to identify innovative sampling methods using state of the art techniques that could evolve into the next generation sampling and analysis system for metallic elements. Sampling and analysis of nuclear fuel recycling plant processes is required both to monitor the operations and ensure Safeguards and Security goals are met. In addition, environmental regulations lead to additional samples and analysis to meet licensing requirements. The volume of samples taken by conventional means, can restrain productivity while results samples are analyzed, require process holding tanks that are sized to meet analytical issues rather than process issues (and that create a larger facility footprint), or, in some cases, simply overwhelm analytical laboratory capabilities. These issues only grow when process flowsheets propose new separations systems and new byproduct material for transmutation purposes. Novel means of streamlining both sampling and analysis are being evaluated to increase the efficiency while meeting all requirements for information. This report addresses just a part of the effort to develop and study novel methods by focusing on the sampling and analysis of aqueous samples for metallic elements. It presents an overview of the sampling requirements, including frequency, sensitivity, accuracy, and programmatic drivers, to demonstrate the magnitude of the task. The sampling and analysis system needed for metallic element measurements is then discussed, and novel options being applied to other industrial analytical needs are presented. Inductively coupled mass spectrometry instruments are the most versatile for metallic element analyses and are thus chosen as the focus for the study. Candidate novel means of process sampling, as well as modifications that are necessary to couple such instruments to introduce these samples, are discussed. A suggested path forward based on an automated microchip capillary based sampling system interfaced to the analysis spectrometer is presented. The ability to obtain micro liter volume samples coupled with remote automated means of sample tracking and transport to the instrument would greatly improve analytical efficiency while reducing both personnel exposure and radioactive waste. Application of this sampling technique to new types of mass spectrometers for selective elemental isotopic analysis could also provide significant improvements in safeguards and security analyses.

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Safeguarding a Lunar Rover with Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test

The virtual bumper is a safeguarding mechanism for autonomous and remotely operated robots. In this paper we take a new approach to the virtual bumper system by using an old statistical test. By using a modified version of Wald's sequential probability ratio test we demonstrate that we can reduce the number of false positive reported by the virtual bumper, thereby saving valuable mission time. We use the concept of sequential probability ratio to control vehicle speed in the presence of possible obstacles in order to increase certainty about whether or not obstacles are present. Our new algorithm reduces the chances of collision by approximately 98 relative to traditional virtual bumper safeguarding without speed control.

safeguarding↗

DOE/DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Security Programs: A Model for Use in Nuclear Facility Safeguards and Security

Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and, in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Remote safeguards and monitoring of reactors with antineutrinos.

The current state-of-the-art in antineutrino detection is such that it is now possible to remotely monitor the operational status, power levels and fissile content of nuclear reactors in real-time. This non-invasive and incorruptible technique has been demonstrated at civilian power reactors in both Russia and the United States and has been of interest to the IAEA Novel Technologies Unit for several years. Expert's meetings were convened at IAEA headquarters in 2003 and again in 2008. The latter produced a report in which antineutrino detection was called a 'highly promising technology for safeguards applications' at nuclear reactors and several near-term goals and suggested developments were identified to facilitate wider applicability. Over the last few years, we have been working to achieve some of these goals and improvements. Specifically, we have already demonstrated the successful operation of non-toxic detectors and most recently, we are testing a transportable, above-ground detector system, which is fully contained within a standard 6 meter ISO container. If successful, such a system could allow easy deployment at any reactor facility around the world. As well, our previously demonstrated ability to remotely monitor the data and respond in real-time to reactor operational changes could allow the verification of operator declarations without the need for costly site-visits. As the global nuclear power industry expands around the world, the burden on maintaining operational histories and safeguarding inventories will increase greatly. Such a system for providing remote data to verify operator's declarations could greatly reduce the need for frequent site inspections while still providing a robust warning of anomalies requiring further investigation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE/NNSA perspective safeguard by design: GEN III/III+ light water reactors and beyond

An overview of key issues relevant to safeguards by design (SBD) for GEN III/IV nuclear reactors is provided. Lessons learned from construction of typical GEN III+ water reactors with respect to SBD are highlighted. Details of SBD for safeguards guidance development for GEN III/III+ light water reactors are developed and reported. This paper also identifies technical challenges to extend SBD including proliferation resistance methodologies to other GEN III/III+ reactors (except HWRs) and GEN IV reactors because of their immaturity in designs.

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New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

automated, nondestructive assay verification techn↗