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At least 379 records · Page 21

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NASA NTRS2004

Goddard Space Flight Center Spacecraft Magnetic Test Facility Restoration Project

The Goddard Space Flight Center Spacecraft Magnetic Test Facility (SMTF) was constructed in the 1960's for the purpose of simulating geomagnetic and interplanetary magnetic field environments. The facility includes a three axis Braunbek coil system consisting of 12 loops, 4 loops on each of the three orthogonal axes; a remote Earth field sensing magnetometer and servo controller; and a remote power control and instrumentation building. The inner coils of the Braunbek system are 42-foot in diameter with a 10-foot by 10-foot opening through the outer coils to accommodate spacecraft access into the test volume. The physical size and precision of the facility are matched by only two other such facilities in the world. The facility was used extensively from the late 1960's until the early 1990's when the requirement for spacecraft level testing diminished. New NASA missions planned under the Living with a Star, Solar Terrestrial Probes, Explorer, and New Millennium Programs include precision, high-resolution magnetometers to obtain magnetic field data that is critical to fulfilling their scientific mission. It is highly likely that future Lunar and Martian exploration missions will also use precision magnetometers to conduct geophysical magnetic surveys. To ensure the success of these missions, ground-testing using a magnetic test facility such as the GSFC SMTF will be required. This paper describes the history of the facility, the future mission requirements that have renewed the need for spacecraft level magnetic testing, and the plans for restoring the facility to be capable of performing to its original design specifications.

Vernier, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2004

Goddard Space Flight Center Spacecraft Magnetic Test Facility Restoration Project

The Goddard Space Flight Center Spacecraft Magnetic Test Facility (SMTF) was constructed in the 1960's for the purpose of simulating geomagnetic and interplanetary magnetic field environments. The facility includes a three axis Braunbek coil system consisting of 12 loops, 4 loops on each of the three orthogonal axes; a remote Earth field sensing magnetometer and servo controller; and a remote power control and instrumentation building. The inner coils of the Braunbek system are 42-foot in diameter with a 10-foot by 10-foot opening through the outer coils to accommodate spacecraft access into the test volume. The physical size and precision of the facility are matched by only two other such facilities in the world. The facility was used extensively from the late 1960's until the early 1990's when the requirement for spacecraft level testing diminished. New NASA missions planned under the Living with a Star, Solar Terrestrial Probes, Explorer, and New Millennium Programs include precision, high-resolution magnetometers to obtain magnetic field data that is critical to fulfilling their scientific mission. It is highly likely that future Lunar and Martian exploration missions will also use precision magnetometers to conduct geophysical magnetic surveys. To ensure the success of these missions, ground testing using a magnetic test facility such as the GSFC SMTF will be required. This paper describes the history of the facility, the future mission requirements that have renewed the need for spacecraft level magnetic testing, and the plans for restoring the facility to be capable of performing to its original design specifications.

Vernier, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2010

Jake Garn Mission Simulator and Training Facility, Building 5, Historical Documentation

In response to President George W. Bush's announcement in January 2004 that the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) would end in 2010, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) completed a nation-wide historical survey and evaluation of NASA-owned facilities and properties (real property assets) at all its Centers and component facilities. The buildings and structures which supported the SSP were inventoried and assessed as per the criteria of eligibility for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) in the context of this program. This study was performed in compliance with Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966 (Public Law 89-665), as amended; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (Public Law 91-190); Executive Order (EO) 11593: Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment; EO 13287, Preserve America, and other relevant legislation. As part of this nation-wide study, in September 2006, historical survey and evaluation of NASA-owned and managed facilities at was conducted by NASA's Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas. The results of this study are presented in a report entitled, "Survey and Evaluation of NASA-owned Historic Facilities and Properties in the Context of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas," prepared in November 2007 by NASA JSC's contractor, Archaeological Consultants, Inc. As a result of this survey, the Jake Gam Mission Simulator and Training Facility (Building 5) was determined eligible for listing in the NRHP, with concurrence by the Texas State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The survey concluded that Building 5 is eligible for the NRHP under Criteria A and C in the context of the U.S. Space Shuttle program (1969-2010). Because it has achieved significance within the past 50 years, Criteria Consideration G applies. At the time of this documentation, Building 5 was still used to support the SSP as an astronaut training facility. This documentation package precedes any undertaking as defined by Section 106 of the NHPA, as amended, and implemented in 36 CFR Part 800, as NASA JSC has decided to proactively pursue efforts to mitigate the potential adverse affects of any future modifications to the facility. It includes a historical summary of the Space Shuttle program; the history of JSC in relation to the SSP; a narrative of the history of Building 5 and how it supported the SSP; and a physical description of the structure. In addition, photographs documenting the construction and historical use of Building 5 in support of the SSP, as well as photographs of the facility documenting the existing conditions, special technological features, and engineering details, are included. A contact sheet printed on archival paper, and an electronic copy of the work product on CD, are also provided.

Slovinac, Trish↗

NASA NTRS2002

Integrated Human Test Facilities at NASA and the Role of Human Engineering

Integrated human test facilities are a key component of NASA's Advanced Life Support Program (ALSP). Over the past several years, the ALSP has been developing such facilities to serve as a large-scale advanced life support and habitability test bed capable of supporting long-duration evaluations of integrated bioregenerative life support systems with human test crews. These facilities-targeted for evaluation of hypogravity compatible life support and habitability systems to be developed for use on planetary surfaces-are currently in the development stage at the Johnson Space Center. These major test facilities are comprised of a set of interconnected chambers with a sealed internal environment, which will be outfitted with systems capable of supporting test crews of four individuals for periods exceeding one year. The advanced technology systems to be tested will consist of both biological and physicochemical components and will perform all required crew life support and habitability functions. This presentation provides a description of the proposed test "missions" to be supported by these integrated human test facilities, the overall system architecture of the facilities, the current development status of the facilities, and the role that human design has played in the development of the facilities.

Tri, Terry O.↗

NASA NTRS2011

An Experimental Study of Upward Burning Over Long Solid Fuels: Facility Development and Comparison

As NASA's mission evolves, new spacecraft and habitat environments necessitate expanded study of materials flammability. Most of the upward burning tests to date, including the NASA standard material screening method NASA-STD-6001, have been conducted in small chambers where the flame often terminates before a steady state flame is established. In real environments, the same limitations may not be present. The use of long fuel samples would allow the flames to proceed in an unhindered manner. In order to explore sample size and chamber size effects, two large chambers were developed at NASA GRC under the Flame Prevention, Detection and Suppression (FPDS) project. The first was an existing vacuum facility, VF-13, located at NASA John Glenn Research Center. This 6350 liter chamber could accommodate fuels sample lengths up to 2 m. However, operational costs and restricted accessibility limited the test program, so a second laboratory scale facility was developed in parallel. By stacking additional two chambers on top of an existing combustion chamber facility, this 81 liter Stacked-chamber facility could accommodate a 1.5 m sample length. The larger volume, more ideal environment of VF-13 was used to obtain baseline data for comparison with the stacked chamber facility. In this way, the stacked chamber facility was intended for long term testing, with VF-13 as the proving ground. Four different solid fuels (adding machine paper, poster paper, PMMA plates, and Nomex fabric) were tested with fuel sample lengths up to 2 m. For thin samples (papers) with widths up to 5 cm, the flame reached a steady state length, which demonstrates that flame length may be stabilized even when the edge effects are reduced. For the thick PMMA plates, flames reached lengths up to 70 cm but were highly energetic and restricted by oxygen depletion. Tests with the Nomex fabric confirmed that the cyclic flame phenomena, observed in small facility tests, continued over longer sample. New features were also observed at the higher oxygen/pressure conditions available in the large chamber. Comparison of flame behavior between the two facilities under identical conditions revealed disparities, both qualitative and quantitative. This suggests that, in certain ranges of controlling parameters, chamber size and shape could be one of the parameters that affect the material flammability. If this proves to be true, it may limit the applicability of existing flammability data.

Kleinhenz, Julie↗

NASA NTRS2017

The Benefits of Incorporating Shipping Containers into the Climate Change Adaption Plans at NASA Wallops Flight Facility

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has several centers and facilities located near the coast that are undoubtedly susceptible to climate change. One of those facilities is Wallops Flight Facility on the Eastern Shore of Virginia which is separated into three areas: Main Base, Mainland, and the Island. Wallops Island has numerous buildings and assets that are vulnerable to flood inundation, intense storms, and storm surge. The shoreline of Wallops Island is prone to beach erosion and is slated for another beach replenishment project in 2019. In addition, current climate projections for NASAs centers and facilities, conducted by the Climate Adaptation Science Investigators, warn of inevitable increases in annual temperature, precipitation, sea level rise, and extreme events such as heat waves. The aforementioned vulnerabilities Wallops Island faces in addition to the projections of future climate change reveal an urgency for NASA to adjust how new buildings at its centers and facilities near the coast are built to adapt to the inevitable effects of climate change. Although the agency has made strides to mitigate the effects of climate change by incorporating L.E.E.D. into new buildings that produce less greenhouse gas, the strides for the agency to institute clear climate adaptation policies for the buildings at its centers and facilities near the coast seem to lag behind. As NASA continues to formulate formidable climate change adaptation plans for its centers and facilities, an architectural trend that should be examined for its potential to replace several old buildings at Wallops Island is shipping containers buildings. Shipping containers or Intermodal Steel Building Units offer an array of benefits such as strength, durability, versatility, modular, and since they can be upcycled, they are also eco-friendly. Some disadvantages of shipping containers are they contain harmful chemicals, insulation must be added, fossil fuels must be used to transport them to the site, and multiple ISBUs are needed. However, the benefits of shipping container buildings could be utilized at NASA centers or facilities near the coast such as Wallops Island on new buildings that are designed to adapt to the impending effects of climate change. Thus, this Masters Research Project will explore how those benefits can be incorporated into the climate change adaptation plans at Wallops Island and make recommendations for policy guidelines and shipping container buildings specific to Wallops Island.

Sustainable Design↗

DOE OSTI2015

Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

Schanfein, Mark J.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Virtual Facility at Fermilab: Infrastructure and Services Expand to Public Clouds

In preparation for its new Virtual Facility Project, Fermilab has launched a program of work to determine the requirements for running a computation facility on-site, in public clouds, or a combination of both. This program builds on the work we have done to successfully run experimental workflows of 1000-VM scale both on an on-site private cloud and on Amazon AWS. To do this at scale we deployed dynamically launched and discovered caching services on the cloud. We are now testing the deployment of more complicated services on Amazon AWS using native load balancing and auto scaling features they provide. The Virtual Facility Project will design and develop a facility including infrastructure and services that can live on the site of Fermilab, off-site, or a combination of both. We expect to need this capacity to meet the peak computing requirements in the future. The Virtual Facility is intended to provision resources on the public cloud on behalf of the facility as a whole instead of having each experiment or Virtual Organization do it on their own. We will describe the policy aspects of a distributed Virtual Facility, the requirements, and plans to make a detailed comparison of the relative cost of the public and private clouds. Furthermore, this talk will present the details of the technical mechanisms we have developed to date, and the plans currently taking shape for a Virtual Facility at Fermilab.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

The MPACT 2020 Milestone: Safeguards and Security by Design of Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities.

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, within the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, has developed a Virtual Facility Distributed Test Bed for safeguards and security design for future nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The purpose of the Virtual Test Bed is to bring together experimental and modeling capabilities across the U.S. national laboratory and university complex to provide a one-stop-shop for advanced Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD). Experimental testing alone of safeguards and security technologies would be cost prohibitive, but testbeds and laboratory processing facilities with safeguards measurement opportunities, coupled with modeling and simulation, provide the ability to generate modern, efficient safeguards and security systems for new facilities. This Virtual Test Bed concept has been demonstrated using a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility as an example, but the concept can be extended to other facilities. While much of the recent work in the MPACT program has focused on electrochemical safeguards and security technologies, the laboratory capabilities have been applied to other facilities in the past (including aqueous reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and molten salt reactors as examples). This paper provides an overview of the Virtual Test Bed concept, a description of the design process, and a baseline safeguards and security design for the example facility. Parallel papers in this issue go into more detail on the various technologies, experimental testing, modeling capabilities, and performance testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

Considerations for Safeguards Implementation in the Post-Operational Facility Life Cycle

Hundreds of facilities around the world under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are currently permanently shutdown or undergoing decommissioning. For facilities in States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force, safeguards obligations under the CSA extend until the IAEA has determined for safeguards purposes that a facility has been decommissioned (i.e., the IAEA has verified that the nuclear material has been removed and residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable). The IAEA Department of Safeguards recently issued a report providing high-level guidance to States on IAEA safeguards implementation throughout the post-operational life cycle phases of facilities and locations outside facilities. These phases include permanent shutdown, closed-down, and decommissioned for safeguards purposes. Additional consideration is needed for how post-operational facilities might be consistently evaluated when developing State-level safeguards approaches. This work presents ideas about how the IAEA might implement the State-level concept and associated elements (e.g., State-specific factors) throughout the post-operational life cycle, focusing on maintaining effectiveness and gaining efficiencies where appropriate. Considerations include whether State-specific factors should influence facility status, how a change in a facility’s post-operational status might impact a State’s acquisition path analysis, and how rendering inoperable/removal of essential equipment could affect resources expended on safeguards implementation.

Hogue, Karen↗

DOE OSTI2017

Database dedicated to nuclear criticality events that occurred in fuel cycle facilities

Nuclear fuel cycle facilities can encounter events, resulting from human errors, failure of safety organization or technical failures. However, the application of the concept of defense in depth, especially the first two levels (prevention of abnormal situations and detection) requires to ensure safety in such undesirable situations. Furthermore, the periodic safety reviews of each nuclear fuel cycle facility involve the evaluation of the safety of these facilities with regard to the regulation evolution, the best safety practices, the facility evolution (modifications, aging...) and the global feedback. Part of this work is based on the analysis of the feedback and lessons learned from the events that occurred during the past period. This specific work indeed provides lessons about the operating conditions of the facility and highlights malfunctions that have occurred during operations, maintenance or restart after a shutdown. Taking into account this feedback, IRSN developed a database gathering the events which have affected the safety of French fuel cycle facilities (from conversion to waste storage, laboratories and experimental facilities, facilities under dismantling and decommissioning). Among all the recorded events, it is possible to extract in particular those impacting the criticality safety. In order to extend the analysis of these events, the IRSN criticality safety department developed a specific database dedicated to criticality risks. The 'criticality events' database is continuously updated on the basis of the declared events and their analysis by engineers from the criticality safety department. At this time, about 600 events are described and analyzed in this database. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2016

The Role of the Nuclear Science User Facilities in Nuclear Energy Research and Development

The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF), established in 2007 as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) National Scientific User Facility is chartered to provide cost-free access to unique and important research and development capabilities and infrastructure to nuclear energy-focused researchers. Originally, the NSUF was formed to utilize excess capacity in the ATR and the Hot Fuels Examination Facility (HFEF) hot cells. In the eight years since its inception, the NSUF has expanded to include most of the capabilities at the Idaho National Laboratory as well as twelve external 'partner' facilities. The inclusion of the partner facilities makes the NSUF the first distributed user facility, a 'laboratory without walls.' Users can apply for access to any of the NSUF INL or partner facilities using the same process, either through the annual Office of Nuclear Energy Consolidated Innovative Nuclear Research funding announcement or the NSUF Rapid Turnaround Experiment (RTE) opportunities, offered three times each year. In support of the capability access mission, the NSUF also offers access to additional resources. In order to help researchers connect with the appropriate capabilities, the NSUF has developed a comprehensive searchable database of nuclear energy R and D infrastructure in the US and worldwide. Additionally, the NSUF hosts a Fuels and Materials Sample Library (FMSL) that includes an ever-expanding set of previously irradiated materials, supporting un-irradiated archive material and fabrication and irradiation data for the materials. The capabilities of the NSUF partner facilities, the NEID, the fuels and materials sample library and the access application information is all available at the NSUF web site: ATRNSUF.INL.gov. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Research and Development Capabilities available through the Nuclear Science User Facilities

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Interactive and Reproducible Computing With Jupyter Tools at Facilities

Increasingly Jupyter tools are being adopted and incorporated into High Performance Computing (HPC) and scientific user facilities. Adopting Jupyter tools enables more interactive and reproducible computational work at facilities across data life cycles. As the volume, variety, and scope of data grow, scientists need to be able to analyze and share results in user friendly ways. Human-centered research highlights design challenges around computational notebooks, and our qualitative user study shifts focus to better characterize how Jupyter tools are being used in HPC and science user facilities today. We conducted twenty-nine interviews, and obtained 103 survey responses from NERSC Jupyter users, to better understand the increasing role of interactive computing tools in DOE sponsored scientific work. We examine a range of issues that emerge using and supporting Jupyter in HPC ecosystems, including: how Jupyter is being used by scientists in HPC and user facility ecosystems; how facilities are purposefully supporting Jupyter in their ecosystems; feedback NERSC users have about the facility’s deployment, and, discuss features NERSC indicated would be helpful. We offer a variety of takeaways for staff supporting Jupyter at facilities, Project Jupyter and related open source communities, and funding agencies supporting interactive computing work.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2016

Decommissioning Demonstration - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station South Yard Facility - 16544

Following the decision to retire Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Southern California Edison (SCE) staffed a multi-discipline team to investigate decommissioning best practices. SCE also tasked this team with reducing the overall radiological footprint and radioactive material inventory in the near term. The SCE decommissioning activities investigation team targeted projects at the facility which could reduce the source term and risk, and investigate management approaches with decommissioning contractors. SCE, through this team, contracted EnergySolutions to provide a solution for processing and disposal of equipment and materials at a storage facility south of the plant. The South Yard Facility included offices, instrument repair facilities, a large machine shop, outage equipment storage, waste management facilities, and decontamination facilities. SCE contracted EnergySolutions to manage, supervise, plan, and provide labor for the disposition of the legacy waste stored at the South Yard to include the Radioactive Equipment/Materials Storage (REMS) Pad and South Yard Facility. Under the Contractor Work Authorization (CWA), SCE authorized EnergySolutions to consolidate, package, transport, and dispose of the Low Level Radioactive Waste (Class A) and Mixed Low Level Radioactive Waste from the aforementioned areas. The scope also included disposition of material that was expected to be free from radiological contamination, but required management as a hazardous waste. The legacy waste consisted of an inventory of containers designated as trash provided by SCE, as well as, all materials stored within the rooms of the SYF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Commissioning and Startup of a New Category 2 Nuclear Facility for RH TRU Sludge Packaging - 18614

For many years the Department of Energy (DOE) has been executing a plan to eliminate all threats of Radiological release to the Columbia River from the Hanford site, in Richland, Washington. While the River Corridor Closure Project is nearing completion, one of the last remaining facilities along the Columbia River is the 100K reactor complex. Since the 1950's the 105KW fuel storage basin has contained varying levels of spent reactor fuel and products of the degradation of aging stored fuel. Having previously removed all of the distinguishable spent fuel components, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is now in the final stages of readiness review to commence removal of the residual sludge material that has accumulated in the basin throughout the years of operation. There is approximately 27 m3 of sludge in the 105KW basin currently. This sludge material exhibits a very high radiation dose rate with levels reaching 100 R/hr. It is also very difficult to mobilize and transfer due to its physical characteristics. CH2M engineers have developed a novel mechanical system for mobilization and transfer of the sludge to specially designed storage containers. Once transferred to these containers, the sludge will be moved away from the river and taken to T Plant, a decontamination and repair facility on site, for interim storage, while a project to treat and package the material for final disposition is established. The Sludge Removal Project (SRP) is a $309 M capital line item project that was established to achieve the goals of this mission. Part of the project is to develop and install the equipment needed to do the transfer, and part of the project is to construct a new Category 2 sludge packaging facility. Construction of the facility is now complete, all equipment is installed and the project is well into the commissioning phase. Over the final three months of 2017, the project progressed into the final stages of readiness to transition to operations. This will represent the first commissioning of a new Category 2 process and facility at Hanford in over 10 years. The SRP team has crossed over many hurdles in establishing a workable plan for the safety basis for installing, commissioning and transitioning to operations within the boundaries of an existing Facility Safety Analysis Report. The project team has also applied extensive use of a mockup facility in the development and execution of the path to readiness and commencement of operations. At the time of the conference, the project will have completed a DOE Operational Readiness Review and will be very near of just entering full operation. This paper will share the experiences of the project team through these final steps and lessons learned on making the project successful. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2017

Thermal Evaluations for Hypothetically Drain-Down Spent Fuel Storage Facility at SRS

The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗