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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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Different types of satellite and conventional remote sensing data are used to monitor urban growth and the pattern of development. Software programs were developed for a growth allocation model that uses LANDSAT information as the basic component.
Debris in space has become an issue that has commanded considerable interest in recent years as society has become both more dependent upon space based systems, and more aware of its dependence. After many years of study the United States Space Policy of February 1988 directed that all sectors of the U.S. community minimize space debris. Other space organizations have adopted similar policies. Among the study activities leading to the policy and to subsequent implementing directives were discussions with the ESA, NASDA, and other space operating agencies. The policy derived from technical consensus on the nature of the issues and upon the courses of action available to mitigate the problem, but there remains the concern as to the adequacy of the data to define cost effective strategies. There are now in place mechanisms to continue technical discussions in more formal terms.
This article presents an Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) architecture developed for the Deep Space Network. An historical review is provided to establish the context for current United States Government policy on interprocessor communication standards. An introduction to the OSI architecture, its seven-layer approach, and an overview of application service entities are furnished as a tutorial. Finally, the results of a prototype system developed for monitor and control of a Deep Space Station are also presented.
Papers presented at a historical symposium on Presidential leadership in the space program include the following: 'The Imperial Presidency in the History of Space Exploration'; 'The Reluctant Racer: Dwight D. Eisenhower and United States Space Policy'; 'Kennedy and the Decision to Go to the Moon'; 'Johnson, Project Apollo, and the Politics of Space Program Planning'; 'The Presidency, Congress, and the Deceleration of the U.S. Space Program in the 1970s'; 'Politics not Science: The U.S. Space Program in the Reagan and Bush Years'; 'Presidential Leadership and International Aspects of the Space Program'; 'National Leadership and Presidential Power'; and 'Epilogue: Beyond NASA Exceptionalism'.
The current United States Space Policy [1] as articulated by the White House and later confirmed by the Congress [2] calls for [t]he extension of the human presence from low-Earth orbit to other regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit will enable missions to the surface of the Moon and missions to deep space destinations such as near-Earth asteroids and Mars. Human exploration of the Moon and Mars has been the focus of numerous exhaustive studies and planning, but missions to Near-Earth Asteroids (NEAs) has, by comparison, garnered relatively little attention in terms of mission and systems planning. This paper examines the strategic implications of human exploration of NEAs and how they can fit into the overall exploration strategy. This paper specifically addresses how accessible NEAs are in terms of mission duration, technologies required, and overall architecture construct. Example mission architectures utilizing different propulsion technologies such as chemical, nuclear thermal, and solar electric propulsion were formulated to determine resulting figures of merit including number of NEAs accessible, time of flight, mission mass, number of departure windows, and length of the launch windows. These data, in conjunction with what we currently know about these potential exploration targets (or need to know in the future), provide key insights necessary for future mission and strategic planning.
In 2004, President George W. Bush proposed a new set of goals for NASA which have since been formalized by Congress as the revised United States Space Policy. A major goal is to return humans to the moon by 2020. This prompted a world-wide discussion about what our goals in space ought to be. In 2006 NASA surveyed potential stakeholders asking the question, "Why the Moon?" Responses were received from over 1000 entities including business, industry, academia, and 13 other space agencies. This presentation reports the responses to that questionnaire, as well as current plans for how the return to the moon will be accomplished.
The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This paper presents the results from a single astronaut test subject who participated in five CAST sessions. The details on the operational philosophy of CAST are discussed, including the approach to crew training, selection criteria for test days, and data collection methods. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers. It is hoped the results of this investigation will guide NASA's implementation of autonomous mission operations for long duration human space missions to Mars and beyond.
The United States space policy is evolving toward missions beyond low Earth orbit. In an effort to meet that policy, NASA has recognized Autonomous Mission Operations (AMO) as a valuable capability. Identified within AMO capabilities is the potential for autonomous planning and replanning during human spaceflight operations. That is allowing crew members to collectively or individually participate in the development of their own schedules. Currently, dedicated mission operations planners collaborate with international partners to create daily plans for astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), taking into account mission requirements, ground rules, and various vehicle and payload constraints. In future deep space operations the crew will require more independence from ground support due to communication transmission delays. Furthermore, crew members who are provided with the capability to schedule their own activities are able to leverage direct experience operating in the space environment, and possibly maximize their efficiency. CAST (Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test) is an ISS investigation designed to analyze three important hypotheses about crew autonomous scheduling. First, given appropriate inputs, the crew is able to create and execute a plan in a reasonable period of time without impacts to mission success. Second, the proximity of the planner, in this case the crew, to the planned operations increases their operational efficiency. Third, crew members are more satisfied when given a role in plan development. This presentation shows the progress done in this study with a single astronaut test subject participating in five CAST sessions. CAST is a technology demonstration payload sponsored by the ISS Research Science and Technology Office, and performed by experts in Mission Operations Planning from the Flight Operations Directorate at NASA Johnson Space Center, and researchers across multiple NASA centers.
On March 26, 2019, Vice President Pence stated that the policy of the Trump administration and the United States of America is to return American astronauts to the Moon within the next five years i.e., by 2024. Since that time, NASA has begun the process of developing concepts of operations and launch campaign options to achieve that goal as well as to provide a sustainable human presence on the Moon. Whereas the Apollo program utilized one Saturn V rocket to carry out a single lunar landing mission of short duration, NASA’s preliminary plans for the Artemis Program call for a combination of medium lift class rockets along with the heavy lift Space Launch System (SLS)to achieve a lunar landing by 2024 as well as subsequent missions. This paper describes how discrete event simulation is used to model the launch campaigns and provide metrics on launch availability and mission duration for each element being launched. Possible methods for improving launch availability are presented.
We review the current state of understanding of Ceres as it relates to planetary protection policy for future landed missions, including for sample return, to the dwarf planet. The Dawn mission found Ceres to be an intriguing target for a mission, with evidence for the presence of regional, possibly extensive liquid at depth, and local expressions of recent and potentially ongoing activity. The Dawn mission also found a high abundance of carbon in the regolith, interpreted as a mix of carbonates and amorphous carbon, as well as locally high concentrations of organic matter. Key findings from this review are as follows: (1) outside of the region of Occator crater, Ceres shows no geological evidence for conduits from the surface to the interior; and (2) considering the biological potential of Ceres’ deep interior, a surface sample return mission should be considered Category V restricted, unless it can be demonstrated that evaporites sourced from Ceres’ deep brine region, and recently exposed in Occator crater, have not been scattered to the rest of Ceres’ surface; in that case, the probability of returning an unsterilized particle to an acceptably low value is to be determined by a future study. Key Words: Ceres—Planetary protection—Brines—Future missions.
The paper discusses principles which must be upheld in order to protect U.S. interests in space, the potential impact of the Moon Treaty on these principles, how to satisfy the legitimate needs of developing countries while protecting U.S. interests, and how to enhance the probability of success in future negotiations concerning space. It is suggested that, in order to preserve the rights of its citizens and industry to exploit space, the United States must make a strong effort to help solve the problems of the developing countries, maintain a strong space program, and develop and follow a space policy that reflects the interests of the American people.
Two aspects of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) are discussed: (1) efforts to state the overarching technology policy in which technology transfer plays an important part; and (2) efforts to coordinate federal R&D contracts programs in several technology areas through the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET) process.
This paper discusses commercial space policy for the State of Florida in the context of state initiatives for general technology and economic development. The paper also compares Florida's commercial space initiatives to national space policies and describes mechanisms for transferring space related technologies and research to Florida businesses for subsequent development and commercialization.
The traditional AI answer to the decision making problem for a robot is planning. However, planning is usually CPU-time consuming, depending on the availability and accuracy of a world model. The Dyna system generally described in earlier work, uses trial and error to learn a world model which is simultaneously used to plan reactions resulting in optimal action sequences. It is an attempt to integrate planning, reactive, and learning systems. The architecture of Dyna is presented. The different blocks are described. There are three main components of the system. The first is the world model used by the robot for internal world representation. The input of the world model is the current state and the action taken in the current state. The output is the corresponding reward and resulting state. The second module in the system is the policy. The policy observes the current state and outputs the action to be executed by the robot. At the beginning of program execution, the policy is stochastic and through learning progressively becomes deterministic. The policy decides upon an action according to the output of an evaluation function, which is the third module of the system. The evaluation function takes the following as input: the current state of the system, the action taken in that state, the resulting state, and a reward generated by the world which is proportional to the current distance from the goal state. Originally, the work proposed was as follows: (1) to implement a simple 2-D world where a 'robot' is navigating around obstacles, to learn the path to a goal, by using lookup tables; (2) to substitute the world model and Q estimate function Q by neural networks; and (3) to apply the algorithm to a more complex world where the use of a neural network would be fully justified. In this paper, the system design and achieved results will be described. First we implement the world model with a neural network and leave Q implemented as a look up table. Next, we use a lookup table for the world model and implement the Q function with a neural net. Time limitations prevented the combination of these two approaches. The final section discusses the results and gives clues for future work.
United States and Soviet policies on outer space and arms control
The United States and Australia are among the 20 or more nations of the world having industries currently engaging in some form of space commerce. As a matter of national policy, the United States has encouraged private investment and involvement in space activities since 1984, when the Congress declared it in the best interest of the Nation that NASA '...seek and encourage to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space.' Australia's space policy, announced in 1986, has the objective of encouraging greater involvement by industry in space research and development, and the development of commercial space activities. This paper discusses the underlying policies, current status, and prospects for the future of commercial space business activities in the two countries.
Interaction of United States objectives in space with those on earth
With its contribution to trade, its coupling with national security, and its symbolism of U.S. technological strength, the U.S. aerospace industry holds a unique position in the Nation's industrial structure. Federal science and technology policy and Federal scientific and technical information (STI) policy loom important as strategic contributions to the U.S. aerospace industry's leading competitive position. However, three fundamental policy problems exist. First, the United States lacks a coherent STI policy and a unified approach to the development of such a policy. Second, policymakers fail to understand the relationship of STI to science and technology policy. Third, STI is treated as a part of general information policy, without any recognition of its uniqueness. This paper provides an overview of the Federal information policy structure as it relates to STI and frames the policy issues that require resolution.