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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1982

Health and safety evaluation of a modified tunnel borer design for application to single entry coal mine development

A health and safety analysis of a single entry coal tunnel borer system is given. The results of the health analysis indicated that while the tunnel borer design offered improvements in dust control through the use of water sprays, a higher face ventilation rule, and the application of spalling rather than the conventional grinding process, it interjected an additional mutagen and toxic compound into the environment through the use of shotcrete. The tunnel borer system easily conformed with the prescribed fatality limit, but exceeded the required limits for disabling and overall injuries. It also exhibited projected disabling and overall injury rates considerably higher than existing continuous mining injury rates. Consequently, the tunnel borer system was not considered an advanced system.

Zimmerman, W. F.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-29, postflight edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-29 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-29 safety risk factors; (4) STS-27 flight anomalies; (5) STS-26 flight anomalies; and (6) the STS-29 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1989

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-30, postflight edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-30 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-30 safety risk factors; (4) STS-29 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-27 inflight anomalies; and (6) the STS-30 official inflight anomaly report. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Finkel, Seymour I.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-32, Postflight Edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-32 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-32 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-28 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-32 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-36, Postflight Edition

The topics covered include: (1) an STS-36 mission summary; (2) safety risk factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-36 safety risk factors; (4) STS-32 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-34 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-36 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission Safety Evaluation Report for STS-43, Postflight Edition

Some of the topics covered include: (1) an STS-43 mission summary; (2) safety risks factors/issues; (3) resolved STS-43 safety risk factors; (4) STS-40 inflight anomalies; (5) STS-37 inflight anomalies; and (6) STS-43 inflight anomalies. Background information and a list of acronyms are also presented.

Hill, William C.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Post-closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geological repository in southern New Mexico that provides for disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from atomic energy defense activities. The Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) Report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addresses nuclear criticality safety based on the projected inventory characteristics for the initial compliance certification application of WIPP in 1996. As the inventory, waste forms, and disposal package designs change, revised or new analyses are necessary to demonstrate acceptability for these configurations within the WIPP safety basis and compliance with 10,000-year post-closure standards of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Saylor and Scaglione evaluated criticality control overpacks (CCOs) in 2017 based on conservative assumptions for post-closure repository structural conditions with resulting effects on containers and container spacing, The Saylor and Scaglione evaluation of CCOs addressed a single waste configuration that represents the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program’s dilute and dispose waste form and composition. This initial CCO study demonstrated that 50 grams of boron carbide (B 4 C) per CCO is sufficient to ensure post-closure criticality safety based on a well-mixed waste composition, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) subsequently determined that this amount of B 4 C does not require constraints on moisture or plastic present as moderator. The Saylor and Scaglione analysis conservatively assumes repository room closure that eliminates all space between fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu masses. The close-packed array was selected based on limited availability of repository salt creep modeling results at that time. In 2019, Brickner provided additional evaluations for pipe overpack containers (POCs), building on the conservative basis provided by Saylor and Scaglione. Brickner’s 2019 analysis made use of new geomechanical data for post-closure spacing that rely on advances in repository modeling as documented in the work by Reedlunn and Bean. This current CCO evaluation for generic waste materials expands on earlier work performed at ORNL and includes evaluation of CCOs across a much broader range of possible waste compositions and geometries. This evaluation is intended to provide input for the required feature, event and process (FEP) screening to determine if post-closure criticality must be included as an event in the 10,000-year regulatory evaluation. As such, the approach to modeling post-closure criticality presented in this report has been coordinated with the Sandia team responsible for FEP screening. The resulting analysis supports disposition of fissile materials in the CCO containing up to 380 FGE 239 Pu and expands conditions acceptable for disposal of fissile material in CCOs. This evaluation builds on the methodology of Saylor and Scaglione and Brickner, using the most recently available geomechanical data for CCO spacing under salt creep compaction scenarios provided by Reedlunn and Bean. The broad range of fissile material configurations analyzed in this report are intended to account for configurations that may occur during the post-closure disposal time period, and it also includes waste configurations that are not physically possible to support analysis of conditions that influence neutron fluence.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-37, postflight edition

STS-37/Atlantis was launched on April 5, 1991 from Kennedy Space Center launch complex 39B at 9:23 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST). Launch was delayed 4 minutes 45 seconds because of safety concerns about the low cloud ceiling and the wind direction in the potential blast area. Based on the limited number and type of inflight anomalies encountered, the Space Shuttle operated satisfactorily throughout the STS-37 mission. A contingency EVA was performed by the crew on Flight Day (FD) 3 to free a sticky Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) high gain antenna, after which the GRO primary payload was successfully deployed by the Orbiter's Remote Manipulator System. The GRO, which weighed just over 35,000 lbs, was the heaviest NASA science satellite ever deployed by the Space Shuttle into low Earth orbit. The scheduled entry/landing on FD 6 was waved off for one day due to high wind conditions at Edwards Air Force Base. Atlantis landed on FD 7, 11 April 1991 on Edwards AFB lakebed runway 33 at 9:55 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

Hill, William C.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Safety Evaluation Methodology for Mining Systems

Methodolgy evaluates design of proposed mining systems. Analysis tests proposed mining systems against specifications and hazards of existing similar systems, examines soundness of new design in terms of reducing or eliminating major health and safety hazards, and identifies major design weaknesses.

Zimmerman, W. F.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integrating the Safety Evaluation for a Molten Salt Reactor Operation and Fuel Cycle Facility Application

Molten salt reactor (MSR) sites may include additional elements of the nuclear fuel cycle beyond those of the existing fleet. In the existing fleet, the individual elements of the fuel cycle typically have been located on different sites and licensed separately. Providing robust separation between hazards remains a useful safety practice for MSRs. Although the different elements of the fuel cycle at a nuclear site that includes MSRs may transfer material between processes more frequently than prior practices, providing adequate separation between distinct facilities avoids the potential for adverse interactions. Additionally, some elements of the MSR fuel cycle, such as fuel salt preparation or waste stabilization, may be more efficient to share among multiple nearby reactors, and nuclear sites that include MSRs may also include other reactor classes. Hence, discrete MSR fuel cycle facilities located at a common site could be physically separated with robust barriers—albeit potentially connected by piping—and licensed individually. This report describes the hazards of individual elements of representative MSR fuel cycle facilities, including their relationship to overall site level hazards. The report maps the regulatory compliance aspects of the individual MSR fuel cycle elements (e.g., fuel salt preparation, reactor, waste stabilization) to existing and developing regulations, as well as describes current and developing site-level regulations from an MSR perspective.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2004

Safety Evaluation of Two Commercial Lithium-ion Batteries for Space Applications

Lithium-ion batteries have been used for applications on the Shuttle and Station for the past six years. A majority of the li-ion batteries flown are Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) varieties. The COTS batteries and cells were tested under nominal and abusive conditions for performance and safety characterization. Within the past six months two batteries have been certified for flight and use on the Space Station. The first one is a Hand Spring PDA battery that had a single prismatic li-ion cell and the second is an Iridium satellite phone that had a two-cell pack with prismatic li-ion cells.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Safety evaluation methodology for advanced coal extraction systems

Qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods for coal extraction systems were developed. The analysis examines the soundness of the design, whether or not the major hazards have been eliminated or reduced, and how the reduction would be accomplished. The quantitative methodology establishes the approximate impact of hazards on injury levels. The results are weighted by peculiar geological elements, specialized safety training, peculiar mine environmental aspects, and reductions in labor force. The outcome is compared with injury level requirements based on similar, safer industries to get a measure of the new system's success in reducing injuries. This approach provides a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of hazards and their effects than existing safety analyses.

Zimmerman, W. F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microgreens Food Safety Evaluation

Microgreens have been recently identified as a new type of pick and eat salad crop that can be utilized in space crop production systems. The majority of traditionally grown leafy green crops can be grown as microgreens, in addition to crops such as legumes (e.g. pea shoots), sunflower, buckwheat, most herbs, and corn, presenting hundreds of microgreen crop options. With a wide variety of flavors, exceptional nutritional density, short growth cycles (7-14 days), and unmatched volume optimization potential, microgreens present as an interesting option for sustainable production of nutritious and flavorful crops in space. The food safety aspects of microgreens have been investigated by USDA in recent years, however, an assessment for crew consumption purposes has not yet been conducted to capture the variety of microgreen cultivar types grown in spaceflight relevant environmental conditions and hardware that could be a part of the astronaut diet. Seed sanitation methods will be developed for each microgreen cultivar to sanitize the seed coat and ensure viable germination and plant growth. Food safety analysis will be performed on 24 different fast-growing cultivars of microgreens by performing aerobic plate counts (APC), fungal counts, and select pathogen screening of edible plant tissue before and after treatment with ProSan sanitizing produce wash. Additional avenues of investigation into microgreens food safety will be undertaken to understand impacts of plant height at time of harvest (able to be manipulated by light spectrum), seed density at time of planting, and role of blue light in food safety metrics of microgreens (n=6-12 microgreen cultivars tested, depending on variable). These findings will be included in the Space Crop Production Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan. This new work is currently postponed due to Covid-19.

M E Hummerick↗
NASA NTRS1991

Mission safety evaluation report for STS-48, postflight edition

Space Shuttle Discovery was launched into a 57 deg inclination orbit from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Complex 39A at 7:11 p.m. EDT on 12 Sep. 1991. STS-48 was the second mission since return-to-flight to have KSC as the planned end-of-mission landing site, and the first mission to have a planned night landing at KSC. However, due to weather conditions at KSC, Discovery flew one extra orbit and landed at Edwards AFB, Calif. at 3:38 a.m. EDT on 18 Sep. 1991. Operation of all systems was generally satisfactory during the 5 day mission. On flight day 3, the Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS) was deployed from Discovery's payload bay 350 statute miles above Earth. This orbiting observatory will study mankind's effects on the planet's atmosphere and its shielding ozone layer. STS-48 safety risk factors are addressed that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that are unique to this flight.

Clatterbuck, Guy E.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Evaluation of Nitric Acid Reactions with Non-Polysaccharide Organic Materials

The hazards of non-polysaccharide materials in a transuranic (TRU) waste drum exposed to nitric acid (HNO 3 ) and metal nitrate salts have been evaluated, focusing on sorbents and on resins used in ion-exchange chromatography. The range of sorbent materials can be grouped into two general categories: 1) a variety of polyacrylate and polyacrylamide compounds that incorporate polar carbonyl functional groups designed to sorb protic (i.e., acidic) substrates and solutions; 2) hydrocarbon based polymers that include polystyrene, polybutadiene, and polyethylene derivatives, which are designed to sorb non-polar organic substrates and solutions. The ion-exchange resins are constructed of hydrocarbon based polymeric networks equipped with pendant ionizable functional groups designed to reversibly sorb/desorb ionic species that are targeted for separation from a mobile phase.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗