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Determine what a criticality safety evaluation is. Define the components to a criticality safety evaluation. Define what is needed and how to create a criticality safety evaluation.
The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.
Learning Objectives: Know that there are multiple sets of factors affecting nuclear criticality safety; Know how the neutron physics relates to physical factors; Know the basic requirements for performing a safety evaluation; Know the basic process for performing a safety evaluation.
Federal safety standards for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines and liquid natural gas facilities incorporate rules and requirements for boiler and pressure vessel design and fabrication into 49 CFR Parts 192, 193, and 195 through the IBR process. The equivalent safety evaluations documented in this report demonstrate that boilers and pressure vessels in pipeline facilities that are designed and fabricated in accordance with rules and requirements specified in the 2021 edition do not violate the fundamental safety assumptions stated or implied in the 2007 edition of the ASME BPVC and therefore provide equivalent safety.
The presentation describes the necessary elements of developing a common approach to molten salt reactor (MSR) safety adequacy evaluation. Developing a common approach to establishing adequate safety for MSRs could substantially decrease the developer risks. However, safety adequacy is intimately associated with reactor licensing which is an element with national sovereignty. No reactor class has a common, portable international license. The advantageous performance characteristics of MSRs can be leveraged to decrease the cost and time necessary to develop reasonable confidence of adequate safety. Adequate safety can be demonstrated though either accident prevention or mitigation. MSR have characteristics that may make accident mitigation a preferable safety adequacy evaluation approach. Adequate quality as well as a thorough understanding of accident progression validated through separate and integral effects testing remains central to any safety adequacy demonstration method.
Fusion energy holds the promise of being a transformative technology as a carbon-neutral, sustainable source of energy. Whole device modeling and the development of fusion digital twins will be increasingly important for emerging fusion device concepts at both national laboratories and within the commercial fusion industry. However, meeting the challenge of whole device modeling of fusion energy devices requires robust, multiphysics, multiscale modeling and simulation technologies capable of running on large-scale supercomputers. Detailed analysis of individual systems at-scale is also required to ensure safe and efficient operation as well as provide the safety basis for future device designs and licensing activities. In a tokamak, toroidal and poloidal magnets confine and shape the fusion plasma to promote the fusion reaction. High plasma temperatures and high magnetic field requirements in modern design concepts (leading to high amounts of energy stored within each magnet) impose electrical, thermal, and mechanical loads on the magnet components, which in turn impacts the safety considerations of the magnet and their supporting systems. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a history of working in this space, including development and benchmarking of the Magnetic System Circuitry Analysis Program (MSCAP) and Magnet Arcing (MAGARC) codes to study magnet quench events; notably, MAGARC was used to study quenching during the ITER Engineering Design Activity. However, these legacy codes and capabilities are not parallel and scalable, and new tools are required for future advances in this area, which leads to the INL-developed Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE) framework. Developed originally for fission reactor systems under United States Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy modeling and simulation programs, the MOOSE framework has been well-suited to multiscale, multiphysics modeling and simulation needs for nuclear systems. The framework is open-source, well-tested, under continuous development and deployment, and developed to a Nuclear Quality Assurance, Level 1 software quality standard. MOOSE has also been used in the fusion space previously in several projects: INL’s Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8) for tritium migration, UK Atomic Energy Authority’s A Unified Resource for OpenMC (fusion) Reactor Applications (AURORA) code for fusion thermo-mechanical and neutronics analysis, and Argonne National Laboratory’s Cardinal for high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics and neutronics. However, to model superconducting magnets, several MOOSE enhancements are required: additions to the current MOOSE electromagnetic capabilities, new material libraries for superconductors of interest (such as YBCO), as well as fusion-specific models for thermo-mechanics. This talk will discuss initial development activities to build these capabilities in MOOSE, focusing on initial validation and benchmarking activities. Proposed coupling workflows and future work to support the simulation of fusion magnets and magnet structural assemblies for performance and safety evaluation in MOOSE will also be discussed.
Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) can potentially improve the performance of the transportation system by reducing human errors. This paper investigates the safety impact of CAVs in a mixed traffic with conventional vehicles at intersections. Analyzing real-world AV crashes in California revealed that rear-end crashes at intersections are the dominant crash type. Therefore, to enhance our understanding of the future interactions between human-driven vehicles with CAVs at intersections, a simulation framework was developed to model the mixed traffic environment of Automated Vehicles (AV), cooperative AVs, and conventional human-driven vehicles. In order to model AVs driving behavior, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and cooperative ACC (CACC) models are utilized. Particularly, this study explores system improvements due to automation and connectivity across varying CAV market penetration scenarios. ACC and CACC car following models are used to mimic the behavior of AVs and cooperative AVs. Real-world connected vehicle data are utilized to modify and tune the acceleration/deceleration regimes of the Wiedemann model. Next, the driving volatility concept capturing variability in vehicle speeds was utilized to calibrate the simulation to represent the safety performance of a real-world environment. Two surrogate safety measures are used to evaluate the safety performance of a representative intersection under different market penetration rate of CAVs: the number of longitudinal conflicts and driving volatility. At low levels of ACC market penetration, the safety improvements were found to be marginal, but safety improved substantially with more than 40% ACC penetration. Additional safety improvements can be achieved more quickly through the addition of cooperation and connectivity through CACC. Furthermore, ACC/CACC vehicles were found to improve mobility performance in terms of average speed and travel time at intersections.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 31 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 40 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to the Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 41 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 28 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 34 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
As part of the effort to review the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report and to understand the risk of plutonium release from the Ulysses spacecraft General Purpose Heat Source-Radioisotope Thermal Generator, the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) performed an integrated, quantitative analysis of the uncertainties of the calculated risk of plutonium release from Ulysses. Using state-of-art probabilistic risk assessment technology, the uncertainty analysis accounted for both variability and uncertainty of the key parameters of the risk analysis. The results show that INSRP had high confidence that risk of fatal cancers from potential plutonium release associated with calculated launch and deployment accident scenarios is low.
Space Transportation System 33 (STS-33) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and the factors that are not unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
This report documents rationale to develop analytical tools and data applicable to the safety and design of advanced molten salt power reactors. This report represents early steps in the implementation of the tasks defined by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2018 in the following sections of A Safety and Licensing Roadmap to identify the Research and Development Gaps of Commercial Molten Salt Reactors
This presentation includes an overview of the program and Background of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1. Additionally, discussed is the Fissile Material Holdup and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS).
This document satisfies ATM-X UAM Task UID 989 “Evaluation Report on Tactical Separation Provision Services with Advisory Detect and Avoid Safety Metrics”. The first version of this document was delivered to the UAM team on October 3, 2022, for initial revision and comments.This current version incorporates all the comments received and is being delivered to the UAM subproject for a final revision before is submitted to satisfy the L1 milestone deliverable.