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Flaw Tolerance in Lap Shear Brazed Joints

Vacuum brazing is a viable process to achieve strong permanent and hermetic joints in space. As in any joining process, brazed Joints have various imperfections and defects. It is important to understand the impact that flaws have on the load carrying capacity and performance of the brazed joints. This study focuses on the behavior of lap shear joints due to their engineering importance in brazed aerospace structures. In Part 1 an average shear strength capabilitY and failure modes of the single lap joints are explored. Specimens comprised of 0.090 inch thick 347 stainless steel sheet brazed with pure silver are tested in accordance with the AWS C3.2 standard. Comparison of the measured loads and average shear stresses at failure with the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) of the same specimens as a function of the overlap lengths shows excellent correlation between the experimental and calculated values for the defect-free lap joints. In Part 2, various flaws will be introduced in the test specimens to simulate lack of braze coverage in the lap joints. Mechanical testing and FEA will be performed on these joints to verify if behavior of ductile ]appoints containing flaws is similar to the joints with the reduced braze area. Finally, in Part 3, the results obtained in Part 1 and 2 will be applied to the brazed assembly to evaluate a load carrying capability of the structural lap joint containing defects.

Flom, Yury↗

Flight 20 (STS-45) polysulfide gas path investigation

This report documents the results of the investigation into causes of gas paths on the 20A and 20B case-to-nozzle joints on STS-42. The investigation was conducted by the Investigation Board appointed by the senior vice president and general manager of Space Operations, Mr. R. E. Lindstrom, on 7 Feb. 1992. The probability of gas path occurrence in the nozzle-to-case-joint polysulfide had been identified during joint redesign. However, actual flight gas path incidence has been limited to RSRM-11 and the 20A and 20B segments. The blow-by condition on the 20A segment was a first time occurrence which was a special concern. The investigation covered all technical aspects associated with the gas path and blow-by conditions: materials and processing history, design requirements and as-built compliance to the design, thermal and structural analyses, computer modeling, and laboratory experimentation with the materials involved. The investigation was coordinated with Mr. Ken Jones at NASA Marshall in bi-weekly teleconferences. The Board also supported Dr. James C. Blair's independent NASA investigation team by providing copies of collected data, conducting requested analyses, and supporting several all-day teleconferences to provide understanding and resolve issues. The Dr. Blair support requirement was successfully concluded on 4 Mar. 1992.

Bjorkman, Rey C.↗

Strategy of the Joint Center for Energy Storage Research to Influence Laboratory Safety Among its Funded Researchers

In 2011, a team at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) was preparing a proposal for a Department of Energy (DOE)-funded project that called for the creation of an “Energy Innovation Hub.” The proposal team, well engrained in Argonne's and DOE's safety culture, was also aware of the high profile university laboratory accidents from 2009 and 2010 and many other high profile research laboratory safety incidents. They knew they wanted to influence safety by setting an expectation of safe science across the Hub they proposed. In 2012, the DOE awarded Argonne the contract to create the Hub, now known as the Joint Center for Energy Research (JCESR). JCESR promptly hired and appointed a Safety Lead charged with fulfilling JCESR's vision of influencing safety across their newly created Hub. This article discusses JCESR's implementation of a strategy to influence laboratory safety among its funded researchers.

Influencing Safety↗

Operation Dominic

A very tall (6’5”) Austin McGuire endured duty aboard the cramped confines of a submarine during World War II. After receiving a doctorate in physics from the University Rochester, he came to Los Alamos in 1954, later participating in the Koa shot of Operation Hardtack I. In 1962, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Los Alamos task unit of Joint Task Force 8 (8.1.1) and sent to Christmas Island for Operation Dominic.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Evaluating the Pharmacodynamics and Protective Efficacy of Catalytic Bioscavenger following Subcutaneous Administration in Guinea Pigs

Previous studies determined the guinea pig was a viableanimal model for evaluating subcutaneous ( s.c. )injection as an alternative route of administration of catalytic Bioscavengers:enzymes designed to render nerve agents non‐toxic in systemic circulation following exposure. Recent studies have focused on evaluating the pharmacodynamics (PD) and protective efficacy (PE) of the lead bioscavenger candidate, organophosphorus hydrolase (OPH) variant, YT, as both unmodified and modified (PEGylated) versions of the enzyme. A comparative study was conducted with YT and three progressively sized PEG‐YT variants (934, 935, and 936) following a single bolus s.c. dose (5 mg/kg). Bioavailability increased linearly with molecular size such that the largest sized PEG‐YT variant, 936, afforded the highest bioavailability, thus promoting 936 to subsequent PD and PEstudies. Dose dependence on bioavailability was also examined via three cohorts of guinea pigs receiving doses (5, 15, 20 mg/kg) of either YT or 936 in which a linear dose response was also found. Guinea pigs receiving either YT or 936 (5 mg/kg) via intramuscular (i.m. )or s.c. routes had superimposable PD profiles regardless of route, suggesting an identical absorption pathway for the drugs. Protective efficacy was also evaluated by exposing the animals to 2xLD 50 of sarin (GB) 7 dayspost‐enzyme administration; only the animals receiving 936 ( i.m. and s.c. ) survived 24 hours post‐exposure. Periodic s.c. dosing strategies were also evaluated with 936 in which three injections were administered either 2 or 24 hours apart for a total dose of 15 mg/kg followed by a protective efficacy assessment 8 days post‐administration. Overall these data support the use of s.c . injection as a practical route of administration for catalytic bioscavenger with PE Gylation, synergistically enhancing both bioavailability and extending drug half‐life in circulation. Support or Funding Information The views expressed in this abstract are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The experimental protocol was approved by the Animal Care and Use Committee at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of ChemicalDefense and all procedures were conducted in accordance with the principlesstated in the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals and the AnimalWelfare Act of 1966 (P.L. 89–544), as amended. This work was supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency‐Joint Science and Technology Office, MedicalS&T Division. *Thisresearch was supported in part by an appointment to the Postgraduate ResearchParticipation Program at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of ChemicalDefense administered by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Educationthrough an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and USAMRMC. This abstract is from the Experimental Biology 2018 Meeting. There is no full text article associated with this abstract published in The FASEB Journal .

Dao, Thuy↗

Quantitative Method Development and Validation of Naloxone and 6α‐naloxol from Male African Green Monkey Plasma.

Theopioid epidemic is a rapidly growing crisis around the world. Current models forpharmacokinetic assessment of countermeasures use African green monkeys (AGM). Arapid, sensitive and selective method was developed and validated usingLC‐MS/MS for the determination of naloxone and 6α‐naloxol in AGM plasma. Samplepreparation involved a simple solid phase extraction (SPE) using ahydrophilic‐lipophilic‐balanced reversed‐phase cartridge. Separation of naloxoneand 6α‐naloxol was achieved on a Halo C18, 2.1 × 50 mm, 2.7μ analytical columnusing an Agilent 1290 Infinity HPLC. A solvent system of methanol‐water‐formicacid was used for the elution of analytes. The analytes were detected and monitoredby a SCIEX QTRAP 6500 + triple quadrupole tandem mass spectrometer operatedin electrospray ionization (ESI) positive mode and multiple reaction monitoring(MRM). Molecular ion transitions for naloxone, 6α‐naloxol and naloxone‐D5 were 328.0/212.0,330.0/185.0, and 333.1/212.0 m/z, respectively. The method was validated usingcalibration and recovery assays with spiked samples. Linear calibration curveswere generated over the range of 1.5–100 ng/ml with values for the coefficientof determination (R 2 ) of >0.9950. The values for both inter‐dayand intra‐day precision and accuracy were well within the generally acceptedcriteria for analytical methods (≤15%). This method was subsequentlyused to measure plasma concentrations of naloxone and 6α‐naloxol in male AGMs administerednaloxone subcutaneously and intravenously. The developed method demonstratedexcellent recovery, repeatability, accuracy and sensitivity. Support or Funding Information DISCLAIMERS. The views expressed in this abstractare those of the authors (s) and do not reflect the official policy of theDepartment of Army, Department of Defense, or U. S. Government. This researchwas supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – Joint Science andTechnology office, Medical S&T Division. Thisproject was supported in part by an appointment to the Research ParticipationProgram for the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command administratedby the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education through an agreementbetween the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. This abstract is from the Experimental Biology 2018 Meeting. There is no full text article associated with this abstract published in The FASEB Journal .

Bandaru, Veera Venkata Ratnam↗

Ulysses - An ESA/NASA cooperative programme

Cooperation between ESA and NASA is discussed, noting that the Memorandum of Understanding lays the framework for this relationship, defining the responsibilities of ESA and NASA and providing for appointment of leadership and managers for the project. Members of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and ESA's ESTEC staff have been appointed to leadership positions within the project and ultimate control of the project rests with the Joint Working Group consisting of two project managers and two project scientists, equally representing both organizations. Coordination of time scales and overall mission design is discussed, including launch cooperation, public relations, and funding of scientific investigations such as Ulysses. Practical difficulties of managing an international project are discussed such as differing documentation requirements and communication techniques, and assurance of equality on projects.

Meeks, W.↗

Organophosphate Hydrolase (OPH) Designed as a Functional Monomer

Organophosphate hydrolase (OPH) mutants haveshown potential use as a medical countermeasure against a range of differentorganophosphorus compounds (OPs). OPH is typicallyexpressed in bacteria as a homodimer. Two separate monomers (~37kDa each) self‐assemble throughnon‐covalent bonding at the enzyme face close to the putative active site, andenzyme activity is dependent upon dimer formation. OPH homodimers do notsecrete expediently from mammalian cells and are often misfolded. This causespotential problems when trying to express the protein from a heterologous plasmidor viral delivery system. To enhance secretion of OPH from mammalian cells, wesought to increase protein solubility without catastrophic detriment toactivity and without addition of fusion proteins. To this end, we designed OPH tobe expressed as a functional monomer by joining two OPH subunits with a poly‐glycinelinker and expressing it as a single polypeptide in bacteria to evaluateactivity. We created the single polypeptide OPH with a tether 10 or 35 aminoacids in length between the two halves, and named them T10 and T35, respectively. Western blot analysis and paraoxon hydrolysis assays revealedthat T10 was being produced and there was a 71% loss in specific activity comparedto an untethered homodimer positive control. This was a surprise as we expectedT10 to have no enzymatic activity since the tether was too short to allowproper dimer formation. The T35 functional monomer (~76 kDa) was produced showing 29% loss of specific activity. Both T10 and T35 OPH showed high molecular weight aggregate formation greater than 250 kDa in dynamic light scattering and native polyacrylamide gels. Construction of a functional OPH monomer with activity against OPs is instrumental in designing secretable OPHs for adeno‐associatedviral expression. It may also prove useful in the development of chimeric OPHs for maintaining control over the composition of each OPH half, allowing blended activities against a combination of organophosphorus substrates. This is the first attempt known for producing OPH as a functional monomer. Support or Funding Information The views expressed in this abstract are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This research was supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – Joint Science and Technology Office, Medical S&T Division. This research was supported in part by an appointment to the Postgraduate Research Participation Program at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense administered by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education through an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and USAMRMC. This abstract is from the Experimental Biology 2018 Meeting. There is no full text article associated with this abstract published in The FASEB Journal .

Baker, Cetara↗

NTS MC&A History

Within the past three years, the Nevada Test Site (NTS) has progressed from a Category IV to a Category I facility. In accordance with direction from the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator, NTS received shipments of large quantities of special nuclear material from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and other sites in the DOE complex. September 2004 was the first occurrence of Category I material at the NTS, with the exception of two weeks of underground testing in 2001, since 1992. The Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program was originally a joint-lab effort by LANL, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Bechtel Nevada (BN), but in March 2006 the NNSA Nevada Site Office appointed the NTS Management and Operations contractor with sole responsibility. This paper will discuss the process and steps taken to transition the NTS MC&A program from multiple disciplines to a single entity and from a Category IV to a Category I program. This transition flourished as MC&A progressed from the 2004 Office of Assessment (OA) rating of “Significant Weakness” to the 2007 OA assessment rating of “Effective Performance.” The paper will provide timelines, funding and staffing issues, OA assessment findings and corrective actions, and future expectations. The process has been challenging, and MC&A’s innovative responses to the challenges have been very successful.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

After Action Report - CUP-2 Comparative Sample Analysis Meeting - Kazakhstan September 2016

Representatives from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) visited the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) to discuss the results and conclusions of a joint sample analysis (CUP-2 uranium ore concentrate) between LLNL, INP and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) (Fig. 1). The U.S. delegation also met with the newly-appointed Director-General of the INP (S. Sakhiyev) who expressed his continued support for this collaboration. On the last day of the visit, the delegation toured the new medical isotope production facilities (which is expected to begin operation in a few months), as well as INP’s Nuclear Security Training Center (co-funded by DOE, the Defense Threat Reduction Initiative (DTRA) and the Kazakhstan government). Construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center is expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

A Core Program in JIAFS

This paper presents appendices listing and summarizing funding of, and participants in the project, for a final report on A Core Program in JIAFS (Joint Institute for Advancement of Flight Sciences). The objectives of the program were to conduct high-risk innovative research, administer and direct the on-going programs, and appoint additional Graduate Research Scholar Assistants depending on availability of applicants and funds.

Whitesides, John L.↗

Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Optimization of an in Vitro CYP450 Induction Assay Using Cryopreserved Cell Lines

Cytochrome P450 (CYP450) enzymes are responsible for the majority for Phase I metabolism. Induction occurs when a drug increases the rate of CYP450 enzyme production. As a result, the rates of metabolism of subsequent drugs increase, posing concerns for dosing and safety. To further expand the USAMRICD Absorption, Distribution, Metabolism, Excretion, and Toxicity Center of Excellence (ADMET CoE) profiling capabilities, a CYP450 induction assay is being developed using alternative cell lines to primary human hepatocytes to measure changes in gene expression of CYP1A2 and CYP3A4 isoenzymes. Primary human hepatocytes are the gold standard for evaluating P450 induction in vitro ; however, they have inherent limitations such as high costs, fastidious nature, and significant lot‐to‐lot variability. Induction assessments using cryopreserved hepatocytes and two immortalized cell lines, HepaRG and HepatoCells, are being conducted to determine a more robust, cost‐effective alternative model. Each cell line was exposed to the standard inducers rifampicin and omeprazole to assess CYP3A4 and CYP1A2 activity, respectively. Following a 72‐hour incubation period, RNA from the cell cultures was extracted and purified. Fold changes of gene expression were measured using real‐time quantitative PCR (RT‐qPCR). Hepatocytes displayed an average fold change of 92.7 for CYP3A4 and 49.6 for CYP1A2, whereas HepaRG displayed changes of 28.6 and 179.5, respectively. Average values for CYP3A4 and CYP1A2 for HepatoCells were 58.7 and 43.9. Based on the data, HepatoCells most closely mimicked cryopreserved hepatocytes in comparison to HepaRG cells. Additional data on assay parameters and technique optimization will be presented. Support or Funding Information Opinion disclaimer: The views expressed in this abstract are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This project was generously supported in part by an appointment to the Postgraduate Research Participation Program at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense administered by the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education through an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. Support is also provided by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency – Joint Science and Technology Office, Medical S&T Division. This abstract is from the Experimental Biology 2019 Meeting. There is no full text article associated with this abstract published in The FASEB Journal .

Lim, Tae Young↗

Core Program in the Joint Institute for Advancement of Flight Sciences

Following the precedent started several years ago, each of the graduating MS and DSc candidates in JIAFS present a seminar which is advertised throughout the area. Following the formal seminar the attendees are excused and the review committee examines the student as in a standard thesis defense. This allows the students to gain experience in presenting their research and disseminating the Institute's research results to a wider audience. A list of seminars are given in Appendix B. Some 172 excellent applications for the Graduate Research Scholar Assistantships were received during this period. Forty-nine new GRSA were appointed by Professor Whitesides to JTAFS under the various research grants and contracts.

Source record↗

Evolution of Trajectory Design Requirement of NASA's Planned Europa Clipper Mission

Europa is one of the most scientifically intriguing targets in planetary science due to its potential suitability for extant life. As such, NASA has funded the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to jointly develop the planned Europa Clipper mission—a multiple Europa flyby mission architecture aimed to thoroughly investigate the habitability of Europa and provide reconnaissance data to determine a landing site that maximizes the probability of both a safe landing and high scientific value for a potential future Europa lander. The trajectory design—a major enabling component for this Europa Clipper mission concept—was developed to maximize science from a set of eight model payload instruments determined by a NASA-appointed Europa Science Definition Team (SDT) between 2011-2015. On May 26, 2015, NASA officially selected 10 instruments from 6 different U.S. research facilities and universities. With the selection of instruments have come the development of new science measurement requirements, as well as a rich set of requirements stemming from project policies, planetary protection, and the evolved capability and characteristics of the flight system and mission operations system. This paper will focus on the evolution of requirements levied on the trajectory design, discuss strategies and solutions to the multidimensional optimization problem of designing high fidelity end-to-end trajectories that maximize Europa science while mitigating mission risk, complexity and cost, and last, verification of candidate trajectories to meet the requirements on the trajectory design.

Buffington, Brent↗

Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack

This document provides general guidelines for airport managers, local officials, and other stakeholders for developing a response and recovery plan for a major airport following the release of a biological warfare agent, with specific guidance for remediation. San Francisco International Airport was selected as the example airport during development of the guidance to illustrate specific details. The spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis was selected as the biological agent of primary concern because it is the most difficult of known bioterrorism agents to inactivate and is considered to be one of the agents most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The focus of the guidance is on cleanup and disposal activities associated with the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance Phases that are defined herein. Activities associated with the Notification and First-Response Phases are brieÀy discussed in Appendixes A and B, respectively. In addition to the main text of this Remediation Guidance document and associated appendixes, a data supplement was developed specifically for San Francisco International Airport. Requests for the data supplement must be made directly to the Emergency Planning Operations Division of San Francisco International Airport. This document does not describe public health responses to release of a biological warfare agent. If laboratory analytical results confirm the presence of a biological agent, the responsible public health agency involved in the response will commence appropriate public health actions, such as treatment (CDC 2004) and decontamination of potentially contaminated individuals, distribution of prophylaxis, and medical examinations. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention web site for more information on emergency public health responses (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/). Effective communication with the media and the public is an essential component of airport remediation and recovery. Whereas such communication is beyond the scope of this document, many helpful resources are available. (See Section 1.1 for more information.) The concept of operations described in this document for cleanup of a Bacillus anthracis release at a major airport conforms to the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2008) and implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS 2004). In most cases, a Unified Command would be formed to direct the cleanup process jointly and to take ultimate responsibility for all cleanup decisions. The Unified Command would likely include the Airport Manager or Airport Emergency Operations Manager, representatives from state and local public health and emergency management agencies, and Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Unified Command and Incident Command Staff would ideally be co-located in an Incident Command Post in an uncontaminated area of the airport. If a release is large or complex, co-location of all key players may not be possible. If a major incident is declared, a Principal Federal Official may be appointed by the Department of Homeland Security to facilitate Federal support to the Unified Command. In some facilities and jurisdictions, additional response plans or procedures (such as BioWatch or other emergency response plans, procedures, or protocols) may govern notification and first response. Facility personnel, responders, and emergency management coordinators should be aware of all applicable plans and procedures and how to implement them. Cleanups following the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the U.S. pre-dated the NRF and NIMS and did not make use of a NIMS Incident Command System as we know it today. Most Incident Commanders for the larger of those cleanups chose to convene a Technical Working Group (TWG) of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, outside experts to advise in developing sampling and decontamination plans. Most of the Incident Commanders also convened a separate Environmental Clearance Committee (ECC) to independently review pre- and post decontamination sampling data as well as data on decontamination parameters, to evaluate whether the decontamination was effective, and to add credibility regarding a decision that decontaminated areas may be reoccupied. Use of such specialized technical expertise is strongly recommended, although it would now operate within the construct of the NIMS Incident Command System. The TWG, if convened, would act in an advisory capacity to the Environmental Unit within the Planning Section. Likewise, the ECC, if convened, would provide independent peer review of products and recommendations by the Environmental Unit. For maximum impartiality, the ECC could also provide recommendations directly to the Unified Command. Cleanup activities commence with site characterization. The principal goal of characterization is to define the extent of contamination and to gather information needed to design the decontamination approach. Initial sampling data collected by first responders are assessed to approximate the location(s) of contamination. Confirmation of the agent type and viability is obtained from a Laboratory Response Network laboratory. Additional characterization data are collected to determine the extent of contamination and where decontamination actions are needed. Areas suspected of being contaminated are contained and isolated to the degree possible to prevent further movement of an agent to uncontaminated areas or the environment, and to reduce the potential for future exposure from the agent or fumigant, if fumigation is needed. Agent air monitoring in areas adjacent to the contained contamination zones is done to ensure the protection of remediation personnel and to monitor any release from the contained zones. Various sampling approaches are considered. For example, wipe samples can be used to sample hard, nonporous surfaces. Swab samples can be used to sample nooks, crannies, joints, and seams. Appendix I is a template for preparing an incident-specific, operational characterization plan. Upon completion of the characterization plan, an internal review is initiated. Upon approval of the plan by the Unified Command, characterization commences. The Site Safety Officer develops a Health and Safety Plan to ensure that coordinated health and safety measures are in place for all responding personnel. This plan describes physical, chemical, and biological hazards at the site, personal protective equipment, personal decontamination procedures, and emergency procedures to be used by sampling and remediation personnel. An incident-specific Remediation Action Plan is developed, which describes the decontamination methods to be used and other details, including waste disposal. Under NIMS, this overall plan, as well as other plans described below, are implemented through a series of standardized, shorter-term Incident Action Plans, which describe specific activities that will take place during a shift or a day. The template in Appendix J is designed to facilitate preparation of the Remediation Action Plan. If fumigation will be done, a Sampling and Analysis Plan will be needed, as well as an Ambient Air Monitoring Plan, which can be a component of the Remediation Action Plan. These three plans are needed to obtain a crisis exemption from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for authorized use of an unregistered sterilant or pesticide during cleanup. If pesticide products become registered for inactivation of B. anthracis in the future, the three plans will likely be required by the product’s labeling, but the plans would no longer be submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval; rather, the Incident Commander would approve them. If fumigation is used, an Emergency Response Plan is also recommended, although such a plan is not required for a crisis exemption. For some nonpersistent biological warfare agents, natural attenuation may be an adequate decontamination option. In cases where contamination is not extensive or an agent is not persistent, application of surface decontaminants or other methods of medical infection control may be effective. For extensive contamination by persistent agents, such as Bacillus anthracis, fumigation may be necessary. In those cases, the Decontamination Phase commences with source reduction, such as pre-cleaning surfaces to reduce the contaminant load. To expedite cleanup and prevent costs from escalating unnecessarily, a cost–benefit analysis should be incorporated in the decision process related to retention versus disposal of facility items and materials. Certain materials and structural components can be decontaminated for reuse, but it may not be feasible or cost-effective to decontaminate other items. Those items must be pre-treated, packaged (with the package decontaminated externally), and removed for disposal as waste. Site preparation includes sealing openings to prevent leaks and setting up equipment. Decontamination reagents and delivery systems are selected, and pre-testing all systems is done before carrying out chemical treatment(s). The important choice of decontamination technologies depends on characteristics of the agent, the nature and extent of contamination, and other site parameters identified during characterization. Decontamination-related decisions can have a major impact on waste-disposal costs, and it is necessary to develop a disposal plan that identifies a means of disposal, necessary approvals, transportation, and other details. A clearance strategy is developed to ensure that after decontamination, the risk of exposure to residual contamination is negligible. A clearance sampling plan is developed, which sets clearance criteria, specifies how to determine whether the criteria have been met, and describes how and where to collect clearance samples after decontamination. In most cases, clearance sampling includes both surface and aggressive air samples. Appendix K is a clearance plan template that identifies the types of required information. To determine whether the decontaminated area may be reoccupied, the Environmental Unit (and the ECC separately, if one is convened) evaluates the results of clearance samples. For the anthrax incidents to date, and given methods that have been used, cleanup was considered successful only when there was no growth of B. anthracis cultured from any environmental samples taken after decontamination. Other factors that will be considered include the decontamination process parameters (e.g., temperature, relative humidity, decontaminant concentration, and contact time) and the results from post-decontamination culture of biological indicators that may have been used during fumigation or sterilization processes. From such an evaluation the Environmental Unit or ECC, or both, recommend whether the area may be reoccupied, or whether further decontamination is necessary. The UC makes the final decision that a facility is appropriately decontaminated for reoccupancy. The facility owner or responsible public health agency makes the final decision to reopen a decontaminated facility. A theme that is emphasized throughout this document is that many activities can greatly reduce the time required to restore airport operations if those activities are conducted prior to an actual release of biological warfare agent. A summary of specific resources (such as Federal, state, and local agency contacts; contractors; prospective team members; subject-matter experts; laboratory facilities; and other entities) that should be identified in advance by airport officials is provided in each pertinent section of this document, and summary contact lists of such resources are provided in Appendix L. A summary of overall pre-planning actions that should be completed by airport officials is presented at the end of this document.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Vehicle Assembly Building Fire Mishap Investigation Report. Volume I of V

On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter inspections. The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to this combination results in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be performed on the proposed roofing method to be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using common industry practices for repair and modification. The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 2. Wind speed and direction 3. Inadequate fire watch technique. Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was predicted for the next day 2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions A total of 17 significant observations were noted during this investigation, which could lead to another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factors in this mishap.

Kight, Ira↗

Clementine: An inexpensive mission to the Moon and Geographos

The Clementine Mission, a joint project of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and NASA, has been planned primarily to test and demonstrate a suite of lightweight sensors and other lightweight spacecraft components under extended exposure to the space environment. Although the primary objective of the mission is to space-qualify sensors for Department of Defense applications, it was recognized in 1990 that such a mission might also be designed to acquire scientific observations of the Moon and of Apollo asteroid (1620) Geographos. This possibility was explored jointly by SDIO and NASA, including representatives from NASA's Discovery Program Science Working Group, in early 1991. Besides the direct return of scientific information, one of the benefits envisioned from a joint venture was the development of lightweight components for possible future use in NASA's Discovery-class spacecraft. In Jan. 1992, SDIO informed NASA of its intent to fly a 'Deep Space Program Science Experiment,' now popularly called Clementine; NASA then formed an advisory science working group to assist in the early development of the mission. The Clementine spacecraft is being assembled at the Naval Research Laboratory, which is also in charge of the overall mission design and mission operations. Support for mission design is being provided by GSFC and by JPL. NASA's Deep Space Network will be utilized in tracking and communicating with the spacecraft. Following a recommendation of the COMPLEX committee of the Space Science Board, NASA will issue an NRA and appoint a formal science team in early 1993. Clementine is a 3-axis stabilized, 200 kg (dry weight) spacecraft that will be launched on a refurbished Titan-2G. One of the goals has been to build two spacecraft, including the sensors, for $100M. Total time elapsed from the decision to proceed to the launch will be two years.

Shoemaker, Eugene M.↗