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At least 37 records · Page 2

Apollo 16 Mission: Oxidizer Deservicing Tank Failure: Anomaly Report - No. 1

An explosive failure of a ground support equipment decontamination unit tank occurred during the postflight deactivation of the oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) portion of the Apollo 16 command module reaction control system. A discussion of the significant aspects of the incident and conclusions are included.

Source record↗

Gearbox Reliability Collaborative Gearbox 1 Failure Analysis Report: December 2010 - January 2011

Unintended gearbox failures have a significant impact on the cost of wind farm operations. In 2007, NREL initiated the Gearbox Reliability Collaborative (GRC). The project combines analysis, field testing, dynamometer testing, condition monitoring, and the development and population of a gearbox failure database in a multi-pronged approach to determine why wind turbine gearboxes do not achievetheir expected design life. The collaborative of manufacturers, owners, researchers, and consultants focuses on gearbox testing and modeling and the development of a gearbox failure database. Collaborative members also investigate gearbox condition monitoring techniques. Data gained from the GRC will enable designers, developers, and manufacturers to improve gearbox designs and testing standardsand create more robust modeling tools. GRC project essentials include the development of two identical, heavily instrumented representative gearbox designs. Knowledge gained from the field and dynamometer tests conducted on these gearboxes builds an understanding of how the selected loads and events translate into bearing and gear response. This report contains the analysis of the first gearboxdesign.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Reliability inputs to Mariner 9 data explosion

This paper describes the prelaunch and post-launch reliability functions which contributed to the success of the Mariner 9 spacecraft. Examples are included to illustrate how each reliability activity was a vital part of each phase of the project. Prelaunch reliability functions included: (1) establishing, negotiating, and monitoring system and subsystem requirements, (2) participating in spacecraft system and subsystem design/hardware reviews, (3) monitoring preparation of failure mode effects and criticality analyses (FMECA), (4) establishing and managing a problem failure reporting (PFR) system for the spacecraft and its support equipment, (5) monitoring electronic parts activities, and (6) participating in spacecraft reviews. Particular emphasis is placed on mission operations reliability assurance activities, which included: (1) spacecraft problem/failure reporting, (2) managing an integrating failure reporting system which covered all mission operations activities, (3) real-time analysis of spacecraft anomalies, and (4) risk assessment.

Macgregor, D. S.↗

Actuation and system design and evaluation OMS engine shutoff valve, Volume 1

A technology program was conducted to identify and verify the optimum valve and actuation system concept for the Space Shuttle Orbit Maneuvering System engine. Of major importance to the valve and actuation system selection was the ten-year, 100-mission, 10,000-cycle life requirement, while maintaining high reliability, low leakage, and low weight. Valve and actuation system concepts were comparatively evaluated against past valve failure reports and potential failure modes due to the shuttle mission profile to aid in the selection of the most optimum concept for design, manufacture and verification testing. Two valve concepts were considered during the preliminary design stage; i.e., the moving seat and lifting ball. Two actuation systems were manufactured and tested. Test results demonstrate the viability of a lifting ball concept as well as the applicability of an ac motor actuation system to best meet the requirements of the shuttle mission.

Dunn, V. B.↗

Facility to Alleviate Salt Technology Risks (FASTR): Preliminary Design Report with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

The Facility to Alleviate Salt Technology Risks (FASTR) is a versatile, high-temperature (>600°C) molten chloride salt test facility designed to enable a variety of testing to advance the Generation 3 (Gen 3) Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) molten salt technology. FASTR includes a salt preparation system and a forced flow test loop with a suite of instrumentation. The FASTR loop is capable of 725°C operation, flow rates of 3–7 kg/s, includes heated and cooled sections, and swappable components to enable testing of future vendor-supplied hardware. The salt preparation system supplies large batches (e.g., 200 kg) of clean salt for use in the FASTR forced convection loop. This report summarizes the planned design and capabilities of FASTR. In addition, a failure modes and effects analysis of the system is reported.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Genesis Failure Investigation Report

The-Genesis mission to collect solar-wind samples and return them to Earth for detailed analysis proceeded successfully for 3.5 years. During reentry on September 8, 2004, a failure in the entry, descent and landing sequence resulted in a crash landing of the Genesis sample return capsule. This document describes the findings of the avionics sub-team that supported the accident investigation of the JPL Failure Review Board.

Klein, John↗

RF Ablation of Giant Hemangiomas Inducing Acute Renal Failure: A Report of Two Cases

ObjectiveIn patients that require treatment for hepatic giant cavernous hemangiomas (GCH), radiofrequency ablation (RFA) has been suggested to represent a safe and effective alternative to invasive surgery. In a recent report of bipolar RFA, using two expandable needle electrodes, was uneventfully performed in patients with large GCH (>10 cm). The objective of this report is to present two cases in which bipolar RFA of symptomatic GCH was complicated by acute kidney injury.Materials and methodsIn 2015 we treated two patients for very large symptomatic GCH (15.7 and 25.0 cm) with bipolar RFA during open laparotomy.ResultsIn both patients the urine showed a red–brown discoloration directly after the ablation. They became anuric and presented with progressive dyspnea, tachypnea, and tachycardia, requiring hemodialysis for a period of 1 month in one case. Lab results revealed hemepigment-induced acute kidney. Both patients fully recovered and both showed a complete relief of symptoms at 3 months following the procedure.ConclusionRFA for large GCHs can cause hemepigment-induced acute kidney injury due to massive intravascular hemolysis. The presented cases suggest that caution is warranted and advocate an upper limit regarding the volume of GCHs that can be safely ablated.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Genesis failure investigation report

On January 7, 2001, the Genesis spacecraft lifted off from Cape Canaveral. Its mission was to collect solar wind samples and return those samples to Earth for detailed analysis by scientists. The mission proceeded successfully for three-and-a-half years. On September 8, 2004, the spacecraft approached Earth, pointed the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) at its entry target, and then fired pyros that jettisoned the SRC. The SRC carried the valuable samples collected over the prior 29 months. The SRC also contained the requisite hardware (mechanisms, parachutes, and electronics) to manage the process of entry, descent, and landing (EDL). After entering Earth’s atmosphere, the SRC was expected to open a drogue parachute. This should have been followed by a pyro event to release the drogue chute, and then by a pyro event to deploy the main parachute at an approximate elevation of 6.7 kilometers. As the SRC descended to the Utah landing site, helicopters were in position to capture the SRC before the capsule touched down. On September 8, 2004, observers of the SRC’s triumphant return became concerned as the NASA announcer fell silent, and then became even more alarmed as they watched the spacecraft tumble as it streaked across the sky. Long-distance cameras clearly showed that the drogue parachute had not deployed properly.

UNKNOWN↗

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy and ubiquitous autonomy throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and concepts of operations for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, concepts of operations, and interface control documents, in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module(i.e. ECLSS).A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM)to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design –GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1)to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels;(2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1)Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM;(2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) standalone demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

Autonomous Systems↗

Risk-Reduction Autonomy Implementation to Enable NASA Artemis Missions

To achieve NASA’s Artemis program mission objectives a high level of autonomy that is ubiquitous throughout the systems that are being developed will be necessary. The autonomous systems of Artemis will require a distributed autonomy capability, with autonomous systems organized functionally in a hierarchical architecture, where systems at higher levels of the hierarchy have authority over systems at lower levels. The challenge of developing autonomy technologies and Concepts of Operations (ConOps) for Artemis has been undertaken by the NASA Gateway Working Group. This group has developed requirements, architectures, ConOps, and interface control documents (ICDs), in the context of a hierarchical distributed architecture that includes the following: a Vehicle System Manager (VSM) that autonomously manages the entire Gateway; Module System Managers (MSMs) that autonomously manage each module; and System Managers (SMs) that autonomously manage systems within a module (i.e. ECLSS). A substantially high level of autonomy needs to be achieved by each element of the hierarchy (VSM, MSM, SM) to meet requirements for uncrewed operations; this includes conditions that will have minimal and/or delayed ground intervention (i.e. requirements for sustainability for months of operation without crew or ground support). To advance an implementation of this autonomy design (Gateway Autonomy Design – GAD), a collaboration was established between the Autonomous Systems Laboratory (ASL) at NASA Stennis Space Center and Lockheed Martin. The objectives of this partnership were the following: (1) to implement autonomy at the VSM, MSM, and SM levels; (2) to implement communications among a VSM, 2 MSMs, ORION (a visiting vehicle somewhat equivalent to a module) and 1 SM (a power system), and (3) test autonomous operations with representative use cases. A SM backed by a high-fidelity simulation was created to facilitate demonstrations of use cases that originated in a system of a module. Communication between the VSM and MSMs was implemented according to Concepts of Operations and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). Demonstrations were conducted to address nominal and off-nominal operations and multi-module interactions with the VSM. Additionally, user interfaces were created to provide awareness about ongoing processes and results while enhancing the demonstration. Demonstrations included the following use cases: (1) Orion as visiting vehicle registers with VSM; (2) VSM reschedules a module’s timelines when another module’s MSM task fails; and (3) a module’s Power System Manager (PSM) demonstration that included component failure diagnostics, tracing component failure to effected components, which in turn, reports failure information up to the VSM for acknowledgement and display. This paper will describe the detailed technology and autonomous systems developed, and the integrated multi-module demonstrations conducted. Also, challenges that must be met to fully implement the GAD defined by Gateway will be addressed.

Fernando Figueroa↗

Characteristics of Space Shuttle Main Engine failures

During development and operation of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), 27 ground test failures of sufficient severity to be termed 'major incident' have occurred. Resourecs including NASA Failure Investigation Board reports, contractor failure reports, originally recorded data, along with engineering notes, data bases, and presentations connected with the failures were available for compilation into the engine failure review presented in this paper. Most SSME failures were a result of design deficiencies stemming from inadequate definition of dynamic loads. High cycle fatigue was the most frequent mechanism leading to failure. Eighteen of the 27 failures occurred during constant power level operation. Formal board reports were not available for all failures. Therefore, the failure history presented in this paper is not complete or of uniform quality.

Cikanek, Harry A., III↗