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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1979

Operational loopwheel suspension systems for Mars Rover demonstration model: Loopwheel failure report

The results are presented from the analysis of a failure which occurred in the fiberglass loop of one of the Loopwheel traction elements delivered to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for use on the JPL Mars Rover demonstration model. The loop failed in compression in the outer fibers forming a hinge which, through cycling, caused the inner fibers to break. The probable cause of this failure was the load being introduced as point loads at the center of the loop causing high compressive stresses and early buckling. To decrease the stress level and delay buckling, the tread lugs can be reshaped so that the entire lug contacts the ground when the loop is loaded. This can be accomplished through removal of lug material, starting with zero removal at the outer edge and linearly increasing to one-half of the lug thickness at the center.

West, E. J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1990

The Hubble Space Telescope optical systems failure report

The findings of the Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Board of Investigation are reported. The Board was formed to determine the cause of the flaw in the telescope, how it occurred, and why it was not detected before launch. The Board conducted its investigation to include interviews with personnel involved in the fabrication and test of the telescope, review of documentation, and analysis and test of the equipment used in the fabrication of the telescope's mirrors. The investigation proved that the primary mirror was made in the wrong shape (a 0.4-wave rms wavefront error at 632.8 nm). The primary mirror was manufactured by the Perkin-Elmer Corporation (Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc.). The critical optics used as a template in shaping the mirror, the reflective null corrector (RNC), consisted of two small mirrors and a lens. This unit had been preserved by the manufacturer exactly as it was during the manufacture of the mirror. When the Board measured the RNC, the lens was incorrectly spaced from the mirrors. Calculations of the effect of such displacement on the primary mirror show that the measured amount, 1.3 mm, accounts in detail for the amount and character of the observed image blurring. No verification of the reflective null corrector's dimensions was carried out by Perkin-Elmer after the original assembly. There were, however, clear indications of the problem from auxiliary optical tests made at the time. A special optical unit called an inverse null corrector, designed to mimic the reflection from a perfect primary mirror, was built and used to align the apparatus; when so used, it clearly showed the error in the reflective null corrector. A second null corrector was used to measure the vertex radius of the finished primary mirror. It, too, clearly showed the error in the primary mirror. Both indicators of error were discounted at the time as being themselves flawed. The Perkin-Elmer plan for fabricating the primary mirror placed complete reliance on the reflective null corrector as the only test to be used in both manufacturing and verifying the mirror's surface with the required precision. This methodology should have alerted NASA management to the fragility of the process and the possibility of gross error. Such errors had been seen in other telescope programs, yet no independent tests were planned, although some simple tests to protect against major error were considered and rejected. During the critical time period, there was great concern about cost and schedule, which further inhibited consideration of independent tests.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2004

Genesis failure investigation report : JPL Failure Review Board, Avionics Sub-Team

On January 7, 2001, the Genesis spacecraft lifted off from Cape Canaveral. Its mission was to collect solar wind samples and return those samples to Earth for detailed analysis by scientists. The mission proceeded successfully for three-and-a-half years. On September 8, 2004, the spacecraft approached Earth, pointed the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) at its entry target, and then fired pyros that jettisoned the SRC. The SRC carried the valuable samples collected over the prior 29 months. The SRC also contained the requisite hardware (mechanisms, parachutes, and electronics) to manage the process of entry, descent, and landing (EDL). After entering Earthas atmosphere, the SRC was expected to open a drogue parachute. This should have been followed by a pyro event to release the drogue chute, and then by a pyro event to deploy the main parachute at an approximate elevation of 6.7 kilometers. As the SRC descended to the Utah landing site, helicopters were in position to capture the SRC before the capsule touched down. On September 8, 2004, observers of the SRCas triumphant return became concerned as the NASA announcer fell silent, and then became even more alarmed as they watched the spacecraft tumble as it streaked across the sky. Long-distance cameras clearly showed that the drogue parachute had not deployed properly. On September 9, 2004, General Eugene Tattini, Deputy Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory formed a Failure Review Board (FRB). This board was charged with investigating the cause of the Genesis mishap in close concert with the NASA Mishap Investigation Board (MIB). The JPL-FRB was populated with experts from within and external to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The JPL-FRB participated with the NASA-MIB through all phases of the investigation, working jointly and concurrently as one team to discover the facts of the mishap.

solar wind↗
NASA NTRS1982

Thematic mapper flight model preshipment review data package. Volume 2, part A: Subsystem data

Performance and acceptance data are presented for the multiplexer, scan mirror, power supply, mainframe/top mechanical and the aft optics, assemblies. Other major subsystems evaluated include the relay optics, the electronic module, the radiative cooler, and the cable harness. Reference lists of nonconforming materials reports, failure reports, and requests for deviation/waiver are also given.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1982

Thematic mapper flight model preshipment review data package. Volume 2, part B: Subsystem data

Summarized performance data are presented for the following major subsystems of the thematic mapper: the focal plane assembly, the radiative cooler, the radiative cooler door assembly, the top optical assembly, and the telescope assembly. Reference lists of the configurations status and of nonconforming material reports, failure reports, and requests for deviation/waiver are included.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1993

The application of automated operations at the Institutional Processing Center

The JPL Institutional and Mission Computing Division, Communications, Computing and Network Services Section, with its mission contractor, OAO Corporation, have for some time been applying automation to the operation of JPL's Information Processing Center (IPC). Automation does not come in one easy to use package. Automation for a data processing center is made up of many different software and hardware products supported by trained personnel. The IPC automation effort formally began with console automation, and has since spiraled out to include production scheduling, data entry, report distribution, online reporting, failure reporting and resolution, documentation, library storage, and operator and user education, while requiring the interaction of multi-vendor and locally developed software. To begin the process, automation goals are determined. Then a team including operations personnel is formed to research and evaluate available options. By acquiring knowledge of current products and those in development, taking an active role in industry organizations, and learning of other data center's experiences, a forecast can be developed as to what direction technology is moving. With IPC management's approval, an implementation plan is developed and resources identified to test or implement new systems. As an example, IPC's new automated data entry system was researched by Data Entry, Production Control, and Advance Planning personnel. A proposal was then submitted to management for review. A determination to implement the new system was made and elements/personnel involved with the initial planning performed the implementation. The final steps of the implementation were educating data entry personnel in the areas effected and procedural changes necessary to the successful operation of the new system.

Barr, Thomas H.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Urine monitoring system failure analysis and operational verification test report

Failure analysis and testing of a prototype urine monitoring system (UMS) are reported. System performance was characterized by a regression formula developed from volume measurement test data. When the volume measurement test data. When the volume measurement data was imputted to the formula, the standard error of the estimate calculated using the regression formula was found to be within 1.524% of the mean of the mass of the input. System repeatability was found to be somewhat dependent upon the residual volume of the system and the evaporation of fluid from the separator. The evaporation rate was determined to be approximately 1cc/minute. The residual volume in the UMS was determined by measuring the concentration of LiCl in the flush water. Observed results indicated residual levels in the range of 9-10ml, however, results obtained during the flushing efficiency test indicated a residual level of approximately 20ml. It is recommended that the phase separator pumpout time be extended or the design modified to minimize the residual level.

Glanfield, E. J.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Small Explorer WIRE Failure Investigation Report

This paper presents the Small Explorer WIRE Failure Investigation Report in viewgraph form. Some of the diagrams include: 1) Overview of the Pyro Box and key interfaces; 2) Schematic Diagram of the A1020 FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) inputs; 3) Three critical FPGA reset signals shown in detail; 4) State machines for firing the cover pyrotechnic devices; 5) Oscillator Overview; and 6) General Crystal Oscillator Startup Characteristics.

Katz, Richard B.↗