Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “explosives safety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2010

Analysis of Possible Explosions at Kennedy Space Center Due to Spontaneous Ignition of Hypergolic Propellants

NASA's Constellation Program plan currently calls for the replacement of the Space Shuttle with the ARES I & V spacecraft and booster vehicles to send astronauts to the moon and beyond. Part of the ARES spacecraft is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which includes the Crew Module (CM) and Service Module (SM). The Orion CM's main propulsion system and supplies are provided by the SM. The SM is to be processed off line and moved to the Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) for stacking to the first stage booster motors prior to ARES move to the launch pad. The new Constellation Program philosophy to process in this manner has created a major task for the KSC infrastructure in that conventional QD calculations are no longer viable because of the location of surrounding facilities near the VAB and the Multi Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF), where the SM will be serviced with nearly 18,000 pounds of hypergolic propellants. The Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) complex, constructed by NASA in 1994, is located just off E Avenue south of the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building in the Kennedy Space Center industrial area. The MPPF includes a high bay and a low bay. The MPPF high bay is 40.2 m (132 ft) long x 18.9 m (60 ft) wide with a ceiling height of 18.9 m (62 ft). The low bay is a 10.4 m (34 ft) long x 10.4 m (34 ft) wide processing area and has a ceiling height of6.1 m (20 ft). The MPPF is currently used to process non-hazardous payloads. Engineering Analysis Inc. (EAI), under contract with ASRC Aerospace, Inc. in conjunction with the Explosive Safety Office, NASA, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has carried out an analysis of the effects of explosions at KSC in or near various facilities produced by the spontaneous ignition ofhypergolic fuel stored in the CEV SM. The facilities considered included (1) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (2) Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) (3) Canister Rotation Facility (CRF) Subsequent discussion deals with the MPPF analysis. Figure 1 provides a view of the MPPF from the northwest. An interior view ofthe facility is shown in Figure 2. The study was concerned with both blast hazards and hazardous fragments which exceed existing safety standards, as described in Section 2.0. The analysis included both blast and fragmentation effects and was divided into three parts as follows: (1) blast (2) primary fragmentation (3) secondary fragmentation Blast effects are summarized in Section 3.0, primary fragmentation in Section 4.0, and secondary fragmentation (internal and external) in Section 5.0. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.0, while references cited are included in Section 7.0. A more detailed description of the entire study is available in a separate document.

Brown, Stephen↗
NASA NTRS1997

The 1997 JANNAF Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee and Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee Joint Meeting

In the Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee (PDCS) meeting, topics included: the analysis, characterization, and processing of propellants and propellant ingredients; chemical reactivity; liquid propellants; test methods; rheology; surveillance and aging; and process engineering. In the Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee (S&EPS) meeting, topics covered included: hydrazine propellant vapor detection methods; toxicity of propellants and propellants; explosives safety; atmospheric modeling and risk assessment of toxic releases; reclamation, disposal, and demilitarization methods; and remediation of explosives or propellant contaminated sites.

Cocchiaro, James E.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Numerical Analysis of Blast Effects and Mitigation in the Far-Field from Small Explosions

Requirements for explosive safety are often given in terms of a “K-Factor”, correlating incident blast effects with the distance and TNT equivalent weight of an explosion. Traditionally, this is conducted using empirical correlations to experimental measurements (e.g., the Kingery–Bulmash equations). In the far-field, empirical verification of incident overpressure and impulse magnitudes can be difficult; extrapolations from data give expected values at reasonable standoff distances that sometimes are too small to measure on available equipment but are larger than some regulations require. The present paper describes the results of numerical hydrocode analysis to verify the expected incident overpressure and impulse from small hemispherical ground charges of TNT at these relatively large distances. Furthermore, the dynamic effect of incident blast waves on lightweight, modular mitigation barriers is studied to gauge their effectiveness at providing safety standard compliance.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
NASA NTRS1968

Chemistry laboratory safety manual available

Chemistry laboratory safety manual outlines safe practices for handling hazardous chemicals and chemistry laboratory equipment. Included are discussions of chemical hazards relating to fire, health, explosion, safety equipment and procedures for certain laboratory techniques and manipulations involving glassware, vacuum equipment, acids, bases, and volatile solvents.

Elsbrock, R. G.↗
NASA NTRS1992

System safety activities supporting an aero-space plane ground support technology

An overview is presented of the specific system safety activities required to support the ground support technology program associated with the design of an aerospace plane. Safe zones must be assessed to ensure that explosive safety requirements are attained to protect the vehicle, personnel, and support and operational facilities. Attention is given to the specific and unique design requirements connected with the utilization of cryogenic fuels as they apply to the design and development of an aerospace plane.

Mattern, Steven F.↗
DOE OSTI2025

A novel ignition model for low velocity impact of heterogeneous explosives based on interacting hot spots

While numerous studies have focused on the ignition of explosives occurring in high velocity impact and the associated shock-to-detonation transition, there has been growing interest in developing computational models focused on low-velocity impact regimes. A predictive low-velocity impact ignition model will be important for analyzing high explosive safety and potential accident scenarios. This work introduces a novel ignition model based on the concept of thermally interacting hot spots to simulate low velocity impacted heterogeneous explosives where observed ignition times are on the order of milliseconds. The model asserts that relevant hot spots are micron-sized, the typical separation between neighboring hot spots is on the order of a hundred microns, and that neighbors interact thermally through heat conduction across the interstitial region between them. To achieve tractable numerical solutions, hot spots are assumed to form a periodic array as opposed to the highly irregular positioning in an actual explosive. This idealization allows a single two hotspot system to characterize the ignition process. Consequently, the model is referred to as the two hot spot Frank-Kamenetskii ignition model. In the present study, hot spots are modeled as constant heat sources terms, but this can be extended to include grain-scale phenomena like frictional heating of micron-sized growing cracks that are confined under high pressure. Because the micron-sized features are below the scale that can be efficiently resolved at a systems level, an efficient subscale scheme based on the Method of Weighted Residuals (MWR) is used to efficiently solve the equations. In conclusion, we carry out numerical examples and analytic predictions illustrating the accuracy and the functioning of the model.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

CISME report on experiments with HMX powder, PBX 9501 prills, and heated PBX 9501

The ability to predict post-ignition explosive response is relevant to explosives safety, particularly weapons assembly/disassembly operations that must operate under a sufficiently conservative safety basis to meet risk mitigation criteria for inadvertent nuclear detonation (IND). In particular, hazard determinations hinge on whether the PBX 9501 main charge can ultimately attain detonation from an initial, non-shock, ignition stimulus. The CISME experiment uses a spherical explosive charge, which is thermally ignited in the center using a fiber-delivered infrared laser pulse. This ignition mechanism - i.e. a localized thermal hotspot - is representative of the ignition-causing insults typical in accident scenarios, including low-velocity impact, drop, skid, and punch events. In fiscal year 2018 CISME experiments were conducted with pristine PBX 9501 spheres, confined and unconfined. Sub-detonative, low-violence reactions were observed. Here we report experiments conducted since 2018. The explosive charge was varied: experiments were conducted with room temperature pour-density HMX powder and prills of PBX 9501, and heated, thermally damaged PBX 9501. Experiments were conducted in a confined configuration, with two 4 mm-thick stainless-steel hemispherical shells bolted around the sphere. Detonation, via DDT (deflagration-to-detonation transition) was observed in the 3-inch diameter powdered HMX and the 6-inch diameter heated and thermally-damaged PBX 9501 tests. No transition to DDT was observed in smaller diameters for those configurations, and no DDT was observed for pour-density prills of PBX 9501 of any diameter. The original test series demonstrated that the response of pristine, undamaged PBX 9501 to a central ignition is relatively benign. This new test series shows that increased porosity, lack of polymer binders and thermal damage can greatly increase the violence of the post-ignition response, up to and including detonation. These results bridge the explosive response of PBX 9501 from sub-detonative through detonation as a function of diameter and provide valuable test cases for modeling efforts that strive to capture the DDT threshold. By exploring explosive response in a more representative 3D geometry, we can also benchmark these new results to more plentiful DDT datasets generated from testing in 1D tube confinement (the historical test configuration)–the configuration upon which almost all DDT models were developed.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Flammability and dispersion of tritium in confined release scenarios

Ignition of a flammable tritium-air mixture is the most probable means to produce the water form (T 2 O or HTO), which is more easily absorbed by living tissue and is hence ~10,000 times more hazardous to human health when uptake occurs compared to the gaseous form (T 2 or HT; per Mishima and Steele, 2002). Tritium-air mixtures with T 2 concentrations below 4 mol% are considered sub-flammable and will not readily convert to the more hazardous water form. It is therefore desirable from a safety perspective to understand the dispersion behavior of tritium under different release conditions, especially since tritium is often stored in quantities and pressures much lower than is typical for normal hydrogen. The formation of a flammable layer at the ceiling is a scenario of particular concern because the rate of dispersion to nonflammable conditions is slowest in this configuration, which maximizes the time window over which the flammable tritium may encounter an ignition source. This report describes the processes of buoyant rise and dispersion of tritium. Accumulation of flammable concentrations of tritium next to the ceiling is a common safety concern for hydrogen, but this situation can only occur if dispersion rates are slow with respect to rates of release and rise. Theory and simulations demonstrate that buoyancy does not cause regions with flammable concentrations to form within buildings from sources that have previously been mixed to sub-flammable concentrations. A simulated series of tritium release events with their associated dispersion behavior are reported herein; these simulations apply computational fluid dynamics to rooms with three different ceiling heights and a variety of tritium release rates. Safety related quantities from these simulations are reported, including the mass and volume of tritium occurring in a flammable mixture, the presence or absence of a flammable layer at the ceiling, and the time required for dispersion to nonflammable conditions after the end of the tritium release event. These safety metrics are influenced by the magnitude and rate of the tritium release with respect to the air volume in the room and also the momentum of the plume or jet with respect to the ceiling height. Several screening criteria are recommended to assess whether a specific tritium release scenario is likely to form a flammable layer at the ceiling. The methods and results in this modeling study have applicability to explosion safety analysis for other buoyant flammable gases, including the lighter isotopes of hydrogen.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2022

An investigation of the multi-mode Richtmyer-Meshkov instability at a gas/HE interface using Pagosa

Here, in this work, we present a hydrocode Pagosa and explore the Richtmyer-Meshkov Instability (RMI) at an air/high explosive (HE) interface for the first time that is important but has not received much attention yet in the high explosive safety field. Thus, the presented Pagosa can be expected to predict the whole deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) process in future. In Pagosa, spatial discretization is implemented on cubic staggered grids by computing different variables at the vertex and the cell center, respectively, a special operator-splitting technique is employed to reduce the computational cost, and an artificial viscosity is added to handle the discontinuous shock waves in our simulations. To quantitatively evaluate the capability of Pagosa to solve these kinds of instabilities, the single mode Rayleigh-Taylor instability (RTI) and the multimode RMI at an air/SF 6 interface are first performed, respectively. The Pagosa results are compared with the related numerical solutions in the existing references and the experimental result. Moreover, a theoretical derivation of growth of RTI is also provided based on our numerical method. Subsequently, we explore the multi-mode RMI at an air/HE interface as well as the effects of several factors using Pagosa. Numerical results show that Pagosa is a powerful toolset to generate the right structures and the amplitude of RTI and RMI at an air/SF 6 interface. The solid HE can be penetrated by a strong shock wave and forms RMI deformations. The RMI at an air/HE interface behaves very different than at an air/SF 6 interface, periodic, decreased oscillation is observed due to material character, and is very sensitive to the initial simulation settings, that is, a tiny change in physical quantities will lead to a remarkable RMI structure, which is also observed in a shock bubble interaction. The findings in this work are significant, and will present a new insight for the high explosive field.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1985

Predicting Effects of Impacts on Confined Explosives

Study aimed at improving safety of explosive storage examined relationship between small-scale experiments and actual explosions. Object of study to develop scaling laws that eliminate need for full-scale explosion tests and reduce need for small-scale tests. Results of study make it possible to predict explosive behavior from small tests and numerical simulation.

Chan, C. K.↗
DOE OSTI2026

Improvement of Drop‐Hammer Impact Testing for Safety Assessment of High Explosives Using 10‐mg Samples

Here, in this study, we established an improved method for drop-hammer impact testing of small quantities of high explosives (10 mg). We performed about seven hundred impact tests under various experimental conditions (e.g., sandpaper vs bare anvil, different sample masses, drop-weights, and striker diameters) to determine an optimal set of conditions and reaction detection methods (e.g., gas analysis, video, and sound recordings) that give the most statistically reliable results with 10 mg samples. We used both Frequentist and Bayesian statistical approaches to compare estimates of the drop height (DH50) that initiates a reaction 50% of the time, and to quantify the associated uncertainty. Gas analysis proved to be the most reliable reaction detection method, showing unambiguous rises in HE decomposition products (e.g., CO 2 ) even when the other indicators (e.g., sound, video) were inconclusive. The impact tests performed with a bare anvil showed much better reproducibility than those conducted with sandpaper, reducing the largest uncertainty observed in the data sets by a factor of 1.7. The DH 50 values obtained from three different sample masses (10, 20, and 35 mg) fell within the uncertainties of the measurements. We demonstrated the improved procedure (i.e., 10-mg samples, gas analysis, bare anvil, and Bayesian approach) on a variety of PETN samples having different surface areas and thermal histories.

PETN↗
DOE OSTI2022

Explosion behavior investigation and safety assessment of large-format lithium-ion pouch cells

We report large-format lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries with high energy density for electric vehicles are prone to thermal runaway (or even explosion) under abusive conditions. In this study, overcharge induced explosion behaviors of large-format Li-ion pouch cells with Li[Ni 0.8 Co 0.1 Mn 0.1 ]O 2 cathode at different current rates (C-rates) (0.5C, 1C, 2C) were investigated. The explosion characteristics of the cells were elucidated by discussing the evolution of the cell voltage, the surface temperature and the shock wave pressure. Generally, the whole overcharge process could be divided into four stages according to the evolution of several key parameters and the overcharge behaviors; the overcharge C-rate has a great influence on cells’ thermal behaviors. The experimental results showed that the thermal runaway process of Li-ion cells caused by overcharging consisted of two kinds of explosions, physical explosion and chemical explosion. The existence of observable negative pressure zone in the pressure curves indicated that the Li-ion cells are not a self-supplying oxygen system during the explosion. Further, the explosion dynamics parameters were matched. An explosion TNT-equivalent conversion strategy that depended on the pressure of the shock wave was utilized to evaluate the released energy and its hazards. In addition, with respect to the overcharge of Li-ion pouch cells, a safety assessment method and a safety management method were proposed based on the explosion behaviors. From the perspective of battery safety, this study is of great significance for the safety design of Li-ion cells and can provide guidance for engineers to optimize the safety function of battery packs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
NASA NTRS1986

Safety considerations of lithium-thionyl chloride cells

The use of spirally wound lithium-thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2) cells is currently limited because of their hazardous behavior. Safety hazards have ranged from mild venting of toxic materials to violent explosions and fires. These incidents may be related to both user- and manufacturer-induced causes. Many explanations have been offered to explain the unsafe behavior of the cells under operating and abuse conditions. Explanations fall into two categories: (1) thermal mechanisms, and (2) chemical mechanisms. However, it is quite difficult to separate the two. Both may be responsible for cell venting or explosion. Some safety problems encountered with these cells also may be due to design deficiencies and ineffective quality control during cell fabrication. A well-coordinated basic and applied research program is needed to develop safe Li-SOCl2 cells. Recommendations include: (1) learnig more about Li-SOL2 cell chemistry; (2) modeling cell and battery behavior; (3) optimizing cell design for safety and performance, (4) implementing quality control procedures; and (5) educating users.

Subbarao, Surampudi↗
DOE OSTI2025

2023 Annual Explosives Inventory Completion

The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS1973

Quantitative understanding of explosive stimulus transfer

The mechanisms of detonation transfer across hermetically sealed interfaces created by necessary interruptions in high explosive trains, such as at detonators to explosive columns, field joints in explosive columns, and components of munitions fuse trains are demostrated. Reliability of detonation transfer is limited by minimizing explosive quantities, the use of intensitive explosives for safety, and requirements to propagate across gaps and angles dictated by installation and production restraints. The major detonation transfer variables studied were: explosive quanity, sensitivity, and thickness, and the separation distances between donor and acceptor explosives.

Schimmel, M. L.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Review Board review of explosive pressing initiation event

On June 30, 2020, a 0.87 gram PETN charge being pressed in the Rapid Prototyping Facility (RPF), unexpectedly initiated, resulting in destruction of the pressing fixture but no injuries or facility damage. In response, the Safety Review Board (SRB) met on Aug. 13, 2020 and Oct. 1, 2020 to review information collected following the incident, consider likely direct causes, and form recommendations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Introduction to Los Alamos National Laboratory [Slides]

The Weapon Systems Engineering Division (W) provides the system engineering and program management necessary to sustain the safety, reliability, and security of the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s assets in the active United States nuclear stockpile - the B61, W76, W78 and W88. The Division generates key certification data for Annual Assessment supporting the Laboratory Director's letter to the President on the health of those warheads. This role demands ongoing surveillance of the active stockpile and evaluation of the potential impact of any issues through design, engineering, fabrication, testing using state-of-the-art computational simulation tools and engineering test facilities. The Division works in close liaison with the several production facilities across the nuclear security complex as well as with the customers in the US Navy and Air Force.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗