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This presentation provides an overview of Explosives and Detonators for the NNSA NSTE 270 Course. It includes an overview of how detonators and high explosives are considered as part of Nuclear Explosives Safety. Several accidents involving High Explosives are also discussed. This presentation was adapted from LA-CP-16-20438 and LA-UR-21-20246.
Nuclear explosives and weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident. The special consideration translates into specific requirements promulgated by Department of Energy (DOE) O 452.1E “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety,” and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02 “DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) W-Division Nuclear Explosive Safety Office mission is to coordinate LANL participation in Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies (NESS) and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies (NWSS); to provide qualified members and advisors to the studies; to liaise with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the DoD, other national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and Pantex Plant with regards to nuclear explosive and weapon system safety. These orders and directives define nuclear detonation as an energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
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Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Groups (NESSG) are convened to evaluate NEOs to determine if positive measures are adequate to meet the Standards as specified in DOE O 452.2E - Nuclear Explosive Safety, DOE O 452.4E – Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons, and NA SD 452.2.
Propellant and explosive safety activities - management planning, static electricity and lightning hazards, and sensitivity measurement
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Small-scale safety testing, while successful in screening out extremely dangerous explosive compositions, does not fully characterize the explosive hazards associated with handling larger, consolidated or bare charges. It is proposed that intermediate-scale tests using consolidated charges in the range 25 mg – 1 kg are warranted to satisfactorily address the hazards. A standard for this intermediate-scale testing should be developed, proofed, peer-reviewed and adopted to assist in the development of safe new high explosive compositions across the complex. This whitepaper explains why current small-scale safety testing is insufficient to characterize the handling hazard, identifies the guiding aspects of explosive response that drive the handling hazards associated with larger consolidated charges, and proposes a suite of tests/experiments that can serve as a starting point for an intermediate-scale safety standard.
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We investigate and model the cook-off behavior of LX-17 to understand the response of explosive systems in abnormal thermal environments. Decomposition has been explored via conventional ODTX (One-Dimensional Time-to-eXplosion), PODTX (ODTX with pressure-measurement), TGA (Thermo-Gravimetric Analysis), and DSC (Differential Scanning Calorimetry) experiments under isothermal and ramped temperature profiles. The data were used to fit reaction rate parameters for proposed schemes in an ALE3D computational model. This model includes chemical reactions, thermo- and hydro-dynamics, and material properties, including thermal expansion, compressibility, and strength. These parameterizations were carried out utilizing a Python evolutionary optimization method on LLNL’s high-performance computing clusters. Additional experiments are being developed to further characterize and monitor decomposition intermediates to improve the model. Once experimentally validated, this model will be scalable to several applications involving LX-17. Furthermore, the optimization methodology developed herein should be applicable to other high explosive materials.
This presentation provides an overview of Nuclear Explosives Safety for a W/Q/E Division WebeX. It includes an overview of how detonators and high explosives are considered as part of Nuclear Explosives Safety. Several accidents involving High Explosives are also discussed. This presentation was adapted from LA-CP-16-20438.
This vocabulary listing characterizes the contents of over 10,000 documents of the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute's (ASRDI) safety engineering collection. The ASRDI collection is now one of the series accessible on the NASA RECON data base. There are approximately 6,300 postable terms that describe literature in the areas of cryogenic fluid safety, specifically hydrogen, oxygen, liquified natural gas; fire and explosion technology; and the mechanics of structural failure. To facilitate the proper selection of information nonpostable, related and array terms have been included in this listing.
Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified LOX/LNG explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.
Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for LOX/LNG explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.
A research effort was conducted to investigate the effects of an unintentional internal detonation of energetic materials on a small transportation container called the “Reinforced Ammo Can” (RAC), which is currently approved for the transport of energetic materials up to 2 grams net explosive weight (NEW) onsite at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The project used experimental testing of the containers based on simulated results conducted by a Missouri S & T explosives engineering graduate student while on an internship working in explosives safety at LLNL. The proposed experimental testing consisted of 20 central detonation tests in separate Reinforced Ammo Can containers to verify their high explosive (HE) containment capability. RAC containers are required for transporting secondary explosives on site at LLNL Site 200 in quantities between 300 mg and 2 grams of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent NEW. Currently, the LLNL Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) Manual states that the RAC containers are permissible for on-site transportation of secondary explosives up to 2 grams NEW by approved HE handlers with the approval of an Explosives Safety Expert (ESE). Simulated results indicated that tensile failure of the closure mechanism on the container is the most likely failure mode, and showed potential occurrence at the 2 gram NEW threshold. Experimental validation tests were conducted indicating failure/rupture of the containers lid with venting of the detonation products at the 2 gram NEW test threshold with an explosive mass safety factor of 1.3. Failure consisted of impact opening the container latch mechanism resulting in potential ejection of the lid depending on the orientation of the charge within the confinement. This analysis solely is an evaluation of the response of the containment if a detonation were to occur, it does NOT consider the probability of such an event.
This comprehensive analysis aimed to evaluate the measurement capability of the AMPTEC 630ES Explosive Safety Igniter Tester, a critical tool for organizations engaged in the measurement of High Explosive components and related Electro-Explosive devices. With a history of notable calibration issues involving specific model numbers, the Metrology Program and Calibration Laboratory (MPCL) initiated an extensive Measurement System Analysis. The analysis's primary focus was to thoroughly quantify the various sources of measurement variability intrinsic to the calibration process. It centered on two pivotal aspects: repeatability (the variation observed when the same operator uses the same instrument) and reproducibility (the variation seen when different operators perform measurements). A secondary objective was to determine whether equipment usage and age had any impact on the instrument's performance.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has conservatively reduced the explosive safety standards suggested by the Small Quantities in Research Laboratories (SQRL) program testing by 60%. For this reason, further research into the detailed effects of small amounts of explosives in typically constructed rooms is needed in order to improve their factor of safety. The team was tasked with designing an experiment to investigate the effect of different variables on drywall under explosive blasts. In order to meet this objective, the team conducted a comprehensive literature review to gain an understanding of industry-standard construction practices and review previous tests conducted by the Army corp of engineers. Since the team used PBXN-5 rather than C4, as in SQRL, an initial shot was conducted to compare damage levels. From those results and the physical constraints of the testing chamber, the team redesigned multiple single-panel drywall frames to capture the entirety of the incurred damage. Proposed designs were narrowed down using a decision matrix. From the study of previous tests and literature review, variables were chosen that the team hypothesized to have an impact on drywall strength. The variables that were tested were chosen from the results of that work and specific variables the sponsor was interested in, and they were paint, humidity/moisture content, and explosive positioning relative to the studs. Detailed plans were made for each variable according to what conditions the team wanted to investigate. For humidity, this involved testing low, ambient, and high conditions by treating the panels in a chamber. Preliminary shots were performed to test the structural integrity of the frame and streamline the test diagnostics which involved a high-speed camera placed behind the drywall, outside of the chamber, and a pressure probe placed behind the drywall, inside the chamber. Once the instrumentation, diagnostics, and frame design were finalized, a quantitative damage criteria matrix was created to categorize the results of the main shot series. In conjunction with evidence from the high-speed video, the achieved damage levels indicate that high moisture content drywall is better able to withstand explosive blasts. Larger stud damage and lower drywall damage occurred when the explosive was located directly in front of a stud. Paint had no noticeable impact on strength. Ultimately, the team conducted a total of 17 tests, leaving the door open for future in-depth research into the impact of humidity.