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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Jefferson Laboratory C100 Superconducting Radio-Frequency Cavity Fault Data, 2020

The dataset was created to train machine learning models for the task of identifying the (1) cavity and (2) fault type from C100-type cryomodules at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (Jefferson Lab), thereby replacing the time-consuming efforts of a subject matter expert. Superconducting radio-frequency (SRF) cavity trips represent a significant source of accelerator downtime. Real-time – rather than post-mortem – identification of the offending cavity and classification of the fault type would give control room operators valuable feedback for corrective action planning. The anticipated benefit is increased beam-on-target time for users and provides performance metrics that can be used to improve future cavity designs. A series of 17 RF signals are recorded for each of the 8 cavities in a C100 cryomodule every time a cavity trips. These time-series signals are written to file using a specially designed data acquisition system. The dataset represents fault events recorded during Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (CEBAF) beam operations between January 18, 2019 and March 9, 2020. The following filtering steps were applied to collected data; (1) only 4 of the 17 signals per cavity are retained (GMES, GASK, CRFP, DETA2) (2) only events with data from each of the eight cavities in the cryomodule are kept, (3) only events that were sampled at 5 kHz were kept, (4) events from cryomodule 0L04 were neglected, (5) events occurring between February 4, 3PM and February 5, 12PM were neglected. As a result of preprocessing, the dataset is comprised of 2,375 unique events. The full dataset is comprised of three files: features.csv, cavity_labels.csv, fault_labels.csv. Each instance in faults.csv includes a timestamp (“date_time”), a label for the cryomodule which experienced the trip (“zone_label”), and 192 features (“feature_1”, “feature_2”... “feature_192”). The features correspond to 6 autoregressive features for each of 4 signals per cavity for each of the 8 cavities (6 × 4 signals/cavity × 8 cavities/cryomodule = 192). To deal with the large variation of signal amplitudes, time-series standardization via the z-score (standard score) function was applied prior to computing the features. For each instance, there is an associated label for the (1) cavity which faulted first (cavity_labels.csv) and (2) the type of fault that caused the trip (fault_labels.csv). The cavity identification can take values of [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and the fault type can take values of [‘Microphonics’, ‘Quench_100ms’, ‘Controls_Fault’, ‘E_Quench’, ‘Quench_3ms’, ‘Single_Cav_Turn_Off’ , ‘Heat_Riser_Choke’, ‘Multi_Cav_Turn_Off’].

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

2019 Groundwater Monitoring Report Project Shoal Area: Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 447

The Project Shoal Area is a site in Nevada where an underground nuclear test was conducted in 1963. It later came to be known as the Shoal, Nevada, Site. Surface contamination at the site has been remediated, but investigation of groundwater contamination resulting from the test is still in the corrective action process. Annual sampling and water-level monitoring are conducted as part of the subsurface corrective action strategy, which has focused on revising the site conceptual model and evaluating the adequacy of the monitoring well network. It has also included enhancements to the monitoring well network to address uncertainties in the groundwater flow direction and the cause of rising water levels in site wells west of the shear zone since the first hydrologic characterization (HC) wells were installed in 1996. Revisions to the site conceptual model and enhancements to the monitoring strategy were provided to Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) in the Addendum to: Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 447 Shoal, Nevada, Site. NDEP approved the addendum to the CADD/CAP, which included an expanded contaminant boundary and compliance boundary for the site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 577 AREA 5 CHROMIUM CONTAINING WASTE DISPOSAL CELLS

Report will be submitted to the state of Nevada Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS), was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office on April 25, 2019. The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste cells and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents (NDEP 2019). As stipulated in Paragraph 5C of the SA, a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) was prepared that identified and evaluated risks and corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for CAU 577, provided the plan for implementing the recommended CAA, and presented the post-closure plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Calendar Year 2024 Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Letter Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Rev. 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada (referred to herein as “the Plan”) (DOE/EMNV, 2025) describes the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s UGTA Activity. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (DOE/EMNV, 2024), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Strategic Qualitative Risk Assessment of Thousands of Legacy Wells within the Area of Review (AoR) of a Potential CO2 Storage Site

The subsurface confinement of anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) demands robust risk assessment methodologies to identify potential leakage pathways. Legacy wells within the Area of Review (AoR) represent one potential leakage pathway. Robust methodologies require enormous amounts of data, which are not available for many old legacy wells. This study strategically categorizes 4386 legacy wells within the AoR of a potential CO2 storage site in the Illinois basin and identifies the high-risk wells by leveraging publicly available data—reports and well logs submitted to state regulatory agencies. Wells were categorized based on their proximity to the injection well location, depth, the mechanical integrity of well barriers, and the accessibility to these wells throughout the project lifecycle. Wells posing immediate risks were identified, guiding prioritized corrective actions and monitoring plans. Out of 4386 wells, 54 have high priority for corrective action, 10 have medium priority, and the remainder are of low priority. Case study results from the Illinois basin demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability of this approach, to assess the risk associated with legacy wells within the AoR of potential CO2 storage site, strategically categorizing over 4000 such wells despite data limitations.

Arbad, Nachiket (ORCID:0000000215353656)↗
DOE OSTI2023

LANSCE Facility Longevity Assessment

This LANSCE Facility Longevity Assessment examined 34 total systems critical to the operation of the LANSCE accelerator complex. These systems are primarily owned, operated, and maintained by AOT Division. Based on the criteria used in this assessment, there are 12 AOT Division systems that are potential high risk as related to longterm LANSCE operations. These systems may also impact the success of LAMP. Also summarized in this report are the facility activities planned over the next decade. These include general facility maintenance and infrastructure upgrades, as well as planned electrical system upgrades. The LANSCE Facility Operations (LFO) Division is responsible for this activity scope and budget planning. Most of the planned activities are general in nature and should have little impact on accelerator operations or LAMP activities as currently envisioned. However, close coordination with between AOT, LFO, and LAMP would be prudent. A next step should be to develop an actionable plan to address the high-risk systems. Potential criteria for developing such a plan could include: (1) Evaluating the global impact of the system (operations, program, safety, etc.), (2) Ranking by impact (ranked now by risk), (3) Estimating cost to implement the corrective actions (Is there already a plan or not?), and (4) Estimating the time required for corrective actions. An alternative could include integration of the assessment data into both the Asset Management System and the Maintenance Analytics Risk Register.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluating offshore legacy wells for geologic carbon storage: A case study from the Galveston and Brazos areas in the Gulf of Mexico

In this article, federal offshore waters in the Gulf of Mexico are of interest for large-scale geologic carbon storage (GCS). However, more than 80,000 offshore oil and gas wells exist in the region, which could impact the integrity of sealing intervals. In this study, we propose a screening methodology for ranking offshore legacy wells based on the challenge they may present to GCS. The methodology relies on the review of well regulatory records to 1) identify leakage pathways and assess the potential hazards that wells pose to planned GCS operations, 2) evaluate well features that impact the accessibility of wells to determine the feasibility of potential corrective actions, and 3) rank wells based on the overall challenge they may pose for GCS. We demonstrate our framework by evaluating the construction and abandonment of 156 wells across eight areas of interest (AOIs) in shallow federal waters along the Texas Gulf Coast. The majority (99.3 %) of wells considered were constructed and plugged in a manner that did not isolate prospective GCS targets in the Upper and Lower Miocene formations and may potentially require a challenging or uncertain corrective action prior to GCS. Dataset trends suggest that the observed well construction and plugging designs may be common in shallow offshore federal waters along the Texas Gulf Coast. Consequently, operators pursuing offshore GCS projects in the region may consider selecting areas that avoid challenging wells or performing robust evaluations of legacy well leakage risks to plan corrective action prior to CO 2 injection.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Architectural Survey of the Area 25 Nuclear Rocket Development Station, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Volume 1 of 3)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), and the U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) plan to implement corrective action activities (under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, agreed to by the State of Nevada) and demolition of the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility and the Test Cell C Historic District. These are major components of the unrecorded Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District, which is eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register). The NRDS is in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, in Nye County, Nevada. Demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitutes an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 572 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from August 2020 through May 2023, as set forth in the SAFER Plan for CAU 572; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. • Corrective actions were completed during decontamination and demolition (D&D) and disposal activities, and were performed from August 2022 through September 2025.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site (Figure 1) surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada (NNSA/NV 2001), hereafter called the CAU 417 Closure Report. The site closure process was completed in 2001 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. Responsibility for environmental site restoration was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from September 2018 through August 2020. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2020 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2020

Monitoring Potential Transport of Radioactive Contaminants in Shallow Ephemeral Channels: FY2019

Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a field assessment of the potential for contaminated soil to be transported from the Smoky Site Contamination Area (CA) because of storm runoff. This activity supported U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) efforts to establish post-closure monitoring plans for the Smoky Site Soils Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550. The work was intended to confirm the likely mechanism of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause the movement of contaminated soils, as well as determine the particle size fraction most closely associated with transported radionuclide-contaminated soils. These data will facilitate the design of the appropriate post-closure monitoring program. In 2011, DRI installed a meteorological monitoring station on the west side of the Smoky Site CA and a hydrologic (runoff) monitoring station within the CA, near the east side. The meteorological station collected air temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, and soil water content data. The maximum, minimum, and average or total values (as appropriate) for each of these parameters were recorded for each 10-minute interval. The maximum, minimum, and average water depth in the flume installed at the hydrologic station were also recorded for each 10-minute interval. This report presents the data collected from these stations during fiscal year (FY) 2019. During the FY2019 reporting period, the warmest months were June, July, and August and the coldest were December and February. The highest monthly solar radiation (i.e., sunshine) values were recorded in June, July, and August, whereas December through February had the lowest solar radiation values. Monthly mean wind speeds were highest in the spring (April) and early summer (June). Winds were predominantly from the north, except in February, July, August, and September when winds were mostly from the west. The monthly average relative humidity ranged from 17 percent to approximately 60 percent. Humidity was lowest in the summer and highest in the winter. Monthly total precipitation ranged from 0.0 during August and September to 2.22 inches (in) (56.39 millimeters [mm]) in February. Total precipitation for FY2019 was 7.83 in (198.88 mm). During the reporting period, a single, nonzero, flow event was recorded at the flume. This occurred over two days between March 6 and 7, 2019, in response to 1.16 in (29.46 mm) of precipitation falling within 9.3 hours on March 6, 2019. This event produced a peak water depth of 0.39 in (0.99 centimeters [cm]) in the flume, and runoff was measured for approximately 23.5 hours. However, the maximum recorded flow depth was less than the limit for flow discharge and velocity that can be calculated for the six-inch (15 cm) throat of a Parshall flume. The runoff event produced insufficient flow velocities through the natural channel to cause local erosion and transport of bedload materials. No bedload samples were collected for radiological analysis. Observing meteorological and environmental conditions that lead to storm runoff will help identify the parameters and threshold conditions that should be incorporated into post-closure monitoring plans for this and similar Soils CAU sites. Routine monitoring of meteorological and hydrologic parameters at the Smoky Site CA has been discontinued at the request of EM NV, effective at the conclusion of FY2019. Environmental data acquisition was completed and the meteorological and runoff monitoring stations were removed from the Smoky Site on October 15, 2019.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Development of a Test-Bed for Testing and Refining EarthEn’s Supercritical CO 2 Based Energy Storage System

EarthEn’s energy storage concept leverages supercritical carbon dioxide (sCO 2 ) as a working fluid and relies on compact, high-performance components operating at elevated pressures and temperatures. To accelerate component development and reduce technical risk prior to larger-scale demonstrations, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) developed a 100 kW-scale sCO 2 test-bed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with EarthEn (CRADA NO. NFE-24-10050). The objective of the work was to design and construct a flexible experimental facility capable of reproducing key thermodynamic state points and heat-transfer conditions relevant to EarthEn’s thermal energy storage (TES) cycle, with particular emphasis on enabling development and evaluation of next-generation heat exchangers and TES concepts. The test-bed consists of a closed-loop sCO 2 circulation system housed within an open-topped enclosure. In its as-installed configuration, dense-phase sCO 2 is recirculated through a printed circuit recuperator, an electrically heated section, a throttling device used to simulate turbine expansion, and a water-cooled printed circuit heat exchanger that rejects heat to the building chilled-water system before returning to the pump. The pump is driven by a variable frequency drive, enabling controlled adjustment of flow and operating point. A comprehensive instrumentation suite was integrated to support both safe operation and high-quality data collection. Installed sensors include Coriolis flow meters for sCO 2 flow rate and density, resistance temperature detectors and thermocouples distributed throughout the loop (including the heated section and key heat exchanger ports), and pressure transducers for absolute and differential pressure measurements. The facility was designed to support high-pressure (19 MPa nominal) and high-temperature (575°C nominal) operation with credited overpressure protection provided by a rupture disk. Nominal operating conditions were selected to support 100 kW-class testing while maintaining flexibility for non-heated and heated shakedown, control development, and future integration of advanced TES test sections. In parallel with facility development, a system-level thermal-hydraulic model was created using Modelica-based tools to support component sizing, anticipate performance over targeted test conditions, and establish a framework for future model calibration against experimental data. At the conclusion of the project performance period, the facility was in final assembly, and the pressure boundary was nearly completed. However, several practical challenges associated with high-pressure/high-temperature systems and specialized component procurement impacted schedule and prevented initial pump-driven operation and full commissioning within the available resources. This report documents the as-built design, operating capabilities, and instrumentation, and it summarizes key lessons learned related to heater fabrication and testing, first-of-a-kind assembly factors, specialty flange supply constraints, and fill pump corrective actions. Finally, it outlines a phased plan for future commissioning and experimental campaigns, including control and instrumentation shakedown, heater characterization, model calibration, and testing at state points representative of EarthEn’s TES cycle.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2020

NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU 366) FY2019

Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a field assessment of the potential for radionuclide-contaminated soil to be transported from the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) because of both wind and storm water runoff. This activity supported U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) efforts to establish post-closure monitoring plans for the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366. The DRI task was intended to identify the likely mechanism(s) of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause the movement of radionuclide-contaminated soils. The emphasis of the work was on collecting sediment transported by channelized storm runoff and measuring airborne dust concentrations and associated wind conditions. These data will facilitate an appropriate post-closure monitoring program. In 2011, DRI installed meteorological monitoring stations north and south of the Plutonium Valley CA—known as Pu Valley North and Pu Valley South, respectively—as well as a fluvial sediment sampling station within the CA. Since installation, temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, volumetric soil moisture content, and airborne particulate concentrations have been collected at both meteorological stations. The maximum, minimum, and average or total (as appropriate) for each of these parameters were recorded for each 10-minute interval. The sediment sampling station included an automatically activated sampling pump with collection bottles for suspended sediment, which was activated when sufficient flow was present in the channel, and passive traps for bedload material that was transported down the channel during runoff events. This report presents data collected from these stations during fiscal year (FY) 2019. During the FY2019 (October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019) reporting period, the warmest month was July and the coldest month was February. Monthly total solar radiation was highest in June or July (depending on the station) and lowest in December. Monthly mean wind speeds were highest during February. At the Pu Valley North station, winds were commonly northerly, northwesterly, and southerly. At the Pu Valley South station, the wind direction was more variable and winds frequently came from most directions, excluding westerly and northwesterly winds. Winds above 15.0 miles per hour (mph) (24.1 kilometers per hour [km/hr]) were frequently southerly at both stations, and less-frequent strong winds were northerly (at the Pu Valley South station) or northwesterly (at the Pu Valley North station). Monthly average relative humidity ranged from 18 percent in August to 62 percent in January and February. Monthly total precipitation ranged from zero at both stations in September to 2.23 inches (in) (56.6 millimeters [mm]) during February at the Pu Valley South station and 2.09 in (53.1 mm) during March at the Pu Valley North station. From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, the total precipitation was 8.23 in (209 mm) and 8.15 in (207 mm) at the Pu Valley South and Pu Valley North stations, respectively. The largest daily precipitation totals of 1.46 in (37.1 mm) and 1.14 in (29.0 mm) occurred at the Pu Valley South and Pu Valley North stations, respectively, on March 6, 2019. However, the ISCO autosampler was not activated during any storm event in FY2019 because the channel water depth measurements were insufficient for suspended sediment sample collection. Additionally, because no significant flow through the channel was indicated, no bedload samples were collected. Light breezes of 0.0 mph to 5.0 mph (0.0 km/hr to 8.0 km/hr) occurred most frequently (approximately 55 percent to 57 percent of the time). The frequency of occurrence diminished exponentially as the wind speed increased such that winds in excess of 25.0 mph (40.2 km/hr) occurred less than 0.01 percent of the time. Winds in excess of 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr) were most commonly southerly, which is likely controlled by the topography of the valley because topographic highs define the east and west sides of the valley and converge toward the north.The concentrations of PM2.5 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter ≤2.5 micrometers [μm]) and PM10 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter ≤10 μm) in the air generally increase as wind speed increases. However, the particle profiler at the Pu Valley South station regularly malfunctioned, which resulted in poor data quality and a limited period of record within FY2019. Therefore, discussion of the annual dust observations is mostly limited to the Pu Valley North station. At the Pu Valley North station, significant increases in windblown dust concentrations were observed when wind speeds exceeded 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr), especially during southerly winds. When all wind speeds were considered, high dust concentrations at the Pu Valley North station were frequently associated with northerly, northwesterly, or southerly winds. The majority of PM10 transport at the Pu Valley North station occurred when winds were blowing northerly and northwesterly because of the high frequency of winds up to 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr). The ratio of PM10 to PM2.5 is a qualitative indicator of the proximity of dust sources to the observation point and the values of the PM10 to PM2.5 ratio tend to be higher nearer to the source. The PM10 to PM2.5 ratio increased from 1.2 to 2.8 with higher wind speeds at the Pu Valley North station. This increase suggests that some locally sourced PM10 was present in the air when local winds exceeded 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr). Local dust suspension is interpreted during major dust events when peaks in the PM10 to PM2.5 ratio occur simultaneously with the maximum wind speed and the peak PM10 concentration. Analysis of the five major dust events in FY2019 revealed that northerly winds were dominant in three events and southerly winds were dominant in two events. Local suspension of dust within Plutonium Valley is suspected to have occurred during two of the five major events (April 9, 2019, and September 28 to 29, 2019), and a nonlocal source of dust is presumed for the three other major dust events (October 14, 2018; May 16, 2019; and September 2, 2019). The three suspected regional dust transport events exhibited winds that typically did not exceed the 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr) wind speed threshold for local dust transport and featured PM10 to PM2.5 ratios that indicate large-scale regional dust transport. Similar event characteristics (e.g., wind speed and PM10 concentration) were observed at air monitoring stations approximately 70 mi (113 km) to the northwest within the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Therefore, these three regional events may not reflect transport from the Plutonium Valley CA. Routine monitoring of meteorological and hydrologic parameters at Plutonium Valley has been discontinued at the request of EM NV, effective at the conclusion of FY2019. Environmental data acquisition has been completed, and both Pu Valley North and Pu Valley South meteorological stations within Plutonium Valley as well as the ISCO autosampler station within the CA were removed on October 14, 2019.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

On the uncertainty of estimating photovoltaic soiling using nearby soiling data

The accumulation of dust on the surface of photovoltaic modules can reduce their performance and affect the cost competitiveness of this technology. This phenomenon is known as soiling and can be mitigated through appropriate corrective and/or preventive actions. In order to maximize its effectiveness, it is important to plan the soiling mitigation strategy even before the PV system is operational. This is typically done through a nearest neighbor approach, by estimating soiling using data from the nearest operational photovoltaic system. This work focuses on understanding the uncertainty related to this practice. For this purpose, the semi-variance function is used to study the dissimilarity between the soiling losses of two locations in California depending on their distance. The results show that, when the soiling loss at a nearby system is used to estimate soiling of a site, the uncertainty can be approximated to increase linearly at a rate of 0.08-0.10%/km up to 60 or 80 km. After this distance, the use of a nearest neighbor approach is no longer justified, as it produces an uncertainty as big as the average soiling loss of the sites in the dataset used in this study. In some conditions, uncertainties > 0% are found also for sites located within 25 km, meaning that even close-by systems might soil differently.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗