Assisting the Government of Iraq in Implementing the Additional Protocol
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At the National Ignition Facility, the symmetry of the hot spot of imploding capsules is diagnosed by imaging the emitted x-rays using gated cameras and image plates. The symmetry of an implosion is an important factor in the yield generated from the resulting fusion process. The x-ray images are analyzed by decomposing the image intensity contours into Fourier and Legendre modes. This paper focuses on the additional protocols for the time-integrated shape analysis from image plates. For implosions with temperatures above ∼4 keV, the hard x-ray background can be utilized to infer the temperature of the hot spot.
The goals of this case study are: (1) To examine the correlation between Iran's nuclear program and clerical statements; (2) To evaluate the importance of these statements; (3) To understand the relationship between policy and fatwas (Islamic decrees); (4) To address the issue of a 'nuclear fatwa'; and (5) To examine how, if at all, Sharia (Islamic law) has influenced Iran's actions or inactions with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran's adherence to its IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) is one of two theocracies in the world, the second being Vatican City. Iran's government derives its constitutional, moral, and political legitimacy from Islam. As a result of this theocratic culture, rules are set and interpreted with a much different calibrator than that of the Western world. Islam affects all aspects of Iranian life. This is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a nationalistic faith, in that many people all over the world believe in and adhere to Islamic principles. As a result, a political system that derives much of its fervor from being nationalistic is caught between two worlds, one within the land boundaries of Iran and the other within a faith that transcends boundaries. Thus, any understanding of Islamic law must first be understood within this delicate balance of nationalism and transcendence. Iran has found itself on the international stage concerning its nuclear program. Because Iran is a theocratic state, it is imperative to examine its political moves, speeches, rights, and obligations through the lens of Islam. This study will examine how Islam plays a role in Iran's dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including parties obligations under Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol, and also provide a recommendation on how to move forward in dealings with Iran based in part on an understanding of Islamic principles.
A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
MPISS is an automatic file transfer system that implements a combination of standard and mission-unique transfer protocols required by the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission (GPM) Precipitation Processing System (PPS) to control the flow of data between the MOC and the PPS. The primary features of MPISS are file transfers (both with and without PPS specific protocols), logging of file transfer and system events to local files and a standard messaging bus, short term storage of data files to facilitate retransmissions, and generation of file transfer accounting reports. The system includes a graphical user interface (GUI) to control the system, allow manual operations, and to display events in real time. The PPS specific protocols are an enhanced version of those that were developed for the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM). All file transfers between the MOC and the PPS use the SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP). For reports and data files generated within the MOC, no additional protocols are used when transferring files to the PPS. For observatory data files, an additional handshaking protocol of data notices and data receipts is used. MPISS generates and sends to the PPS data notices containing data start and stop times along with a checksum for the file for each observatory data file transmitted. MPISS retrieves the PPS generated data receipts that indicate the success or failure of the PPS to ingest the data file and/or notice. MPISS retransmits the appropriate files as indicated in the receipt when required. MPISS also automatically retrieves files from the PPS. The unique feature of this software is the use of both standard and PPS specific protocols in parallel. The advantage of this capability is that it supports users that require the PPS protocol as well as those that do not require it. The system is highly configurable to accommodate the needs of future users.
The Operating Missions as Nodes on the Internet (OMNI) project at NASA's Goddard Space flight Center (GSFC), is demonstrating the use of standard Internet protocols for spacecraft communication systems. This year, demonstrations of Internet access to a flying spacecraft have been performed with the UoSAT-12 spacecraft owned and operated by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (SSTL). Previously, demonstrations were performed using a ground satellite simulator and NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). These activities are part of NASA's Space Operations Management Office (SOMO) Technology Program, The work is focused on defining the communication architecture for future NASA missions to support both NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" concept and to enable new types of collaborative science. The use of standard Internet communication technology for spacecraft simplifies design, supports initial integration and test across an IP based network, and enables direct communication between scientists and instruments as well as between different spacecraft, The most recent demonstrations consisted of uploading an Internet Protocol (IP) software stack to the UoSAT- 12 spacecraft, simple modifications to the SSTL ground station, and a series of tests to measure performance of various Internet applications. The spacecraft was reconfigured on orbit at very low cost. The total period between concept and the first tests was only 3 months. The tests included basic network connectivity (PING), automated clock synchronization (NTP), and reliable file transfers (FTP). Future tests are planned to include additional protocols such as Mobile IP, e-mail, and virtual private networks (VPN) to enable automated, operational spacecraft communication networks. The work performed and results of the initial phase of tests are summarized in this paper. This work is funded and directed by NASA/GSFC with technical leadership by CSC in arrangement with SSTL, and Vytek Wireless.
The IAEA has verified the declared nuclear material according to the comprehensive safeguards agreement under NPT between the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, as well as the undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. In the safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, the Agency drew a broader conclusion for Korea that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Korea because there was no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the ROK. The IAEA also informed that the implementation of Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Korea started on 1 July, 2008 in accordance with the state level IS approach after a drawing of the broader conclusion. In addition, for now, a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLA) is adopted for the ROK, including 11 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in KAERI. This paper describes a comparison analysis between IS and SLA.
From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.
The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to build confidence in the State System. Viewed from this perspective, the model can be thought of as a quality assurance tool that assists states in ensuring that the outputs of their State System (the tangible 'goods' that are provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the State's agreements) are of high quality. As such, this tool is for the internal use of a State System that wishes to assess and improve its capacity. It is not intended for comparison or outside evaluation. In addition to providing a self-assessment tool, INSEP expects this model to be useful in several other ways: it will inform the approach that INSEP uses in bilateral consultations to identify areas where INSEP outreach and training may be of value, and it will provide a structure for its training curriculum. It will help INSEP to evaluate the effectiveness of its outreach - where there are gaps in the training provided, and whether the training that is provided meets its stated objectives. Finally, it will provide a framework for coordinating with the IAEA and other member states in the 'harmonization' efforts currently underway to align the outreach efforts of states that provide safeguards training. This paper describes the process of evaluation that INSEP is developing. It looks at the expected usefulness of the metrics for conducting self-assessments and joint assessments and enabling partners to identify training needs. The paper begins with a description of various performance requirements that define what must be done at the state and facility level to implement effective and efficient international safeguards. Next, technical performance measures are discussed, that define how well a state and its facilities are fulfilling these requirements. Then a functional analysis is conducted to align the technical requirements with competencies and determine who should carry out the various activities necessary to fulfill the performance requirements. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion about SEP's approach in applying the metrics to its outreach activities intended to help countries to implement high-functioning SSACs.
Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.
The ATLAS experiment is expected to deliver an unprecedented amount of scientific data in the High Luminosity(HL-LHC) era. As the demand for disk storage capacity in ATLAS continues to rise steadily, the BNL Scientific Data and Computing Center (SDCC) faces challenges in terms of cost implications for maintaining multiple disk copies and adapting to the coming ATLAS storage requirements. To address these challenges, the SDCC Storage team has undertaken a thorough analysis of the ATLAS experiment's requirements, matching them to suitable storage options and strategies, and has explored alternatives to enhance or replace the current storage solution. This paper aims to present the main challenges encountered while supporting big data experiments such as ATLAS. We describe the experiment's specific requirements and priorities, particularly focusing on the critical storage system characteristics of the high-luminosity run and how the key storage components provided by the Storage team work together: the dCache disk storage system; its archival back-end, HPSS; and its OS-level backend Storage. Specifically, we investigate a novel approach to integrate Lustre and XRootD. In this setup, Lustre serves as backend storage and XRootD acts as an access layer frontend, supporting various grid access protocols. Additionally, we also describe the validation and commissioning tests, including the performance comparison between dCache and XRootd. Furthermore, we provide a performance and cost analysis comparing OpenZFS and LINUX MD RAID, evaluate different storage software stacks, and showcase stress tests conducted to validate Third Party Copy (TPC) functionality.
Purpose: Due to its capability to more accurately detect deep lesions inside the breast by removing the effect of overlying anatomy, digital breast tomosynthesis (DBT) has the potential to replace the standard mammography technique in clinical screening exams. However, the European Guidelines for DBT dosimetry are still a work in progress and there are little data available on organ doses other than to the breast. It is, therefore, of great importance to assess the dosimetric performance of DBT with respect to the one obtained with standard digital mammography (DM) systems. The aim of this work is twofold: (i) to study the dosimetric properties of a combined DBT/DM system (MAMMOMAT Inspiration Siemens{sup ®}) for a tungsten/rhodium (W/Rh) anode/filter combination and (ii) to evaluate organs doses during a DBT examination. Methods: For the first task, measurements were performed in manual and automatic exposure control (AEC) modes, using two homogeneous breast phantoms: a PMMA slab phantom and a 4 cm thick breast-shaped rigid phantom, with 50% of glandular tissue in its composition. Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended v.2.7.0. A MC model was implemented to mimic DM and DBT acquisitions for a wide range of x-ray spectra (24 –34 kV). This was used to calculate mean glandular dose (MGD) and to compute series of backscatter factors (BSFs) that could be inserted into the DBT dosimetric formalism proposed by Dance et al. Regarding the second aim of the study, the implemented MC model of the clinical equipment, together with a female voxel phantom (“Laura”), was used to calculate organ doses considering a typical DBT acquisition. Results were compared with a standard two-view mammography craniocaudal (CC) acquisition. Results: Considering the AEC mode, the acquisition of a single CC view results in a MGD ranging from 0.53 ± 0.07 mGy to 2.41 ± 0.31 mGy in DM mode and from 0.77 ± 0.11 mGy to 2.28 ± 0.32 mGy in DBT mode. Regarding the BSF, the results achieved may lead to a MGD correction of about 6%, contributing to the improvement of the current guidelines used in these applications. Finally, considering the MC results obtained for the organ dose study, the radiation doses found for the tissues of the body other than the breast were in the range of tens of μSv, and are in part comparable to the ones obtained in standard DM. Nevertheless, in a single DBT examination, some organs (such as lung and thyroid) receive higher doses (of about 9% and 21%, respectively) with respect to the CC DM acquisition. Conclusions: Taking into account an average breast with a thickness of 4.5 cm, the MGDs for DM and DBT acquisitions were below the achievable value (2.0 mGy) defined by the European protocol. Additionally, in the case of a fusion imaging study (DM + DBT), the MGD for a 4.5 cm thick breast is of the order of 1.88 ± 0.36 mGy. Finally, organ dose evaluations underline the need to improve awareness concerning dose estimation of DBT exams for some organs, especially when radiation risk is assessed by using the effective dose.
otsdaq is a Ready-to-Use data-acquisition (DAQ) solution aimed at scaling down to test-beam, detector development, and other rapid-deployment scenarios; and scaling up through the development cycle to fullscale production and operation. otsdaq uses the artdaq DAQ framework under-the-hood, providing flexibility and scalability to meet evolving DAQ needs. otsdaq provides a library of supported front-end boards and firmware modules which implement a custom UDP protocol. Additionally, an integrated Run Control GUI and readout software are provided, preconfigured to communicate with otsdaq firmware.
This document is part of a series of guidance documents developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international safeguards by design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) avoid costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save both industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or the Agency) time, money, and resources—a mutually beneficial, win-win endeavor. The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards, the safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance as a basis for IAEA safeguards is the international safeguards agreement between a country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.