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REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

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Training program to prepare the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the protocol additional to the agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United

In 2008, a joint team from Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) consisting of specialists in training IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the U.S. Additional Protocol. Since the U.S. Additional Protocol would allow for IAEA access to the DOE laboratories under the aegis of complementary access activities, the DOE laboratories would need to prepare for such visits. The goal of the training was to ensure that the DOE laboratories would successfully host an IAEA complementary access. In doing so, the labs must be able to provide the IAEA with the information that the IAEA would need to resolve its questions about the U.S. Declaration and declared activities at the lab, and also protect certain equities, as provided under the U.S. Additional Protocol Article 1.b and c. which set forth a 'National Security Exclusion.' This 'NSE' states that the AP provisions apply within the United States 'excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to location or information associated with such activities.' These activities are referred to collectively as DNSS-direct national security significance. Furthermore, the U.S. has a specific right to employ managed access, without prejudice to the right under Article 1.b, in connection with activities of DNSS. The provisions in Articles 1.b and 1.c are unique to the U.S. AP, and are additional to the more general right, under Article 7, to use managed access to protect from disclosure proprietary and/or proliferation-sensitive information, and to meet safety and security requirements, that is incorporated directly from the Model Additional Protocol. The BNL-LANL team performed training at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory to cover the situations that these labs, which respectively represent nuclear weapons labs, nuclear energy labs, and science labs and environmental management sites, would encounter during a complementary access. Each of the three labs hosted a mock complementary access activity, which included mock inspectors from the BNL-LANL team. In addition to reviewing the draft declarations from each of the host labs, the BNL-LANL team conducted open source research in a manner similar to what IAEA inspectors would do to research the activities at a location and prepare questions for the location to answer and that would be the focus of a complementary access. The host labs and other labs attending the training found the training to be extremely useful and helpful in making sure that each lab's Additional Protocol team had made correct declarations of nuclear activities, had properly trained staff ready to host and answer IAEA inquiries, and would implement managed access during a complementary access that would provide access by the IAEA team to resolve questions or inconsistencies about a particular declaration and still protect the information addressed by Articles 1 and 7 of the U.S. AP.

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CREATION OF THE MODEL ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

In 1991, the international nuclear nonproliferation community was dismayed to discover that the implementation of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under its NPT INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement with Iraq had failed to detect Iraq's nuclear weapon program. It was now clear that ensuring that states were fulfilling their obligations under the NPT would require not just detecting diversion but also the ability to detect undeclared materials and activities. To achieve this, the IAEA initiated what would turn out to be a five-year effort to reappraise the NPT safeguards system. The effort engaged the IAEA and its Member States and led to agreement in 1997 on a new safeguards agreement, the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. The Model Protocol makes explicit that one IAEA goal is to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Model Protocol requires an expanded declaration that identifies a State's nuclear potential, empowers the IAEA to raise questions about the correctness and completeness of the State's declaration, and, if needed, allows IAEA access to locations. The information required and the locations available for access are much broader than those provided for under INFCIRC/153. The negotiation was completed in quite a short time because it started with a relatively complete draft of an agreement prepared by the IAEA Secretariat. This paper describes how the Model Protocol was constructed and reviews key decisions that were made both during the five-year period and in the actual negotiation.

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A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

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Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Preparations for Additional Protocol Implementation

The United States Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force (EIF) January 6, 2009. In anticipation of the EIF, the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) began the initial DOE AP data call on November 3, 2008. This paper describes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL's) preparation, organization, and development efforts to successfully implement the AP and complete the AP data call. ORNL had 35 days to identify declarable activities and finalize the declaration line items (DLIs) for submission to NA-243. To be able to respond within the required time frame, many preparation activities at ORNL were necessary, such as determining the AP coordinator (APC) and team roles; conducting site awareness training; creating the ORNL Standards-Based Management System (SBMS) procedure Reporting of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities; training personnel; and defining site implementation software tools. Identifying, updating, compiling, reviewing, and submitting the DLIs to NA-243 were all critical activities for successfully implementing the AP and completing the AP data call at ORNL.

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Department of Energy Efforts to Promote Universal Adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol

Entry-into-force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) in January 2009 continues to demonstrate the ongoing commitment by the United States to promote universal adherence to the AP. The AP is a critical tool for improving the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) capabilities to detect undeclared activities that indicate a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is because States Parties are required to provide information about, and access to, nuclear fuel cycle activities beyond their traditional safeguards reporting requirements. As part of the U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification, the Administration is required to report annually to Congress on measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states, as well as assistance to the IAEA to promote the effective implementation of APs in those states. A key U.S. effort in this area is being managed by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Through new and existing bilateral cooperation agreements, INSEP has initiated technical assistance projects for AP implementation with selected non-weapon states. States with which INSEP is currently cooperating include Vietnam and Thailand, with Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, and other countries as possible future collaborators in the area of AP implementation. The INSEP collaborative model begins with a joint assessment with our partners to identify specific needs they may have regarding entering the AP into force and any impediments to successful implementation. An action plan is then developed detailing and prioritizing the necessary joint activities. Such assistance may include: advice on developing legal frameworks and regulatory documents; workshops to promote understanding of AP requirements; training to determine possible declarable activities; assistance in developing a system to collect and submit declarations; performing industry outreach to raise awareness; guidance for reporting export and manufacturing of “especially designed or prepared” equipment listed in AP Annex I/Annex II; and lastly, developing indigenous capabilities to sustain AP implementation. INSEP also coordinates with the IAEA to ensure the harmonization of the assistance provided by DOE and the IAEA. This paper describes current efforts and future plans for AP international implementation support.

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Lessons learned during the training exercise for the entry into force of the U.S. additional protocol in the DOE complex

In 2008 in anticipation of the United States bringing into force the Additional Protocol in early 2009 DOE/NNSA planned and executed training exercises in the conduct of Additional Protocol complementary access activities. Brookhaven National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory together produced the exercises designed to prepare the following types of DOE laboratories for complementary access - weapons laboratories, nuclear engineering laboratories, and science laboratories. This panel provides a forum to discuss and summarize the results and lessons learned from the 2008 exercise.

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Report on July 2015 Additional Protocol Coordinators Best Practices Workshop

After 10 years of implementation experience, the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) within the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) conducted the Additional Protocol (AP) Coordinators Best Practices Workshop at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from July 29-30, 2015. The goal of this workshop was to identify implementation best practices, lessons learned, and compliance challenges from the various Additional Protocol Coordinators (APCs) at each laboratory in the DOE/NNSA complex and associated sites. The workshop provided the opportunity for participants to share their insights and establish networks that APCs can utilize to continue to discuss challenges (new and old), identify best practices, and enhance communication and coordination for reporting multi-lab research projects during review activities. Workshop participants included DOE/NNSA HQ, laboratory and site APCs, seasoned experts, members of the original implementation outreach team, and Field Element and site security representatives.

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NGSI student activities in open source information analysis in support of the training program of the U.S. DOE laboratories for the entry into force of the additional protocol

In 2008 a joint team from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) consisting of specialists in training of IAEA inspectors in the use of complementary access activities formulated a training program to prepare the U.S. Doe laboratories for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. As a major part of the support of the activity, LANL summer interns provided open source information analysis to the LANL-BNL mock inspection team. They were a part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's (NGSI) summer intern program aimed at producing the next generation of safeguards specialists. This paper describes how they used open source information to 'backstop' the LANL-BNL team's effort to construct meaningful Additional Protocol Complementary Access training scenarios for each of the three DOE laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

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Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Philippines: USDOE/PNRI Cooperation

The Philippines entered into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2010. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is the government agency responsible for implementing the AP. In June 2010 the IAEA invited the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to help conduct a joint national training seminar on the AP. DOE presented to PNRI its AP international technical assistance program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), which helps partner countries implement the AP. In coordination with the IAEA, DOE established this program in 2008 to complement IAEA AP seminars with long-term country-specific cooperation from the perspective of a Member State. The US version of the AP is the same version as that of non-nuclear weapon states except for the addition of a national security exclusion. Due to this, DOE cooperation with other countries enables the sharing of valuable lessons learned in implementing the AP. DOE/INSEP described to PNRI the various areas of cooperation it offers to interested countries, whether they are preparing for entry into force or already implementing the AP. Even countries that have entered the AP into force are sometimes not fully prepared to implement it well, and welcome cooperation to improve their implementation process. PNRI and DOE/INSEP subsequently agreed to cooperate in several areas to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Philippines AP implementation. These areas include providing working-level training to PNRI staff and preparing an information document that details that training for future reference, assisting with the development of an outreach program and procedures for AP reporting and complementary access, and identifying Annex II equipment and non-nuclear materials whose export must be reported under the AP. DOE laboratory representatives, funded by INSEP, met again with PNRI in February 2011 to provide training for PNRI AP staff and investigate specific ways to improve implementation. Another meeting in July 2011 focused on preparations for outreach to industry and universities. In this paper PNRI describes current implementation of the AP in the Philippines, and both DOE/INSEP and PNRI provide their perspectives on their cooperation to enhance that implementation.

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Lessons Learned at the Idaho National Laboratory for the Entry into Force of the U.S. Additional Protocol

For a number of years, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been preparing for the entry into force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP). These preparations included attending training, participating in tabletop exercises, preparing draft declarations, developing INL-specific guidance documents, preparing for and hosting a mock complementary access visit, and preparing declarations for official submittal. All of these activities, the training materials, and software developed by other U.S. DOE national laboratories (PNNL, ORNL, LANL, and BNL) were very helpful in preparing for the entry into force of the AP. As with any endeavor of this size and complexity, however, there are always instances where even the best preparations and advanced planning do not anticipate every challenge. As the DOE's lead nuclear energy research and development facility, the INL faced many unique challenges. The majority of research conducted at the INL is nuclear fuel cycle related, most of which is not protected by the National Security Exclusion. This paper describes the lessons learned from the INL’s experience of preparing for the entry into force of the AP, specifically how translating and implementing general principles into actual activities proved to be one of many challenges, and provides general suggestions on how to respond effectively and efficiently to routine annual data calls and other AP requests.

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Developments in Assisting Countries in Implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began assisting selected non-nuclear weapon states in planning and preparing for implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol (AP). Since then, the AP international implementation program has contributed to the substantial progress made by Vietnam, Thailand, Iraq, and Malaysia in preparing for entry-into-force of the AP. An overall engagement plan has been developed with components designed to train government AP implementing agencies, inform policy makers, conduct outreach to industry and universities, make AP reporting software available and useful, and plan a detailed approach for implementing the declaration and complementary access provisions of the AP. DOE recently began collaborating with Indonesia, which has already entered the AP into force, requiring a second method of engagement somewhat different from that taken with countries that have not entered the AP into force. The AP international implementation program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program, is working more closely with DOE’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program to ensure countries are aware of and prepared to implement the export/import provisions of the AP. As the AP implementation program matures and helps move countries closer to entry-into-force or improved AP implementation, it is identifying characteristics of a country’s “end-state” that indicate that DOE assistance is no longer required. The U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification require the Administration to report annually to Congress on measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states. DOE’s AP international implementation program is a significant part of these measures. This paper describes recent developments to increase the scope and effectiveness of the program.

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Additional Protocol (AP) Protocol Reporter version 3.0 (PR3) System Requirements Specification (SRS)

The Protocol Reporter (PR) was developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist Member States in the creation and preparation of declarations pursuant to articles 2 and 3 of the model Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540, corrected), and was designed to be a complete tool for compiling, arranging, editing, managing, and submitting State declarations in support of the AP.

Cain, Ronald A.↗

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards at almost all of its meeting.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME III/III, IAEA COMMITTEE 24, DEVELOPMENT OF INFCIRC/540, ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE REVIEW (1996-1997).

In this section of the report, the development of INFCIRC/540 is traced by a compilation of citations from the IAEA documents presented to the Board of Governors and the records of discussions in the Board that took place prior to the establishment of Committee 24 as well as the documents and discussions of that committee. The evolution of the text is presented separately for each article or, for the more complex articles, for each paragraph or group of paragraphs of the article. This section covers all articles, including those involving no issues. Background, issues, interpretations and conclusions, which were addressed in Volumes I, II, and III are not repeated here. The comments by states that are included are generally limited to objections and suggested changes. Requests for clarification or elaboration have been omitted, although it is recognized that such comments were sometimes veiled objections.

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