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DOE OSTI2025

Identifying Adversarial Cyber-Activity in Operational Technology Environments Using Bayesian Networks

Critical infrastructure and other operational technology (OT) environments face increasing cybersecurity risks from adversarial behavior. This paper describes the development of a risk model using a Bayesian network to enhance the comprehension of observable cyber events caused by malicious activity in OT environments. The core of the Bayesian network is a process model that describes the stages of adversary behavior. The remainder of the model is based on the MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) taxonomy, which includes tactics and techniques that may be used by the adversary. The observables provide evidence for adversary behavior through the intermediary technique and tactic nodes. One challenge in constructing this model is a lack of open-source data from cyber-attacks on OT systems. This paper discusses learning from limited data, the elicitation of expert opinion to construct the conditional probability tables when data is scarce, and the refinement of the most difficult conditional probabilities tables using several forms of sensitivity analyses. Finally, the Bayesian network is demonstrated using two historical case studies: the DarkSide ransomware attack on the Colonial Pipeline and the destructive cyberattack targeting the ThyssenKrupp blast furnace. Index Terms—Cybersecurity, industrial control systems, operational technology

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Wind Supply Chain Security: Hardware Enumeration and Analysis

This project, undertaken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) Wind Energy Technologies Office (WETO), focused on the enumeration and analysis of six key devices important to wind technologies. The devices analyzed included Beckhoff Bus Terminal Controllers (BK1120 and BC9000), a Beckhoff Economy Built-in Panel PC (CP6231), an N-Tron Managed Industrial Ethernet Switch (711FX3), a Bachmann M1 Gateway, and a Bachmann Smart Power Plant Controller. Device selection was driven by availability and budget constraints, with several components sourced from existing wind farms and others procured through a co-agreement with another WETO-funded project. The project's primary objective was to create a hardware bill of materials (HBOM) for each device, identifying and documenting all components to assess potential security and supply chain risks. A detailed analysis revealed over 750 unique components across the six devices, with 80% successfully identified and accompanied by datasheets. Notably, Texas Instruments emerged as the leading supplier, providing over 16% of the components, followed by ON Semiconductor at 11.3%, Analog Devices at 5.3%, and Renesas Electronics Corp at 4.1%. Other notable vendors included Toshiba Corporation, iC-Haus Corporation, Atmel, Vishay, and STMicroelectronics. The enumeration process involved thorough documentation of each component, including its designation, quantity, identifiers, pin package, description, vendor, model, and country of origin. This process provided valuable insights into the complexity and diversity of the electronic systems within these wind devices. It also highlighted the distinct separation of components between vendors, suggesting a trend of vendor-specific component usage. Key findings from the project emphasized the importance of broadening the scope of vendor analysis in future research to gain a comprehensive understanding of component distribution and commonality. The identification of vendor-specific component usage patterns offers new avenues for research and underscores the significance of continued investigation in this field. Overall, this project provides critical insights into the component composition of wind devices, aiding in the development of improved supply chain management and component sourcing strategies. The results contribute valuable knowledge to the wind technology sector, laying the groundwork for enhanced security and resilience in wind energy systems.

17 - WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Total metals, carbon, nitrogen & anion concentration data; Slate River & East River floodplains, Crested Butte, CO; May 2022-October 2022

This data package includes processed and undiluted measurements for metal, total carbon, total nitrogen, and anion concentrations from pore water (groundwater) and surface water samples from the Slate River and East River floodplains of Crested Butte, CO, focus field sites for the SLAC Floodplain Hydro-Biogeochemistry SFA. The data was generated as part of the work targeting the overarching research question for the SLAC SFA: How do ubiquitous subsurface interfaces mediate molecular-scale biogeochemical processes and groundwater quality in floodplains and watersheds? Samples were collected between May and October of 2022. These measurements were all recorded at the Arizona Laboratory for Emerging Contaminants (ALEC) at the University of Arizona located in Tucson, AZ. Groundwater samples were extracted from a network of installed rhizon (Rhizosphere Research Products, part no. 19.60.21F, 0.6 micrometer mesh size) and piezometer wells within the river floodplain. All water samples were shaded from sun exposure during extraction from the subsurface and preserved at 4C until measured at ALEC.Analysis by ICP-MS (metals):Measurements for total metals were made on the Agilent 7700x ICP-MS (for total metals) – Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA. The analytical QA/QC protocol was adapted from US EPA Method 200.8 for analysis by ICP-MS. Calibration standards were prepared from multi-element stock solutions (SPEX Certiprep, Metuchen, NJ). Calibration curves include at least 7 points with correlation coefficients > 0.995. The QC protocol includes a continuing calibration blank (CCB), a continuing calibration verification (CCV) solution and at least one quality control sample (QCS) to be analyzed just after calibration and again after every 12 samples and at the completion of the run. The QCS solutions are from an independent source, such as NIST SRM 1643e - Trace elements in water, or QCS solutions from High Purity Standards (Charleston, SC). Acceptable QC responses must be between 90 and 110% of the certified value. Lastly, a suitable internal standard (usually Rh, In, Ga or Ge) is added using on-line addition into the sample line and mixing tee.Analysis by Shimadzu TOC-L (TOC/TN):The TOC-L system is a combustion technique where liquid samples are injected and combusted into CO2 for carbon detection by non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) and NO for detection by chemiluminescence. A calibration curve using five standard solutions between 0.1 and 7 ppm for carbon and 0.05 and 3.5 ppm for nitrogen is made for each type of measurement with a linearity >0.99. All samples, standards, and QC’s are prepared in 24mL scintillation vials that have been baked for 4hrs at 475 Cº and made using RO water (18.2mΩ). QC’s include a calibration blank check (CCB), continuing calibration check (CCC), and a certified reference material check (CRM). All QC’s are within ±10% error and are run before and after each batch of samples. Samples are diluted and rerun if any measurement concentrations are above the highest standard.Analysis by Ion Chromatography (Anions):The instrument used is the Thermo Scientific Dionex ICS-6000 using AS+AG22 column set for anion analysis with sodium carbonate eluent. A calibration curve using five standard solutions between 5 and 250 umol/L is made with a linearity >0.99. Standards and QC’s are prepared in 15mL polypropylene conical tubes, pipetted along with the samples into 1.5mL polypropylene vials. Dilutions are made using RO water (18.2mΩ). QC’s include a calibration blank check (CCB), continuing calibration check (CCC), and a certified reference material check (CRM). All QC’s are within ±10% error and are run before and after each batch of samples. Samples are diluted and rerun if any measurement concentrations are above the highest standard.All files are in csv format.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Reactor System Facility Modification to Detect Compromised Human Machine Interfaces

This study focuses on a multi-layered Industrial Control System (ICS)/Operational Technology (OT) security architecture to aid in the discovery and mitigation of compromised Human Machine Interface (HMI)/Instrumentation & Control (I&C) based systems for modifying a prototypical reactor condition test facility called the Flowing Autoclave System (FAS) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This is achieved through a three-layered combination of network security solutions, hash-based algorithms, and blockchain technologies. Hash algorithms are mathematical functions used to generate a predetermined set of fixed-length values. They are widely used in computer security to verify the integrity of system information and data, both on a local network and the wider internet. Even small amounts of unauthorized system modification will cause the hash algorithm to output a set of characters that deviate significantly from its original value. Assisting secure hash functions, blockchain technology is a secure and distributed technology used to provide an immutable set of records replicated on all devices within a decentralized network. Blockchain offers a cost-effective solution to detect system compromise by providing a traceable breadcrumb trail of all network activity and data modification happening on a system. If both are used in conjunction with network monitoring tools, the integration of this three-pronged approach can become an asset in detecting suspected system compromises before any real damage can occur.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗