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Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

TU-AB-BRC-07: Efficiency of An IAEA Phase-Space Source for a Low Energy X-Ray Tube Using Egs++

Purpose: To extend the capability of the EGSnrc C++ class library (egs++) to write and read IAEA phase-space files as a particle source, and to assess the relative efficiency gain in dose calculation using an IAEA phase-space source for modelling a miniature low energy x-ray source. Methods: We created a new ausgab object to score particles exiting a user-defined geometry and write them to an IAEA phase-space file. A new particle source was created to read from IAEA phase-space data. With these tools, a phase-space file was generated for particles exiting a miniature 50 kVp x-ray tube (The INTRABEAM System, Carl Zeiss). The phase-space source was validated by comparing calculated PDDs with a full electron source simulation of the INTRABEAM. The dose calculation efficiency gain of the phase-space source was determined relative to the full simulation. The efficiency gain as a function of i) depth in water, and ii) job parallelization was investigated. Results: The phase-space and electron source PDDs were found to agree to 0.5% RMS, comparable to statistical uncertainties. The use of a phase-space source for the INTRABEAM led to a relative efficiency gain of greater than 20 over the full electron source simulation, with an increase of up to a factor of 196. The efficiency gain was found to decrease with depth in water, due to the influence of scattering. Job parallelization (across 2 to 256 cores) was not found to have any detrimental effect on efficiency gain. Conclusion: A set of tools has been developed for writing and reading IAEA phase-space files, which can be used with any egs++ user code. For simulation of a low energy x-ray tube, the use of a phase-space source was found to increase the relative dose calculation efficiency by factor of up to 196. The authors acknowledge partial support by the CREATE Medical Physics Research Training Network grant of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (Grant No. 432290).

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

International Scavenging for First Responder Guidance and Tools: IAEA Products

In fiscal years (FY) 2016 and 2017, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) examined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) radiological emergency response and preparedness products (guidance and tools) to determine which of these products could be useful to U.S. first responders. The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC), which is responsible for emergency preparedness and response, offers a range of tools and guidance documents for responders in recognizing, responding to, and recovering from radiation emergencies and incidents. In order to implement this project, BNL obtained all potentially relevant tools and products produced by the IAEA IEC and analyzed these materials to determine their relevance to first responders in the U.S. Subsequently, BNL organized and hosted a workshop at DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) for U.S. first responders to examine and evaluate IAEA products to consider their applicability to the United States. This report documents and describes the First Responder Product Evaluation Workshop, and provides recommendations on potential steps the U.S. federal government could take to make IAEA guidance and tools useful to U.S. responders.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cooperation between SSACs/RSACs and the IAEA Under the State-Level Concept:

The role of State and Regional Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSACs/RSACs) will increase within the framework of the state-level concept that is being implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to effectively implement the concept and further establish a state-level approach, which is sought to tailor safeguards activities in a specific state accordingly, collaboration between SSACs/RSACs and the IAEA is very important. Nevertheless, the implementation of such concept is not simple. Optimal relationship between operators and national/governmental authorities and between SSACs/RSACs and the IAEA is an evolving process. Benefits of such an approach as well as roles and responsibilities must be made clear to all parties involved. Acknowledging the uniqueness and diversity of SSACs/RSACs is a first step, followed by the implementation of confidence-building measures that result from an efficient communication process, and culminating with a transparent technical cooperation program. This paper analyses various aspects of the complex relationship among all parties involved in the implementation of the state-level concept: operators, national authorities, government agencies, SSACs/RSACs, and the IAEA. The author analyses the intricate network of possibilities to improve cooperation and discusses issues involving the provision of additional and voluntary information by SSACs/RSACs to the IAEA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Update on Spent Fuel Management Activities with Focus on Reprocessing

The IAEA continues to give a high priority to safe and effective implementation of spent fuel management. As the options for spent fuel management may in the long term diversify due to evolving requirements and new priorities in strategic criteria, it is worthwhile identifying viable technical options for spent fuel treatment and their applicability to spent fuel management. The IAEA has issued several publications in the past that provide technical information on the global status and trends in spent fuel reprocessing and associated topics. The latest update of this information, collected from the experts in this field, covers currently available spent fuel reprocessing technologies as well as emerging technologies that are being investigated. The information exchange on advanced nuclear fuel cycles is also achieved through the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) initiated by IAEA. Substantial global growth of nuclear electricity generation is expected to occur during this century, in response to environmental issues and to assure the sustainability of the electrical energy supply in both industrial and less-developed countries. Recent initiatives by (IAEA, USA and Russia) are proposing the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. These proposals imply a need for the development of innovative means for closure of the nuclear fuel cycle as advanced reactors (Generations III and IV) are deployed and as the quantities of material in the fuel cycle are set to increase to levels several times larger than at present. Spent fuel treatment/reprocessing options have evolved significantly since the start of nuclear energy application. There is a large body of industrial experience in fuel cycle technologies complemented by research and development programs in several countries. A number of options exist for the treatment of spent fuel. Some, including those that avoid separation of a pure plutonium stream, are at an advanced level of technological maturity. These could be deployed in the next generation of industrial-scale reprocessing plants, while others (such as dry methods) are at a pilot scale, laboratory scale or conceptual stage of development. Innovative reprocessing methods would have to be developed for the treatment of fuel types that may be utilized in the future; these fuels may differ substantially from the UO{sub 2} or MOX ceramics used in current light water reactors. Continued research and development on these methods must continue in view of the expected evolution in fuel and reactor types. The design of advanced reprocessing methods must deal in a comprehensive manner with (1) safety, (2) the control and minimization of plant effluents, (3) minimization of the waste generation, (4) the production of stable and durable waste forms, and (5) economic competitiveness. International collaboration on the development of advanced reprocessing methods, considering the magnitude of the challenges, is essential to facilitate the future deployment of these technologies. Several organizations (like IAEA and OECD) have developed modelling tools for analyzing nuclear fuel cycles. There are a number of challenges to be addressed in development of new reprocessing strategies and technologies. Proliferation risk has to be reduced. One of the major obstacles to overcome is public acceptance of the advanced fuel strategies. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addressing the Legacy Waste Challenge - IAEA Activities in Support of Member States - 16304

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promotes the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy including the safe management of radioactive waste. Although safe and effective radioactive waste processing technologies and practices are well established and widespread, the issue of legacy waste remains a challenge for many IAEA member states. The primary source of the world-wide legacy waste inventory has its origins in past nuclear weapons programs and associated research and development activities. Other sources include historical waste in old storage and disposal facilities that were either never intended to be a permanent end-state or are no longer considered adequate from a safety perspective. Additionally, many IAEA member states with less advanced nuclear energy programs, often have small inventories of legacy radioactive waste arising from medical, research and industrial activities but lack the processing capabilities to put these wastes into a safe form for storage and disposal. These wastes have the potential to create a safety and environmental hazard and pose a radioactive waste management challenge for many reasons including lack of characterization data and process knowledge, waste package degradation, or the presence of hazardous or mixed waste components. The Waste Technology Section (WTS) within the Department of Nuclear Energy at the IAEA has an extensive program of activities to support the safe retrieval, processing, storage and disposal of radioactive waste including legacy waste. These include publications, co-ordinated research projects, technical co-operation activities, and information exchange forums including workshops, technical meetings and virtual networks. This paper will present an overview of recent IAEA activities and accomplishments aimed as assisting member states with addressing their legacy waste inventories. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Turbo FRMAC Implementation of IAEA Radiological Assessment Methodologies for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies: Ingestion Pathway and Skin and Thyroid Monitoring

This report documents the findings of an assessment of the Turbo FRMAC© software’s ability to implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance for calculating operational intervention levels (OIL) for nuclear and radiological emergencies. This assessment is a continuation of previous work that considered IAEA OIL1 and OIL2 for evacuation and relocation protective actions. The IAEA OIL and U.S. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) derived response and intervention level methodologies were compared for ingestion and skin and thyroid monitoring pathways. This comparison revealed significant differences in IAEA versus FRMAC handling of these pathways, which precluded an assessment of Turbo FRMAC’s ability to implement the IAEA approach.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Training and Human Resources

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) priority of training and human resources is aimed at providing the Department of Safeguards with an appropriate mixture of regular staff and extrabudgetary experts who are qualified to meet the IAEA's technical needs and to provide personnel with appropriate instruction to improve the technical basis and specific skills needed to perform their job functions. The equipment and methods used in inspection activities are unique, complex, and evolving. New and experienced safeguards inspectors need timely and effective training to perform required tasks and to learn new skills prescribed by new safeguards policies or agreements. The role of the inspector has changed from that of strictly an accountant to include that of a detective. New safeguards procedures are being instituted, and therefore, experienced inspectors must be educated on these new procedures. The USSP also recognizes the need for training safeguards support staff, particularly those who maintain and service safeguards equipment (SGTS), and those who perform information collection and analysis (SGIM). The USSP is committed to supporting the IAEA with training to ensure the effectiveness of all staff members and will continue to offer its assistance in the development and delivery of basic, refresher, and advanced training courses. This paper will discuss the USSP ongoing support in the area of training and IAEA staffing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

TH-EF-204-02: Small Field Radiation Therapy: Physics and Recent Recommendations From IAEA and ICRU

Joanna E. Cygler, Jan Seuntjens, J. Daniel Bourland, M. Saiful Huq, Josep Puxeu Vaque, Daniel Zucca Aparicio, Tatiana Krylova, Yuri Kirpichev, Eric Ford, Caridad Borras Stereotactic Radiation Therapy (SRT) utilizes small static and dynamic (IMRT) fields, to successfully treat malignant and benign diseases using techniques such as Stereotactic Radiosurgery (SRS) and Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy (SBRT). SRT is characterized by sharp dose gradients for individual fields and their resultant dose distributions. For appropriate targets, small field radiotherapy offers improved treatment quality by allowing better sparing of organs at risk while delivering the prescribed target dose. Specialized small field treatment delivery systems, such as robotic-controlled linear accelerators, gamma radiosurgery units, and dynamic arc linear accelerators may utilize rigid fixation, image guidance, and tumor tracking, to insure precise dose delivery to static or moving targets. However, in addition to great advantages, small field delivery techniques present special technical challenges for dose calibration due to unique geometries and small field sizes not covered by existing reference dosimetry protocols such as AAPM TG-51 or IAEA TRS 398. In recent years extensive research has been performed to understand small field dosimetry and measurement instrumentation. AAPM, IAEA and ICRU task groups are expected to provide soon recommendations on the dosimetry of small radiation fields. In this symposium we will: 1] discuss the physics, instrumentation, methodologies and challenges for small field radiation dose measurements; 2] review IAEA and ICRU recommendations on prescribing, recording and reporting of small field radiation therapy; 3] discuss selected clinical applications and technical aspects for specialized image-guided, small field, linear accelerator based treatment techniques such as IMRT and SBRT. Learning Objectives: To learn the physics of small fields in contrast to dosimetry of conventional fields To learn about detectors suitable for small fields To learn about the role of Monte Carlo simulations in determination of small field output factors To provide an overview of the IAEA small field dosimetry recommendations To provide an overview of the content of the ICRU report on Prescribing, Reporting and Recording of Small Field Radiation Therapy. To learn about special technical considerations in delivering IMRT and SBRT treatments To appreciate specific challenges of IMRT implementation J. Seuntjens, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council; Canadian Institutes of Health Research.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Co-ordination of the International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluators; Summary Report of an IAEA Technical Meeting

The IAEA Nuclear Data Section convened the 18th meeting of the International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluators at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, 23 to 27 March 2009. This meeting was attended by 22 scientists from 14 Member States, plus IAEA staff, concerned with the compilation, evaluation and dissemination of nuclear structure and decay data. A summary of the meeting, recommendations/conclusions, data centre reports, and various proposals considered, modified and agreed by the participants are contained within this document. The International Network of Nuclear Structure and Decay Data (NSDD) Evaluators holds biennial meetings under the auspices of the IAEA, and consists of evaluation groups and data service centres in several countries. This network has the objective of providing up-to-date nuclear structure and decay data for all known nuclides by evaluating all existing experimental data. Data resulting from this international evaluation collaboration is included in the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) and published in the journals Nuclear Physics A and Nuclear Data Sheets (NDS).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Philippines: USDOE/PNRI Cooperation

The Philippines entered into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2010. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is the government agency responsible for implementing the AP. In June 2010 the IAEA invited the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to help conduct a joint national training seminar on the AP. DOE presented to PNRI its AP international technical assistance program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), which helps partner countries implement the AP. In coordination with the IAEA, DOE established this program in 2008 to complement IAEA AP seminars with long-term country-specific cooperation from the perspective of a Member State. The US version of the AP is the same version as that of non-nuclear weapon states except for the addition of a national security exclusion. Due to this, DOE cooperation with other countries enables the sharing of valuable lessons learned in implementing the AP. DOE/INSEP described to PNRI the various areas of cooperation it offers to interested countries, whether they are preparing for entry into force or already implementing the AP. Even countries that have entered the AP into force are sometimes not fully prepared to implement it well, and welcome cooperation to improve their implementation process. PNRI and DOE/INSEP subsequently agreed to cooperate in several areas to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Philippines AP implementation. These areas include providing working-level training to PNRI staff and preparing an information document that details that training for future reference, assisting with the development of an outreach program and procedures for AP reporting and complementary access, and identifying Annex II equipment and non-nuclear materials whose export must be reported under the AP. DOE laboratory representatives, funded by INSEP, met again with PNRI in February 2011 to provide training for PNRI AP staff and investigate specific ways to improve implementation. Another meeting in July 2011 focused on preparations for outreach to industry and universities. In this paper PNRI describes current implementation of the AP in the Philippines, and both DOE/INSEP and PNRI provide their perspectives on their cooperation to enhance that implementation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safety-Related Activities of the IAEA for Radioactive Waste, Decommissioning and Remediation - 13473

To fulfil its mandate and serve the needs of its Member States, the IAEA is engaged in a wide range of safety-related activities pertaining to radioactive waste management, decommissioning and remediation. One of the statutory obligations of the IAEA is to establish safety standards and to provide for the application of these standards. The present paper describes recent developments in regard to the IAEA's waste safety standards, and some of the ways the IAEA makes provision for their application. The safety standards and supporting safety demonstration projects seek to establish international consensus on methodologies and approaches for dealing with particular subject areas, for example, safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Department of Energy Efforts to Promote Universal Adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol

Entry-into-force of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP) in January 2009 continues to demonstrate the ongoing commitment by the United States to promote universal adherence to the AP. The AP is a critical tool for improving the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) capabilities to detect undeclared activities that indicate a clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is because States Parties are required to provide information about, and access to, nuclear fuel cycle activities beyond their traditional safeguards reporting requirements. As part of the U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification, the Administration is required to report annually to Congress on measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states, as well as assistance to the IAEA to promote the effective implementation of APs in those states. A key U.S. effort in this area is being managed by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Through new and existing bilateral cooperation agreements, INSEP has initiated technical assistance projects for AP implementation with selected non-weapon states. States with which INSEP is currently cooperating include Vietnam and Thailand, with Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, and other countries as possible future collaborators in the area of AP implementation. The INSEP collaborative model begins with a joint assessment with our partners to identify specific needs they may have regarding entering the AP into force and any impediments to successful implementation. An action plan is then developed detailing and prioritizing the necessary joint activities. Such assistance may include: advice on developing legal frameworks and regulatory documents; workshops to promote understanding of AP requirements; training to determine possible declarable activities; assistance in developing a system to collect and submit declarations; performing industry outreach to raise awareness; guidance for reporting export and manufacturing of “especially designed or prepared” equipment listed in AP Annex I/Annex II; and lastly, developing indigenous capabilities to sustain AP implementation. INSEP also coordinates with the IAEA to ensure the harmonization of the assistance provided by DOE and the IAEA. This paper describes current efforts and future plans for AP international implementation support.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

IAEA Photonuclear Data Library 2019

Here, photo-induced reaction cross section data are of importance for a variety of current or emerging applications, such as radiation shielding design and radiation transport analyses, calculations of absorbed dose in the human body during radiotherapy, physics and technology of fission reactors (influence of photo-reactions on neutron balance) and fusion reactors (plasma diagnostics and shielding), activation analyses, safeguards and inspection technologies, nuclear waste transmutation, medical isotope production and astrophysical applications. To address these data needs the IAEA Photonuclear Data library was produced in 1999, containing evaluated photo-induced cross sections and neutron spectra for 164 nuclides which were deemed relevant for the applications. Since the release of the IAEA Photonuclear Data Library however, new experimental data as well as new methods to assess the reliability of experimental cross sections have become available. Theoretical models and input parameters used to evaluate photo-induced reactions have improved significantly over the years. In addition, new measurements of partial photoneutron cross sections using mono-energetic photon beams and advanced neutron detection systems have been performed allowing for the validation of the evaluations and assessments of the experimental data. Furthermore, technological advances have led to the construction of new and more powerful gamma-beam facilities, therefore new data needs are emerging. We report our coordinated efforts to address these data needs and present the results of the new up-to-date evaluations included in the new updated IAEA Photonuclear Data Library consisting of 219 nuclides. The new library includes 188 new evaluations produced by the CRP evaluators, and one evaluation taken from the JENDL/PD-2016 library, while 20 evaluations were retained from the previous 1999 IAEA Photonuclear Data Library. In most of the cases, the photon energy goes up to 200 MeV. A total of 55 nuclides are new in this library reflecting the progress in measurements but also the developing data needs. In this paper we discuss the new assessment method and make recommendations to the user community in cases where the experimental data are discrepant and the assessments disagree. In addition, in the absence of experimental data, we present model predictions for photo-induced reaction cross section on nuclides of potential interest to medical radioisotope production.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

How To Maintain Effective IAEA Safeguards While Reducing Facility Impact

For almost twenty years, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been visiting the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site where excess plutonium has been placed under IAEA safeguards as part of the United States Volunatary Offer Agreement. During that time, the mission of K-Area Complex has expanded from storage of nuclear matieral to glovebox operations in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition program. With this change in mission, it is becoming increasingly challenging to manage facility staff radiation exposure and operating activities during the IAEA’s annual Physcial Inventory Verifications (PIV). This study has identified both near-term and long-term recommendations for IAEA monitoring protocols that would allow the IAEA to maintain effective safeguards of the material while decreasing the impact to the facility. A statisitical analysis has shown that reducing the number of containers measured during an annual PIV from 12 to 4 still ensures a high level of confidence in the confidence while reducing the inspector time in the facility amd with a corresponding significant reduction in personnel radiation exposure. A modified installation pattern of Remotely Monitored Sealing Arrays (RMSAs) is also proposed utilizing only the outer rows of arrays of stored material containers in the Stack Area (SA). The modified RMSA placement will provide equivalent protection, while significantly reducing personnel radiological exposure, manpower requirements and associated costs. With advances in technology, there are additional potential options in containment/surveillance and continuity of knowledge that would allow the agency to be outside of the facility during PIV measurements and have confidence in the accuracy and authencitity of the results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗