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This report documents the findings of an assessment of the Turbo FRMAC© software’s ability to implement International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance for calculating operational intervention levels (OIL) for nuclear and radiological emergencies. This assessment is a continuation of previous work that considered IAEA OIL1 and OIL2 for evacuation and relocation protective actions. The IAEA OIL and U.S. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) derived response and intervention level methodologies were compared for ingestion and skin and thyroid monitoring pathways. This comparison revealed significant differences in IAEA versus FRMAC handling of these pathways, which precluded an assessment of Turbo FRMAC’s ability to implement the IAEA approach.
This study presents the results of Physical Model user interviews conducted with 12 people who have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards experience. The goal of this report is to provide additional context for policy makers when prioritizing the needs of the IAEA regarding support for enhancements to the Physical Model. The interviews covered the general usability of the Physical Model, its effectiveness as a technical reference, and the scope and utility of the Physical Model's indicators and content. The key conclusions from these interviews are as follows: 1) The Physical Model is difficult to find and not well advertised. 2) The Physical Model can be difficult to use due to its format, which makes searching for information difficult, and lack of visual content. Therefore, the Physical Model should be supported in multiple formats (print, PDF, web) to maximize its usability for different stakeholders. 3) The scope of the Physical Model's content and indicators is likely sufficient, and translating indicators into other languages is unlikely to be worth the effort. 4) Despite its inefficiencies and other issues, the Physical Model in its current form is a vital (albeit under-utilized) resource for key stakeholders. 5) Despite its broad use case the Physical Model is not a catch-all tool and force-fitting the Physical Model into functions for which it has not been designed for would likely diminish its value. 6) It can be difficult to disentangle challenges related to the Physical Model and its usability from broader challenges at the Agency, such as general issues with communication and coordination. Based on these conclusions and considering the results of past studies on the Physical Model funded by NA-241, the analysis team developed a list of recommendations and associated actions for IAEA consideration. These recommendations are prioritized based on the assessed level of difficulty for the IAEA to implement a recommendation, emphasizing low hanging fruit then building to more ambitious changes to the Physical Model's format and content.
In compliance with their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, based on INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972), States Party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are obligated to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all changes in their nuclear material inventory as well as movement of the material across boundaries of IAEA recognized material balance areas (MBA), inventories and nuclear material balances. This project addresses capabilities to detect irregularities in State reports, thus ensuring their accuracy and completeness, and in the broader context, States’ compliance with safeguards obligations of the NPT. A recent study (Henzl et al., 2022) (lead by this project’s PI) demonstrated how analysis of dynamic correlations in nuclear material movement within the entire fuel cycle of a State (viewed as a single system) can reveal variances consistent with and indicative of “irregular” activities. Expanding on this concept, novel ways to analyze State declarations themselves—again, for the State as a whole entity—will help the IAEA draw accurate safeguards conclusions and trust the validity and authenticity of Stategenerated declaration reports. Introducing new declaration analyses capabilities explored in this project will help to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State in general.
This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 17 May 2024. The meeting was attended by 26 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA). A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
Drawing upon globally recognized efforts by a variety of institutions, the paper develops a practical and defensible framework for consideration and use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the adoption of credible ethical standards for autonomous and intelligent systems (AIS). The analysis is based on a future hypothetical AIS that identifies signatures of misuse, diversion, and other research and development (R&D). The hypothetical system serves as an exemplar for subject matter expert (SME) workshop participants to begin to answer ethical AIS questions around how these systems should be governed and maintained, what the internal and external considerations associated with artificial intelligence (AI) tools are, and where the boundaries between ethical and non-ethical uses are. The ethical AIS workshop explored several important topics: (a) Recommendations that can be currently implemented by the IAEA, (b) Proposed defensible criteria and metrics aligned with an ethical AI for safeguards implementation, (c) Discussion of future needs and capabilities, and (d) Derive appropriate next steps and actions to support filling current technological, operational, and cultural gaps and realizing an effective ethical AI for safeguards framework. The Establishing Ethical Guidelines for Applying AI to IAEA Safeguards project creates awareness in the community of the ethical AIS approach.
Gender mainstreaming has emerged as a critical mechanism towards achieving gender equality in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and programs, including those related to national security. Gender mainstreaming is generally defined as the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, and programs, in all areas and at all levels, with the ultimate goal to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming, which in essence can be thought of as “gender equality by design,” is an important element for building a robust nuclear security infrastructure. To date, however, gender mainstreaming has not been fully operationalized in the nuclear sector. For instance, the IAEA Milestones Approach, which provides important guidance to states seeking to develop nuclear power programs, has not yet incorporated or addressed gender considerations in its various phases or nuclear infrastructure issues, including those related to nuclear security. Therefore, this paper will argue that specifically for nuclear newcomer states, gender mainstreaming could serve as a powerful tool to integrate gender considerations into the design of laws, policies, programs, and entities necessary to successfully implement a nuclear power program. The objective of this study is twofold: first, to explore the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance to nuclear security, and second, to identify how gender can be incorporated into the IAEA Milestones Approach. The paper will emphasize the importance of developing guidance for the IAEA and nuclear newcomer states on how gender considerations could be incorporated throughout the development of a nuclear security program.
The Fukushima-Daiichi accident in 2011 highlighted the pressing need for enhanced design and safety analysis of nuclear fuels, especially under accident conditions in nuclear power plants (NPPs). To address this need, the international nuclear fuel community has developed several concepts of Accident Tolerant and Advanced Technology Fuels (ATFs) for light water reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at the request of its Member States, has initiated a series of three Coordinated Research Projects (CRPs) to aid in the development and testing of these ATFs. Further, these projects, known as FUMAC, ACTOF, and ATF-TS, focus on the experimentation and simulation of ATFs under various accident conditions, including design basis accidents and design extension conditions. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the main activities, as well as the achieved or anticipated results of these three CRPs. The insights and advancements gained from these projects will enable IAEA Member States to further refine nuclear fission technology, thereby contributing to efforts aimed at mitigating climate change.
IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation - This presentation is intended to introduce the audience to the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency at nuclear facilities around the world. It covers the State Level Approach, random statistical sampling processes, material balance area structure, non-destructive assay techniques, and inspection areas. Addition of advanced verification technologies for the IAEA
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.
Despite interesting properties, the use of 67 Cu, 186 Re and 47 Sc theranostic radionuclides inpreclinical studies and clinical trials is curtailed by their limited availability due to a lack of widelyestablished production methods. An IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) was initiated toidentify important technical issues related to the production and quality control of these emergingradionuclides and related radiopharmaceuticals, based on the request from IAEA Member States.The international team worked on targetry, separation, quality control and radiopharmaceutical aspectsof the radionuclides obtained from research reactors and cyclotrons leading to preparation ofa standard recommendations for all Member States. The CRP was initiated in 2016 with fourteenparticipants from thirteen Member States from four continents. Extraordinary results on the production,quality control and preclinical evaluation of selected radionuclides were reported in this projectthat was finalized in 2020. The outcomes, outputs and results of this project achieved by participatingMember States are described in this minireview.
The IAEA Conference on the Development of Preparedness for National and International Emergency Response 2021. The purpose of the event is to foster the exchange of information and enhance global awareness on various EPR topics through the discussion of both the progress made at national and international levels and the challenges encountered, by sharing experiences, evaluating current trends, technologies and lessons in EPR
The IAEA’s model testing programmes have included a series of Working Groups concerned with modelling radioactive contamination in urban environments. These have included the Urban Working Group of Validation of Environmental Model Predictions (1988–1994), the Urban Remediation Working Group of Environmental Modelling for Radiation Safety (EMRAS) (2003–2007), the Urban Areas Working Group of EMRAS II (2009–2011), the Urban Environments Working Group of (Modelling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments) MODARIA I (2013–2015), and most recently, the Urban Exposures Working Group of MODARIA II (2016–2019). The overarching objective of these Working Groups has been to test and improve the capabilities of computer models used to assess radioactive contamination in urban environments, including dispersion and deposition processes, short-term and long-term redistribution of contaminants following deposition events, and the effectiveness of various countermeasures and other protective actions, including remedial actions, in reducing contamination levels, human exposures, and doses to humans. This paper describes the exercises conducted during the MODARIA I and MODARIA II programmes. These exercises have included short-range and mid-range atmospheric dispersion exercises based on data from field tests or tracer studies, hypothetical urban dispersion exercises, and an exercise based on data collected after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. We report improvement of model capabilities will lead to improvements in assessing various contamination scenarios (real or hypothetical), and in turn, to improved decision-making and communication with the public following a nuclear or radiological emergency.
Here we summarize the contributions presented at the IAEA technical meeting on plasma disruptions and their mitigation, held virtually, 20–23 July 2020. The meeting brought together more than 120 experts from nuclear fusion research sites worldwide to discuss experimental, theoretical and modelling work in the field of plasma disruptions with special emphasis on developing a solid basis for possible disruption mitigation strategies in ITER and next generation fusion devices. The main topics of the meeting were: (i) disruption consequences, including electromagnetic loads, heat loads, and runaway electrons; (ii) disruption prediction and avoidance, including machine learning and physics-based approaches, and control aspects; and (iii) disruption mitigation, including shattered pellet injection, alternative techniques and general aspects of disruption mitigation.
Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR) are one of the promising Generation IV fast reactors. The China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) is a 65 MWth pool-type SFR with a high neutron leakage core using high enriched uranium oxide fuel. The CEFR start-up tests in 2010 consist of series of neutronics experiments. Essential experimental data are available from the 2018 IAEA-CEFR-CRP benchmark document and useful for the validation of neutron transport codes and nuclear data libraries. The TRIPOLI-4 Monte Carlo transport code is a general-purpose neutronics code using continuous-energy nuclear data libraries. It has a rich validation database covering different computational and experimental benchmark data sets to assure the accuracy and credibility of numerical studies. Previous TRIPOLI-4 SFR core physics calculations used mainly MOX fuels. SFR control rod worth studies with TRIPOLI-4 were mainly on big-size cores. To test the modeling capability of TRIPOLI-4 on fuel loading patterns and on variable control rods positions for SFRs and to check recent nuclear data libraries, it is interesting to investigate the CEFR start-up tests in this work, including core states from subcritical to supercritical, control rods and rod group worth, point kinetics parameters, and radial foil activation measurements. TRIPOLI-4 calculation results using new data libraries JEFF-3.3, ENDF/B-VIII, and those of ENDF/B-VII.1 for different CEFR core states are reported here. By means of different options of TRIPOLI-4, control-rod SAs reactivity worth, point kinetics parameters, and radial {sup 237}Np(n,f) fission rate distribution were successfully evaluated. Both ENDF/B-VIII and JEFF-3.3 nuclear data libraries provided reliable results with a difference of 170 +/- 11 pcm in k{sub eff}.
IAEA Priority Objective T2, R&D Need T.2.R6 to “Develop and implement methods to detect signatures of nuclear activities in environmental samples including: Age determination of U and Pu relevant to the origin of nuclear materials”- specific focus on plutonium (Pu) age dating
Objective was to develop a robust, tamper-indicating seal for IAEA (or similar applications).