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The IAEA Workshop on Requirements and Potential Technologies for Replacement of 3He Detectors in IAEA Safeguards Applications

From 22 – 24 March, 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held an international workshop to address the question of a possible replacement for helium-3 based neutron detectors. Within this wider scope, the workshop was focused on those applications used in IAEA verification activities. There were two principle objectives of the workshop: 1) to determine the specific requirements that a potential replacement technology would have to satisfy, and 2) to identify alternative detector technologies that appear promising for meeting those requirements. The workshop was successful in achieving both objectives. A set of detailed and quantitative specifications was developed and achieved a general consensus among the conference participants. These included operational considerations such as temperature stability, safety, weight, and cost in addition to a number of performance requirements. The performance requirements were derived from an analysis of the spectrum of IAEA applications that use neutron detectors. After analyzing these applications, it was determined that the most common application for 3He detectors was for neutron coincidence counting, comprising over 95% of 3He use. The details and rationale for this assessment will be provided. The performance requirements for neutron coincidence counting can be directly calculated from the standard variance expressions. From these, a basic figure of merit (FOM) was developed that can be used to rank various different options. For neutron coincidence counting, the figure of merit is: , where ε is the detection efficiency and is the detector die away time. Both the FOM and the calculations will be presented. The full list of requirements is included in this paper. The second purpose of the workshop was to identify promising replacement technologies. There were multiple presentations of candidate detection technologies over the course of the workshop, covering a wide spectrum of approaches and detection physics. These technologies were judged relative to the performance of a 3He-based system, as well as its ability to meet the replacement technology requirements as developed in this workshop. The paper will present a summary of this assessment.

Pickrell, Mark↗

12th IAEA Technical Meeting on Energetic Particles in Magnetic Confinement Systems (7–11 September 2011) and 5th IAEA Technical Meeting on Theory of Plasma Instabilities (5–7 September 2011)

The 12th IAEA Technical Meeting on Energetic Particles in Magnetic Confinement Systems took place in Austin, Texas (7–11 September 2011). This meeting was organized jointly with the 5th IAEA Technical Meeting on Theory of Plasma Instabilities (5–7 September 2011). The two meetings shared one day (7 September 2011) with presentations relevant to both groups. Some of the work reported at these meetings was then published in a special issue of Nuclear Fusion [Nucl. Fusion 52 (2012)]. Summaries of the Energetic Particle Conference presentations were given by Kazuo Toi and Boris Breizman. They respectively discussed the experimental and theoretical progress presented at the meeting. Highlights of this meeting include the tremendous progress that has been achieved in the development of diagnostics that enables the ‘viewing’ of internal fluctuations and allows comparison with theoretical predictions, as demonstrated, for example, in the talks of P. Lauber and M. Osakabe. The need and development of hardened diagnostics in the severe radiation environment, such as those that will exist in ITER, was discussed in the talks of V. Kiptily and V.A. Kazakhov. In theoretical studies, much of the effort is focused on nonlinear phenomena. For example, detailed comparison of theory and experiment on D-III-D on the n = 0 geodesic mode was reported in separate papers by R. Nazikian and G. Fu. A large number of theoretical papers were presented on wave chirping including a paper by B.N. Breizman, which notes that wave chirping from a single frequency may emanate continuously once marginal stability conditions have been established. Another area of wide interest was the detailed study of alpha orbits in a burning plasma, where losses can come from symmetry breaking due to finite coil number or magnetic field imperfections introduced by diagnostic or test modules. An important area of development, covered by M.A. Hole and D.A. Spong, is concerned with the self-consistent treatment of the induced fields that accounts for toroidally asymmetric MHD response. In addition, a significant number of studies focused on understanding nonlinear behavior by means of computer simulation of energetic particle driven instability. An under-represented area of investigation was the study of electron runaway formation during major tokamak disruptions. It was noted in an overview by S. Putvinski that electron energies in the 10–20 MeV range is to be expected during projected major disruptions in ITER and that reliable methods for mitigation of the runaway process needs to be developed. Significant recent work in the field of the disruption induced electron runaway, which was reported by J. Riemann, had been submitted to Physics of Plasmas. Overall it is clear that reliable mitigation of electron runaway is an extremely important topic that is in need of better understanding and solutions.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

R-Matrix Codes for Charged-Particle Induced Reactions in the Resolved Resonance Region (3), Summary Report of an IAEA Consultants' Meeting IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, 28-30 June 2017

A Consultants Meeting was held at the IAEA Headquarters, from 28 to 30 June 2017, to discuss the results of a test exercise that had been defined and assigned to all participants of the previous meeting held in December 2016. Five codes were used in this exercise: AMUR, AZURE2, RAC, SFRESCO and SAMMY. The results obtained from these codes were compared and further actions were proposed. Participants’ presentations and technical discussions, as well as proposed additional actions have been summarized in this report.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose techniques and methods that could be used by the IAEA to strengthen safeguards. Creative thinking was encouraged during discussion of the proposals. On the final day of the workshop, the OAC facilitators summarized the participant's ideas in a combined briefing. This paper will report on the results of the April 2007 USSP-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards and give an overview of the proposed technologies of greatest promise.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

IAEA Inspections for Undeclared and Declared Activities: Is a More Robust Approach Needed?

The United States has long supported a strong international safeguards system and for many years has served as the foremost supplier of technology, equipment, and training to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it drew in many instances on DOE sponsored R&D and training that was directed towards domestic safeguards and then adapted for IAEA purposes. This was relatively straightforward because of the strong overlap between the development of nuclear material accountancy measures needed for both domestic and international purposes. Two factors have emerged that have made this strong reliance on domestic measures less and less able to be a source of support for the IAEA. One is the shift by the IAEA safeguards system towards detecting undeclared activities. The second is the shift of domestic attention away from nuclear material accountancy and towards physical protection. As a result, a gap in US sponsored R&D and training relevant to international safeguards has developed. The NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the DOE NA-22 Safeguards R&D program are intended to help fill this gap and, thereby, permit the U.S. to remain as the pre-eminent supplier of technology for international safeguards purposes. In this context, IAEA challenges have been examined from the perspective of detecting the diversion of nuclear material from declared stocks; detecting undeclared production of nuclear material and activities at locations declared under INFCIRC/153; and detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities elsewhere in a state. Of these, the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is, perhaps, the IAEA’s most significant challenge. It is a challenge that even the international community finds difficult to meet because of the scope and the geographic scale of the problem, the technical constraints, the knowledge required, and the significant resources needed to deploy effective systems world-wide (e.g., satellite surveillance systems). The IAEA’s success in carrying out this mission hinges on its capability to evaluate the declarations made by the state for completeness, correctness, and consistency in order to detect possible indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Three elements go into this evaluation: (1) evaluating the internal consistency of a State’s declaration and comparing it to information gathered by IAEA inspectors on the basis of their access to the locations, facilities, sites, personnel, and documents disclosed in the state’s declarations; (2) comparison of States’ declarations with other information available to the IAEA, including the information it gathers from its review of open sources, including scientific and technical literature and data bases, trade journals, and media reports; and (3) its ability to archive, retrieve, organize, and analyze all available information for indications of potential undeclared nuclear material and activities, and, when warranted, to request states to provide further information and access in order to investigate and clarify any questions or inconsistencies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Training activities at FSUE 'RADON' and Lomonosov's Moscow state university under practical arrangements with IAEA

The International Education Training Centre (IETC) at Moscow Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) 'Radon', in co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has developed expertise and provided training to waste management personnel for the last 15 years. Since 1997, the educational system of the enterprise with the support of the IAEA has acquired an international character: more than 470 experts from 35 countries - IAEA Member States completed the professional development. Training is conducted at various thematic courses or fellowships for individual programs and seminars on IAEA technical projects. In June 2008 a direct agreement (Practical Arrangements) has been signed between FSUE 'Radon' and the IAEA on cooperation in the field of development of new technologies, expert's advice to IAEA Member States, and, in particular, the training of personnel in the field of radioactive waste management (RWM), which opens up new perspectives for fruitful cooperation of industry professionals. A similar agreement - Practical Arrangements - has been signed between Lomonosov's MSU and the IAEA in 2012. In October 2012 a new IAEA two-weeks training course started at Lomonosov's MSU and FSUE 'Radon' in the framework of the Practical Agreements signed. Pre-disposal management of waste was the main topic of the courses. The paper summarizes the current experience of the FSUE 'Radon' in the organization and implementation of the IAEA sponsored training and others events and outlines some of strategic educational elements, which IETC will continue to pursue in the coming years. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - Destructive Analysis

The U.S. Support Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards priority of destructive analysis is aimed at strengthening the IAEA's ability to use destructive analysis as a safeguards tool. IAEA inspectors bring back nuclear and environmental samples from inspections, which are first cataloged by the IAEA and then analyzed by a network of laboratories located in many Member States and the IAEA's own Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Historically, the USSP was instrumental in introducing environmental sampling techniques to the IAEA in order to enhance its understanding of material processing activities conducted at nuclear facilities. The USSP has also worked with the IAEA to improve understanding of measurement uncertainty and measurement quality, incorporate new and improved analytical methods, and purchase analytical and computer equipment. Recent activities include a temporary increase in analysis of environmental samples using secondary ion mass spectrometry and provision of a cost-free expert to restore secondary ion mass spectroscopy laboratory functionality and to modernize the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory Information System.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

WE-AB-213-04: IAEA Support to Medical Physics in Africa and Latin America: Achievements and Challenges

AAPM projects and collaborations in Africa Adam Shulman (AA-SC Chair) The African Affairs Subcommittee (AA-SC) of the AAPM will present a multi-institutional approach to medical physics support in Africa. Current work to increase the quality of care and level of safety for the medical physics practice in Senegal, Ghana, and Zimbabwe will be presented, along with preliminary projects in Nigeria and Botswana. Because the task of addressing the needs of medical physics in countries across Africa is larger than one entity can accomplish on its own, the AA-SC has taken the approach of joining forces with multiple organizations such as Radiating Hope and TreatSafely (NGO’s), the IAEA, companies like BrainLab, Varian and Elekta, medical volunteers and academic institutions such as NYU and Washington University. Elements of current projects include: 1) Distance training and evaluation of the quality of contouring and treatment planning, teaching treatment planning and other subjects, and troubleshooting using modern telecommunications technology in Senegal, Ghana, and Zimbabwe; 2) Assistance in the transition from 2D to 3D in Senegal and Zimbabwe; 3) Assistance in the transition from 3D to IMRT using in-house compensators in Senegal; 4) Modernizing the cancer center in Senegal and increasing safety and; 5) Training on on 3D techniques in Ghana; 6) Assisting a teaching and training radiation oncology center to be built in Zimbabwe; 7) Working with the ISEP Program in Sub-Saharan Africa; 8) Creating instructional videos on linac commissioning; 9) Working on a possible collaboration to train physicists in Nigeria. Building on past achievements, the subcommittee seeks to make a larger impact on the continent, as the number and size of projects increases and more human resources become available. The State of Medical Physics Collaborations and Projects in Latin America Sandra Guzman (Peru) The lack of Medical Physicists (MP) in many Latin American (LA) countries leads to recruitment of professionals with incomplete education. In most LA countries only one MP responsible for each Center is currently mandated. Currently there is a large disparity among MP training programs and there is significant debate about the standards of MP graduate education in many LA countries. There are no commonly recognized academic programs, not enough clinical training sites and clinical training is not typically considered as part of the MP work. Economic pressures and high workloads also impede the creation of more training centers. The increasing need of qualified MPs require establishing a coordinated system of national Education & Training Centers (ETC), to meet the international standards of education and training in Medical Physics. This shortfall calls for support of organizations such as the IOMP, AAPM, ALFIM, IAEA, etc. Examples from various LA countries, as well as some proposed solutions, will be presented. In particular, we will discuss the resources that the AAPM and its members can offer to support regional programs. The ‘Medical Imaging’ physicist in the emerging world: Challenges and opportunities - Caridad Borrás (WGNIMP Chair) While the role of radiation therapy physicists in the emerging world is reasonably well established, the role of medical imaging physicists is not. The only perceived needs in radiology departments are equipment quality control and radiation protection, tasks that can be done by a technologist or a service engineer. To change the situation, the International Basic Safety Standard, which is adopted/adapted world-wide as national radiation protection regulations, states: “For diagnostic radiological procedures and image guided interventional procedures, the requirements of these Standards for medical imaging, calibration, dosimetry and quality assurance, including the acceptance and commissioning of medical radiological equipment, are fulfilled by or under the oversight of, or with the documented advice of a medical physicist, whose degree of involvement is determined by the complexity of the radiological procedures and the associated radiation risks”. Details on how these requirements can be carried out in resource-limited settings will be described. IAEA support to medical physics in Africa and Latin America: achievements and challenges Ahmed Meghzifene (IAEA) Shortage of clinically qualified medical physicists in radiotherapy and imaging, insufficient and inadequate education and training programs, as well as a lack of professional recognition were identified as the main issues to be addressed by the IAEA. The IAEA developed a series of integrated projects aiming specifically at promoting the essential role of medical physicists in health care, developing harmonized guidelines on dosimetry and quality assurance, and supporting education and clinical training programs. The unique feature of the IAEA approach is support it provides for implementation of guidelines and education programs in Member States through its technical cooperation project. The presentation will summarize IAEA support to Latin America and Africa in the field of medical physics and will highlight how the new International Basic Safety Standards are expected to impact the medical physics practice in low and middle income countries. Learning Objectives: Learn about the shortage of qualified Medical Physicists in Africa and Latin America. Understand the reasons of this shortage. Learn about the ways to improve the situation and AAPM role in this process.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Building an Effective Nonproliferation Program: US Support of IAEA Safeguards

A central pillar of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. From the inception of the IAEA, the United States has supported the development and evolution of both the safeguards system itself and devices and systems approaches used by inspectors. The IAEA safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States to the IAEA about their nuclear programs. From Iran to Syria, to the more than 190 other countries that accept IAEA safeguards, the IAEA safeguards system enhances international security, seeking to assure compliance with international nuclear agreements. The cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA safeguards largely have evolved to ensure non-nuclear weapon state compliance with the NPT.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of an IAEA Training Course for Future U.S. Inspectors

U.S. citizens currently make up only 12% of the positions held in the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. While the United States has maintained a high level of support for the Agency over the duration of its history, the number of American inspectors currently in the field does not reflect this level of involvement. As a result, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of International Relations, as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) mission, has tasked Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a rigorous two week hands-on training program to encourage and operationally acclimatize U.S. Citizens who are interested in applying for IAEA inspector positions using IAEA authorized equipment at INL. Idaho National Laboratory is one-of-a-kind in its ability to train IAEA inspectors by including training at nuclear facilities on site and includes, for example, direct measurement of an active spent fuel storage cooling pond. This accredited course will introduce and train attendees on the major IAEA systems used in collecting nuclear safeguards data and performing safeguards inspections. Unique in the United States, these classes will give attendees direct hands-on training and will address equipment purpose, function, operating principles, application, and troubleshooting, based upon what would be expected of an IAEA Safeguards Inspector in the field and in the office. Upon completion, U.S. applicants will be better qualified to pursue a position in the IAEA Department of Safeguards Operational Divisions. In support, INL has recently established a new laboratory space to house state of the art nuclear safeguards instrumentation. Currently, equipment installed in the laboratory space includes attended systems: 3DLR (3-D Imaging Laser) for design information verification, a Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device for measurement of spent fuel, HM-5 handheld radiation detectors, quantitative neutron and gamma systems; unattended monitoring systems including: NGAM and MiniGRAND radiation systems and a DMOS camera system, and VACOSS/EOSS Optical Sealing Systems..

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Four Years of Practical Arrangements between IAEA and Moscow SIA 'Radon': Preliminary Results - 13061

The International Education Training Centre (IETC) at Moscow State Unitary Enterprise Scientific and Industrial Association 'Radon' (SIA 'Radon'), in co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has developed expertise and provided training to waste management personnel for the last 15 years. Since 1997, the educational system of the enterprise with the support of the IAEA has acquired an international character: more than 470 experts from 35 countries- IAEA Member States completed the professional development. Training is conducted at various thematic courses or fellowships for individual programs and seminars on IAEA technical projects. In June 2008 a direct agreement (Practical Arrangements) was signed between SIA 'Radon' and the IAEA on cooperation in the field of development of new technologies, expert's advice to IAEA Member States, and, in particular, the training of personnel in the field of radioactive waste management (RWM), which opens up new perspectives for fruitful cooperation of industry professionals. The paper summarizes the current experience of the SIA 'Radon' in the organization and implementation of the IAEA sponsored training and others events and outlines some of strategic educational elements, which IETC will continue to pursue in the coming years. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

IAEA Initiatives that Integrate Stakeholders, Models and Decision Making - 18646

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated an effort to provide stakeholder support services as part of Phase II of the Constraints to Implementing Decommissioning and Environmental Remediation (CIDER II) programs. The intent of this sub-group of CIDER II is to provide members states support in areas of stakeholder communication, engagement and participation, with the goal of building trust in decommissioning and environmental remediation (D and ER) decisions for radioactive contamination and facilities. IAEA has also initiated a follow-on effort to address Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA II), which is aimed at enhancing the capabilities of Member States to simulate radionuclide transfer in the environment, and to ensure appropriate levels of protection from ionizing radiation. Working Group 1 of MODARIA II is focused on the integration of modeling and decision analysis. These two groups have complementary and supporting objectives, which provides an opportunity for collaboration and mutual benefit. The technical integrator is the approach of structured decision making, which follows a five-step process that combines stakeholder values with models through a technically defensible decision analysis. Briefly, the steps are: 1. Provide the context and decision context for the problem; 2. Obtain costs, values and concerns from stakeholders, to develop objectives that need to be achieved (e.g., improve human health, minimize costs, increase jobs); 3. Identify options that might achieve the objectives (e.g., cleanup, institutional controls, education); 4. Develop probabilistic models that connect options to objectives so that the objectives can be evaluated collectively (e.g., a fate and transport and risk model to address the objective of reducing human health risk, a cost model to address costs of taking action); and, 5. Model evaluation, including sensitivity analysis, to determine if an action can be taken with sufficient certainty, or if collection of more data is needed to decrease uncertainty before a decision is made. This approach also supports adaptive management as new data are collected. This approach clarifies the roles of stakeholders and subject matter experts in the decision-making process, where stakeholders specify values, and subject matter experts focus on the models that are needed to evaluate the options. It also provides a technically defensible, reproducible, transparent and traceable approach to all of the components necessary to properly solve the types of complex decision problems that plague radioactive waste management, decommissioning and environmental remediation. This paper introduces the major challenges to implementing such a broad scale of decision analysis, and approaches to overcoming those challenges, which include not only the technical challenges, but also the need to develop capacity in a range of skills not usually accommodated in environmental modeling and includes the need for the IAEA to address decision making in different countries, and with different cultures, religions, political affiliations, and languages. This paper explores the potential for IAEA to benefit from both the CIDER II and MODARIA II programs, and hence to develop a fully integrated approach to effective decision making for radioactive waste management and environmental remediation. Note that there are many people involved in these efforts at the IAEA, and credit belongs to those people for the progress that has been made to date. Our intent here is simply to introduce these IAEA programs at the WM2018 Symposium to provide our perspective and some awareness of some of the directions in which IAEA appears to be headed regarding stakeholder engagement, environmental and risk modeling, data science, and decision analysis. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

IAEA Domestic Inspections in the US

The Voluntary Offer Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United States, INFCIRC/288, entered into force in 1980. Under this Agreement, the United States provides to the IAEA an Eligible Facilities List, which lists facilities eligible for IAEA inspection and verification of compliance through either a reporting-only process or for full-scope safeguards (to include inspections). Approximately 300 facilities are currently listed on the Eligible Facilities List. Since 1981, the IAEA has conducted over 700 inspections on ~20 of these facilities. Currently, four NRC-licensed facilities have been selected under the Initial (Reporting) Protocol, and one DOE facility, KAMS at the SRS, has been selected for full-scope safeguards. These IAEA inspections are documented in the ID/288 database managed by staff at ORNL and the Y-12 National Security Complex for the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This database also maintains records of US designated inspectors, the status of indices checks, and inspection schedules. The database was most recently updated in FY 2014 to include information related to the IAEA visit to URENCO-USA in New Mexico and will be upgraded again via proposal in FY 2017 to include the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) inspections in the US Caribbean territories, associated with INFCIRC/366. During the FY 2017 upgrade, the system will also be overhauled to allow for quicker updates and to improve performance using a modern software package.

White-Horton, Jessica↗

Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗