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28 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Development of Decay Heat Sensitivity Analysis Capability in SCALE/ORIGEN

In this work, a decay heat sensitivity analysis capability was developed and implemented in the ORIGEN code of the SCALE nuclear modeling and simulation suite. This capability introduces improved numerical integration schemes, which overcome the challenges associated with accurately modeling the behavior of adjoint nuclide amounts during coarse time steps for both nuclide amount and decay heat sensitivity calculations. This capability significantly improves the accuracy of calculations without compromising computational efficiency compared to the existing method. Extensive verification was conducted for various benchmark problems, including a 238 Pu decay and an irradiation problem involving 135 Xe, evaluated with both coarse and fine time grids. The results show excellent agreement with reference direct perturbation solutions, reaffirming the computational accuracy of the newly proposed numerical integration methods. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses were performed for fission product inventories ( 147 Sm, 150 Sm, 155 Gd) in pressurized water reactor UO 2 and MOX fuel assemblies. These analyses demonstrated that the ORIGEN sensitivity analysis capability can capture detailed sensitivity coefficients and underlying physics in real applications. Additionally, a decay heat sensitivity analysis for high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel, including various initial 235 U enrichment and burnup points, highlights the extended capabilities of SCALE/ORIGEN in comprehensively assessing the factors influencing total decay heat. These advancements in ORIGEN offer valuable insights for reactor analysis, fuel design, and safety assessments, especially in the context of advanced nuclear fuel development and design changes.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Assessment of Deep Burnup HALEU Fuel Impact and Requirements

This report explores advancements in nuclear fuel technology, focusing on once-through high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuels. It examines the potential for increased fuel residence time in reactors and the fuel cost implications. The study highlights the differences between fast and thermal reactors in terms of fuel enrichment and burnup, emphasizing the complex relationship in fast reactors in which increased core size and fuel density can lead to lower enrichment requirements. Various advances in fuel technologies for light-water reactors (LWR) and sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) are presented in this report to provide more comprehensive analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Study on Application of Distributed Network of Sensors with List Mode for NMAC Literature Review

Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) for nuclear security detects, deters, and resolves questions related to unauthorized removal (i.e. theft) or misuse of nuclear material. NMAC also serves as a key insider threat mitigation measure and aids in recovery of nuclear material that is missing. Effective nuclear security depends on NMAC for timely and accurate information about nuclear material types, quantities, and locations. Bulk nuclear material processing facilities, however, present unique challenges for effective NMAC due to the presence of large quantities of material in-process and the accumulation of residual material holdup within process equipment. These holdup accumulations can obscure accurate physical inventory taking and complicate efforts to resolve NMAC irregularities at the facility level. Bulk material monitoring systems often rely on material balance calculations and indirect measurement techniques, which may mask protracted theft of smaller amounts of nuclear material. These monitoring limitations have generated increased interest in continuous monitoring technologies, including distributed non-destructive assay (NDA) sensor networks capable of providing real-time or near-real-time measurement of material movement and accumulation within bulk processing environments. Recent advancements in distributed networks of NDA radiation detectors and sensing technologies provide an opportunity to address these limitations. Although such distributed sensor networks have been implemented in select facilities for IAEA Safeguards applications, their potential for supporting NMAC functions specifically tailored to nuclear security objectives remains largely unexplored. Furthermore, emerging list-mode data acquisition technologies have reached high technology readiness levels, enabling time-correlated detection of nuclear events across multiple temporal scales. These capabilities provide enhanced opportunities for accurate holdup measurement, continuous process monitoring, and improved detection of material theft or misuse over time. The increasing global expansion of civil nuclear power and development of related bulk material processing facilities, including those supporting high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and other advanced reactor fuel fabrication, further increases the need for advanced measurement and monitoring strategies for NMAC.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Nuclear Security Risks for HALEU Fuels

There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Deployable 40 kWe Lunar Fission Surface Power Concept

Continuous power at the kilowatt level will be imperative for future lunar users including crew infrastructure, future science, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU). The Compass Team explored both 10 kWe and 40 kWe concepts, assuming planned lander and rover capabilities. Both concepts found that a crew pressurized rover chassis, repurposed for deploying reactor power components, could place a fission surface power system (FSPS) at least one km from users. While the 10 kWe fission power system (FPS) could be deployed as a single unit, the 40 kWe system was too large and had to be deployed in multiple trips with the same rover. Key technologies and design approaches included a high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), yttrium hydride (YH) moderated heat pipe reactor, Stirling convertors, deployable radiators based on International Space Station (ISS) designs, and power conversion/transmission at ±2800 VDC for a one km remote distance.

Fission Power↗
NASA NTRS2022

40kW Fission Surface Power System (FSPS) Deployability

Continuous power at the kilowatt level will be imperative for future lunar users including crew infrastructure, future science, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU). The Compass Team explored both 10 kilowatt electric (kWe) and 40 kWe concepts, assuming planned lander and rover capabilities. Both concepts found that a crew pressurized rover chassis, repurposed for deploying reactor power components, could place a fission surface power system (FSPS) at least one kilometer from users. While the 10 kWe fission power system (FPS) could be deployed as a single unit, the 40 kWe system was too large and had to be deployed in multiple trips with the same rover. Key technologies and design approaches included a high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), yttrium hydride (YH) moderated heat pipe reactor, Stirling convertors, deployable radiators based on International Space Station (ISS) designs, and power conversion/transmission at ±2800 volts of direct current (VDC).

Lunar reactor 40kW fission deployable↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Coupled Reactor Multiphysics and Mass Scalability Assessment for Crewed Megawatt-Class NEP System Architectures

Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) is an in-space propulsion technology capable of enabling opposition and conjunction class crewed Mars missions. NEP subsystems include the reactor for heat generation, a power conversion system (PCS), power management and distribution (PMAD), electric propulsion subsystem (EPS), and a primary heat rejection system. Specific mass, or αe (kg / kWe), is a key performance parameter (KPP) of the propulsion system which is directly scalable with the performance and mass estimates for individual components. To inform technology maturation planning, full system and component level parametric modeling is ongoing to explore the design trade space and illustrate the effect of subsystem design choices on the system KPPs. In this study, scaling of high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) reactor designs is assessed through coupled reactor physics and thermal hydraulics analyses. Scaling analyses evaluate the impact of system performance parameters (power level, interface temperatures) on mass for direct gas cooled, pumped liquid metal, and passively cooled heat pipe reactor concepts. Each concept requires specific geometries and working fluids to reach the performance goals of PCS interface conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate) and system mass. The reactor assembly includes the active core (fuel, moderator, cladding, working fluid), axial and radial neutron reflectors, control drums, structural support / pressure vessel, and external radiation shielding. Each of these components are parametrically sized based on performance parameters for a megawatt-class power cycle. Results of this scaling analysis increase NEP propulsion system modeling fidelity and ultimately aim to support technology down-selection along with related technology development planning. The reactor and shield αe are a function of several PCS design choices, and reactor scaling with these parameters must be considered to enable an informed decision on reactor geometry and working fluid combination.

Nuclear Electric Propulsion↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Coupled Reactor Multiphysics and Mass Scalability Assessment for Crewed Megawatt-Class NEP System Architectures

Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) is an in-space propulsion technology capable of enabling opposition and conjunction class crewed Mars missions. NEP subsystems include the reactor for heat generation, a power conversion system (PCS), power management and distribution, electric propulsion system, and heat rejection system. Specific mass, or α (kg/kWe), is a key performance parameter (KPP) of the propulsion system which is directly scalable with the performance and mass predictions for each individual component. To inform technology maturation planning activities, full system and component level parametric modeling is ongoing to explore the design trade space and illustrate the effect of subsystem design choices on the system KPPs. In this study, scaling of high-assay, low-enriched uranium reactor designs is assessed through coupled reactor physics and thermal hydraulics analyses. Scaling analyses evaluate the impact of system performance parameters (power level, interface temperatures) on mass for direct gas cooled, pumped liquid metal, and passively-cooled heat pipe reactor concepts. Each concept requires specific geometries, fluids, and power conversion interface conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate) to meet desired performance and mass. The reactor assembly includes the active core (fuel, moderator, cladding, working fluid), axial and radial neutron reflectors, control drums, structural support / pressure vessel, and external radiation shielding. Each of these components are parametrically sized based on performance parameters for a megawatt-class power cycle. Results of this scaling analysis increase NEP propulsion system modeling fidelity and ultimately aim to support concept down-selection along with related technology development planning. The reactor and shield α are a function of several PCS and heat rejection system design choices, and reactor scaling with these parameters must be considered to enable an informed decision on an optimal reactor geometry and working fluid combination.

Nuclear Electric Propulsion↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantifying the Economic Impacts of Managing Irradiated High-Assay Low-Enriched Fuel

Commercial nuclear power plants typically use nuclear fuel that is enriched up to five weight percent in the isotope 235 U. However, recently several vendors have proposed new nuclear power plant designs that would use fuel with 235 U enrichments between five weight percent and 19.75 weight percent. Nuclear fuel with this level of 235 U enrichment is known as “high assay low-enriched uranium.” Once it has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor and becomes used (or spent) nuclear fuel, it will be stored, transported, and disposed of. However, irradiated high assay low-enriched uranium fuel differs from typical irradiated nuclear fuel in several ways, and these differences may have economic effects on its storage, transport, and disposal, compared to typical irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report described these differences qualitatively (Price et al., 2024); this report builds on the previous report and provides quantitative estimates of the potential economic effects on storage, transport, and disposal of high assay low-enriched uranium spent fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗