SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Distributed Energy Resources Risk Manager”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Informing Cybersecurity Decisions With the Value-at-Risk Framework

Security at every site is critical to making hydropower a strong contributor to the country's grid, but with ongoing development and expanding capabilities, the diversity of the existing hydropower fleet makes across-the-board investment decisions difficult. The threat of cyberattacks naturally increases as the interconnection of Information Technology and Operational Technology networks broadens. Hydropower plants require custom analyses that are specific to the unique challenges and characteristics of any given facility. Facilities, however, often do not have the necessary resources for managers to make informed decisions on investments based on assessed capabilities and risks.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗

DOE OSTI2026

Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop Report

The Aggregation and Grid Security Workshop - held on June 17-18, 2025, National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) in Golden, Colorado - brought together approximately 40 external stakeholders from the energy sector, including VPP owner/operators, aggregators, OEMs, utilities, testing & certification labs, trade associations, and cybersecurity vendors. Led by key facilitators, the workshop focused on addressing cybersecurity challenges and enhancing grid resilience for aggregated Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs). The workshop was catalyzed by recognition that traditional, rearward-looking regulatory frameworks are insufficient to keep pace with technological change. There is a "missing understanding" of risk, an "absent security basis" for managing it, and an "untenable responsibility" due to unclear ownership and requirements. The workshop aimed to shift the mindset from reacting to past crises to proactively preparing for emerging threats, fostering forward resilience through risk simulation and collaborative action. This report summarizes the outcomes of the workshop, marking it a significant step toward a secure, reliable and affordable energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Home energy management under realistic and uncertain conditions: A comparison of heuristic, deterministic, and stochastic control methods

We report home energy management systems (HEMS) have been shown to reduce energy bills and to provide grid services including peak demand reduction and demand flexibility. However, uncertainty in residential energy systems is a significant issue and can reduce the benefits of a HEMS to the homeowner or grid operator. Sources of uncertainty include weather forecasts, predictions of energy-related occupant activities (e.g., hot water draws), and parameter estimation for the building envelope and energy-consuming equipment. This paper tackles the problem of uncertainty by developing a framework that simulates HEMS in uncertain conditions and evaluates the performance of multiple control strategies. A linear, reduced-order residential building model for model predictive control applications is derived and compared to a full-order model. Stochastic model predictive control is shown to perform better than deterministic and heuristic methods when considering realistic forecasts with uncertainty. The framework can evaluate the performance of HEMS in real-world applications, which can help de-risk HEMS deployment.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2021

Voltage Regulation Performance Evaluation of Distributed Energy Resource Management via Advanced Hardware-in-the-Loop Simulation

This paper evaluates the performance of coordinated control across advanced distribution management systems (ADMS), distributed energy resources (DERs), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) using an advanced hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) platform. This platform provides a realistic laboratory testing environment, including accurate dynamic modeling of a real-world distribution system from a utility partner, real controllers (ADMS and DERMS), physical power hardware (DERs), and standard communications protocols. One grid service—voltage regulation—is evaluated to show the performance of the coordinated grid automation system. The testing results demonstrate that the coordinated DERMS and ADMS system can effectively regulate system voltages within target operation limits using DERs. The realistic laboratory HIL testing results give utilities confidence in adopting the grid automation systems to manage DERs to achieve system-level control and operation objectives (e.g., voltage regulation). This helps utilities mitigate potential risks (e.g., instability) prior to field deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Integrated Transmission-Distribution Multi-Period Switching for Wildfire Risk Mitigation: Improving Speed and Scalability with Distributed Optimization: Preprint

With increasingly severe wildfire conditions driven by climate change, utilities must manage the risk of wildfire ignitions from electric power lines. During "public safety power shutoff'" events, utilities de-energize power lines to reduce wildfire ignition risk, which may result in load shedding. Distributed energy resources provide flexibility that can help support the system to reduce load shedding when lines are de-energized. We investigate a coordinated transmission-distribution optimization problem that balances wildfire risk mitigation and load shedding. We model distribution systems that include battery energy storage systems which may support loads when transmission lines are de-energized. This multi-period integrated transmission-distribution optimal switching problem jointly optimizes line switching decisions, the generators' setpoints, load shedding, and the batteries' states of charge, resulting in significant computational challenges. To improve scalability, we decompose the problem over both space and time and apply a distributed optimization algorithm. Using a large-scale synthetic California test case with realistic distribution models and real wildfire risk data, we show that distributed optimization can solve large-scale multi-period switching problems that are otherwise intractable for centralized solvers. We also discuss challenges and future directions for improving the distributed algorithm's convergence performance as the number of time periods increases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2022

2.1.3.404 - WEC Array Power Management and Output Simulation Tool

An array of wave energy converter (WEC) devices has variations in power output due to the chaotic nature of the waves. Eliminating or mitigating the power fluctuations is important for reducing the integration impacts of WEC plants in both distribution and transmission grids, and in standalone isolated power systems. Reduced variability of WEC-generated power in combination with energy storage or power management control at each WEC and at the array level will help increasing hosting capacity of distribution feeders for this type of variable renewable generation, and minimization of electric losses. To reduce risks and risk perception, gain key stakeholder acceptance, and enable developers to design effective and compatible energy plants with arrays of WEC devices, it requires the use of modeling tools to simulate the resource environment, device dynamics, utility power system response, as well as the development of an interface for an array controller. The project will create a publicly accessible numerical modeling framework to empower the wave energy sector to design projects of various scales (kW-100s MW), which are optimized on a plant performance basis and are compatible with different power systems and wave conditions. The framework will integrate with WEC-Sim, a wave environment model (SWAN-FUNWAVE), as well as established relevant electrical analysis tools, to model the grid system and interconnection, and optimize power output and power management for the WEC array.

POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION,TIDAL AND WAVE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Resilience Framework for Electric Energy Delivery Systems (R.1)

The intent of this document is to provide a Resilience Framework for electrical energy delivery systems which can be applied to Distributed Wind. However, the framework is not limited by application to any resource or system. This framework represents the defined steps to a cyclical process similar in mechanism to both cybersecurity and risk frameworks, while providing a common set of language and process for all stakeholders involved. The need for this Resilience Framework was established in a previous document, “Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems.” One important characteristic we see in resilience is the unique needs and perspectives of different systems, geographies, resources, stakeholders, perceived risks, and consequences, which we term the distinctiveness property. This distinctiveness property drives the requirement to have a resilience framework or methodology that can be implemented by different types of organizations and systems. The process or methodology should be cyclic. Recognizing that a system’s resilience is based on finite resources and time, it must continually evolve through this framework’s risk management and capital investment steps at an appropriate pace for its distinctiveness property.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2022

1.3.3.402 - Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework

The Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework tool will guide users through an assessment and detailed analysis of a hydropower plant's operations. The tool will then provide results and data to inform effective cybersecurity investment decision-making and planning. The results will help managers understand the risk probability of cyberattacks on their facilities and how best to use resources to mitigate those risks.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2022

Unleashing the Frequency: Multi-Megawatt Demonstration of 100% Renewable Power Systems with Decentralized Communication-Less Control Scheme

Power systems, which range in size from small microgrids to island systems to large regional grids, are typically managed by a central controller that requires complex communication methods and can be unreliable and pose cyber security risks in certain applications, especially when controlling a larger number of nodes. We propose an inherently robust, scalable method of integration using multiple energy storage systems and distributed energy resources, which does not require any means of dedicated communication. This method moves beyond the paradigm of controlling grid frequency at a fixed value (e.g., 60 Hz), instead allowing the frequency to fluctuate within certain limits (e.g., 59.6-60.4 Hz). With a greater operating range, the frequency can carry necessary information from energy storage systems to highly variable distributed energy resources like photovoltaics, wind, hydro, etc.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Security Enhancement of Network Constraint Grid-Edge Energy Management System

Network constrained grid edge energy management system (EMS) provides economic solution for active and reactive power dispatch of distributed energy resources (DERs) at the grid edge level. Grid edge EMS ensures secure interconnection of a circuit segment to the distribution system by maintaining grid code requirements (e.g. IEEE 1547–2018). Grid edge EMS is dependent on communication to receive load measurement, which brings a risk of unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs). To mitigate the risk, this paper proposes a framework to enhance resilient operation of grid edge EMS by detecting the unobservable FDIAs on loads and replacing them with forecasted values. In this work, a two-step detection algorithm is proposed. In first step, conventional residual based algorithm is deployed. Autoencoder (AE) based data driven mechanism is included in second step to detect the presence of unobservable FDIAs. After ensuring the presence of FDIA, its specific location is detected by checking the maximum residue values till the predefined threshold value is reached. Detected false data injected loads are then replaced with forecasted load values following long-short term memory (LSTM) based forecast to ensure resilient performance of grid edge EMS in the presence of attacks. This proposed security enhancement framework for grid edge EMS is evaluated in IEEE 13 bus system with three integrated DERs. Numerical simulation shows the validation of the proposed framework by reducing voltage violation in real operation of grid edge EMS.

cyber attack detection↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Centralized Model Based FLISR in a Lab Setup

Utilities are installing advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) around the globe to improve the sensing and control of distribution systems. ADMS is becoming a critical component to improve the resiliency and reliability of distribution systems. These management systems host a multitude of applications that can be used to sense, control, and operate distribution systems. Fault location, isolation, and service restoration (FLISR) is one of the ADMS applications that is critical to improving resilience during fault conditions. FLISR applications use smart, controllable devices that are installed in the distribution system for FLISR operation. These controllable devices include distributed energy resources (DER) and reclosers. Evaluating such ADMS applications before installation in the field can help de-risk the field implementation and avoid costly failures in the field. This paper presents a background on experimental setup that are typically used to evaluate ADMS applications. This is followed by briefly presenting the setup used to evaluate the FLISR application in an off-the-shelf ADMS tool. Finally, results from the evaluation experiments are presented.

94 GMLC - Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Centralized Model-Based FLISR in a Lab Setup: Preprint

94 GMLC - Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium↗

DOE OSTI2025

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗