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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2023

FIND: A Synthetic weather generator to control drought Frequency, Intensity, and Duration

Water systems worldwide are experiencing climate change-induced shifts in drought properties like frequency, intensity, and duration, affecting water security and reliability. To develop and test effective drought preparedness plans, researchers often use synthetic weather generators to create hydrological scenarios that explore drought variability beyond historical records. Existing weather generators typically allow users to adjust streamflow statistics like percentiles or temporal correlation but do not directly control drought properties of frequency, intensity, and duration. To fill this gap, we propose FIND (Frequency, INtensity, and Duration) synthetic weather generator. FIND incorporates a standardized drought index to directly and in dependently control drought frequency, intensity, and duration in generated streamflow time series while preserving observed hydrological variability. Use cases for FIND include i) water systems analysis applications that seek to train and test drought strategies under historical and plausible future drought conditions, and ii) bottom-up vulnerability studies relating system vulnerability outcomes to specific changes in drought properties of frequency, intensity, and duration. Here, we demonstrate FIND’s versatility through three experiments: replicating historically observed drought properties, generating streamflow scenarios for multiple sites preserving correlation between their drought conditions, and generating a set of scenarios with direct and independent changes in drought properties. FIND source code is openly available for applications beyond the scope of this paper.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2006

Addressing the Tension Between Strong Perimeter Control an Usability

This paper describes a strong perimeter control system for a general purpose processing system, with the perimeter control system taking significant steps to address usability issues, thus mitigating the tension between strong perimeter protection and usability. A secure front end enforces two-factor authentication for all interactive access to an enclave that contains a large supercomputer and various associated systems, with each requiring their own authentication. Usability is addressed through a design in which the user has to perform two-factor authentication at the secure front end in order to gain access to the enclave, while an agent transparently performs public key authentication as needed to authenticate to specific systems within the enclave. The paper then describes a proxy system that allows users to transfer files into the enclave under script control, when the user is not present to perform two-factor authentication. This uses a pre-authorization approach based on public key technology, which is still strongly tied to both two-factor authentication and strict control over where files can be transferred on the target system. Finally the paper describes an approach to support network applications and systems such as grids or parallel file transfer protocols that require the use of many ports through the perimeter. The paper describes a least privilege approach that dynamically opens ports on a host-specific, if-authorized, as-needed, just-in-time basis.

Hinke, Thomas H.↗

DOE OSTI2023

LDRD23-0730: Invoking Multilayer Networks to Develop a Paradigm for Security Science—Summary Report

Current approaches to securing high consequence facilities (HCF) and critical assets are linear and static and therefore struggle to adapt to emerging threats (e.g., unmanned aerial systems) and changing environmental conditions (e.g., decreasing operational control). The pace of change in technological, organizational, societal, and political dynamics necessitates a move toward codifying underlying scientific principles to better characterize the rich interactions observed between HCF security technology, infrastructure, digital assets, and human or organizational components. The promising results of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) 20-0373—“Developing a Resilient, Adaptive, and Systematic Paradigm for Security Analysis”—suggest that when compared to traditional security analysis, invoking multilayer network (MLN) modeling for HCF security system components captures unexpected failure cases and unanticipated interactions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

DOE OSTI2024

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗

DOE OSTI2020

Charting the unknown: A dive into the world of standards mapping

When you hear standards mapping what do you think about? For the Secure Software Central (SSC) project this means comparing our process to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) security control catalog. So how is it done? The project completed this summer can be broken down into three simple phases. Phase one consists of mapping the SSC process to the NIST’s security control catalog. While phase two entails mapping mitigations from a threat profile to NIST. Lastly phase three requires the creation of a knowledge base allowing for the reuse of controls across numerous projects This project presented a few different challenges: locating the correct control within the NIST catalog while correctly matching the proposed mitigations from the SSC team, accurately leveling the mitigation to the security level of the system, creating a toolbox to showcase a dataset of mitigations and standards to be used in current and future projects. each challenge allowed for opportunities in growth and understanding of how security controls can map to a governing set of standards. These standards maps are a crucial element to support the insights provided by the SSC team and allow the client to have confidence in the work being completed. My internship has allowed me to set and achieve many goals such as coming to understand that the field of cybersecurity truly is the right place for me. I have also learned that it’s ok to be wrong if you learn something from it. For significant accomplishments I have helped integrate standards mapping into the fabric of SSC. The field experience that I have gained such as interacting with the SSC team along with other senior staff and building a good rapport are crucial skills to. This time at PNNL has been an irreplaceable experience.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2002

Command and Control of Space Assets Through Internet-Based Technologies Demonstrated

The NASA Glenn Research Center successfully demonstrated a transmission-control-protocol/ Internet-protocol- (TCP/IP) based approach to the command and control of onorbit assets over a secure network. This is a significant accomplishment because future NASA missions will benefit by using Internet-standards-based protocols. Benefits of this Internet-based space command and control system architecture include reduced mission costs and increased mission efficiency. The demonstration proved that this communications architecture is viable for future NASA missions. This demonstration was a significant feat involving multiple NASA organizations and industry. Phillip Paulsen, from Glenn's Project Development and Integration Office, served as the overall project lead, and David Foltz, from Glenn's Satellite Networks and Architectures Branch, provided the hybrid networking support for the required Internet connections. The goal was to build a network that would emulate a connection between a space experiment on the International Space Station and a researcher accessing the experiment from anywhere on the Internet, as shown. The experiment was interfaced to a wireless 802.11 network inside the demonstration area. The wireless link provided connectivity to the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Internet Link Terminal (TILT) satellite uplink terminal located 300 ft away in a parking lot on top of a panel van. TILT provided a crucial link in this demonstration. Leslie Ambrose, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, provided the TILT/TDRSS support. The TILT unit transmitted the signal to TDRS 6 and was received at the White Sands Second TDRSS Ground Station. This station provided the gateway to the Internet. Coordination also took place at the White Sands station to install a Veridian Firewall and automated security incident measurement (ASIM) system to the Second TDRSS Ground Station Internet gateway. The firewall provides a trusted network for the simulated space experiment. A second Internet connection at the demonstration area was implemented to provide Internet connectivity to a group of workstations to serve as platforms for controlling the simulated space experiment. Installation of this Internet connection was coordinated with an Internet service provider (ISP) and local NASA Johnson Space Center personnel. Not only did this TCP/IP-based architecture prove that a principal investigator on the Internet can securely command and control on-orbit assets, it also demonstrated that valuable virtual testing of planned on-orbit activities can be conducted over the Internet prior to actual deployment in space.

Foltz, David A.↗

DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

DOE OSTI2022

Privacy-preserving Information Security for the Energy Grid of Things

Smart grid infrastructure relies on information exchange between multiple actors in order to ensure system reliability. These actors include but are not limited to smart loads, grid control, and energy management technologies. Further, as information exchange between these actors is susceptible to cyber-attacks, security and privacy issues are indispensable to ensure a reliable and stable grid. This position paper proposes a privacy-preserving, trust-augmented secure scheme for a smart grid implementation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS1985

Protecting intellectual property in space; Proceedings of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference, McLean, VA, March 20, 1985

The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2004

Compact Microscope Imaging System With Intelligent Controls Improved

The Compact Microscope Imaging System (CMIS) with intelligent controls is a diagnostic microscope analysis tool with intelligent controls for use in space, industrial, medical, and security applications. This compact miniature microscope, which can perform tasks usually reserved for conventional microscopes, has unique advantages in the fields of microscopy, biomedical research, inline process inspection, and space science. Its unique approach integrates a machine vision technique with an instrumentation and control technique that provides intelligence via the use of adaptive neural networks. The CMIS system was developed at the NASA Glenn Research Center specifically for interface detection used for colloid hard spheres experiments; biological cell detection for patch clamping, cell movement, and tracking; and detection of anode and cathode defects for laboratory samples using microscope technology.

McDowell, Mark↗

DOE OSTI2025

Tracking and Positioning System for Floating Solar (CRADA Abstract)

The project goal is to develop a floating solar photovoltaics (FPV) tracking & position system that: (1) increases annual energy production of FPV projects by >10%, (2) lowers levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for FPV by >10%, and (3) leverages U.S. contract supply chain & manufacturing. The outcome of the project will be a certified tracking product that has undergone extensive field testing and is ready for commercial sales. The primary objectives for each budget period are: • BP1: Define product requirements, develop initial controls architecture and design other sub-components, complete small-scale pilot testing, install a larger-scale pilot, secure sites for commercial pilots, and develop the beta-version of a user portal. • BP2: complete control system and sub-component design, successful demonstration and testing at a commercial pilot, certification & bankability, finalize user portal, and complete various commercialization activities related to supply chain, customer acquisition, and sales. PNNL will provide support during both project phases for prototype development and testing of the controls architecture, software, and hardware components of the tracking and positioning system. PNNL will provide support during both project phases for prototype development and testing of the controls architecture, software, and hardware components of the tracking and positioning system. This effort represents PNNL’s first opportunity to support the floating solar photovoltaics (FPV) industry with capabilities, facilities, and personnel developed to contribute to the marine energy (e.g., wave and tidal energy) sector. This portfolio expansion leverages internal and DOE EERE investments and the growing visibility of PNNL-Sequim’s Marine and Coastal Research Laboratory (MCRL) and our marine research capabilities, in general. The development of effective and low-cost FPV platforms is a potential way to increase the nation’s set of tools for providing emission-free electricity without utilizing valuable terrestrial resources. Successful commercialization of such a project may lead to economic benefits through job creation, supply chain creation, and access to a cheaper source of electricity.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies’ more public-facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber-threat actors’ capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS1991

Description of the control system design for the SSF PMAD DC testbed

The Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) DC Testbed Control System for Space Station Freedom was developed using a top down approach based on classical control system and conventional terrestrial power utilities design techniques. The design methodology includes the development of a testbed operating concept. This operating concept describes the operation of the testbed under all possible scenarios. A unique set of operating states was identified and a description of each state, along with state transitions, was generated. Each state is represented by a unique set of attributes and constraints, and its description reflects the degree of system security within which the power system is operating. Using the testbed operating states description, a functional design for the control system was developed. This functional design consists of a functional outline, a text description, and a logical flowchart for all the major control system functions. Described here are the control system design techniques, various control system functions, and the status of the design and implementation.

Baez, Anastacio N.↗