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At least 235 records · Page 13

Managing Spacecraft Risk With Space Environments Testing Via Process Safety Management At The NASA Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility

The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.

Safety↗

Managing Spacecraft Risk with Space Environments Testing via Process Safety Management at the NASA Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF)

The NASA Glenn Research Center’s Neil A. Armstrong Test Facility (GRC-ATF) is home to several unique, world class aerospace test facilities, including the In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility. The ISP Facility is NASA’s largest chamber designed to store and transfer large quantities of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen; and is designed to support developmental testing of upper stage chemical propulsion systems as well as fully integrated stages. The facility is also capable of providing thermal-vacuum simulation services to support testing of aerospace hardware, Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) systems and other In-Space propulsion programs. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) is an analytical tool focused on preventing the release of chemicals and other energy sources. In a short timeframe, GRC-ATF was required to restore a PSM Program at the Facility. Although the summarized work is specific to the ground testing of rockets and space vehicles, the ISP Facility is used to verify system level requirements, some of these are safety requirements, and thus key to managing risks in space.

Safety↗

Mars Sample Receiving Facility Research and Development to Enable Preservation, Safe Containment, and Scientific Research of Martian Samples on Earth

NASA and ESA are working together to plan a joint campaign to potentially bring back the first Martian samples to Earth in the early 2030s. On the surface of Mars, the Mars 2020Perseverance Rover is selecting and packaging samples that could be returned to Earth for careful examination by an international team of scientists. In preparation for this historic sample return, advance planning is underway to design and build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in the mid-2020s. In 2022, a Mars Sample Receiving Facility Assessment Study(MSAS) will be conducted to further define construction modality and capability options for a facility in the conterminous United States. Since Mars Sample Return (MSR) is currently categorized as a planetary protection restricted Earth return, this new facility would feature biosafety level 4 (BSL-4)-like high containment to protect Earth’s biosphere from any potential hazard. In addition, the facility also requires integration of cleanroom technologies to mitigate against terrestrial contamination and preserve sample integrity for science investigations. The integration of both clean handling and high containment requires significant technology research and development (R&D) by the mid-2020s to support the definition and planning of a SRF before commencing the site specific design phase. The SRF project will need to solidify the inorganic, organic, and biological contamination control (CC) requirements for the facility. This could entail a translation of Mars 2020 mission CC requirements for geologic material to engineering requirements for surfaces and airborne molecular contamination inside isolators and cleanrooms. In tandem, the project will need to determine precision cleaning and sterilization approaches for cleanrooms, isolators, equipment, and tools. Initial material selections for the facility construction materials, cleanrooms, isolators, and BSL-4 suits/garments are an important activity. The recent construction of the OSIRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 curation cleanroom laboratories greatly benefited from early materials testing, before the design phase, to reduced organic outgassing and particulate shedding inside the laboratory. While the early biohazard investigations in the SRF may deem the samples safe to release to laboratories throughout the world, sterilization methods need to be defined to safely release Martian samples. One key aspect of enabling simultaneous sample containment and cleanliness is the concept of a Double-Walled Isolator (DWI) that ESA has been pursuing. Further R&D is needed about DWIs, sample handling, and instrumentation interfaces before beginning the SRF site specific design phase. A working isolator/DWI engineering model should be developed and fabricated. Isolator sizes, connections, pass-through antechambers, and configurations and basic interfaces with instruments and tools as well as the use of robotic, mechanical, and/or human manipulation need to be considered. Inert high purity gas supply (one-pass or recirculation) and other isolator utilities must be determined. Special accommodations for large instruments (e.g., XCT,SEM, etc.) need to be developed. Techniques for opening the sample tubes packaged by M2020and extracting the headspace gas while keeping samples pristine will be challenging, requiring additional R&D, and engagement of the M2020 project. In addition, careful micromanipulation for subdivision and packaging of samples will also need to be included. These combined R&D activities are important before commencing the SRF design phase to ensure safe biohazard containment, sample preservation, and science integrity for the samples that would be studied in the SRF and in laboratories around the world.

mars sample return↗

Establishing Regulatory Jurisdictional Boundaries at Collocated Advanced-Reactor Facilities

This white paper discusses establishing and applying nuclear facility jurisdictional boundaries at advanced-nuclear-reactor facilities. It was written for industry review and evaluation with possible consideration by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for subsequent regulatory action. The paper proposes a regulatory basis for establishing jurisdictional boundaries at operational advanced (i.e., non-light water) reactor installations at sites proximate to and sharing systems with non-NRC regulated facilities (e.g., users of process heat, fossil-plant retrofits, microgrid electrical power, desalination, etc.). Advanced-reactor technologies can be applied to support many industrial applications to replace the burning of fossil fuels as well as produce steam for electricity. The principal application of the current light-water reactor fleet is electricity generation. These varied industrial applications may involve an advanced-reactor design in combination with different site-specific energy-conversion systems. Some of these process-heat applications will require process-heat delivery systems to lie partially outside the advanced-reactor operator’s facility. Energy conversion systems are conventional, non-nuclear equipment and buildings. Given these varied applications, there should be a clear understanding between the advanced-reactor applicant and the NRC regarding a nominal demarcation between those systems that reside within the nuclear facility under the regulatory jurisdiction of the NRC (i.e., within the scope of a 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50 operating license or Part 52 design certification and a combined license) and those that fall outside the scope of the NRC (e.g., an industrial facility). Additionally, it is important to have a clear understanding regarding the plant scope that should be addressed in an advanced-reactor facility Part 52, design certification application and the part of the plant scope that could be addressed as part of a site specific combined license application.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Test Beam and Irradiation Facilities

Progress in particle physics depends on a multitude of unique facilities and capabilities that enable to advance detector technologies. Among others, key facilities involve test beams and irradiation facilities, which allow users to test the performance and lifetime of their detectors under realistic conditions. Test beam facilities are particularly important for collider and neutrino detector applications, while irradiation facilities are crucial for collider as well as some space-based astro particle detectors. This contributed Snowmass paper aims to summarize existing test beam and irradiation facilities as well as develop the need and proposals for future facilities.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Laser Cleaning for Decontamination of a Nuclear Facility - 20609

This paper describes laser cleaning of contaminated tools in a nuclear power facility in Chalk River, Ontario Canada and also the same for EnergySolutions facility in Memphis facility. For the Chalk River facility, other methods of cleaning which included dry ice blasting, disassemble and wipe clean and steam cleaning, generated secondary waste and were time consuming. Laser cleaning of the tools in facility did not create secondary waste, was more efficient and safer for the operator. The laser cleaning method was compared with other methods. For the EnergySolutions facility in Memphis, laser cleaning was compared with hands on cleaning and laser removal by applying them to a rail car, a metal plate and a metal skate. (authors)

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Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

The requirements of the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit are fulfilled through execution of LANL's fourth strategic goal: “Enabling mission delivery through next-generation facility, infrastructure, and operational excellence.” With input from our stakeholders, we will continue to fulfill those requirements and to improve our waste operations. In 2015, the Laboratory purpose statement focused waste management efforts by directing delivery of mission success through operational effectiveness and scientific excellence. This Plan advances that purpose through community involvement. In the process of achieving our national security mission, Los Alamos National Laboratory generates some hazardous and mixed waste. Hazardous waste is solid waste that is dangerous or potentially harmful to human health or the environment. Hazardous wastes can be liquids, solids, gases, or sludges. They can be discarded as commercial products, such as cleaning fluids or pesticides, or as the byproducts of operations. Specific substances are listed in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 261: 40 CFR Part 261. Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515-1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure, post closure care, and cleanup as necessary, of permitted waste management units. On November 30, 2010, NMED renewed the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (the Permit). In June 2020 the Permittees submitted a permit renewal application to the NMED for their review and approval. The Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan (CRP) describes the scope of public involvement in the activities of the Permit. The CRP is specifically designed to facilitate the community outreach, engagement, and relations activities concerning the Laboratory’s Hazardous Waste Facility Permit and coordinates with but does not include public involvement for other Laboratory programs, initiatives, or environmental activities.

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Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Chapter 1

This report documents the revised Performance Assessment (PA) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). A PA analysis is required for DOE-operated facilities that dispose of low-level radioactive waste. PA analyses simulate (1) the release of radionuclides from the disposal site after facility closure, (2) transport of those contaminants through the environment, and (3) exposure/impacts to potential receptors. The purpose of the PA analysis is to demonstrate that the facility is operated in a manner that ensures long-term environmental protection after facility closure, thereby providing for the protection of public health and safety in limiting doses to a hypothetical member of the public (MOP) or an inadvertent human intruder (IHI). DOE Manual (M) 435.1-1, Chg. 3, Radioactive Waste Management (U.S. DOE, 2021b) establishes quantitative post-closure environmental impact limits and requires a facility-specific PA analysis to demonstrate compliance with these limits for DOE low-level waste (LLW) disposed of after September 26, 1988. These limits are defined in terms of human health (e.g., dose limits) with respect to radioactive constituents in the waste.

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NSTX-U liquid metal core-edge facility (LMCE)

NSTX-U/LMCE will provide a unique and world-leading research facility to address the primary challenge to delivering economic and timely magnetic fusion energy, namely the need to develop a power and particle exhaust and first-wall system that can withstand very high edge heat fluxes, maximize energy confinement, and avoid the production of large masses of solid eroded first-wall material. The NSTX-U/LMCE facility will assess the ability of liquid metals (LMs) – especially liquid lithium – to provide a new boundary condition for magnetic fusion systems, to extend the lifetime of the plasma facing components (PFCs) and improve core plasma confinement. Such capability is needed to establish the basis for next-step fusion facilities including fusion pilot plants, and to maintain U.S. world leadership in core-edge integration research. NSTX-U/LMCE will leverage the ability to generate very high divertor perpendicular heat flux q⊥ ~ 100MW/m 2 , extensive diagnostics, and liquid-metal-applicable infrastructure of NSTX-U. NSTX-U/LMCE will provide access to a high-confinement plasma core with majority self-driven plasma current, the flexibility to test a range of liquid metal divertor concepts, access to a range of separatrix collisionalities (from high to very low), and the ability to controllably vary the first-wall temperature to vary the plasma- wall interaction physics on liquid lithium components. Further, NSTX-U/LMCE will utilize more reactor-relevant high-Z refractory-metal PFC substrates. With these capabilities the NSTX-U/LMCE facility will explore the full continuum of core-edge solutions ranging from high core radiated power, to conditions with radiative losses concentrated in the scrape-off layer (SOL), and ultimately low recycling conditions. The low collisionality SOL that may be accessible in the low recycling regime is relatively unexplored and will require a kinetic treatment of the edge, which can be addressed theoretically, and with experiments in LTX-β. Additional smaller-scale preparatory R&D facilities will be required to reduce the risk of premature technical/engineering failure of liquid metal systems implemented in NSTX-U. The NSTX-U/LMCE facility aligns very well with recommendations in the FESAC Long-Range Plan and NASEM Pilot Plant reports and the Bold Decadal Vision, will be unique in the world program throughout the next decade, and is garnering private company interest in utilizing NSTX-U/LMCE for development of LM PFCs.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Hazards and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Advanced Nuclear Reactors Coupled with Industrial Facilities

This report provides a roadmap and tool kit for site specific risk assessments across a broad range of industrial customers co-located with advanced nuclear power plants (ANPP) that are not currently built and operating in the U.S. This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Integrated Energy Systems Pathway that has produced industrial requirements studies and techno-economic assessments on the topics of feasibility of ANPP supported industrial processes. This report also leverages the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program that has presented hazards assessment and generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors (LWRs) co-located with hydrogen production facilities. Many of the hazard assessments and risk assessments performed for the LWRS report are agnostic to whether the nuclear reactor is an ANPP or were adapted to the ANPP focus. The report performs hazards assessments to include industrial facilities: an oil refinery, a methanol plant, a synthetic fuel (synfuel) plant, the production of synthetic gas (syngas) as part of the methanol and synfuel plants, wood pulp and paper mills, and hydrogen production. Hydrogen production facilities are assessed in depth through prior reports in the LWRS program and the results are leveraged in this report. All these facilities are specified through industrial process and requirements research performed by national laboratories, universities, and interaction with industry. Many of the processes used in this report are pre-conceptual designs to use for decarbonization of the current technology facilities. A process of failure modes and effects analysis (what can go wrong) and accidentology (what has historically gone wrong) was used to determine the hazards presented to the nuclear power plant by the addition of the HES and the industrial customer. Chemical properties of feedstocks and products are summarized as part of the hazards assessment. Example analysis procedures are provided for each of the hazard types identified. These deterministic analyses can be used to assess adherence to licensing criteria. They can also be used to meet other safety goals like protection of the public, workers, or industrial facility equipment. A modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) PRA only existing on paper was modeled and verified in modern PRA software. This will provide a tool for representative ANPP probabilistic analyses for future research.

10 SYNTHETIC FUELS↗

NASA Plum Brook Station In-Space Propulsion Facility Test Stand Characterization Hot Fire Test

A test facility modification to enable small scale altitude propulsion testing at the NASA Glenn Research Center's In-Space Propulsion (ISP) Facility was verified with a hot fire test campaign. As the facility's primary steam supply system undergoes refurbishment, the alternate facility configuration, known as the "vacuum accumulator" mode, would enable rocket engine testing up to 10,000 lbf thrust. The NASA Johnson Space Center developed the vehicle for the verification test campaign: the Integrated Cryogenic Propulsion Test Article (ICPTA). Constructed primarily from assets of the former Morpheus Project, the ICPTA provided an integrated liquid oxygen (LOX) / liquid methane (LCH4) propulsion system including a 2,800 lbf thrust main engine. The ISP Facility's vacuum accumulator configuration leveraged the large test volume of the facility and a diffuser insert to maintain altitude conditions. During hot fire, the ICPTA main engine "started" the diffuser insert constructed for the test campaign. As a result, the test chamber upstream of the diffuser insert remained at altitude conditions throughout the hot fire. Upon engine shut down, a backflow deflector mitigated blow back into the test chamber by restricting the mass flow and redirecting it away from the test article. The test campaign successfully characterized the performance of the vacuum accumulator configuration. In addition, it provided an opportunity to collect data for an integrated LOX / LCH4 propulsion system in an altitude and thermal vacuum environment.

Rocket Engine Testing↗

A Preliminary Study of Inter-Facility LWC Differences in Appendix C and Supercooled Large Droplet Conditions due to Calibration Instruments

The simulation of clouds containing Supercooled Large Droplets has received increasing attention due to the introduction of Appendix O and future associated requirements for means of compliance. Supercooled Large Droplet conditions can cover four orders of magnitude in drop sizes, imposing a larger instrument measurement challenge than for Appendix C conditions. Wind tunnel facilities have adopted different instrumentation for liquid water content measurement, with fundamentally different principles of operation. In order to explore the comparability of the different instruments used for Appendix C and SLD measurement, and its impact on confidence in measurements used for means of compliance, a project was established to conduct a series of dedicated tests at three wind tunnel facilities. To date, liquid water content measurements have been completed using a Multi-Element sensor as the common instrument at two of the facilities. The data have provided preliminary information suggesting that substantial inter-facility differences likely exist in liquid water content estimates in Supercooled Large Droplet conditions that appear to be largely attributable to the choice of calibration instruments. These results are dependent on the assumption that the Multi-Element probe would produce equivalent measurements at the two facilities if the liquid water content were the same, regardless of other environmental differences that may exist between the two facilities. Planned further testing with other liquid water content measurement techniques may provide further information to confirm or refute the results of this study.

aircraft icing↗

Predicting contamination accumulation in facilities with limited data

"In preparation for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) launch at Centre Spatial Guyanias (CSG) in French Guiana, particulate contamination accumulation predictions were necessary for each facility in which the hardware would be exposed because the Telescope would be uncovered in each of the facilities and had strict particulate requirements. These included facilities for final integration and testing, fueling, transportation and encapsulation. Minimal heritage data existed from CSG and previous launch campaigns to use as a basis for contamination predictions. Data from the Automatic Transfer Vehicle and Herschel & Planck launch campaigns were used in conjunction with facility monitoring data provided by ESA and data collected during JWST working group visits to CSG. These campaigns were conducted at varying cleanliness levels that were typically less stringent than JWST requirements. Each facility was evaluated using the data provided and likely performance improvement with the addition of High Efficiency Particulate Air filter (HEPA) banks operating when possible. Once the launch campaign was completed, the predicted fallout was compared with actual data collected throughout the campaign. Based on the actual measurements, JWST’s primary and secondary mirrors are likely much cleaner than was expected with the predicted fallout in each facility. "

James Webb Space Telescope, contamination, cleanro↗

Capability Improvements at Marshall Space Flight Center's X-Ray and Cryogenic Facility

The X-Ray & Cryogenic Facility (XRCF) at Marshall Space Flight Center is the world’s largest x-ray optic calibration facility and NASA’s premier cryogenic optical test facility. Built specifically to calibrate the Chandra telescope, the facility contributed to several other x-ray missions until 2005 when it became dedicated to normal incidence optical testing at cryogenic temperatures. Recently the facility’s x-ray test capability has been returned to service and updated. New beam monitors, focal plane detectors, and test article and instrument positioning systems have been added. The x-ray data acquisition system has been updated. A real-time position monitoring metrology system is being developed that will enable calibration of large diameter optics via partial illumination in a diverging beam. The newly expanded x-ray test capabilities of the facility will be discussed.

XRCF↗

Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

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Nuclear Deactivation and Downgrade of Enriched Uranium Facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex

Buildings 9206 and 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex are both Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities from the Manhattan Project era that supported various missions over the decades, including the processing of enriched uranium. The production mission for Building 9206 ended in the 1990s, while Building 9212 is still an active production facility. The disposition process for contaminated excess facilities is generally described in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Guide DOE O 430.1A, Life Cycle Asset Management, which provides guidance on facility surveillance and maintenance, deactivation, decommissioning, and transition in supplemental guides DOE G 430.1-2 through 430.1-5. Historically, production facilities similar to Buildings 9206 and 9212 have not always been cleaned out and deactivated prior to being excessed, which significantly complicates the decommissioning phase. Many legacy facilities were shut down before the formal DOE guidance was established. This paper presents the practical application and implementation of the DOE guidance for the nuclear deactivation of Buildings 9206 and 9212, and summarizes the lessons learned for application across the DOE enterprise.

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Non-Nuclear Test Facility Development to Support Verification and Validation Needs

This study focuses on developing a non-nuclear test facility to help meet the verification and validation (V&V) requirements of a water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) system. The scaling analysis necessary for reactor system experimentation and assessment model V&V considers various reactor system accident scenarios such as main steam line break (MSLB), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and containment condensation and heat transfer. The goal is to identify key physics based phenomena of interest (POI), specific figures of merit (FOMs), and the state of knowledge (SOK) by employing phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies. Important physics phenomena such as heat transfer, fluid dynamics, structural integrity, and material selection must be addressed when scaling a thermal-hydraulics system. Alongside these considerations, modifications to the facility may be needed to align the scaled system with the available footprint (height and space) of the facility. These modifications may include infrastructure upgrades, changes to the piping layout, implementation of safety measures, and installation of new instrumentation and control systems. The test facility aims to provide a scaled-down version of prototypic facilities for comprehensive V&V activities by overcoming these challenges and making the necessary modifications. This approach minimizes scaling distortion, simulates prototypic plant conditions, and accurately models accident event progressions. Thus, the facility will be capable of adequately modeling a scaled SMR system to support the design, development and licensing needs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Use of the Manuela 3D/Radiation Scanning Tool at Nuclear Facilities - 20437

Licensees, facility operators and decommissioning contractors have a need for comprehensive, accurate and precise radiological and topographical data to plan and execute safe and efficient Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) projects. Traditional approaches rely greatly upon labor and administratively intensive data collection methods that require considerable time and effort to glean the relevant data to plan and perform work in a radiological work area. Orano Decommissioning Services has developed and utilized at French nuclear facilities a lightweight portable scanning instrument called MANUELA (Mobile Apparatus for Nuclear Expertise Localization Assistance). Recently Orano conducted demonstrations at two United States nuclear facilities using MANUELA that may prove useful in areas of the fuel cycle including: - ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) planning during facility operations; - Scoping and site characterization during the D and D planning phase; - Remedial action support during active decommissioning work; - Radiation and modeling planning for plant modifications; - Support Final Status Survey and demonstration of 'end state' compliance for license termination. MANUELA is currently being evaluated for use during decommissioning of nuclear facilities and could aide in demonstrating compliance with end state criteria after decommissioning. Of particular interest are decommissioning projects planned for various sites across the United States. Most of these sites present unique challenges and opportunities to safely and efficiently decommission in a regulatory compliant manner. The two demonstration site's current conditions of relatively low radiation levels inside containment proved to be ideal platforms to deploy the MANUELA instrument for evaluation of the complex geometries typically found in a nuclear facility. The MANUELA instrument was able to precisely identify local hot spots of the reactor system's primary equipment and was able to simultaneously overlay the dose information onto the scanned 3D images. Using data like this, a licensee would be able to make informed technical and personnel decisions on methods to remediate, shield or properly dispose of the radioactive source term. MANUELA can be used throughout the decommissioning process to validate progress and continue to refine the work activities to optimize the efforts of the crew which reduces downtime waiting for survey results, whereas traditional survey methodology relies on a physical survey to be performed and the data transcribed onto survey maps that are only two dimensional. The traditional format tends to be inaccurate and difficult to interpret the precise location(s) of hot spots or generalized dose rates. The resultant scan also allows the user to know the exact extent of the survey versus transposing information onto a map with only a portion of the map area scanned. MANUELA also compiles all of the relevant survey data into a downloadable table format which includes the measurement identification number, time stamp, point space location on the XYZ plane, and the dose rate value. (authors)

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