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Integration of Safety, Security, and Safeguards During Design and Operations: A Technical Assessment and Regulatory Considerations for Advanced Reactor and Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This report presents the current state of knowledge, technology, methodologies, and tools that could be implemented to realize the robust integration of safety, security, and safeguards (3S) for advanced nuclear reactors (ARs) and advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities. This report was motivated by the global development of ARs which are expected to play a key role in meeting domestic energy and climate objectives. Domestically, with many ARs in the early design phase, the integration of 3S provides an opportunity to achieve risk reduction while using less resources than traditional light water reactors by leveraging interdependencies and synergies between each domain. In addition, domestic policy considerations encourage the convergence of each 3S domain through facility design and operations. Therefore, there is a need to better understand the interdependencies and integration between 3S across ARs and advanced reactor fuel cycle facilities’ lifecycles including design, construction, and operational phases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

FORCE-DISPATCHES Integration - Initial Demonstration

Integrated energy systems (IES) combine, in mutually beneficial ways, power from variable renewable energy sources and nuclear power plants (NPP) to improve economic viability under uncertain market and weather conditions. The open-source Framework for Optimization of Resources and Economics (FORCE) tool suite, developed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), has enabled comprehensive modeling and simulation of IES. The capabilities within FORCE include grid portfolio optimization through the Holistic Energy Resource Optimization Network (HERON) and the transient process model analysis library HYBRID, among others. Continuous efforts and investments from the IES programs have been made to expand and improve the versatility of the FORCE toolset in fiscal year 2022. Code-coupling and cross-tool communication have been important methods for improving this versatility. This report focuses on an additional workflow in the HERON tool for capacity and dispatch stochastic optimization through integration with the external tool Design Integration and Synthesis Platform to Advance Tightly Coupled Hybrid Energy Systems (DISPATCHES). DISPATCHES was primarily developed by the National Energy Technology Laboratory, in collaboration with other national laboratories, which included INL, universities, and industry partners. It is coupled to a library of algebraic models for specific plant components, and to a framework for stochastic optimization different from that provided in the current Risk Analysis Virtual Environment (RAVEN)-running-RAVEN algorithm in HERON. HERON currently conducts stochastic optimization via an outer-inner loop: it optimizes over variable capacity on the outer loop, and at each step within the capacity parameter space, conducts an inner optimization over scenarios (of market signals, demand, and/or weather patterns) and hourly dispatch throughout a user-specified number of years. On the other hand, DISPATCHES conducts stochastic optimization via an “all-at-once” strategy in which capacity variables are optimized at the same level as dispatch variables, as all scenarios are considered at once. The latter method works especially well for projects of limited size and project length, as the necessary computational power and memory increases with the number of variables and scenarios. The new capability to use the DISPATCHES workflow in HERON enhances standalone simulations by leveraging FORCE tools—namely, the economic metrics from the Tool for Economic Analysis (TEAL) and reduced-order model (ROM) sampling from RAVEN. The initial demonstration of the DISPATCHES workflow simulates an existing nuclear-case flowsheet within the DISPATCHES repository—this models a NPP with a secondary revenue stream for hydrogen production. Electrical output from the plant is converted to hydrogen via a proton-exchange membrane (PEM) electrolyzer, hydrogen tanks are used for storage, and an additional turbine is added for hydrogen combustion. Continued work regarding this FORCE-DISPATCHES integration will include automatic generation of DISPATCHES models from HERON inputs, offering analysts the option of using either the RAVEN-runsRAVEN or DISPATCHES workflow to solve technoeconomic optimization problems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

CCE Phase 1: Consequence Prioritization

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) methodology to provide public and private organizations with steps to work collaboratively and establish a working relationship to protect critical infrastructure and other national assets. This process is a considerable undertaking, iterative in nature, and—as time and resources allow—should become a part of a company’s culture. By focusing on the impact of potentially negative Events, CCE provides a better understanding of how and why adversaries can affect critical functions and services using cyber-enabled sabotage. This document describes Phase 1 of the CCE process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Development of Control System Functional Capabilities within the IES Plug-and-Play Simulation Environment

The concept of an Integrated Energy System (IES) is meant to combine different energy technologies in synergistic ways to achieve a more secure and economical energy supply. The RAVEN-based HYBRID framework is used to find the optimal installed capacity and the optimal economical dispatch of each component of the IES. A new RAVEN (Risk Analysis Virtual ENvironment) plugin for grid and capacity optimization (HERON) has been developed for optimizing the production variables of the IES given the demand profile. Currently, only the limits that affect the production variables and their corresponding time rates of change are considered (explicit constraints). However, other variables are additionally subject to constraints, but the associated limits are not accounted for (implicit constraints). In particular, for the power dispatch problem, the optimization algorithm takes into account the limits on the electrical power output and the corresponding hourly power variations but does not consider other constraints on process variables whose response effects the service life of the IES. This report describes a scheme that allows accounting for implicit constraints without increasing the size of the optimization problem. The Reference Governor (RG) algorithm is traditionally used for enforcing state and control constraints by modifying the set-point trajectories supplied to the feedback regulators. In our application, the RG is coupled within an iterative loop with the HERON-power dispatcher to generate optimal trajectories that ensure the operational constraints are met. A data-driven procedure to derive a representation of the dynamics of the controlled system was developed. First, the variables that represented the state of the system are selected (PCA-based approach), and then state-space representation matrices are derived from the collected measurements (DMDc algorithm). A preliminary version of the developed workflow based on Linear Time Invariant matrices was assessed by adopting a two-unit test case. More sophisticated versions of this workflow foreseeing the on-line derivation of system matrices will be deployed in FY 2021. Finally, a “plug-and-play” library of controllers and state observers was developed in Dymola. Some aspects of the current configuration of the IES unit components, e.g., the encapsulation of the control schemes into dedicated blocks, are consistent with the “plug-and-play” philosophy. Other features, e.g., the system buses collecting the input and the output variables, are not. For this reason, once listed and described the limits of the current configuration, necessary modifications to the plant model interface are presented. As a test-case, the interfaces of the SES model in the RAVEN-based HYBRID framework were reworked accordingly, and two different control schemes were applied to the same plant model.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 34, No. 1, January-March 1993]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 An Integrated Regional Approach To Risk Management of Industrial Systems, S. Chakraborty and R. Stratton; 9 Annual Technical Meeting of the NRC Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program, E. G. Silver; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 13 Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria as Severe Accident Design Criteria and Policy for the New Production Reactor-Heavy Water Reactor, P. T. Rhoads; 20 Proposed Deterministic Severe Accident Criteria for the Heavy Water Reactor-New Production Reactor Containment, K. D. Bergeron, S. E. Slezak, and C. E. Leach; 33 Quasi-Static Core Liquid Level Depression and Long-Term Core Uncovery During a PWR LOCA, Y. Kukita, R. R. Schultz, H. Nakamura, and J. Katayama; 49 LIRA: An Advanced Containment System to Minimize the Accidental Radioactivity Releases, A. Turricchia; 63 Errata to “A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs,” Vol. 33, No. 4; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 64 The Nuplex 80+™ Advanced Control Complex from ABB Combustion Engineering, F. Ridolfo, D. Harmon, and K. Scarola; DESIGN FEATURES: 76 A Scheme for Passive Isolation of the Containment of a Reactor, A. K. Ghosh, V. V. Raj, and K. Kakodkar; 84 Utility Requirements for Safety in the Passive Advanced Light-Water Reactor, T. U. Marston, W. H. Layman, and G. Bockhold, Jr.; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 91 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 103 Testing Deficiencies in Auxiliary Systems Feedwater Systems, J. D. Kueck; 110 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 113 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 115 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 133 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 145 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 150 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 75 Harvard Short Course on Risk: Science, Assessment, and Management; 102 International Conference on Reactor Physics and Reactor Computations; 102 The Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Waste Reprocessing and Waste Management [RECOD ’94]; 132 International Symposium on the Radiological Exposure of the Population of the European Community from Radioactivity in the Mediterranean Sea [MARINA-MED]; 162 International High-Level Radioactive Waste Conference ‘Technology Integration—Above and Below”; 154 The Authors; 158 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 33.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

On-device lead sequestration for perovskite solar cells

Perovskite solar cells, as an emerging high-efficiency and low-cost photovoltaic technology face challenges on their way towards commercialization. Substantial improvements have been made to device stability but potential issues with lead toxicity and leaching from devices remain relatively unexplored. The potential for lead leakage could be perceived as an environmental and public health risk when using perovskite solar cells in building-integrated photovoltaics. Here we present a chemical approach for on-device sequestration of more than 96 per cent of lead leakage caused by severe device damage. A coating of lead-absorbing material is applied to the front and back sides of the device stack. On the glass side of the front transparent conducting electrode, we use a transparent lead-absorbing molecular film containing phosphonic acid groups that bind strongly to lead. On the back (metal) electrode side, we place a polymer film blended with lead-chelating agents between the metal electrode and a standard photovoltaic packing film. The lead-absorbing films on both sides swell to absorb the lead, rather than dissolve, when subjected to water soaking, thus retaining structural integrity for easy collection of lead after damage.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

NRAP Toolkit Screening for CarbonSAFE Illinois - Macon County

In this report we take stratigraphic data from the ISGS-led Macon County Phase 2 CarbonSAFE’s proposed site in Christian County, Illinois, and conduct reservoir simulations to generate pressure and CO 2 saturation plume data as a function of time. We then use this plume data along with the stratigraphic data as inputs to the NRAP Open-source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to evaluate project risks. For this report we focus on the probabilistic risk associated with hypothetical leakage of CO 2 and brine along the injection well and one monitoring well. We also study the resulting impact to two overlying aquifers, which could be used to inform monitoring technology selection.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Recent Cryogenic Carbon Capture™ Field Test Results

Sustainable Energy Solutions (SES) has been developing Cryogenic Carbon Capture™ (CCC) since 2008. In that time, two processes have been developed, the External Cooling Loop and Compressed Flue Gas CCC processes (CCC-ECL and CCC-CFG, respectively). The CCC-ECL process cools the flue gas with an external refrigerant loop. This process currently captures up to 1 tonne of CO2 per day (TPD). SES has tested CCC-ECL on real flue gas slip streams from subbituminous coal, bituminous coal, biomass, natural gas, shredded tires, and municipal waste fuels at field sites that include utility power stations, heating plants, cement kilns, and pilot-scale research reactors. The CO2 concentrations from these tests ranged from 5 to 22% on a dry basis. CO2 capture ranged from 95-99+% during these tests. Several other condensable species were also captured including NO2, SO2 and PMxx at 95+%. NO was also captured at a modest rate. The CCC-CFG process has been scaled up to a 0.25 ton per day system. This system has been tested on real flue gas streams including subbituminous coal, bituminous coal, and natural gas at field sites that include utility power stations, heating plants, and pilot-scale research reactors. CO2 concentrations for these tests ranged from 5 to 15% on a dry basis. CO2 capture ranged from 95-99+% during these tests. Several other condensable species were also captured including NO2, SO2, and PMxx at 95+%. NO was also captured at 90+%. Hg capture was also verified and the resulting effluent from CCC-CFG was below a 1ppt concentration. This paper will focus on discussion of the capabilities of CCC generally, the results of CCC-ECL field testing, and future steps surrounding the development of this technology. Test results that will be presented have been collected during 9 months of testing at a commercial power plant under funding from the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the host utility. Testing of one of the systems at a commercial cement plant in the United States will also be discussed. During this testing, the system captured CO2 from the cement plant and stored the CO2 in pressurized tanks. These tanks were provided to a partner company that later used the CO2 in a CO2 utilization demonstration. The CO2 was utilized to cure concrete manufactured using cement from the same plant where the CO2 was captured. This integrated capture and utilization demonstration was the first time that the cement industry has shown in the field that it can sequester its CO2 emissions in its main product stream. This represents a potential game changing solution for industrial CO2 emissions. Operational data and host-site feedback indicate that the CCC process is ideally suited for deployment into a variety of commercial environments. A few areas of de-risking remain to make sure the technology can meet very strict industrial reliability standards. These areas of de-risking are identified and discussed. The product CO2 is shown to meet specification for many uses including industrial and merchant applications. The technology is nearing readiness for deployment at commercial scale and several initial target markets have been identified.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Regulatory Decision-Making Process Using 'Weight of Evidence: An Evidence Integration Approach' by the State of Washington at the Hanford Site - 20163

Performance Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement Modeling, Human and Ecological Risk Assessments are the tools used by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) to make regulatory decisions for permitting and cleanup. These efforts all inherently have large amounts of uncertainty no matter how many alternative approaches are attempted. Professional feedback from tribal governments, stakeholders, federal and state regulators, the public and independent peer review groups are taken into account in this process of informed decision making. The process also includes full evaluation of the comments and the associated reviews made by the various peer review groups such as the Low -Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group (DOE order 435.1) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The evolution of technology has produced quicker and more efficient fate and transport modeling tools with related quantification of uncertainties and their significance. Groundwater and vadose zone models have been expanded across the entire Hanford site. Many of the technical approaches identified in the Washington State Regulations are updated using current knowledge to better understand the complexities of the Hanford Site using the latest state of the art tools for risk assessment and modeling. More emphasis and time are directed on defining uncertainty and then managing the uncertainty. One added tool is to run sensitivity cases based on informed decision making. The weight of evidence approach considers all relevant information in an integrative assessment that takes into account the kinds of evidence available, the quality and quantity, the uncertainty and error associated with each type, and how they fit together. Evidence of integration involves looking at systematic reviews and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. In conclusion, Ecology, Washington State's lead regulatory agency at the Hanford site, has had to modify its site closure approach compared to the rest of the state. A more holistic approach dealing with the Hanford site as an integrated system has evolved leading to a defensible informed approach for regulatory closure decisions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies –GETs and HPCs Session 3: HPCs and Building Actions Plans to Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program, held on November 11, 2025, centered on High Performance Conductors (HPCs) and the formulation of action plans to address digital assurance risks associated with Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs). This session convened experts from utilities, vendors, and government agencies to examine the technical, operational, and cybersecurity aspects of HPC deployment. Discussions highlighted the benefits of HPCs, such as their ability to rapidly increase transmission capacity using existing corridors, improve grid resilience, reduce system losses, and align with FERC Orders 2023 and 1920. Participants evaluated supply chain and digital assurance risks, including reliance on imported materials, limited domestic manufacturing capacity, workforce shortages, and traceability issues. The session also emphasized the importance of digital trust, integration-layer cybersecurity, and unified risk frameworks, introducing tools like intrusion detection systems, encryption, zero trust networking, and firmware integrity. Recaps of earlier workshops on Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), and Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO) underscored institutional barriers and integration challenges. Action plans were proposed to mitigate issues such as inconsistent cybersecurity practices, SBOM usage, supply chain visibility, operator trust, and misaligned incentives. Additionally, INL presented its supply chain risk management tools and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to support secure procurement and system design. The session concluded with a commitment to share key takeaways, incorporate cohort feedback into future policy development, and continue collaborative engagement through upcoming pilot activities. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage

In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016 - both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented - the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrating CO2 Electrolysis with Gas Fermentation to Produce Valuable Fuels and Chemicals

Many industrial activities squander CO2, decreasing process yield. We envision a future where this waste carbon is instead captured, upgraded, and valorized directly at the point of emission. Within the CO2 Reduction and Upgrading Consortium (a collaboration of seven US national laboratories and industrial partners), we are pursuing this goal by developing and de-risking new technologies for low temperature CO2 electrolysis, coupled with biological upgrading of intermediates into more valuable compounds. One such process involves electrocatalytic reduction of CO2 to generate carbon monoxide (CO). As both a carbon and energy source, CO represents an attractive feedstock for microbial upgrading by certain syngas-fermenting species, such as the autotrophic bacterium Clostridium autoethanogenum. Our team has developed new genetic tools and optimized cultivation techniques to enhance C. autoethanogenum as a platform host for the biological conversion of syngas into value-added products. For example, we have created novel CRISPR-based genetic engineering techniques to build new, genome-reduced, platform strains of C. autoethanogenum with improved growth rates. Further, we ve introduced heterologous biochemical pathways into C. autoethanogenum to enable the production of high-value compounds from syngas, such as the isoprenoid precursor mevalonic acid. With the tools of electrochemistry and synthetic biology, there is virtually no limit to the spectrum of products that could be sustainably manufactured from CO2.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration: Phase III (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP) is one of 7 regional partnerships formed in 2003 under the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships (RCSPs) initiative. The overall purpose of the initiative was to help determine and implement the technology, infrastructure, and regulations most appropriate to promote carbon storage in different regions of the country. Covering Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and parts of Texas, Wyoming, and Kansas, the SWP evaluated regional carbon storage and utilization potential and focused on technologies and sites that could complement the region’s strong position in energy production. The project progressed through three phases: • Phase I (2003–2005): Characterized regional geologic formations and CO 2 sources, assessed sequestration potential, and identified pilot test sites. • Phase II (2005–2013): Conducted small-scale field tests to validate sequestration methods, including geologic and terrestrial projects. • Phase III (2008–2022): Demonstrated large-scale CO 2 injection at a commercial oil field to test monitoring, verification, and long-term storage strategies. This report covers Phase III. The final project site, the Farnsworth Unit (FWU) in Texas, provided real-world testing of reservoir characterization, monitoring, and risk evaluation tools and processes that could be used in any commercial scale carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) project. Extensive data collection and analysis helped refine best practices for reservoir characterization, injection monitoring, and storage verification. The SWP contributed to national databases, DOE best practice manuals, and regional geological assessments to support future sequestration efforts. Key lessons learned include the importance of robust data management, strategic site selection, regulatory navigation, and effective industry collaboration. The project’s findings will inform ongoing and future carbon storage initiatives. Task 1 (Regional Characterization) • The SWP continued to participate in national outreach efforts and NATCARB. • The SWP evaluated multiple potential sites before selecting the FWU as the primary field test location. Task 2 (Public Outreach and Education) • The SWP contributed to national databases, DOE best practice manuals, and regional geological assessments to support future sequestration efforts. Task 3 (Permitting and Regulatory Compliance) • The SWP ensured compliance with federal and state regulations, including National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. • The SWP obtained all necessary permits for drilling, injection, and monitoring activities. Task 4 (Site Characterization and Planning) • The SWP developed work plans for four key activities: characterization, simulation, monitoring and verification, and risk evaluation. • The SWP collected and synthesized legacy data from multiple sources to build initial static geological models and dynamic reservoir models demonstrating project feasibility. • The SWP conducted an initial risk evaluation and developed mitigation plans. Task 5 (Field Operations and Data Collection) • The SWP drilled, logged, and cored three characterization wells to gather critical subsurface data. • The SWP conducted multiple geophysical surveys, including 3D seismic, crosswell seismic, and vertical seismic profiling, to improve reservoir characterization. Task 6 (Monitoring and Verification) • The SWP performed extensive geological characterization using data from characterization wells and seismic surveys. • The SWP established a surface monitoring network to track CO 2 flux in soil gas, groundwater chemistry, and near-surface atmospheric CO 2 levels. • The SWP built and refined reservoir models to study the effects of relative permeability on simulation behavior and improve calibration with experimental data. Task 7 (Risk Assessment and Model Refinement) • The SWP conducted multiple studies to evaluate reservoir integrity, predict CO 2 plume behavior and improve predictive modeling capabilities. • The SWP refined geological models and used them to enhance the accuracy of simulation models. • The SWP continued quantitative risk assessment of top-ranked risks and strengthened the link between qualitative and quantitative risk methodologies.

02 PETROLEUM↗