Results for “PROTECTIVE COVERINGS” — Page 12

DOE OSTI2022

Assessment of San Onofre Concrete Susceptibility Against Irradiation Damage

The work performed under this contract covers the characterization of unirradiated concrete specimens cored from the walls of the steam generator room of the SONGS Unit 2, currently under decommission. This report documents the extensive set of characterization conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, at the Ohio State University, and at ALG Global. The susceptibility of irradiation-induced damage in concrete is governed by the exposure level (fast neutron fluence > 10 19 n.cm -2 at E > 0.1 MeV) and the mineralogy of the aggregates (high quartz content and chemical heterogeneity of the assemblage). Both conditions are met for the SONGS concrete biological shield. Hence, harvesting in-service irradiated concrete from the SONGS Unit 2 or 3 biological shield is currently an unparalleled opportunity to study the flux effects of neutron irradiation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Multilayer Architecture Barriers for High Temperature Nuclear Applications

Innovative thin film multilayer metal/ceramic barrier coatings have been developed by Argonne National Laboratory to protect fuel cladding against different phenomena that can be encountered under the harsh operating conditions of advanced nuclear reactors. One phenomenon is Fuel-Cladding Chemical Interaction (FCCI), which can represent a challenge to the performance of steel-clad metallic fuels in sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), especially when operating to high burnups at elevated cladding temperatures, and long fuel residence time. Another phenomenon is the corrosion of zirconium-based cladding under prototypic boiling water reactor (BWR) conditions and associated cladding during off normal conditions, including loss of coolant accidents (LOCA). This work provides details of the development and testing of a thin film (few microns) multilayer metal/ceramic (CrY/Y 2 O 3 ) coatings on steel cladding and its performance against FCCI. The coating architecture evolved through systematic mechanical testing, radiation tolerance assessments, and high-temperature diffusion studies from a preliminary multilayer concept to an optimized high-performance design. The optimized structure leverages stoichiometric Y 2 O 3 for its exceptional radiation stability, chemical inertness, and ultra-low fission product diffusivity (e.g., Ce diffusivity ~10 -20 m 2 /s in irradiated Y 2 O 3 at 650 °C). This is paired with ductile chromium-rich interlayers (Cr 95 Y 5 ), which significantly enhance fracture toughness and mechanical resilience. Design refinements, including increased ceramic layer thickness and optimized Cr–Y interlayer composition, eliminated fracture propagation and preserved coating integrity under extreme mechanical stress (>10× typical reactor conditions) and prolonged radiation exposure (~300 dpa). Those conditions are well beyond expected conditions during normal operations in SFR, and cover some of the transient conditions as well. In addition, the coating deposition was demonstrated to be applied uniformly to the inner surface of steel tubes representing prototypic SFR cladding. Another phenomenon under consideration in this work is the corrosion of zirconium-based cladding under prototypic boiling water reactor (BWR) conditions and associated off normal conditions including loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Another multilayer thin film coating is considered for mitigation of this phenomenon, where a coating of yttrium aluminum and yttrium aluminum ceramic/metal thin film coating. Preliminary results on the coating performance during high temperature thermal cycling (up to 1000 C) have shown promising performance of the coating. On-going optimization of the coating will continue in FY26.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2021

CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update

This report documents the quantitative results of the common-cause failure (CCF) data collection effort (which included data through 2020) and summarizes the results of the parameter estimation quantification process performed on CCF data in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database. This is the 2020 update to NUREG/CR-5497, updating data and parameter estimations for CCFs. This release, CCF Parameter Estimation 2020, reflects the CCF data contained within the CCF database, https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx, by executing (in August 2021) the CCF query rules in the folder SPAR Rules 2020. The data covers the period from 1/1/2006 to 12/31/2020, the most recent 15-year period in which data are available. The use of the most recent rolling 15-year data in parameter estimation differs from previous updates, in which 1/1/1997 was used as the starting date (e.g., 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2015 for the 2015 update, 1/1/1997 to 12/31/2012 for the 2012 update). The new date range (i.e., the most recent 15-year period), was selected for this CCF update so as to be consistent with the date range chosen for the component reliability parameter estimation, and with the effort to include sufficient data for analysis while simultaneously reflecting the most recent industry performance. These results are appropriate for use in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies, including the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the U.S. This update may be referred as: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update," https://nrcoe.inl.gov/publicdocs/CCF/ccfparamest2020.pdf, November 2021.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Examining Graphite Degradation in Molten Salt Environments: A Chemical, Physical, and Material Analysis

Molten-salt reactors (MSRs) are Generation IV nuclear reactors that use liquid salt as a coolant and/or fuel. In several MSR designs, graphite serves as a moderator and/or reflector. However, due to limited experimental data and operational experience, our understanding of graphite behavior in molten salt environments remains incomplete. This report aims to identify the degradation mechanisms of nuclear graphite in MSRs, detail the mechanisms of each factor, and provide an initial assessment of their impact on the structural integrity of graphite components. This assessment is based on an extensive literature review and insights from subject matter experts. Furthermore, given the limited data, a modeling strategy using existing Grizzly software is proposed for a more thorough analysis where appropriate. Additionally, it presents mitigation strategies where applicable. The report covers physical degradation mechanisms such as infiltration, erosion, and abrasion, as well as chemical degradation mechanisms including fluorination, intercalation, corrosion, and oxidation. Molten salt can infiltrate the porous structure of graphite, leading to several detrimental effects. Entrapment of fissile products within the graphite pores can cause radiation damage and could pose challenges in the handling and disposal of contaminated components. The differential thermal expansion between the infiltrated salt and graphite, along with internal stress from pressurized molten salt and volumetric heating, can compromise the structural integrity of graphite. To mitigate these effects, employing ultra-fine graphite grades and applying sealants and coatings are effective strategies. A computational model based on coupled solid mechanics and heat transfer phenomena could be used to predict the internal stresses using Grizzly software. In pebble-bed MSRs, graphite fuel pebbles can cause abrasion against reactor components due to friction and wear. The severity of wear is influenced by various factors such as temperature, environment, and the presence of lubricants. Tribological studies reveal that higher temperatures and molten salt environments, such as FLiBe, significantly reduce wear rates compared to dry conditions. Additionally, the chemical composition of the salt can further optimize graphite's tribological performance. Long-term wear effects can be modeled by incorporating surface defects into the geometry and predict stresses under thermal and radiation effects using Grizzly software. Chemical degradation of graphite in a molten salt environment can occur through fluorination and intercalation. Fluorination can occur via replacement of hydrogen or oxygen atoms, or at the active sites, but does not cause structural degradation. Intercalation, on the other hand, can lead to exfoliation, where layers of graphite separate and peel away, damaging the graphite. Protective coatings can enhance graphite's resistance to intercalation. Graphite generally exhibits good chemical stability in molten salt environments, though it can corrode under specific conditions, particularly in the presence of impurities or oxidants. Studies have shown that protective coatings, such as plasma-sprayed partially stabilized zirconia (PSZ), can effectively prevent such degradation. Corrosion behavior varies significantly with different graphite grades and coating applications, underscoring the need for detailed studies on uncoated and coated graphite to understand and mitigate corrosion mechanisms in MSRs. Research indicates that the presence of oxidants and impurities can accelerate graphite degradation in molten salts, making it essential to explore acceptable impurity limits. Oxidation is another critical degradation mechanism, leading to weight loss and structural damage due to the formation of CO and CO 2 from the reaction of carbon atoms with oxygen. This process creates new porosity and compromises graphite's integrity. While extensive research on graphite oxidation has been conducted for gas-cooled reactors, studies specific to MSRs are limited. Findings from the coal industry suggest that molten alkali metal salts can significantly accelerate graphite oxidation, a hypothesis worth exploring for fluoride salts in MSRs. Understanding oxidation behavior in MSRs is vital for developing protective measures. The analysis of post-irradiated graphite from the MSRE experiment demonstrated exceptional chemical compatibility with molten fluoride salt, suggesting that the extent of chemical attack on graphite largely depends on the salt's infiltration capability. Therefore, the use of ultra-fine grade graphite could help mitigate chemical degradation effects. Existing oxidation modeling capabilities in Grizzly, which use reaction-diffusion equations to model graphite-air interactions, could be adapted to simulate the chemical degradation effects of graphite in molten salt environments.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Development of Dry Cask Risk Tools

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has repeatedly expressed a desire to increase the use of risk in its decision-making. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement published in 1995 formalized the Commission’s commitment to risk-informed regulation through the expanded use of PRA. While a great deal of work has been done to incorporate risk insights into the regulatory framework for at-power nuclear reactors. Far less progress has been made to risk inform the dry-casks and nuclear waste transportation areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. INL was tasked with incorporating the information from the two completed dry cask PRAs as well as any additional available information into a tool that helps the NRC use those insights to identify levels of risk at various stages in the nuclear waste cycle. The first task was to address the License Amendment Request (LAR) Process for Dry Cask storage, the second task is for the incorporate transportation into the tool, and the third and final task will be incorporate any additional regulatory applications for dry cask storage. This report covers the first task of the tool and will eventually incorporate the remaining two tasks may be completed in the future and built off the model described here. Task 1 specifically asked to incorporate the risk insights into the process for determining and prioritizing review of license amendment changes related to storage applications by outlining a resource allocation strategy and defining recommendations of for the depth and breadth of the LAR review. It was requested that the tool be similar in design to the SDP notebooks/worksheets and contain quantitative, qualitative, or semi-quantitative approaches to assessing the risk of the change. The final tool that was selected by INL to be developed was a flowchart and associated rationale document that allows the reviewer to quickly assess potential LAR changes and their associated risks as well as the rationale behind the risk categorization. This risk categorization will lead to specific actionable recommendations to expect from a change of that specific category. This allows for a more consistent review process as well as improving the overall efficiency of the review itself.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2023

Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes

A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Large Volume Airborne Contamination Monitoring To Support Nuclear Processes' Deactivation and Decommissioning

Current D and D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries - Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne Pu, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations - Current air samplers and CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required - Hanford is located in a high radon environment, making air monitoring for alpha emitting actinides challenging in high alpha radon induced backgrounds. - Inexpensive HEPA based home and industrial air purifiers filter significantly higher volumes of air than commercially available continuous-air monitoring (CAM) systems. - Inexpensive models capable of filtered air volumes exceeding 1000 times that of a CAM. - Detector system can be built to detect x-rays generated from actinide decay. - Branching ratios of x-rays are 4 orders of magnitude more intense from Plutonium decay than its gamma emissions. - Detector system can be a low resolution systems, as x-ray region of interest is not terribly congested. - Detection systems evaluated will be designed based on slabs of NaI or pixelated NaI or CsI panels. - Simple graphical user interface software will be developed to operate the detection system. - Concept is to deploy some of these air-purifying systems in nonradiological areas around SRNL to confirm radon can be rejected with confidence. - Generate some filters contaminated with plutonium via electroplated Pu or lab generated simulated particles. - then deploy units in known airborne radiological environments to establish systems ability to accurately measure actinide based hot particles Lab analyses will follow up the system analyses to ensure hot particles were correctly identified. Analysis by Scintillation: - Application of scintillation media to the surface of the filters is being explored. - Evaluating slabs of ZnS(Ag), application of powdered ZnS(Cu) and spray on Perkin Elmer Enhance. - Scintillation events would then be digitized with a digital camera and quantified. - Comparing against sensitivity of a PMT or SiPD readout. - Currently evaluating a Thorlabs 8 Megapixel Monochrome Scientific CCD Camera, hermetically sealed cooled package with a wide angle lens. - Wide angle lens allows complete view of HEPA filter from 7 inches away. - Images taken of glow in the dark paint, as well as plutonium-induced fluorescence. - Plutonium was flamed mounted on a 1 inch diameter stainless steel planchet, covered with a layer of mylar and a section of scintillating ZnS obtained from Eljon. - Currently working on reducing signal-to-noise levels to boost sensitivity. - Dark box to hold contaminated or electroplated source covered filters under fabrication. Analysis by x-ray Spectroscopy: - Branching ratios for x-ray emissions from Plutonium isotopes are orders of magnitude more intense than gamma-ray emissions. - The nuclear databases are incomplete on the branching ratios of some of the isotopes. - Evaluating some custom built SrI2 x-ray spectrometers vs a conventional windowed NaI detector. - SrI2 detectors are carbon-composite-windowed 51 mm x 51 mm. - MCNP calculations to establish self absorbance of filter media on 17 keV x-ray. Radon Rejection: - Activated charcoal pre-filter acts as a Radon trap. - Adding a time lapse feature to camera to aid in radon rejection. SRS Plutonium Fuel Form D and D Operations: Currently deploying air sampler to D and D operation of Pu-238 facility at SRS to generate some field samples to analyze.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Tracking cropland transitions: A comparative analysis of U.S. land cover change data

There are a growing number of land cover data available for the conterminous United States, supporting various applications ranging from biofuel regulatory decisions to habitat conservation assessments. These datasets vary in their source information, frequency of data collection and reporting, land class definitions, categorical detail, and spatial scale and time intervals of representation. These differences limit direct comparison, contribute to disagreements among studies, confuse stakeholders, and hamper our ability to confidently report key land cover trends in the U.S. Here we assess changes in cropland derived from the Land Change Monitoring, Assessment, and Projection (LCMAP) dataset from the U.S. Geological Survey and compare them with analyses of three established land cover datasets across the coterminous U.S. from 2008-2017: (1) the National Resources Inventory (NRI), (2) a dataset Lark et al. 2020 derived from the Cropland Data Layer (CDL), and (3) a dataset from Potapov et al. 2022. LCMAP reports more stable cropland and less stable noncropland in all comparisons, likely due to its more expansive definition of cropland which includes managed grasslands (pasture and hay). Despite these differences, net cropland expansion from all four datasets was comparable (5.18-6.33 million acres), although the geographic extent and type of conversion differed. LCMAP projected the largest cropland expansion in the southern Great Plains, whereas other datasets projected the largest expansion in the northwestern and central Midwest. Most of the pixel-level disagreements (86%) between LCMAP and Lark et al. 2020 were due to definitional differences among datasets, whereas the remainder (14%) were from a variety of causes. Cropland expansion in the LCMAP likely reflects conversions of more natural areas, whereas cropland expansion in other data sources also captures conversion of managed pasture to cropland. The particular research question considered (e.g., habitat versus soil carbon) should influence which data source is more appropriate.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

Vitrification of Hanford Tank 241-AP-107 with Recycled Condensate

During the vitrification of nuclear waste at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) – the primary mission of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection – the offgas condensate generated from the waste-to-glass conversion is currently planned to be concentrated by evaporation in the Effluent Management Facility (EMF). This concentrated condensate can then be recycled back to the incoming waste and vitrified. To test the recycle process, a test apparatus was designed to mimic the EMF evaporator and used to concentrate a volume of condensate that had been previously produced during the vitrification of Hanford tank 241-AP-107 (referred to herein as AP-107) waste in a continuous laboratory-scale melter (CLSM). The test apparatus successfully concentrated the AP-107 condensate by a factor of 10 while retaining over 90 % of the technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), Cs, and I inventory. A second portion of AP-107 waste was retrieved by Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, given to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and combined with the AP-107 condensate concentrate after undergoing solids filtration and cesium removal by ion exchange. This combination served to approximate the recycling action to be performed at the WTP. After the addition of glass-forming chemicals (GFCs), the combined AP-107 waste and AP-107 condensate concentrate were processed in the CLSM to produce a glass, called AP-107-1R, that was designed to satisfy the WTP baseline requirements (Kim et al. 2012). During the 8.87 hours of processing, 7.27 kg of AP-107-1R glass were produced for an average glass production rate of 1739 kg m 2 d -1 . Compared to the previous run in the CLSM without recycled condensate, the run with the recycle had a greater average glass production rate, but the rate was within the potential range of variability when processing melter feeds with similar composition in the CLSM. The glass produced from the AP-107 recycle run in the CLSM was within 10 % of the target AP-107-1R glass composition with respect to the primary glass components. Analysis of the minor component impurities revealed that their content in the glass product had approached their nominal target after 2 turnovers of the glass inventory in the CLSM while the activity of the minor radionuclides was retained in the glass product. The 99 Tc and total cesium content in the combined AP-107 waste and recycled condensate were maintained at concentrations expected to be experienced at the WTP. During processing in the CLSM, at discrete sampling time periods, the target 99 Tc/Cs mass ratio in the glass formulation varied from 0.9 to 62.9. Across this range, the Cs retention in the glass ranged from 53 to 60 %, while the retention from the entire runtime totaled 68 %, values which align with Cs retention in other scaled melter systems while processing LAW melter feeds at 99 Tc/Cs mass ratios ranging from 1 to 100. The 99 Tc retention in the glass ranged from 22 to 32 %, primarily due to the cold-cap coverage on the glass melt surface, the area covered by reacting melter feed, varying from ~80 % to ~95 % during processing, demonstrating greater volatility of 99 Tc from the glass while more surface was exposed, as expected based on previous 99 Tc volatility studies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Measured Performance of Over the Range Microwave Range Hoods

The California residential building code requires kitchen exhaust ventilation to protect indoor air quality. The requirement can be met with a kitchen exhaust fan or a range hood that conforms to airflow and sound specifications based on certified, standard test results. Appliances that integrate an exhaust fan with an over the range microwave (OTRs) are popular for their space saving utility; but for years there were none with the certified performance data required for building code compliance. This project, initiated during that period, aimed to evaluate OTR models found in new California homes and compare their performance to range hoods that minimally met code requirements. The study aimed to expand on limited information available about OTR performance with a particular focus on measuring the fraction of cooktop-generated air pollutants that are captured and removed by the exhaust devices, a parameter called “capture efficiency”. Airflow and capture efficiency (CE) were measured in a simulated kitchen in Berkeley Lab’s FLEXLAB facility. Airflows were measured using several variations of a balanced-pressure flow method (Walker et al. 2001) including a protocol that had been used in the California Healthy Efficient New Gas Homes (HENGH) field study. Measurements were made for six OTRs observed in the field study, including three with certified test results (published after the start of this project) for airflow and sound. Measurements were also made on two standard range hoods with comparable airflows and costs to the OTRs, when accounting for the microwave functionality. CE was measured using the CO 2 emitted from burners while heating pots of water (POW) as a tracer and calculating the ratio of added CO 2 in the exhaust flow over the total CO 2 generated from burning fuel. Results show that OTRs generally met the California code requirements for airflow, which are the same as those of the residential ventilation standard of ASHRAE. It was determined that the field protocol used in HENGH study homes was biased low by ~14% on average. The CE performance of OTRs tested in this study were consistent with those tested under controlled conditions in prior studies, showing CE increasing with airflow and being higher for emissions occurring at the back cooktop burner(s) compared with front burner emissions. The measured CE covered a range of 40% to 85% for the front burners and 60% to 100% for the back burners. The relationship of CE to airflow for OTRs was within the range of those found for standard range hoods in this study and prior studies, with the key caveat that OTRs appear to have more consistent CE performance for emissions on the front burner.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2023

Assessing Methodologies for Detecting Water Intrusion in Wall Systems: Phase 2

Studies by the University of Florida, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Housing (HUD) have revealed that there is a substantial fraction of commercial and residential buildings that have been exposed to moisture resulting in damage or durability problems. Water intrusion into building envelope components leads to a variety of undesirable conditions such as mold, wood rot, corrosion, and aesthetic damage. Tests methods that are presently used to evaluate the amount of water intrusion into a building envelope component are usually qualitative in nature. For example, ASTM E 331, Standard Test Method for Water Penetration of Exterior Windows, Curtain Walls, and Doors by Uniform Static Air Pressure Difference requires that you “observe and record points of water leakage, if any.” This test was originally developed to assess the performance of fenestration products but is commonly adapted to evaluate other enclosure assemblies. However, when it is typically used for walls, this procedure is limited to recognizing if the moisture is visually observable from the backside side of the sheathing. It does not address moisture that is absorbed in the layers of the building envelope component, which could impact the durability of the assembly. Clearly a quantitative means of determining water penetration would improve the quality of this type of test and assist with better understanding the resultant impact on enclosure assemblies. In 2018-20, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in conjunction with the Air Barrier Association of America, initiated a research project to address this issue. The purpose of that study was to evaluate nine different methods of detecting moisture intrusion through a wall assembly. air and water barrier. The wall assemblies included metal frame construction faced with gypsum sheathing and both self-adhered and fluid applied air and water barriers (AWB) were evaluated for this exercise. This project did not test the efficacy of the different AWBs, rather, fasteners were purposely installed in various ways to foster water penetration and activate the different methods of detection. Each detection method was evaluated for five features that included simplicity of use, cost of implementation, whether the method was quantitative or subjective, accuracy, and applicability. A scale of green/yellow/red was used to assess each feature where green was acceptable, yellow was borderline, and red was not to be pursued at this time. This report covers additional research that has been undertaken to extend the activities initiated in this earlier project with refinements for specific detection methods and considerations for expansion related to field versus laboratory testing standards.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

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DOE OSTI1995

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material shipping package, or the 9982, differs from the others by allowing a multitude of radionuclides instead of a single defined set. While allowing flexibility, this requires more justification on why these contents would be worthwhile and why they would not cause various safety hazards when shipped together. The latter was covered through mass limit calculations, and the potential uses for the package are shown through comparison with historical shipments. Here, the mass limits were already calculated[1] and used to show three example shipments are suitable for the 9982 as well. Plutonium stored in 3013 containers[2], training sources shipped in 9977 packages[3], and americium standards shipped in 9978 packages[4] were all analyzed. The mass of each radionuclide and the corresponding mass limit were used to first determine if the listed content could be shipped. If so, the maximum allowed mass of such contents is also calculated in order to see if the 200-gram fissile limit for the 9982 would be violated if additional material was packed. The sum-of-the-fractions method produces contents that do not violate the mass limits or exceed the 200-gram fissile limit. These sets also serve as realistic examples of what may be shipped in the 9982. Well-founded example contents will help the approval of the package by showing its compatibility with previously shipped material. Unfounded hypothetical contents would not show the usefulness of having a wide variety of allowed radionuclides. More contents may be developed in order to incorporate other radionuclides that were not present in these three examples. The light elements will also need to be evaluated due to their exclusion currently preventing some materials from being allowed in the 9982.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

The role of peer review and science for advancing public understanding

We live in a time of rapid change. The Covid-19 pandemic has united the world to understand and develop solutions to protect the health and wellbeing of society. At the same time, access to information on the internet and social media has exploded. People are exposed to information with many claims. Some of the information is relevant and accurate. A significant fraction may be inaccurate, biased, and potentially dangerous. With Covid-19, the information might point to cures that are toxic or risks that are not relevant. The scientific community has developed a process to develop and convey knowledge. The validation of results and their interpretation is critical to advancing knowledge. The core of the scientific process is based on developing a hypothesis-driven concept, designing and executing an experimental approach to prove or disprove the hypothesis, conducting a statistical analysis of the results to confirm their validity, and interpreting their meaning and impact. When their work is completed the scientist prepares to publish the work. Publication requires peer review. Hypotheses, experimental approaches, results, and interpretation of results are independently and anonymously reviewed by a scientific peer. The reviewers are selected based on their expertise in the field. The peer review process is essential for the integrity of the scientific process. Without a robust scientific process, society cannot discriminate between validated results and interpretations and biased, inaccurate, and potentially dangerous conjecture. With inaccurate science society and policy makers may make poor decisions that could hurt people and the world around them. While scientists should not censor information available to the public, scientists have a responsibility to inform the public. We must articulate what the scientific process is and why it is essential when considering the validity of information. Scientist are responsible for pointing out when public information has not been vetted through a scientific process and therefore cannot be considered conclusive. Scientists are responsible for highlighting information that has been generated and vetted with the scientific process. Over time, our goal is for the public to value the scientific process based on peer review. The public could become enlightened to the necessity for peer review to support decisions and action. Scientists need to contribute to advancing public knowledge. When invited to serve as a peer reviewer, scientists have a responsibility to contribute to the process. We all are extremely busy making peer review a distraction. While peer review does not directly benefit our own work and career, it benefits our chosen field of science. This is very important for the research area that our journal, Water-Energy Nexus, is focusing on. We cover the convergence of science and technology integrating across large spatial ranges (micro to global) in environmental pollution and the balance of remediation issues with energy use. Water-Energy Nexus wants to provide scientists with a platform for scientific debate and discussion on this rich and complicated topic. With the manuscripts submitted to WEN cover integrated research topics across a broad range of subjects from environment sciences through energy engineering, the role of peer review is essential. Peer review on a new submission to WEN should not be biased towards a specific science field. It should be done considering the complex nature of issues in the water-energy nexus. Scientists need to contribute to the public dialog. To accomplish these goals, we need to be honest, accurate, articulate, and use understandable language. The impact of WEN is very diverse affecting society in many ways. The scientific audience for WEN is diverse and readers may not fully understand the content of the papers outside their research expertise. Therefore, scientists, especially those who want to contribute to WEN, should work with communications specialists to convey message to benefit society. The audience includes the general public and researchers outside the author’s core specialty. While the peer-reviewed journal article is the cornerstone of our careers and critical for advancing scientific knowledge, a general interest story could benefit society even more. The author cannot lose sight that our work has two audiences, the science community, and more importantly, our family, friends, neighbors, and policy makers.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 2, April-June 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 97 The Nuclear Community and the Public: Cognitive and Cultural Influences on Thinking About Nuclear Risk, M. A. Meyer; 109 Twenty-Third Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting, D. A. Copinger; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 126 Analysis of a PWR LBLOCA Without SCRAM, Trevor N. Tyler, Rafael Macian-Juan and John H. Mahaffy; DESIGN FEATURES: 139 Vulnerability of Multiple-Barrier Systems, N. C. Lind; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 149 A Study of Wet Catalytic Oxidation of Radioactive Spent Ion Exchange Resin by Hydrogen Peroxide, Xingchao Jian, Tianbao Wu, and Guichun Yun; 157 A Comparison Study and Resolution of Differences Between Emergency Response and Safety Analysis Codes Used at the Savannah River Site, A. A. Simpkins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 164 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 167 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 172 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 178 American Nuclear Society 1997 Annual Meeting; 178 American Nuclear Society Nuclear Criticality and Safety Division Topical Meeting; 176 The Authors.

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