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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2024

GLIMPSE of Future Power Grid Models

Power grid is one of the critical national infrastructures with social, economics, and national security impacts. Particularly, power distribution systems represent part of the infrastructure between power distribution substations and customers such as residential, commercial, and industrial. To address various grid modernization challenges, state-of-the-art algorithms and methodologies have been developed to deploy, operate, and expand a secure and resilient power grid. At the same time, there is a need to develop capabilities to assist power grid stakeholders to quickly get insight into the design and structure of the grid. Data visualization is a key approach to comprehend and understand complex systems such as the power grid. We present GLIMPSE Grid Layout Interface for Model Preview and System Exploration), a graph-based semantic-aware application to visualize and update distribution power grid models. The GLIMPSE can be used with standard IEEE models to search and highlight power grid objects such as generators, loads, overhead lines, etc. Additionally, it supports updating attributes and model export to integrate with GridLAB-D simulations.

Cybersecurity, power grid, visualization↗

DOE OSTI2025

Edge ML for CAN bus intrusion detection in AVs

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are revolutionizing transportation, but their reliance on interconnected cyber-physical systems exposes them to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. This study addresses the critical challenge of detecting real-time cyber intrusions in self-driving vehicles by leveraging a dataset from the Udacity self-driving car project. We simulate four high-impact attack vectors, Denial of Service (DoS), spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, by injecting noise into spatial features (e.g., bounding box coordinates) to replicate adversarial scenarios. We develop and evaluate two lightweight neural network architectures (NN-1 and NN-2) alongside a logistic regression baseline (LG-1) for intrusion detection. The models achieve exceptional performance, with NN-2 attaining an AUC score of 93.15% and 93.15% accuracy, demonstrating their suitability for edge deployment in AV environments. Through explainable AI techniques, we uncover unique forensic fingerprints of each attack type, such as spatial corruption in fuzzy attacks and temporal anomalies in replay attacks, offering actionable insights for feature engineering and proactive defense. Visual analytics, including confusion matrices, ROC curves, and feature importance plots, validate the models' robustness and interpretability. This research sets a new benchmark for AV cybersecurity, delivering a scalable, field-ready toolkit for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and policymakers. By aligning intrusion fingerprints with SAE J3061 automotive security standards, we provide a pathway for integrating machine learning into safety-critical AV systems. Our findings underscore the urgent need for security-by-design AI, ensuring that AVs not only drive autonomously but also defend autonomously. This work bridges the gap between theoretical cybersecurity and life-preserving engineering, offering a leap toward safer, more secure autonomous transportation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Designing resilient IoT and Edge Computing with federated tinyML

The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Edge Computing (EC) has brought significant conveniences to modern society but has also greatly expanded the cyber attack surfaces, particularly as these technologies are being increasingly integrated into critical systems such as power grids, healthcare, and smart homes. Here, to improve IoT/EC’s cybersecurity posture, we leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) by employing tinyML to monitor voluminous IoT data for cyber threats while addressing devices’ resource constraints, and utilizing Federated Learning (FL) to share local detection knowledge across the system while preserving privacy. Building on our three-layer architecture combining tinyML and FL to enhance autonomous cyber attack detection, this paper demonstrated that the architecture improves detection accuracy, reduces resource consumption, and enables lightweight, secure IoT device monitoring. These results were validated using the public N-BaIoT dataset as well as real IoT network traffic data collected under multiple attack scenarios from our testbeds. Additionally, we introduced an enhanced FL methodology with a novel preprocessing stage, including federated feature selection and global preprocessor construction, to address IoT/EC data heterogeneity. We developed a physical IoT testbed for attack simulations and data collection, implemented a tinyML-powered detector for realistic model validation, and also built a virtual testbed for scalable evaluations of FL models across diverse network environments.

Cognitive cyber↗

DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗

DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Data Center Cybersecurity, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Cohort Summary: Takeaways and Action Plans

This report summarizes the outcomes of the Data Center Cohort under the Department of Energy’s Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, aimed at enhancing grid resilience through cybersecurity, supply chain risk management (SCRM), and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). The cohort engaged 17 organizations across utilities, data center operators, vendors, and technology providers in three sessions combining presentations, discussions, and exercises. Key topics included AI-driven load behavior, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in UPS/BESS and cooling systems, governance gaps at utility–data center boundaries, and supply chain integrity. Five cross-cutting themes emerged: interconnection architecture vulnerabilities, fragmented governance, AI-driven stability risks, lack of regulatory frameworks, and long-term supply chain concerns. Actionable recommendations were developed, including implementing DMZ segmentation, formalizing vendor access agreements, designing AI workload limits, and advancing standards through NERC and state-level programs. These strategies aim to strengthen resilience, clarify responsibilities, and ensure secure integration of data centers into the grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2024

Assessment and Coordination of DER Cybersecurity Standards

Distributed energy resources (DERs) are becoming increasingly important to the electric grid, including solar energy systems. However, DERs also introduce new cybersecurity risks, including those posed by cloud computing. Standards harmonization is essential for ensuring that DERs are secure and can be safely integrated into the grid. This panel will discuss cyber standards harmonization for solar security. The panel will feature experts from the S2G Program, National Labs and Industry.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Blockchain-Based Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack Detection for Photovoltaic Systems

Cybersecurity of photovoltaic (PV) systems entails a much larger scope than just encryption and firewall of communications. For instance, integrity of data in transit between inverters and a cloud server can be compromised by authorized third-party, devices, and internal network within security perimeter (i.e., man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack). To address this challenge, this paper proposes a blockchain-based MITM attack detection method for a PV system. A breakthrough method includes screening network data, network intrusion detection, and hash comparison of in-transit data using distributed ledgers. Furthermore, the proposed method is implemented in Internet-of-Thing (IoT) security modules as clients of a blockchain network and validated by experiments.

blockchain↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Methods for Grid-Connected Power Electronics

The present work shows a secure-by-design process, defense-in-depth method, and security techniques for a secure distributed energy resource. The distributed energy resource is a cybersecure, solar inverter and battery energy storage system prototype, collectively called the Cybersecure Power Router. Consideration is given to the use of the Smart Green Power Node for a foundation of the present work. Metrics for controller security are investigated to evaluate firmware security techniques. The prototype's ability to mitigate, respond to, and recover from firmware integrity degradation is examined. The prototype shows many working security techniques within the context of a grid-connected, distributed energy resource. Further work is expected in the Cybersecure Power Router project. Consideration is also provided for the migration of the present research and the Smart Green Power Node to realize a pre-production prototype.

Moquin, Stephen Joe↗

DOE OSTI2025

CyberMESA: Evaluation Procedures and Metrics for Charging Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A report detailing the cybersecurity evaluation and assessment procedures for EV charging infrastructure. This report is authored by three national lab contributors. INL, PNNL, NRL. The grid integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI) is a large and complex system of systems (SoS) made up of components from many manufacturers and integrated by various companies responsible for their operation and maintenance. This complexity makes it challenging to implement security standards like IEC 62443 across the entire infrastructure. This document aims to aid in the vulnerability assessments of individual devices, such as Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE), to support vendors in adopting and implementing security standards such as UL 2900, NIST SP 800-53 and Common Criteria (CC) (ISO/IEC 15408). This document serves as a guide to help evaluate the cybersecurity posture of EVCI assets. It aims to provide a consistent method for evaluating EVCI, enabling cybersecurity research teams to systematically test a wide range of electric vehicle (EV) assets. The target audiences include cybersecurity research teams, vendor development teams, automotive OEMs, and third-party evaluators.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Building a Trusted Roaming Hub [Slides]

The Trusted Roaming Hub is a U.S. Department of Energy-backed initiative led by the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to address one of the most persistent challenges in electric vehicle (EV) charging: fragmented roaming, inconsistent interoperability, and insufficient digital trust across charging networks. As EV adoption accelerates and charging infrastructure scales nationwide, today's many-to-many integration model between eMobility Service Providers (eMSPs) and Charge Point Operators (CPOs) has become increasingly brittle, costly, and difficult to secure. The Trusted Roaming Hub introduces a neutral, cybersecurity-forward "switchboard" architecture that enables standardized, secure, and scalable roaming interactions across the EV charging ecosystem. Rather than replacing existing networks or commercial relationships, the hub acts as a trusted intermediary that enforces consistent identity, authentication, authorization, and routing across participants improving reliability for drivers, lowering integration burden for industry, and creating a foundation for future grid-interactive charging services. This read-ahead provides an overview of the problem the hub is designed to solve, the core functional and security concepts behind the architecture, the value proposition to key stakeholders, and the near-term trajectory of the work.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Accelerating Next-Generation Cybersecurity R&D Using AI Workflows: BADGER Project Development

The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.

5G/6G↗

DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Certification Requirements for Distributed Energy Resources: A Survey of SunSpec Alliance Standards

This survey paper explores the cybersecurity certification requirements defined by the SunSpec Alliance for Distributed Energy Resource (DER) devices, focusing on aspects such as software updates, device communications, authentication mechanisms, device security, logging, and test procedures. The SunSpec cybersecurity standards mandate support for remote and automated software updates, secure communication protocols, stringent authentication practices, and robust logging mechanisms to ensure operational integrity. Furthermore, the paper discusses the implementation of the SAE J3072 standard using the IEEE 2030.5 protocol, emphasizing the secure interactions between electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) for functionalities like vehicle-to-grid (V2G) capabilities. This research also examines the SunSpec Modbus standard, which enhances the interoperability among DER system components, facilitating compliance with grid interconnection standards. This paper also analyzes the existing SunSpec Device Information Models, which standardize data exchange formats for DER systems across communication interfaces. Finally, this paper concludes with a detailed discussion of the energy storage cybersecurity specification and the blockchain cybersecurity requirements as proposed by SunSpec Alliance.

Tsikteris, Sean (ORCID:0009000524202250)↗

DOE OSTI2026

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Self-Assessment Guide Checklist

This Equipment Self-Assessment Checklist is designed for asset owners and operators (AOOs) responsible for the deployment, operation, maintenance, or cybersecurity oversight of grid systems and digital energy technologies. It provides a structured inspection checklist for evaluating the security, integrity, and operational trustworthiness of equipment across substations, generation sites, distributed energy resources (DERs), and control environments.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗

DOE OSTI2022

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗