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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Coordinated Optimal Control of PV Inverters and HVAC Loads in Distribution Systems

The increasing integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as photovoltaics (PVs) and smart buildings into distribution systems complicate power system operation and controls. This paper proposes a coordinated optimal control strategy for PV inverters and Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) loads in smart buildings to minimize the total network loss in a distribution system. For the HVAC units, we enforce minimum on and off time constraints to avoid frequent switching that can degrade the unit. The proposed control will dispatch optimal control signals of active and reactive power to PV inverters and on/off commands to HVAC units while maintaining the nodal voltage within a secure range and the temperature of HVAC units at a comfort level. The simulation results on a modified IEEE 33-node distribution system demonstrate that the proposed coordinated control scheme can reduce the network loss.

Pani, Naveen↗
DOE OSTI2021

Simple, Secure, Internet Delivery of MOOSE-based Applications

Application packaging and distribution are the final steps for delivering software to end-users; both are frequently neglected when creating scientific software. Commercial businesses rely on electronic distribution systems that have rendered disk drives obsolete. Still, national laboratories continue to rely heavily on removable media to distribute and limit access to controlled applications. With increasing concerns of unauthorized copying of sensitive applications, a modern distribution system that utilizes cryptographically secure communication and authentication protocols has been developed. This new distribution system will secure the chain of custody for nuclear software while simultaneously simplifying access to these tools. This report summarizes four primary advancements made toward the secure distribution of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS)-developed, Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based applications: application installation, package distribution, automated package building, and distribution of documentation. NEAMS is currently developing more than ten separate applications based on the open-source MOOSE Framework. Distribution of these applications has primarily been accomplished by distributing source code, with end-users compiling the applications themselves. This work created a mechanism where MOOSE applications can be installed in a similar way to any other software. This allows both administrators and end-users simplified access to runnable executables. With this new installation capability, it was then possible to rethink distribution. A new, secure capability for delivering MOOSE-based applications over the internet has been created. This system requires unique cryptographic tokens for authentication, greatly securing the custody chain for software. Once granted access, installation of any NEAMS code can be accomplished with these terminal commands: "conda install ncrc" "ncrc install ncrc-bison." After these two commands (and authenticating) the BISON application will be securely down- loaded from Idaho National Laboratory (INL)’s servers, installed, and ready to use. To enable this new distribution capability to be successful, the open-source Continuous Integration, Verification, Enhancement, and Testing (CIVET) Continuous Integration (CI) capability was augmented to add Continuous Delivery (CD). CD enables the automated building and packaging of MOOSE-based applications as they are modified by development teams, ensuring that our customers can obtain up-to-date versions of the software at any time. The need for instruction on how to use these applications was addressed through modifications to the MOOSE documentation system. The MooseDocs capability, which enables robust documentation of MOOSE-based applications, has been extended to allow both for the installation of documentation and the packaging of documentation with installed applications. Together, these enhancements form the core of a new, secure distribution mechanism for nuclear simulation tools. In concert with the Nuclear Computational Resource Center (NCRC), NEAMS- developed applications will now be straightforward to obtain securely.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Secure Communications Concept and API Concept for Integrating XENDEE Positronix with TESLA PowerPack System at Site 300 (Final Deliverable)

The CleanStart DERMS project focuses on the management of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) for enhanced distribution grid resilience. The demonstration site has changed from Riverside Public Utility to the LLNS Site 300 DERS demonstration site. This project has so far focused only on device level controllers and local area controllers. These controllers potentially lack the ability to perform supervisory control and grid interactive control functions, essential for grid-level optimal DER management. This project seeks to close that gap in development of secure communication concept and appropriate Application Programming Interfaces (API) to enable integration with DERs, device level and local area controllers, such as Distributed Energy Resources Management System (DERMS).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Accelerating Next-Generation Cybersecurity R&D Using AI Workflows: BADGER Project Development

The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.

5G/6G↗
DOE OSTI2021

Security assessment and impact analysis of cyberattacks in integrated T&D power systems

In this paper, we examine the impact of cyberattacks in an integrated transmission and distribution (T&D) power grid model with distributed energy resource (DER) integration. We adopt the OCTAVE Allegro methodology to identify critical system assets, enumerate potential threats, analyze and prioritize risks for threat scenarios. Based on the analysis, attack strategies and exploitation scenarios are identified which could lead to system compromise. Specifically, we investigate the impact of data integrity attacks in inverted-based solar PV controllers, control signal blocking attacks in protective switches and breakers, and coordinated monitoring and switching time-delay attacks. Index Terms—Cyberattacks, security assessment, impact analysis, case studies, integrated power systems.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Generic characterization of electrical test benches for AC- and HVDC-connected wind power plants

The electrical test and assessment of wind turbines go hand in hand with standards and network connection requirements. In this paper, the generic structure of advanced electrical test benches, including grid emulator or controllable grid interface, wind torque emulator, and device under test, is proposed to harmonize state-of-the-art test sites. On the other hand, modern wind turbines are under development towards new features, concerning grid-forming, black-start, and frequency support capabilities as well as harmonic stability and control interaction considerations, to secure the robustness and stability of renewable-energy-based power systems. Therefore, it is necessary to develop new and revised test standards and methodologies to address the new features of wind turbines. This paper proposes a generic test structure within two main groups, including open-loop and closed-loop tests. The open-loop tests include the IEC 61400-21-1 standard tests as well as the additional proposed test options for the new capabilities of wind turbines, which replicate grid connection compliance tests using open-loop references for the grid emulator. In addition, the closed-loop tests evaluate the device under test as part of a virtual wind power plant and perform real-time simulations considering the grid dynamics. The closed-loop tests concern grid connection topologies consisting of AC and HVDC, as well as different electrical characteristics, including impedance, short-circuit ratio, inertia, and background harmonics. The proposed tests can be implemented using available advanced test benches by adjusting their control systems. The characteristics of a real power system can be emulated by a grid emulator coupled with real-time digital simulator systems through a high-bandwidth power-hardware-in-the-loop interface.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cybersecurity Event Simulation Tool and Platform

Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems (ICSs) have replaced analog control systems in nuclear power plants raising cybersecurity concerns. To study and understand the cybersecurity risks of nuclear power plants both high fidelity models of the plant physics and controllers must be created, and a framework to test and evaluate cyber security events must be established. A testing and evaluation framework of cybersecurity events consists of a method of interfering with control systems, a simulation of the plant network, and a network packet capture and recording tool. Sandia National Labs (SNL) in collaboration with the University of New Mexico’s Institute for Space and Nuclear Power Studies (UNM-ISNPS) is developing such a cybersecurity testing framework.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

FIND: A Synthetic weather generator to control drought Frequency, Intensity, and Duration

Water systems worldwide are experiencing climate change-induced shifts in drought properties like frequency, intensity, and duration, affecting water security and reliability. To develop and test effective drought preparedness plans, researchers often use synthetic weather generators to create hydrological scenarios that explore drought variability beyond historical records. Existing weather generators typically allow users to adjust streamflow statistics like percentiles or temporal correlation but do not directly control drought properties of frequency, intensity, and duration. To fill this gap, we propose FIND (Frequency, INtensity, and Duration) synthetic weather generator. FIND incorporates a standardized drought index to directly and in dependently control drought frequency, intensity, and duration in generated streamflow time series while preserving observed hydrological variability. Use cases for FIND include i) water systems analysis applications that seek to train and test drought strategies under historical and plausible future drought conditions, and ii) bottom-up vulnerability studies relating system vulnerability outcomes to specific changes in drought properties of frequency, intensity, and duration. Here, we demonstrate FIND’s versatility through three experiments: replicating historically observed drought properties, generating streamflow scenarios for multiple sites preserving correlation between their drought conditions, and generating a set of scenarios with direct and independent changes in drought properties. FIND source code is openly available for applications beyond the scope of this paper.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

LDRD23-0730: Invoking Multilayer Networks to Develop a Paradigm for Security Science—Summary Report

Current approaches to securing high consequence facilities (HCF) and critical assets are linear and static and therefore struggle to adapt to emerging threats (e.g., unmanned aerial systems) and changing environmental conditions (e.g., decreasing operational control). The pace of change in technological, organizational, societal, and political dynamics necessitates a move toward codifying underlying scientific principles to better characterize the rich interactions observed between HCF security technology, infrastructure, digital assets, and human or organizational components. The promising results of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) 20-0373—“Developing a Resilient, Adaptive, and Systematic Paradigm for Security Analysis”—suggest that when compared to traditional security analysis, invoking multilayer network (MLN) modeling for HCF security system components captures unexpected failure cases and unanticipated interactions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗
DOE OSTI2020

Charting the unknown: A dive into the world of standards mapping

When you hear standards mapping what do you think about? For the Secure Software Central (SSC) project this means comparing our process to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) security control catalog. So how is it done? The project completed this summer can be broken down into three simple phases. Phase one consists of mapping the SSC process to the NIST’s security control catalog. While phase two entails mapping mitigations from a threat profile to NIST. Lastly phase three requires the creation of a knowledge base allowing for the reuse of controls across numerous projects This project presented a few different challenges: locating the correct control within the NIST catalog while correctly matching the proposed mitigations from the SSC team, accurately leveling the mitigation to the security level of the system, creating a toolbox to showcase a dataset of mitigations and standards to be used in current and future projects. each challenge allowed for opportunities in growth and understanding of how security controls can map to a governing set of standards. These standards maps are a crucial element to support the insights provided by the SSC team and allow the client to have confidence in the work being completed. My internship has allowed me to set and achieve many goals such as coming to understand that the field of cybersecurity truly is the right place for me. I have also learned that it’s ok to be wrong if you learn something from it. For significant accomplishments I have helped integrate standards mapping into the fabric of SSC. The field experience that I have gained such as interacting with the SSC team along with other senior staff and building a good rapport are crucial skills to. This time at PNNL has been an irreplaceable experience.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗
DOE OSTI2022

Privacy-preserving Information Security for the Energy Grid of Things

Smart grid infrastructure relies on information exchange between multiple actors in order to ensure system reliability. These actors include but are not limited to smart loads, grid control, and energy management technologies. Further, as information exchange between these actors is susceptible to cyber-attacks, security and privacy issues are indispensable to ensure a reliable and stable grid. This position paper proposes a privacy-preserving, trust-augmented secure scheme for a smart grid implementation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗