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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Quantum Key Distribution Applicability to Smart Grid Cybersecurity Systems

To meet the increasing demand for electricity and to have a more reliable and resilient electric grid against conventional and extreme events, grid modernization is more crucial now than ever before. This will require the development and deployment of devices that provide advanced communication capabilities. The overall efficiency, reliability, and resilience of the smart grid will be inextricably linked to the exchange of information between these devices. Unfortunately, the increased information flow will increase the potential attack surface and introduce new vulnerabilities. While a smarter grid will depend critically on information flow, these benefits will be accrued only if that information can be protected. Nowadays, information is secured in smart grids primarily through cryptography. However, with the increasing number of sophisticated attacks as well as the increasing computational power, the security of the “classical” cryptographic algorithms is threatened. Quantum information science offers solutions to this problem, specifically quantum key distribution (QKD), which provides a means for the generation and secure distribution of symmetric cryptographic keys. The security of QKD stems ultimately from the very nature of quantum physics. In this paper, we investigate the applicability of QKD to the various smart grid sectors and specific use cases. We have identified 18 smart grid use cases of interest for QKD suitability together with 7 QKD factors used for the assessment of the various use cases. For each use case, the impact to security of the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability is specified. In addition, the suitability of QKD is assessed for each use case with respect to multiple factors.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

FY 2021 Isolated Grids and Grid-Connected Turbine Reference Systems; Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL)

For individuals, businesses, and communities focused on building resilient electrical grid infrastructure, wind energy can provide an affordable, accessible, and compatible distributed energy resource option that also enhances the capabilities of local grid operations. The Microgrids, Infrastructure Resilience, and Advanced Controls Launchpad (MIRACL) project is a multi-year distributed wind research effort, driven through a partnership between four Department of Energy National Laboratories and industry to develop and improve the planning, design, and operation of wind-centered microgrids to complement solar, energy storage, and other distributed energy resources for grid-tied and isolated operation (U.S. Department of Energy, 2021). This report documents the application of methods developed through the initial three years of the MIRACL project to two real-world distributed wind reference systems. Specifically, the methods demonstrated in this report include 1) a market valuation framework to comprehensively value the services distributed wind can provide and 2) a resilience framework that enables stakeholders to characterize distribution system resilience and compare grid investment decisions from a resilience perspective. Additional methods mentioned in this report include distributed hybrid system design methods for grid resilience, advanced control co-simulation platforms, and power hardware-in-the-loop (PHIL) models. Preliminary results from these additional methods are presented in this report and will be demonstrated and/or applied to the reference systems in the coming year. The purpose of applying these methods to reference systems is to drive technology transfer of the theories, methodologies, and technologies developed under the MIRACL project and increase the number of referenceable case studies available to stakeholders interested in additional value-added capabilities of wind systems beyond bulk energy supply (i.e. kilowatt-hours).

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Accelerating Next-Generation Cybersecurity R&D Using AI Workflows: BADGER Project Development

The Broadband Automation for Distributed Grid Efficiency and Resilience (BADGER) project aligns with national strategic priorities for integrating emerging wireless technologies and advancing AI-driven security. As critical infrastructure modernizes toward increasingly software-defined and interconnected systems, the ability to leverage 5G/NextG networks and AI-enabled control becomes essential. This report outlines work at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to develop a NextG-native security architecture powered by AI-RAN concepts and evaluate workflows that enable efficient and reliable architectures. Together, these efforts position the laboratory to accelerate innovation while directly supporting national security and resilience objectives.

5G/6G↗
DOE OSTI2023

Adaptive Cyber-Physical Resilience for Building Control Systems

The main goal of the project is to develop an AI-based process layer cybersecurity suite for detection, isolation and mitigation of cyber-attack effects on operation of building energy management systems (BEMS). The following constituent key technologies were developed under the program towards fulfilling the program objectives: (1) developed a high fidelity BEMS testbed for generation of training data and validation of developed technologies; (2) developed a physics informed ML based attack detection and localization module (ADL) capable of detecting high impact stealthy attacks (HISA - attacks causing 30% energy utilization but no immediate visible impact otherwise) with 98% accuracy; (3) developed a methodology to determine ’representative days’ to limit the data required for training; (4) developed a virtual sensing system that can reconstruct affected sensors with 10% error for the same HISA set; (5) developed a resilient model predictive control system that can continue operation of the BEMS without jeopardizing stability for the HISA set; and (6) integrated and deployed all the constituent modules and demonstrated the efficacy of the technology in real-time in a hardware in loop simulation.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Enabling Secure and Resilient XFC: A Software/Hardware-Security Co-Design Approach

Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Scalable, Physical Effects Measureable Microgridfor Cyber Resilience Analysis

SPEMMCRA provides a low-cost simulated method to provide for testing of control theory and cybersecurity approaches to microgrid implementations. Specifically, this physics-based approach provides realistic responses to compare control strategies in simulation, but also to demonstrate actions that can or cannot be taken in taking cybersecurity actions . As communications interfaces or other actions are taken that affect the flow of data, SPEMMCRA can show whether the microgrid operation is adversely affected by what is intended to mitigate a cybersecurity event.

Rieger, CraigG↗
DOE OSTI2022

Synchrophasors-based Master State Awareness Estimator for Cybersecurity in Power Grid: Testbed Implementation & Field Demonstration

The integration of distributed energy resources(DERs) and expansion of complex network in the distribution grid requires an advanced distributed state estimator to monitor the grid health at micro-level. The distribution state estimator will improve the situational awareness and resiliency of distributed power system. This paper proposes a synchrophasors-based master state awareness (MSA) estimator to enhance the cybersecurity in distribution grid by providing a real-time estimation of system operating states to control center operators. In this paper, the proposed MSA estimator utilizes only phasor measurements, bus magnitudes and angles, from phasor measurement units (PMUs),deployed in local substations, to estimate the system states and also detects data integrity attacks, such as load tripping attack that disconnects the load. To validate the proof of concept, we implement the proposed methodology in cyber-physical testbed environment at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Electric Grid Security Testbed. Further, to address the “valley of death” and support technology commercialization, field demonstration is also performed at the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex(CITRC) at the INL. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting load tripping attack and providing an accurate situational awareness through an alert visualization dashboard in real-time

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Intern Deliverable Poster 2025

An Incident Response Plan (IRP) is a document that is created and maintained by an organization that provides guidance in the event of a cyber incident. The primary objectives of an IRP are to aid in the detection, response, and recovery from incidents, as well as to enhance preparation and preventative measures. An IRP should outline specific procedures at each stage of an incident, with the goal of minimizing asset damage, data leakage, and operational impact. By investing in a well-defined IRP, organizations can better manage and mitigate risks associated with cyber threats, ensuring business continuity and resilience. This poster summarizes incident response guidelines for wind energy, which faces unique cybersecurity and physical challenges.

17 - WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience?

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. In surveying the current state-of-the-art across different but interconnected topics, we illustrate how aggregators can be power system participants that enhance grid security. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗
DOE OSTI2020

Real-Time Federated Cyber-Transmission-Distribution Testbed Architecture for the Resiliency Analysis

With the ongoing automation driven by the push toward the smart electric grid and the advancement in associated cyber infrastructure, the interaction between physical [electric transmission and distribution (T&D) systems], cyber (communication, automation, and control), and human (grid operators and decision-makers) is increasingly becoming more complex. This creates the requirement of analyzing the effect of the transmission system on the distribution system and vice versa with consideration of the additional complexity of the cyber infrastructure. Such an integrated testbed will also help with resiliency analysis, where resiliency refers to the ability of the system to continue serving energy to the critical loads even with limited extreme contingencies. Interaction of the physical power grid with the cyber layer can be effectively modeled using real-time (RT) simulator for developing and validating various operational and control algorithms. Testbeds using RT simulators with multiple capabilities have been developed at different institutions. Still, no single existing testbed can offer full scalability while simultaneously meeting high fidelity requirements for resiliency experimentation. Co-simulating federated testbed assets can provide a scalable experimentation platform that can be leveraged for verification and validation. In this article, an architecture is developed for federated cyber-physical testbed. A local federation with two real-time simulators is developed: real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and OPAL-RT have been interfaced using VILLAS framework for end-to-end testing. Also, a real-time linear predictor is developed and integrated here to address the communication latency impact on geographically allocated federated RT simulation. Finally, resiliency analysis tools are formulated and utilized for T&D systems. Finally as an illustrative use case, the resiliency of a T&D test system is simulated, and the results are analyzed. A 179-bus Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) transmission system is developed using OPAL-RT/ HYPERSIM, and a modified IEEE 13 node feeder system is modeled in RTDS/RSCAD and interfaced for resiliency analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Resilience Framework for Electric Energy Delivery Systems (R.1)

The intent of this document is to provide a Resilience Framework for electrical energy delivery systems which can be applied to Distributed Wind. However, the framework is not limited by application to any resource or system. This framework represents the defined steps to a cyclical process similar in mechanism to both cybersecurity and risk frameworks, while providing a common set of language and process for all stakeholders involved. The need for this Resilience Framework was established in a previous document, “Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems.” One important characteristic we see in resilience is the unique needs and perspectives of different systems, geographies, resources, stakeholders, perceived risks, and consequences, which we term the distinctiveness property. This distinctiveness property drives the requirement to have a resilience framework or methodology that can be implemented by different types of organizations and systems. The process or methodology should be cyclic. Recognizing that a system’s resilience is based on finite resources and time, it must continually evolve through this framework’s risk management and capital investment steps at an appropriate pace for its distinctiveness property.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Equipment Assessment Guide: A Technical Inspection and Hardening Guide for Devices in Power Grid Operations

This Equipment Assessment Guide, developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides a comprehensive framework designed to enhance the security of operational technology (OT) devices within power grid operations. The guide outlines essential steps for asset owners to conduct technical inspections and harden vulnerable hardware and firmware components commonly found in embedded systems. It focuses on components frequently targeted by cyber threats, offering valuable identification techniques for locating and recognizing critical components on devices. Additionally, the guide presents recommended secure configurations aimed at minimizing exposure and reinforcing defenses, along with impact analysis that highlights the potential consequences for grid operations if components are compromised. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this guide, asset owners can significantly enhance their cybersecurity posture, reduce the attack surface of field-deployed devices, and improve the resilience of grid services against emerging cyber threats.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity and Distributed Energy Resources

This fact sheet addresses cybersecurity for distributed energy resources (DERs) and identifies best practices in cybersecurity governance, technical management of cyber-physical systems, and physical security.

cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2022

The NREL Cyber Range

With the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) cyber range, researchers can replicate cybersecurity scenarios as they would occur on real, complex energy systems. With supercomputing and advanced emulation capabilities, the cyber range allows users to build digital twins of real systems and connect the emulated environment to actual physical devices throughout NREL's laboratories. The space offers unlimited potential to test the frontier of energy systems security.

cyber range↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hydropower Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework

Hydropower remains one of the strongest forms of renewable energy generation methods. It is crucial to address the increasing risks associated with the rapid digitization. The push towards decarbonization also factors in the need to ensure security and resilience for grid-connected renewable energy resources. This report summarizes the U.S. Department of Energy's Water Power Technologies Office's effort to develop a cybersecurity valuation methodology that assists hydropower stakeholders in assessing risks associated with plan operations and gathers valuation guidance through a web-based application. The Hydropower Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework delivers a platform for industry members to perform self-assessments and make informed decisions on their cybersecurity investments.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework

Hydropower remains one of the strongest forms of renewable energy generation methods. It is crucial to address the increasing risks associated with the rapid digitization. The push towards decarbonization also factors in the need to ensure security and resilience for grid-connected renewable energy resources. This report summarizes the U.S. Department of Energy's Water Power Technologies Office's effort to develop a cybersecurity valuation methodology that assists hydropower stakeholders in assessing risks associated with plan operations and gathers valuation guidance through a web-based applicaiton. The Hydropower Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework delivers a platform for industry members to perform self assessments and make informed decisions on their cybersecurity investments.

CVF↗